DANKOVICH S.P. Military and Strategical Situation at the Southern Front by the Beginning of the Tuapse Defensive Operation

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2015.4.4  

Sergey Pavlovich Dankovich

Retired Major General

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Abstract. When planning for a 1942 campaign the Soviet General Staff anticipated the main German blow on Moscow as it was in 1941. So it was in the Moscow direction where the main Red Army forces were concentrated. Besides, the Soviet Command overestimated combat capability of the Red Army and underestimated the Wehrmacht force. On the basis of those false assumptions the Soviet Command planned a series of offensive operations in 1942. The battles at the southern section of the Eastern Front in spring and summer of 1942 demonstrate the total superiority of the German forces over the Red Army. In the course of these battles the Red Army was defeated at Kharkov, and after that the Wehrmacht started an offensive on the Caucasus and Stalingrad. It used the advantages in mobility, coordination, efficiency under the conditions of steppe landscape. The Soviet troops were forced to retreat and could only stop at the approaches to the Caucasus and to Tuapse. The defense of Tuapse was a priority for the Soviet Command, so large forces were concentrated in the region. The Germans could not capture Tuapse and had to wage protracted battles.

Key words: Great Patriotic War, spring and summer of 1942, retreat of Soviet troops, defense of Tuapse, Southern Front.

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Military and Strategical Situation at the Southern Front by the Beginning of the Tuapse Defensive Operation by Dankovich S.P. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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