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## RUSSIA-UKRAINE MILITARY CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCES ON KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

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**Abstract. Introduction.** This article, empirically and theoretically, analyses to what extent the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI), as a far-away non-state actor, has been affected by the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. **Analysis.** The theory of globalisation highlights that under this circle, a number of sectors in the Kurdistan region, for instance, energy, economy, migration, individual psychology and education, have been profoundly influenced. The article further points out that both direct war-involved actors globally have been heavily relied on, in light of some basic human needs, simultaneously recognises both states as either developed or supported by developed countries as well as rich in various resources, in particular the state of Russia; thereby, they could easily leave significant influence on any actors anywhere at any time. **Results.** Eventually, the article points to some suggestions on how the KRI can rationally cope with the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict.

**Key words:** Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, Kurdistan region of Iraq, globalization, state dependence, energy, migration.

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## РОССИЙСКО-УКРАИНСКИЙ ВОЕННЫЙ КОНФЛИКТ И ЕГО ВЛИЯНИЕ НА ИРАКСКИЙ КУРДИСТАН

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**Аннотация. Введение.** В данной статье эмпирически и теоретически анализируется, в какой степени Курдистанский регион (КРИ) – как далеко расположенный негосударственный субъект – пострадал от российско-украинского военного конфликта. **Анализ.** В рамках теории глобализации анализируются ряд секторов КРИ, например, энергетика, экономика, миграция, индивидуальная психология и образование, как центральные сферы, которые подверглись глубокому влиянию. В статье указывается на то, что оба непосредственных участника войны во всем мире в значительной степени опирались на некоторые базовые человеческие потребности, одновременно признавая оба государства либо развитыми, либо поддерживаемыми развитыми странами, а также богатыми различными ресурсами, в частности, государства Россия, тем самым они могли легко оказывать значительное влияние на любых акторов где угодно и когда угодно. **Результаты.** В конечном итоге в статье указываются некоторые предположения о том, как КРИ может рационально справиться с последствиями российско-украинского военного конфликта.

**Ключевые слова:** российско-украинский военный конфликт, Иракский Курдистан, глобализация, государственная зависимость, энергетика, миграция.

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**Introduction.** Wherever war takes place, there is no doubt the directly involved actors will be the most vulnerable. Here in this article, we would like to point to the other actors (indirectly involved actors – the third actors) and categorise them based on the idea of who will be the most affected, having sort of understood that geographically, who is closer has been most affected. But this does not mean that the distant state can remain safe and avoid crises. This view has been very likely from a historical point of view, since communities in the past did not live as developed as they do today and did not have the same advanced tools as they do today. Contrary to today, in the age of globalisation and state dependence, crises (especially wars between states) have become very complex. The direct involved actors, based on realist scholars of thought, have widely attempted to expand their security and distribution of relative power capabilities, as well as bring in the third actors for their own interests, no matter where these actors are located. Sometimes the third actor even has nothing to do with the crisis that occurred but ends up being directly affected by it. The impact of interstate warfare on other actors in the world stays much greater when the states directly involved in the war are counted as developed and superpower states or assisted by superpowers. The Russian and Ukrainian conflict has been counted as one of the most effective crises in the

21<sup>st</sup> century and has deeply affected all actors around the world. Day after day, these war consequences become more and more apparent as well as effective, especially when both states directly involved in conflict have been heavily relied on by the world states for different levels (e.g., agriculture, energy, etc.), especially the state of Russia, which is one of the most powerful, developed, and rich countries in the world and can easily have a significant impact on any actor around the world at any time. This article focuses on explaining to what extent the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has affected the Kurdistan region of Iraq. However, the distance between the capital cities of Kiev, Ukraine (the central point of conflict) and the Erbil, Kurdistan region of Iraq, is 1918 km, but the Kurdistan region would not be able to keep itself far from the effects of the Russian-Ukraine war (see Fig. 1).

This article is divided into the following segments: firstly, theoretical reaching the subject of study, and pointing out that both school of thought realism as well as dependency have been able to clearly analysis, how the conflict leave significant impact on the other; secondly, turning the article to practical point of view and directly points to the economic consequences on Kurdistan region in particular, the conflict leaves significant effect on oil and other agriculture products; thirdly, the article explains, how Iraq including Kurdistan have been drawn to be involved in the crisis as third or even

### Distance Map Between Kiev and Erbil

Kiev, Ukraine ↔ Erbil, Iraq = 1192 miles = 1918 km.




