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**RUSSIAN DIGITAL DIPLOMACY TOWARDS CHINA  
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION  
IN UKRAINE: THE INSTANCE OF THE OFFICIAL WEIBO ACCOUNT  
OF THE EMBASSY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN CHINA <sup>1</sup>**

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**Abstract.** *Introduction.* Digital diplomacy based on cutting-edge information and communication technologies is playing an increasingly major role and is gradually becoming an important tool in boosting traditional public diplomacy by providing information and public opinion support for the implementation of the country's foreign policy abroad. The Embassy of the Russian Federation in China has been actively engaged in digital diplomacy on the Chinese social media platform Sina Weibo, aiming to put an end to the "public opinion hegemony" of the Western media and counter fake news and negative propaganda from Ukraine and other countries about the Special Military Operation. *Methods and materials.* This paper is built on a streak of official interviews with diplomats at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Beijing. Drawing on content analysis of the microblogs published by the official account of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in China from January 1, 2022 to April 1, 2023, this article examines the digital diplomacy of the Russian official institutions regarding China against the background of the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine. *Analysis.* Russia's digital diplomacy towards China has been focusing strongly on the Special Military Operation. In the field of digital diplomacy with China, two main information sources have arisen that are represented by the Russian Embassy in China and two mainstream media outlets, Russia Today and Sputnik. They advocate steadfastly for Russia's national interests and express its official stance. In terms of content and topics, the Russian Embassy's Weibo diplomacy with China is overwhelmed by the political issues following the Special Military Operation, that emphasize the official position of Russia and explains the objectives of the Special Military Operation – to disarm and control the foreign forces used against the people of Donbas and to stop neo-Nazism and its ideology. In terms of communication methods, the Weibo operations team of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in China has demonstrated its professionalism and aptitude to market events while using such unique Weibo functions as the hashtagging events feature. *Results.* The target audience's attention to a hot issue is time-sensitive, i.e., about one month after the event, which is the "golden stage" for effective digital diplomacy. At the same time, the study illustrates that while carrying out digital diplomacy activities with China, the Russian Embassy in China still has shortcomings in its performance, i.e., in early 2023, the official position was over-highlighted and the content and form of communications were relatively homogeneous. The content of communication should be appropriately enriched in order to eventually build up a multi-faceted and multi-angle communication system.

**Key words:** Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine, digital diplomacy, Embassy of the Russian Federation in China, Weibo, Russian Federation.

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## РОССИЙСКАЯ ЦИФРОВАЯ ДИПЛОМАТИЯ В ОТНОШЕНИИ КИТАЯ В КОНТЕКСТЕ СПЕЦИАЛЬНОЙ ВОЕННОЙ ОПЕРАЦИИ НА УКРАИНЕ: ПРИМЕР WEIBO-АККАУНТА ПОСОЛЬСТВА РФ В КНР<sup>1</sup>

