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From Bipolar Confrontation to Polycentric Management

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NATO'S GOING ON GEOGRAPHICALLY GLOBAL ACTIVITY: THE PAST AND THE NEW STRATEGIES

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Abstract. *Introduction.* Today, the West attempts to hold NATO accountable for issues that extend far beyond the alliance's geographical and functional responsibilities, similar to the situation in the 2000s–2010s. This issue is crucial for establishing a West-orientated global order. *Methods and materials.* The goal is to explore the strategies of the 2000s–2010s and, since the mid-2020s, the geographical globalisation of NATO's activity. The concept of securitisation is used in the article. The actor (establishment of Western democracies) convinces the audience (the societies) that the defence of the object (the Euro-Atlantic community's countries) is impossible without increasing the power of NATO and noticeable geographic diversification of its activities to containment and throwing back opponents (Russia; also Iran and China). Previously, the actor had proved to the audience the danger of instability threats from conflict zones in Asia and Africa but had failed to provide protection and had searched for new challenges to deter. *Analysis.* In the 1990s in the Balkans, NATO tested strategic activity outside the zone of responsibility. Taking into account this experience, in the 2000s – 2010s, the Alliance had been trying to position itself as a security provider for the countries of origin of the armed conflict in North Africa and the Near East. The features and reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of this strategy are revealed in the examples of NATO's activity in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. By the mid-2020s the new strategy to ensure NATO's global presence is based on the alliance's involvement in the containment of the group of opponents of the West (first of all, Russia and China and also Iran). In this context the alliance tried to strengthen its position in post-Soviet space and the Near East and prepare to penetrate the Indo-Pacific region. *Results.* The article summarised the features of strategies of the globalisation of NATO's activities and the Alliance's return to its traditional aim at containment, but on the scale of the international arena as a whole.

Key words: NATO, strategic presence, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, post-Soviet space, IPR, containment.

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ДВИЖЕНИЕ НАТО К ГЕОГРАФИЧЕСКИ ГЛОБАЛЬНОМУ ОХВАТУ В ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ: ПРОШЛАЯ И НОВАЯ СТРАТЕГИИ

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Аннотация. *Введение.* Сегодня заметно желание наделять НАТО компетенциями, которые далеко выходят за пределы зоны ее ответственности географически (как было в 2000–2010-е гг.) и функционально. Это важно

для продвижения западнцентричной схемы миропорядка. *Методы и материалы.* Задача – исследовать стратегии 2000–2010-х гг. и вновь выстраиваемую к середине 2020-х гг. по географической глобализации деятельности НАТО. В статье использована концепция секьюритизации. Актор (истеблишмент «западных демократий») убеждает аудиторию (свои общества), что защита объекта (стран-участниц блока) невозможна без наращивания мощи НАТО и заметной географической диверсификации ее деятельности для «сдерживания» и «отбрасывания» оппонентов (РФ, а также ИРИ, КНР). Ранее актор доказывал аудитории опасность от угроз нестабильности из зон конфликтов в Азии и Африке, но не сумел обеспечить защиту, перешел к поиску новых вызовов для противодействия. *Анализ и результаты.* В 1990-е гг. на Балканах НАТО отработала стратегический выход за пределы зоны ответственности. С учетом этого опыта в 2000–2010-е гг. Альянс пытался позиционировать себя как провайдера безопасности для стран происхождения вооруженного конфликта в Северной Африке, на Ближнем и прежде всего Среднем Востоке. Особенности и причины неудачной реализации этой стратегии раскрыты на примерах использования НАТО в Афганистане, Ираке и Ливии. К середине 2020-х гг. в основе планов обеспечить глобальное присутствие НАТО стало лежать ее подключение к «сдерживанию» круга оппонентов Запада, особенно РФ, КНР, ИРИ. В этом контексте Альянс стал укреплять позиции на постсоветском пространстве и Ближнем Востоке, готовить проникновение в Индо-Тихоокеанский регион. *Заключение.* Обобщены черты стратегий по глобализации деятельности НАТО, ее возвращение к традиционной нацеленности на «сдерживание», но уже в масштабах международной арены в целом.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, стратегическое присутствие, Афганистан, Ирак, Ливия, постсоветское пространство, ИТР, «сдерживание».