Fig. 1. Distance map between Kiev, Ukraine, and Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq

Note. Source: <https://www.distancecalculator.net/from-kiev-to-erbil>

forth party; fourthly, it analyses that the Russian and Ukrainian conflict leaves significant impact on Kurdistan region in terms of humanitarian toll (psychology and education); and concluding the article and rising some suggestion points.

**Theoretical approaching.** The Ukrainian-Russian conflict is described as one of the most effective events in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The consequences of this conflict have reached such a level that, at the end, it has led to the division of the world into two opposing fronts, even allowed them to stand against each other at certain levels, and prompted many states, either directly or indirectly, to take part, or at least to give support to one side of the directly involved actors [22]. Eventually, the conflict brings the world to feel unsafe, and even some believe that “the 3<sup>rd</sup> world war is on the way”. This has left a deep influence on all sectors of human life in terms of economy, transportation, immigration, education, security, etc. [6].

Turning the article to a theoretical approach might help us better understand the subject of our study. When we talk about the interstate conflict and its impact on other actors around the world, we should directly jump to knock on the door of the school of thought “globalisation.” The literature in the circle of the theory of globalisation and conflict is extensive; however, in this article, two arguments lead to further debate: realism and dependency.

In classical realism, it is posited that states, particularly the great powers, are the most essential and influential actors in “the anarchic structure of the international political system”. States are usually concerned about their security and the distribution of relative power capabilities [24] in “the inherently hostile environment of international relations”. Indeed, in this regard, the realists are deeply passionate about the state and ignore other actors (in particular non-state actors) [27, p. 1303]. But the Neorealist theorists, such as Waltz, start with a new evolution and bring up non-state actors within the parameters of realism, recognising the importance of non-state actors in parallel with states. Consequently, such actors, together with states, set the scene for the international agenda [40, p. 129]. Waltz further goes on to say that it is true that states are the chief agents, but other actors are directing states – and vice versa – to create places and spaces to share their positions.

It was becoming quite clear from the very essential point of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that both, in particular Russia, have been very worried about its security. In this regard and based on structural realism, the great power, to reach its security target, always seeks to dominate its neighbourhood [40]. This has led to a core point of conflict between Russia and Ukraine. And both Russia and Ukraine, to achieve their dreams around security, have tried to use different strategies as well as heavily rely on the role of other actors around the world, including non-state actors. As J.P. Mulford mentioned, in this new age of warfare, non-state actors play a larger role than ever before [15]. And simultaneously, if non-state actors play a crucial role in today’s global arena, then we cannot close our eyes to the reality that non-state actors can safely avoid the sparks of global events. To follow this idea, analysing the situation of the Kurdistan region under the influence of Russian and Ukrainian conflict is the best example. In the upcoming section, this will be further explained.

According to classical realism, politics is the primary cause of conflict, rather than any other factors. But, undoubtedly, in the age of globalization, aside of politics, the other factors will be actively involved in conflict, and therefore all this together will have a significant impact on the States directly involved in the conflict, as well as on other actors around the world. Under this understanding, we can highlight two further schools of thought about the influences of war: “the war renewal” and “the ruins of war.” On one hand, the “war renewal”, which is in line with Keynesian economic theory, contends that war can have positive effects because the war weakens the impact of powerful special interests, “fosters innovation, and boosts economic efficiency by increasing human capital.” Koubi looked at the influence of armed conflicts between countries on the growth of the economies of big states between 1960 and 1989 [25]. According to his study, “war’s features and incidence are causally connected to the differences in economic growth across nations”. On the other hand, the “ruins of war” view war as a catastrophic event with no economic benefit [19]. Within this regard, Chassang and Miquel pointed out that poor nations, either directly (un)involved in war or located far or close to where the war takes place,

are more likely to suffer from interstate war, “especially when poor countries are suffering from negative income shocks” [17]. It has become quite clear how the poor countries in East Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia have been deeply affected by the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