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**Аннотация.** *Введение.* Цифровая дипломатия, основанная на передовых информационно-коммуникационных технологиях, играет все более важную роль и постепенно становится ключевым инструментом развития традиционной публичной дипломатии, обеспечивая информационную поддержку и общественное мнение для реализации внешней политики страны за рубежом. Посольство Российской Федерации в Китае активно занимается цифровой дипломатией на китайской платформе социальных сетей Sina Weibo, стремясь положить конец «гегемонии общественного мнения» западных СМИ и противостоять фейковым новостям и негативной пропаганде из Украины и других стран о специальной военной операции. *Методы и материалы.* Эта статья основана на серии официальных интервью с дипломатами Посольства Российской Федерации в Пекине. С опорой на контент-анализ микроблогов, опубликованных официальным аккаунтом Посольства Российской Федерации в Китае с 1 января 2022 г. по 1 апреля 2023 г., в данной статье рассматривается цифровая дипломатия российских официальных институтов в отношении Китая на фоне российско-украинского конфликта наряду со специальной военной операцией. *Анализ.* Российская цифровая дипломатия по отношению к Китаю была сосредоточена главным образом на специальной военной операции. В области цифровой дипломатии с Китаем возникли два основных источника информации, которые представлены Посольством России в Китае и двумя основными СМИ – «Russian Today» и «Sputnik». Они отстаивают национальные интересы России и выражают ее официальную позицию. Что касается содержания и тем, то дипломатия российского посольства в Weibo перегружена политическими проблемами, возникшими после специальной военной операции, что подчеркивает официальную позицию России и объясняет цели специальной военной операции – разоружить и контролировать иностранные силы, используемые против народа Донбасса, и остановить неонацизм и его идеологию. Что касается методов коммуникации, оперативная группа Weibo Посольства России в Китае продемонстрировала свой профессионализм и способность к маркетингу, используя такие уникальные функции Weibo, как функция хэштегирования событий. *Результаты.* Интерес целевой аудитории к актуальной теме зависит от времени, то есть примерно через месяц после события, что является «золотым периодом» для эффективной цифровой дипломатии. В то же время исследование показывает, что Посольство России в Китае испытывает трудности в осуществлении цифровой дипломатии с китайской целевой аудиторией: в начале 2023 г. официальная позиция была чрезмерно подчеркнута, а содержание и форма сообщений были относительно однородными, в то время как содержание сообщений должно быть соответствующим образом обогащено, чтобы в конечном итоге создать многогранную и многоугольную систему коммуникации.

**Ключевые слова:** специальная военная операция России на Украине, цифровая дипломатия, Посольство Российской Федерации в Китае, Weibo, Российская Федерация.

**Цитирование.** Инь Сымэн. Российская цифровая дипломатия в отношении Китая в контексте специальной военной операции на Украине: пример Weibo-аккаунта Посольства РФ в КНР // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. – 2023. – Т. 28, № 3. – С. 76–84. – (На англ. яз.). – DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2023.3.7>

**Introduction.** Digital diplomacy, also known as Internet diplomacy, social media diplomacy, and/or Web diplomacy 2.0, was first used in US foreign policy. It refers to extensive use of information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as new media, social networks, blogs, and other platforms, to communicate policy and

influence foreign public opinion via social networks or the Internet to assist government agencies in implementing their diplomatic functions and communicating with target audiences on the foreign policy agenda [8]. Amid the ever-rising influence of new media and the evolution of state-of-the-art technologies, Russia's digital diplomacy

has become a linchpin in traditional public diplomacy, which gathers information to maintain foreign policy. Due to radio and television broadcasts in foreign languages, the creation of websites by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies, and the opening of accounts by diplomatic missions on social networks, Russia combats fake news and negative propaganda on the Special Military Operation within the Western media. This builds a positive image of the country, and provides information and public opinion support for the further development of its foreign policy.

Although the term “digital diplomacy” is not incorporated explicitly into some keystone official documents, it scores highly in regards to political communication through social networks or the Internet, influencing the objective perception of Russia by foreign audiences, using “soft power” tools, mass media, and social media to ensure the advancement of the country’s foreign policy and create a positive image of the state.

The second chapter of the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept [12], “The Modern World and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, states that the use of “soft power” tools to address foreign policy issues has become an integral element in modern international politics, in addition to traditional diplomacy methods. The 2021 version of the Russian National Security Strategy states: “Against the background of the crisis of the Western liberal model, some countries are deliberately trying to erode traditional values, falsify and distort world history, revise public perceptions of Russia’s role and status, revive fascism, and incite inter-ethnic conflicts. Fascism is being revived, and inter-ethnic as well as inter-religious conflicts are being fomented. Information campaigns are being conducted designed to reinforce Russia’s hostile image” [13]. In addition, the document stresses that “the widespread use of information technologies poses a serious threat to the security of Russian state information, in particular: espionage in cyberspace by foreign intelligence services, hacking, cyber-terrorist activities, unfriendly propaganda against Russia on social media, disinformation, etc.” [13]. Russia needs to highly prioritize information security, streamline its response actions, and strengthen its information warfare capabilities and strategies so as to succeed in information warfare against

Western countries. These two important documents issued by the Russian government in 2016 and 2021, the respectively, the elevate status of digital diplomacy tools in foreign policy to the level of national strategy elaboration and as a vital tool upholding national information security. The significance of digital diplomacy to project a positive image of Russia in the public consciousness of foreign citizens is augmenting as well, and social media plays an important role in Russia’s national image building contributing to the country’s success in foreign policy practices.