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Введение. «Западные демократии» сопротивляются становлению облика перспективного миропорядка, что продвигает РФ. Иллюстративны масштаб и характер мер по противодействию России в ходе СВО. Государства-члены НАТО и ЕС отнюдь не готовы ограничиваться реактивными шагами, но стремятся реализовать комплекс проактивных мер с целью сохранить западнцентричность миропорядка. Ответственная роль отведена НАТО как структуре: ее позиционируют как «сильнейший альянс в истории» [28]. По завершении перехода к новой модели войск НАТО (стартовал в 2022 г.) в подчинении Альянса должны быть не менее 800 тысяч военных [19]. Основные усилия блок прикладывает в пределах зоны ответственности, особенно в передовой части. Однако значима с 1990-х гг. и деятельность Альянса вовне.

К середине 2020-х гг. государства-члены блока стали ставить перед ним задачи далеко за пределами зоны ответственности – географически и функционально. Стратегическая концепция Альянса (2022) закрепила включение не только РФ, но также ИРИ и КНР в список объектов для «сдерживания» [16, р. 2]. На Вашингтонском саммите (9–11 июля 2024 г.) были заявлены компетенции НАТО на

многочисленных направлениях вне зоны ее ответственности: на Украине, Ближнем и Дальнем Востоке [28]. Это стало отнюдь не первым комплексом попыток активно использовать НАТО вдали от ее зоны ответственности¹. Масштабные усилия были предприняты в 2000–2010-е гг., когда Альянс пытался стать гарантом безопасности для ряда стран происхождения вооруженного конфликта на БСВ. Но результат оказался в целом неудачным: символом тому явилась экстренная эвакуация миссии НАТО из Афганистана (2021).

Методы и материалы. Задача – исследовать прошлую (2000–2010-х гг.) и возникающую к середине 2020-х гг. стратегии по превращению Альянса в географически глобально оперирующего актора. Основной массив источников составили документы самой НАТО: доктринальные (декларации, стратегические концепции), характеризующие ее шаги вне зоны его ответственности.

Исследователи уделяли в целом заметное внимание вопросам функционирования блока, использования его потенциала. Но конкретно проблематика глобализации деятельности НАТО раскрыта ограниченно [4]. Она начала изучаться в *функциональном* измерении с саммита 2021 г., когда на Альянс стала воз-

лагаться нагрузка в сферах, не входивших в зону его ответственности и опосредованно связанных с вопросами безопасности и обороны (экономической, энергетической, экологической, соблюдения прав человека) [2].

Кейсы *географического* применения НАТО за пределами ареала ответственности находили детальное освещение, но их рассматривали скорее в качестве набора частных случаев для блока как региональной организации. Иллюстративна работа С. Слоана, в которой он изучал неприменение эгиды Альянса в 2003 г. для военной кампании в Ираке и, напротив, использование в Афганистане и Ливии [25]. Детальнее всего исследовалась деятельность сил *ISAF*. Так, Д. Ауэрсвальд и С. Сэйдеман раскрывали реальные пределы согласия при выработке решений об использовании НАТО в Афганистане в разных формах (на примерах подходов США, ФРГ и Нидерландов) [7].

Насколько применимо понятие «стратегия» к деятельности блока вне зоны ответственности в 2000–2010-е годы? Утвердительный ответ обусловлен, *во-первых*, повышенным вниманием на доктринальном уровне Альянса к «кризисному регулированию», то есть принятию функций как гаранта безопасности в зонах локальных конфликтов. В стратегической концепции НАТО 2010 г. эта цель стоит де-юре на втором месте (после коллективной обороны), но де-факто ей уделено наибольшее внимание [26, р. 7–8, 19–22]. *Во-вторых*, числом миссий Альянса в отдалении от зоны ответственности, продолжительностью, масштабом каждой по отдельности и их суммарно. *В-третьих*, еще одно доказательство – характер трансформации ВС стран-участниц НАТО, прежде всего для использования под эгидой блока. Это масштабные сокращения, особенно войск, насыщенных тяжелыми ВиВТ. Фокус делался на «легкие» силы, способные действовать вдали от Евро-Атлантического сообщества – против комбатантов, немногочисленных, почти не имевших тяжелых ВиВТ и не являвших регулярные ВС [11].