As it is clear, both Russia and Ukraine are very wealthy with some products. In particular, the state of Russia, a part of its superpower, has a strong comparative trade advantage in several commodities such as oil, coal, wheat, sunflower seeds, fertiliser and some other products. Russia is also counted as the 14<sup>th</sup> largest world economy by goods exported. It exports \$337 billion worth of goods [8]. This leads to the fact that a great number of global countries (e.g., countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and South America) are heavily dependent on both Russia and Ukraine. These countries, consequently, are going to be particularly impacted by the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

This idea has brought us to the circle of states-dependency within the frame of the “economic globalisation” school of thought, as Dos Santos analysed, “a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected” [14, p. 231]. This theory further highlights that the states in the circle of dependency bring the “periphery” as well as “underdeveloped” nations to be stayed and faced even more difficult. This has been quite observable during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. States that are dependent on Russia as well as Ukraine, like Belarus, Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, the Maldives, Montenegro and Uzbekistan, are the most vulnerable [10], and other countries like Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Georgia, East Africa and European countries have been even worse affected. There is no doubt that the other nations and in particular the non-state actors, have not survived the impact of this war. The Kurdistan region of Iraq as a non-state actor is another example that has been greatly impacted on different levels. In the next sections, the case of the Kurdistan region will be further put under discussion.

**Kurdistan region and the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.** As aforementioned above, the directly involved actors in the conflict are the most vulnerable, but the other actors

around (in particular, undeveloped actors) could not be safely survived. From a practical point of view, Iraq is considered a non-developed country and a heavy importer, as well as highly dependent on others to fulfil its internal requirements. The Kurdistan region, as a non-state actor, is located in the north of Iraq, and it is considered that the Kurdistan region is one of the actors who has been in some way or another greatly impacted by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

**Economy.** Directly, turning to the economic point of view, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, global oil prices soared to more than \$120 per barrel “amid concerns about a shortfall in global supplies from Russia” [33]. This is, in one way, highly impacted on the Kurdistan region of Iraq and the other states in the area since the Kurdistan region highly relies on oil for collecting its budget and infrastructure. Before the beginning of Russian operations in Ukraine, in 2020, the price of oil was about 41.96 dollars [4] (see Fig. 2). As the Kurdistan region of Iraq is not a sovereign state, there are some limits for the Kurdistan region to sell its own energy independently, which is why it sold its energy at lower prices than the others in the world market. According to the Kurdistan region government, the average price of Kurdistan oil in 2020 was 28.1 dollars per barrel, with the gross value of crude oil sold via pipelines standing at 4,443,842,235 dollars [9]. However, with the early start of Russia’s military operation against Ukraine in January 2022, the average price of oil sold by the Kurdistan Region was 86.730 dollars per barrel [20].

In this regard, the Russian-Ukraine conflict, based on the school of thought of the “war renewal”, has positively affected the life situation of each person in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, as well as leaving some gains for the government in terms of the Kurdistan region’s infrastructure. Even before the conflict began, during the oil crisis of 2016–2022, the Kurdistan Region was unable to provide enough budget for the salaries of its employees. And it followed a salary-saved strategy. It was basically about to cut some amount from each employee’s salary. This came to an end when the Kurdistan region felt that the price of oil gradually increased, and eventually, the Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister declared that “we will distribute

### Average annual Brent crude oil price from 1976 to 2022 (in U.S. dollars per barrel)




Fig. 2. The oil price from 1976 to 2022

Note. Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/262860/uk-brent-crude-oil-price-changes-since-1976/>

salaries of the Kurdistan [region’s] people without cuts...” [30].

Meanwhile, another impact of the war is reflected in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). According to the Kurdistan Region Government website, the price of food and other daily life services has recently dramatically increased in the Kurdistan region. Indeed, in the age of globalisation based on the theory of dependency, since the state of Iraq, including the Kurdistan region, relies heavily on imported products to meet its local

needs, any event as well as any change that takes place around the world would have directly affected Iraq and Kurdistan as well. If we just take the annual inflation rate for the last two years (2021 and 2022) as an example, then it becomes quite clear how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has impacted the cost of life in the Kurdistan Region. The CPI recorded 113.69 in the Kurdistan Region for December 2022, where it shows an annual increase of 6.5% compared to December 2021 (106.70) [29] (Fig. 3).