Over recent years, Chinese, Russian, and Western scholars have been carrying out research in digital diplomacy more pro-actively reflecting the fact that this research is both a theoretical hotspot and a practical challenge. Apart from that, the appropriate academic findings have laid a solid foundation for this paper [1; 4; 6; 9; 14; 19]. However, there is a lack of specific case studies in Russian digital diplomacy with China in the context of the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022, and there is a lack of in-depth research on the digital diplomacy practices of the Russian official institutions on Sina Weibo, a crucial Chinese social media platform.

**Methods and materials.** Having taken the official account of the Russian Embassy in China on Sina Weibo as an example, this paper uses content analysis to scrutinize the text of tweets posted on this account from January 1, 2022 to April 1, 2023 and evaluates the current environment of the Russian Embassy in China’s digital diplomacy practices in the context of the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine in terms of topic distribution, post content, and means of communication, as well as summarizes Russia’s digital diplomacy practices in the context of the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine. Also the study summarizes the strategic goals, features, and flaws in Russia’s digital diplomacy with China amid the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine, which will help China learn from Russia’s experience in digital diplomacy as a great power and rationalize its foreign communication.

**Analysis. Construction of Russia’s digital diplomacy system towards China.** In digital diplomacy, sources refer to the official institutions and individuals that disseminate information, as well as the officially controlled media [21]. In the field of digital diplomacy with China, Russia has

forged the major source systems consisting of the official institutions and mainstream media, which render technical and informational support for the country's foreign policy.

At the official institutions tier, this is represented by the official activities of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in China. Currently, the Russian Embassy in China has opened official accounts on five major Chinese social media platforms: ShakeYin, Sina Weibo, Today's Headline, Xigua Video, and WeChat [3]. Among them, Sina Weibo is a widely influential and representative Chinese social media platform, as well as an essential tool and platform for other embassies and consulates in China and foreign media to carry out digital diplomacy on the Chinese Internet. Sina Weibo's content is represented mainly by text and images, supplemented by video content and hashtag tracking, agenda setting, super talk, and word limit. According to the Sina Weibo User Development Report 2020 published by the Sina Weibo Data Centre, the microblogging user database continues to lure a younger audience, with the post-90s and post-00s accounting for nearly 80% of all users [15]. In other words, Sina Weibo is used primarily by young and middle-aged audiences aged 23–33. According to data published on the official website of the China Securities Journal, by the end of Q4 2022, Weibo had 586 million monthly active users, a net increase of 13 million year-on-year, and 252 million daily active users, a net increase of 3 million year-on-year, with the proportion of monthly active users from mobile reaching 95% in Q4 [16]. The Sina Weibo account of the Russian Embassy in China was registered in December 2011 and is an important Chinese social media outlet that broadcasts real-time updates on the latest news from Russia, the Russian Embassy, and Sino-Russian relations. Given the tensions between the West and Russia, in the context of the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine as well as sanctions and restrictions imposed on Russia by Western media platforms, the Chinese social media platform Sina Weibo has become one of the most meaningful channels for Russia to submit its position on issues of common concern to the international community.

At the mainstream media level, Russia has elaborated a system of media communication with China, represented by Russia Today TV (RT) and

the satellite news agency Sputnik. These two major media outlets have accounts on Sina Weibo and have 1.747 million and 11.675 million followers, respectively. Under this system, the main tasks of the official media holdings are to maintain the security of Russian state information, improve the public opinion environment in the international arena, and alleviate anti-Russian and Russophobic sentiment among foreign audiences triggered by the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine. The official microblog of the Russian Embassy in China establishes a well-established system of communication with China by retweeting articles or videos posted by RT and Sputnik accounts. For example, on October 17, 2022, the official microblogging account of the Russian Embassy in Beijing retweeted a report published by Sputnik on the awarding of a prize to the Moscow Chinese Mutual Aid Association by the former Ambassador Andrey Denisov, and on October 21 the account retweeted a video by RT on Maria Zakharova's response to Western allegations arguing the West's accusations against Russia were sheer robbery and responsibility shirking by NATO countries [20].

