IVANYUK S.A. Pomeranian Campaign (1712–1713): Reconnaissance and Sabotage Activities of the Russian Army

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2024.3.1

Sergey A. Ivanyuk,

Candidate of Sciences (History),

Director, Central Museum of Communications named after A.S. Popov,

Pochtamtsky Lane, 4, 190000 Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation,

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. ,

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3097-9307

Abstract. Introduction. During the Great Northern War, the Russian army conducted many military campaigns in various theaters of combat operations. Many research papers have been devoted to the study of these events, but the events in Northern Germany (1712–1713) were not sufficiently disclosed. The article, with the involvement of sources on the history of the so-called “Pomeranian campaign,” including those not yet introduced into scientific circulation, reveals the features of conducting intelligence and sabotage activities of the army of Peter I in the conditions of a small war.

Мaterials. The research is based on both published documents and those stored in archives, which allow us to restore the chronology of events and the methods of conducting intelligence and sabotage activities of the Petrovsky troops.

Analysis. A comparison of the documentary evidence of the participants of the Pomeranian campaign, as well as research by Danish military historians, made it possible to determine the main methods of conducting reconnaissance and sabotage activities of Peter I’s troops in this theater of operations and to build a chronology of the events of the period 1712–1713, as well as the place and role of tactical intelligence assessment in the overall course of the campaign.

Results. Despite the conditionally zero result of the Russian army, it was possible to achieve several significant results in Pomerania, in which the reconnaissance and sabotage activities of its troops played an important role, with the ability to expect the actions of the enemy and to stop threats from his side.

Key words: Peter I, Great Northern War, Pomerania, intelligence assessment, small war.

Citation. Ivanyuk S.A. Pomeranian Campaign (1712–1713): Reconnaissance and Sabotage Activities of the Russian Army. Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya 4. Istoriya. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [Science Journal of Volgograd State University. History. Area Studies. International Relations], 2024, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 6-15. (in Russian). DOI: https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2024.3.1.

Pomeranian Campaign (1712–1713): Reconnaissance and Sabotage Activities of the Russian Army by Ivanyuk S.A. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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