Fig. 3. The CPI annual increase

Note. Source: <https://krso.gov.krd/content/upload/1/root/cpi-report-for-dec-2022.docx.pdf>



The CPI annual increase is due to an increase in the prices of the following sections:

1. Restaurants by 13.7%,
2. Transportation by 9.8%,
3. Recreation and Culture by 8.2%,
4. House Supplies, Appliances and Maintenance by 7.9%,
5. Food and non-alcoholic beverages by 7.3%,
6. Housing (housing rental, water, electricity and LPG) by 5.8%,
7. Misc. Services and Goods by 5.5%,
8. Education by 4%.

**Involvement in conflict as a third actor.**

Since the beginning of the crisis, Western states (in particular, NATO) – under classical realism – have been very concerned about their security situation as well as the distribution of the relative power capabilities of Russia; thereby, they have shown considerable sympathy for Ukraine. At the same time, they reacted and imposed tough sanctions against Russia, and among them, the United States has taken further steps even against those countries that have dealt with Russia, for example, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It seems that Iran did not take these US assessments seriously, which is why in 2021 Iran signed a long-term agreement with both US-unfriendly states, China, and extended its long-term agreement with Russia [21]. Later, starting with the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Iran further expanded its relations with Russia and provided Russia with a number of weapons, especially drones, which greatly upset the United States. In this regard, to end this situation, the US has followed some strategies against the state of Iran. For instance, while the Biden administration embarked on a broad effort to halt Iran's ability to produce and deliver drones to Russia, the US also, as previously stated, made an endeavour that has echoes of its year's long programme to cut off Tehran's access to nuclear technology [39].

As part of its strategy against Iran, the USA put the pressure on countries, such as Iraq, that, in one way or another, provided or dealt with Iran, in particular, from an economic point of view. This strategy against Iran was not new; during the Donald Trump administration, it reached its peak. And even President Donald Trump has "warned that countries doing business with Iran will 'NOT

be doing business with the United States' as his administration reimposed sanctions on Iran" [36].

But it would not be easy for Iraq to digest this, as it has direct contacts with Iran in various security, social, religious, political and economic fields. Since the 2003 invasion, Iran's primacy in Iraq has remained mostly at its peak. Iran has managed to exert great control over various sectors, in particular the Iraqi economy [32]. And as Iraq became Iran's most important trading partner, the volume of annual trade exchange between both states dramatically increased. Even though both states have reached a number of free trade agreements, the last agreement was signed in 2014 [11]. For example, Iran's non-oil exports to Iraq in 2008 amounted to about 2.8 billion dollars, and in 2019, this amount reached 9 billion dollars [35]. And according to Ihsan al-Shammari, a political scientist at the University of Baghdad, "that Iraq has become an 'economic lifeline' for Iran" [2] (see Fig. 4).

Further, Iraq has been heavily depending on Iranian gas for electricity production, within this regard, according to a spokesman of the Ministry of Electricity-Iraq, Iraq imports 50 to 70 million cubic metres of gas from Iran [29]. In this regard, especially during the Donald Trump administration, all countries dealing with Iran were strongly warned. But with all the above-mentioned intercourse between both states, and in particular, Iraq, it is quite difficult to be directly and easily persuaded, as well as to be stopped from dealing with Iran. On the other hand, the Trump administration took into account the situation in Iraq and made it easier for Iraq to deal with Iran only under limited circumstances.

When Biden came to power, both the Iraqi and Iranian administrations built too much optimism on him, believing that he could in some way or even significantly ease relations between Iran and Iraq and remove the tough Trump measure against Iran. But this optimism did not last long. America found out that Iran supported Russia in the fight for Ukraine and relied heavily on smuggling American dollars from Iraq (including the Kurdistan region). America was deeply convinced that Iran was using this money, as well as its good relationship with Iraq, to create its weapons. Therefore, the US took some measures against Iraq in order to be able to control its borders and limit Iran from smuggling American dollars from Iraq.



Fig. 4. The role of Iran in Iraq

Note. Sources: <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/10/20141017476934755.html>

Hence, in this regard, the USA has put significant economic pressure on Iraq, and this has led to the fact that the Iraqi currency (dinar) has lost almost 20 percent of its value in 2023. As a result, this led to a sharp increase in prices for almost all products in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. So, according to the Rudaw report, flour, rice, legumes, tea, and cooking oil are among the goods whose prices have increased dramatically [38].