Obviously, the Russian digital diplomacy with China has formed a system relying on the Embassy in China, supplemented by Sputnik and RT mainstream media, which clearly assert Russia's national interests, voice the official political positions, and proactively repulse "information attacks" by the Western media. However, it is worth mentioning that President Putin and the Russian diplomatic corps have not yet registered their personal accounts on Chinese social media platforms. According to Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has no intention of setting up personal accounts on social networking platforms such as Jitterbug [5]. Unlike the diplomatic corps, which had previously opened accounts in their personal names on Western media platforms, Russian diplomats have not opened personal accounts on any Chinese social media platforms, although the Director General of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Zakharova, is proficient in Chinese. It also depicts the difference between Russian digital diplomacy with regards to Western countries and China. In the next section of the

case study, based on the advantages of Sina Weibo's total number of users and its outreach to young Internet users, the paper selects representative content posted by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in China on the Sina Weibo platform for reflection.

***Case study: the embassy's "Weibo" diplomacy with China in the context of the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine.*** Since the Crimean crisis in 2014, the practice of Russian digital diplomacy abroad has been challenged as never before, with political trust between Russia and the West fading away, harsh Western sanctions against Russia, "information warfare" in cyberspace, disinformation, and cybersecurity, for example, the "Primakov" incident and the Skripal poisoning case in 2018 [18]. After Russia's special military operation against eastern Ukraine in February 2022, the US-led West used artificial intelligence, big data analysis, and other information and technological means to launch an "information war" against Russia. They imposed a series of severe sanctions, including restrictions on the activities of Russian official and mainstream media on Western social media platforms.

In this adverse international public opinion environment, Russia took a series of steps to counteract it head-on. The Federal Service for Monitoring Communications, Information Technologies, and Mass Media of the Russian Federation (Роскомнадзор) decided to block Twitter in Russia from March 4, 2022, in accordance with Article 15.3 of the Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection. This decision restricts access to programs containing websites of mass riots, extremist activities, and participation in mass events held in violation of established procedures [11]. In response, Twitter blocked the page of the Russian Embassy in London on March 10 to refute information about the Mariupol maternity hospital [7]. The Twitter account of the Russian television channel RT was also blocked on April 8 for its posts about the captured armed forces of the Ukrainian army [11]. Western media, represented by Facebook and Twitter, launched comprehensive sanctions against Russia. On August 5 the official English-language account of the Russian Foreign Ministry on Twitter was blocked for seven days for publishing excerpts of

a briefing by Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Unit (ПХБЗ) of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces, on US military biological activity [10]. In essence, the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine is a game between the great powers, and the United States, which is constantly "stoking the fire" in order to maintain hegemony. The US is arguably the beneficiary of the biggest geopolitical crisis of the post-Cold War period.

Faced with the suppression and "gagging" of the Western mainstream media, Russia has turned its voice to Chinese social media, actively engaging in digital diplomacy with China through the official accounts of its embassy in China and with the cooperation of mainstream media, in an attempt to subvert the autonomy and control of the US and Western countries over social media communication activities and public opinion and to express its political positions and disseminate meaningful views. The main strategic objectives of Russia's digital diplomacy with China are to use information technology to leverage direct dialogue with Chinese Internet audiences, counter negative reporting on Russia in the context of Western sanctions, criticize mainstream Western liberal discourse, promote Russian values, create a positive image of the Russian state, enhance national influence, and promote the comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and China.

From January 1, 2022 to April 1, 2023, the Russian Embassy in China posted a total of 1,062 tweets [2]. As of April 1, 2023, @RussianEmbassyChina had 763,000 followers, 5.25 million cumulative retweets and likes, and 44.207 million total video views [2]. By comparison, the official account of the Embassy of Ukraine in Beijing (@乌克兰信使) has 186,000 fans, 4.637 million retweets and likes, and 30.667 million cumulative video views [17].