**Migration.** On the other hand, a number of Kurds – in particular, youths – were dissatisfied with their living conditions, considering that they did not have such a chance to meet all the basic life necessities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, so they tried to leave their home country and migrated to Europe. “According to Ari Jalal, head of the Sulaymaniyah-based Summit Foundation for Refugees and Displaced Affairs, at least 40,000 Iraqis have left the country” [18] since the beginning of 2021 until December 2021, 70 percent of whom came from the Kurdistan region. Throughout history, people have testified to different routes to migrate to Europe, either via sea or land. For example, just in the year 2015, around 972,551 people travelled via sea and 43,000 by land. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), people have mainly entered Europe via six EU nations: Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, Spain, Malta and Cyprus (see Fig. 5).

But later, in 2020, Iraqi migrants changed their way and headed via Belarus to Europe (see Fig. 6); in particular, in 2020, the tension between Belarus and Europe reached a higher level. And in May 2021, Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, very strongly reacted to Europe and allowed migrants to flood into Western Europe by no longer taking action to prevent illegal crossings [5]. Just in October 2021, there were around 11,300 attempts to illegally enter the state of Poland from Belarus [37].

It seemed that the state of Belarus, with the assistance of Russia, used migrants as “political weapons” and the European Union named migrants as “hybrid attacks”, with the aim of making pressure on Europe [28].

With the intensification of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the situation of Kurdish immigrants has become even more difficult. This is due to the fact that those who have already reached Belarus and tried to cross the border could neither cross the border (since Europe has completely closed all its borders in the direction of Belarus) nor be further able to stay in Belarus because “the life situation at the borders became critical during the winter, with hundreds of people stranded for weeks in freezing conditions” [12] and even 24 people died. And recently, in 2023, even the state of Belarus adhered to a new strategy regarding immigrants because




Fig. 5. Migration to Europe

Note. Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35158769>




Fig. 6. The migration route from Iraq to Belarus into the EU

Note. Source: <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/36063/the-route-from-iraq-to-belarus-how-are-migrants-getting-to-europe>

it understood that immigration weapons are not as effective as before against Europe; thereby, Belarus followed a policy of either putting migrants in prison or deporting them to Kurdistan [3].

**Psychology.** Another impact of the Russian-Ukraine conflict is related to individual psychological situations. With the early start of the war, almost all the Kurdish media in the Iraqi Kurdistan region started to heavily talk about the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, and even this event became the most mainstream of all watchable channels. Some are thinking that this is a Western political strategy that, through constant media broadcasting of the Ukraine and Russia crises, will be able to draw international voices against Russia [41].

According to the BBC report for 2023, “television (in the Kurdistan region) is the main medium for news” [41]. A survey conducted by Gallup on the media status in the Kurdistan region found that “more than nine in ten (92.1%) adults say they watch TV news at least weekly” [34]. The most popular watchable channels in the Kurdistan region – namely, Rudaw, Kurdistan 24, NRT, Kurdsat, Kurdistan TV, Payam TV, Speda TV and KNN – very heavily started to broadcast the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. Consequently, they attracted everyone’s attention and largely affected almost everyone, especially children. Since the Iraqis, including Kurds, have had a very bad experience of war in 1990, 2003 and 2014, and that about 13 million children were directly affected



just during the 2003 Iraq war [7], it is also according to both Murthy and Lakshminarayana, who have done very fruitful research and come to the conclusion that war as well as the TV programmes to endure mainstream violence will cause a “definite increase in the incidence and prevalence of mental disorders” among Iraqi civilians, including Kurdistan [26]. They also refer to some recent quotations from the media that depict the direct impact of war on mental health: “We are living in a state of constant fear” (in Iraq, including the Kurdistan region); “War takes a toll on Iraqi mental health”; “War trauma leaves a physical mark”; “War is hell... it has an impact on the people who take part that never heals”; “War is terrible and beyond the understanding and experience of most people”; “A generation has grown up knowing only war” [13]. This brings us to the conclusion that the broadcast of such programmes on television for a long time – even some TV channels have devoted almost all programmes to showing the war in Ukraine and Russia – will undoubtedly have a very bad effect on everyone, in particular children [16]. And according to a study that took a survey among 45 Kurdish families regarding the impact of world conflicts on mental Kurdish health, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was present in 87% of children and 60% of their carers’ [1].