In terms of amount and frequency of posts, the former on this account changed tremendously in February and March before and after the Special Military Operation (i.e., from 16 in February to 79 in March). The highest number of posts during the selected period was concentrated in six months from March till October, with posts frequency exceeding 2.0 posts/day, with their overall downward trend in number and frequency since November 2022.

**Posts on the official Weibo account of the Russian Embassy in China from January 1, 2022 to March 29, 2023**

Month	@RussianEmbassyChina	Frequency
January 2022	15	0.48
February	16	0.53
March	79	2.55
April	71	2.37
May	64	2.06
June	51	1.70
July	58	1.87
August	64	2.13
September	75	2.50
October	67	2.16
November	56	1.87
December	47	1.52
January 2023	38	1.23
February	39	1.30
March	34	1.17

In terms of content and choice of topics for publication, the period from January 1 to February 22, 2022, prior to the “Special Military Operation”, was focused on the following areas: diplomatic activities and speeches by President Putin, diplomatic input by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov and the former Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov, Russian cultural exchanges (on the traditional Chinese New Year festival and promotion of Russian cinema, the Beijing Winter Olympics, the 8<sup>th</sup> Andrey Steyning International Photojournalism Competition), bilateral relations and cooperation between Russia and China in various fields (Russian-Chinese gas, vaccine cooperation, etc.).

From February 22, 2022 to March 28, 2023, the account was bringing out mainly political topics, statements and official Russian announcements on developments in Ukraine (including releases by the official bodies such as the Defense Ministry and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the official spokeswoman of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs Mariya Zakharova, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev and other diplomats and official representatives of the Russian Federation), statements or interviews on Russia’s Special Military Operation in Donbass, elucidation of the recent situation on the battlefield between Russia and Ukraine, refutation of the

disinformation campaigns and “information attacks” by the Ukrainian and US-Western media, as well as diplomatic efforts by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. In addition, a slighter proportion of 37 articles were devoted to bilateral relations between Russia and China, cultural exchanges, and scientific and technological collaboration<sup>2</sup>. Specifically, they include such topics as cultural exchange between China and Russia, scientific and technological cooperation, bilateral cooperation under the SCO aegis, traditional Chinese festivals, university entrance examinations, and the meeting of the Russian and Chinese heads of state. Four of the blog posts in March 2023 concerned President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Moscow after his re-election as the head of state.

In terms of communication methods, the team operating the official microblog of the Russian Embassy in China has demonstrated professionalism and proficiency in applying such microblogging-specific features as hashtags and events, along with event marketing capabilities. For instance, the hashtag “#ZakharovaResponse” (“#扎哈罗娃回应#”) was used to express Russia’s official position in response to the false information released by Western media, another round of sanctions against Russia declared by the US State Department and the insulting comments made by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2]. In addition, the hashtag “#Ukraineisaterroriststate” (#乌克兰是恐怖主义国家) generated a lot of debate among Chinese Internet users, seeking

factual justification for the “legitimacy” of the “special military operation.” In addition, engagement with the Chinese target audience was in limelight, emphasizing the proactive nature of issue-setting. An immediate communication mechanism was set up between the Russian expert team and ordinary netizens to proactively set issues and respond to netizens concerns. Through the hashtag “#RTasksyoutoaskquestions” (#RT 喊你来提问), Chinese netizens were asked about “Russian President Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilisation decree” (俄罗斯总统普京部分动员令), and TASS military expert Viktor Litovkin was invited to answer questions about “the referendum on accession of the four regions to Russia” (四个地区入俄公投), and “The use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict”(乌克兰冲突中使用核武器). The Russian Foreign Minister answered Chinese netizens’ questions on “the possibility of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine”(俄乌谈判的可能性) and other issues.