**Education.** Beyond all the above impacts, the Ukraine-Russian conflict has also affected the situation of Kurdish students who are studying either in Ukraine or in Russia. Students from the Kurdistan region eagerly followed degrees at European and Russian universities before the beginning of the Russian operation; some 200 students studied in Ukraine [23] and another great number studied in Russia. The Kurdistan region government/ministry of higher education made a quick decision regarding the students studied in Ukraine; upon their return, they would be able to continue their studies at the Iraqi Kurdistan universities. But when it comes to the Iraqi Kurdish students in Russia, there are still some difficulties that, until the writing of this article, have not been solved. The Western countries imposed heavy sanctions on Russia and allowed the rest of the states to have very limited relations with Russia. This has left a very negative consequence on Kurdish students since they cannot, or in a very difficult way, receive their needs from their

families. I even personally met a number of them who have faced significant difficulties regarding transferring money and other necessities from Iraq to Russia.

**Conclusion and discussion.** This article analyses how the latest and most serious 21<sup>st</sup> century war (the Ukrainian-Russian conflict) affected every actor around the world, including non-state actors (Kurdistan region of Iraq). Nevertheless, it is clear that the Kurdistan Region is geographically far from the field of the war and even though the Kurdistan region did not have direct or indirect asides from Russia or Ukraine, undoubtedly the conflict left significant consequences for the Kurdistan region. Therefore, choosing the KRI as a case study lets our article be unique, as far as the KRI has nothing to do with this conflict but can’t be safely sustained from its sparks.

In this regard, this study, based on the globalisation school of thought, reached the reality that any actor (states or non-state actors) in any place around the world could not have a chance to keep itself safe from conflict-sparks, in particular undeveloped countries. The article points to “the war renewal” and “the ruins of war.” The thought of “war renewal” evaluated the case of the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Within this, the article points to the oil and gas prices. Since the war just began, energy prices have been rising significantly, simultaneously, the Kurdistan region has heavily relied on oil sales to replenish the infrastructure of its borders, and that has had a strongly positive consequence for the Kurdistan region. Another impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war is related to the price of products, which remarkably increased during the war in the Kurdistan region. This is examined under the school of dependency thought within the circle of economic globalisation, since the state of Iraq (including the Kurdistan region) has heavily relied on importing products to meet its local needs. Ultimately, this has had significant impacts on the price of all products in Iraq, pointing to the fact that the consumer price index in the Kurdistan region in 2022 reached 113.69 as an example, which was a relatively high level from 2003. In addition to all the above-mentioned direct consequences, there is still some indirect impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the Kurdistan region. Explaining that the war divided all the states of the world to either support Russia or

side with Ukraine; even the conflict intensified more and led to the direct involvement of a third actor, in this regard, we pointed to the state of Iran, which provided some military support to Russia against Ukraine. This has allowed the Western countries (in particular the USA and NATO) to impose sanctions against Iran as well as against those countries that could provide assistance to Iran and deal with it. In this regard, Iraq comes to the fore, including the Kurdistan region, which since 2003 has had many interests with Iran, very specifically in economics and military. Kurdish individual psychology, as well as the education sector, were two other sectors in the Kurdistan region that have not survived the negative impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The best suggestion here for the Kurdistan region to at least mitigate the negative effects of the war is that the Kurdistan region should distance itself in any way from showing support and/or from providing affection to either side. This suggestion is based on the idea that both the United States, the Ukrainian's main supporter in the conflict, and Russia [31] have broad interests as well as deep strategy in the Kurdistan region; therefore, in any movement of the Kurdistan region towards any side (Russia or Ukraine), of course the opposing state creates a major obstacle in front of Kurdistan and that leaves a significant negative impact on it. Simultaneously, the Kurdistan region even should think very deeply about avoiding being either a third or fourth party in support of the war, because both direct actors involved in the conflict are developed countries or are supported by developed countries; thereby, in any case, they are able to find out and create problems for the Kurdistan region. The Kurdistan region also needs and has to deal with this situation carefully, and while Kurdistan is quite sure that it, as a non-state actor, has no influence on the war, that is why it has only to think about how it has been able to deal rationally with the consequences of the Ukrainian-Russian war.

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