In terms of quantity of comments and likes, the target audience’s interest in the “special military operation” was concentrated between February 22 and March 31, 2022. After that span of time, the audience’s interest in this event dropped abruptly. Specifically, the number of retweets, comments, and likes on the post “Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree recognizing the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics” on February 22, 2022 was 660, 7328, and 47,000, respectively. If we look at the number of likes as a reference, from January to February 2022, there were 8 posts with more than 10,000 likes, 6 of them in March 2022, and there were 20 blogs with more than 10,000 likes, in contrast to only 3 blogs with more than 10,000 likes in April. Noteworthy, on February 28, 2022, the post “Statement of the Russian Embassy in China on the Situation in Ukraine” received 263,000 likes, the highest number of likes and the most intense comments from the audience over the selected period<sup>3</sup>.

Yet, the study has also found out that digital diplomacy with China around the Russian “special military operation” is not bereft of shortcomings, i.e. the content posted on the official microblog of the Russian Embassy in China after the special military operation over-emphasized Russia’s official political position, with political

content and official overtones too prominent, except for 3-4 posts in December 2022 on Russian New Year food, 5 posts in January 2023 on Russian higher education, visa processing for Chinese citizens (Higher Economic University), the Ambassador’s wishes to the Chinese people for a Happy Chinese New Year, and 1 post in March on Russian cultural exchange, i.e. The rest of the content is too political. The content of the blog is not only about Russian cultural exchange but also about the official position of the Mariinsky Orchestra. In fact, in terms of content dissemination, it would be intriguing to combine cartoon satire and Russian diplomats’ rebuttals to the Western media in order to diversify communication forms and enrich the content accordingly, shaping a multifaceted and multilayered communication system. For example, on March 3, 2022, the account brought forward the Russian satellite news agency “Russian cats banned from international exhibitions in other countries” with the text “Russian cats don’t believe in cats”, protesting against Western sanctions in a witty and humorous way. Such content was adopted to counteract public resistance caused by an overemphasis on political positions.

**Results.** The rapid evolution of information technologies, the growing impact of new media, and the “information attacks” launched by the US and the West against the Russian government in international public opinion through social media networks have brought digital diplomacy to the level of official state policy in Russia. In the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept [12], the importance of using “soft power” tools to address foreign policy issues was acknowledged, highlighting the complementary role of information technology and communication methods to traditional diplomatic methods. In addition, the new Russian National Security Strategy for 2021 [13] considers hostile propaganda and disinformation attempts against Russia on social media as a threat to national information security and assigns strategic importance to the use of digital diplomacy in foreign policy.

The Embassy of the Russian Federation in China is the most representative official institution for Russia’s digital diplomacy with China. It has opened official accounts on several Chinese social media platforms to conduct digital diplomacy practices targeting Chinese Internet

audiences in various forms of communication and content, while Sina Weibo, with its large number of users and active users, is an influential and representative Chinese social media platform. In addition, Sputnik and RT, the two main media outlets, are the mainstays of the media communication system with China, firmly defending Russia's interests and national information security, shaping public opinion in favor of the Russian government, and mitigating international public pressure on Russia.

The Russian Embassy in China's "Weibo" diplomacy with China around the "special military operation" and the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine was spinning around the content and themes of the article "Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree recognizing the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic on February 22, 2022. Since then, the content has gone rather political, with a strong emphasis on Russia's official position. In terms of communication methods, the Russian Embassy's Weibo team has proven its professionalism and ability to market events through the use of hashtags and other Weibo-specific features. In addition, the target audience's interest and attention to a sudden hot topic lasts over a short period of time, mainly within a month after the event, which is also the key time to focus communication and highlight political stances in this regard. As public attention tends to wane, it is expedient to enrich the content of the communication, reduce the number of political statements, and diversify the forms of communication in order to be more targeted and exert a more effective and concentrated impact on the target audience.

#### NOTE

<sup>1</sup> This article is the result of the Liaoning Provincial Education Department's basic research project "Research on Russian Digital Diplomacy in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict" (project number: LJKMR20221527).

<sup>2</sup> The author's keyword search based on the content of blog posts published by the Russian Embassy in China.

<sup>3</sup> The author's keyword search based on the content of blog posts published by the Russian Embassy in China.

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