С середины 2010-х гг. заметен спад в изучении деятельности блока вне зоны ответственности, что обусловлено сужением ее географии и сокращением объемов. Дойдя до минимальных значений в начале 2020-х гг., оба эти показателя стали вновь демонстрировать предрас-

положенность к росту. Рамочные условия заложила востребованность НАТО для «сдерживания» не только РФ, но также ИРИ, КНР в стратегической концепции (2022) [16, р. 2], конкретизация этих планов [28]. Эксперты указывали, что создаваемые как часть новой модели войск НАТО силы союзнического реагирования должны увеличить потенциал Альянса по кризисному регулированию, то есть вдали от зоны ответственности [9, р. 3].

При подготовке статьи нашла применение концепция *секьюритизации*. В основе лежит схема: актор, который подчеркивает перед аудиторией опасность от конкретной угрозы, побуждает к подготовке и реализации комплекса мер, которые могли бы нейтрализовать риски. Результат достигнут, когда актор убеждает аудиторию, что требуемая защита обеспечена [8, р. 26–33]. В исследуемом случае актор – истеблишмент государств-членов НАТО и самого Альянса. Аудитория включает массы граждан в «западных демократиях», с адресацией послания ко всему человечеству. Объект для проецирования угрозы – государство как институт и общество для каждой из стран-участниц НАТО, все они в совокупности. В качестве источников угроз обозначены: Россия (в первую очередь), Китай (в возрастающей мере), Иран, круг наиболее дружественных им государств (особенно Беларусь и Северная Корея) [16; 28]. Аудитория убеждается в необходимости «сдерживать» и «отбросить» совокупность данных государств – источников рисков. Для этого требуется нарастить мощь, географически и функционально диверсифицировать деятельность «западных демократий» в целом и конкретно НАТО как института. Она представлялась как ключевая структура, позволившая Евро-Атлантическому сообществу не просто выстоять в прошлую «холодную войну», но считать себя победившей. Кроме того, де-факто обыгрывается правило: сведенный воедино (то есть грамотно структурированный) потенциал на практике заметно весомее, чем равная ему простая сумма потенциалов, его образующих. Выстраивание глобальной сетки присутствия под флагом блока – необходимое (хотя само по себе еще недостаточное) условие для убеждения аудитории, что цель по защите достигнута.

В 2000-е – начале 2010-х гг. указанный актор уже обращался к отмеченной аудитории, но с педализацией иной опасности: угрозы нестабильности. Их источники располагались в зонах вооруженных конфликтов на БСВ, в Африке, севернее экватора. Однако тогда НАТО в итоге не обеспечила защиту: европейские «западные демократии» не смогли эффективно противодействовать на своей территории массовому притоку беженцев (из Сирии и Ирака), росту террористической активности в 2015–2017 гг.; были вынуждены свернуть присутствие в Афганистане (2021) – важнейшем направлении приложения усилий. Невозможность убедить аудиторию в способности защитить от одного типа угрозы актор решил заместить поиском новых, неизменно задействуя НАТО.

Безусловно, между странами-участниками Альянса есть противоречия по широкому кругу вопросов его использования. Вместе с тем НАТО остается для «западных демократий» наиболее действенным механизмом приложения многосторонних усилий, что отнюдь не исключает сбоев при применении блока.

Анализ. Стратегия 2000–2010-х годов. НАТО как провайдер безопасности для стран происхождения вооруженного конфликта на БСВ. Уже в конце прошлой «холодной войны», когда встал вопрос о будущих смыслах существования для НАТО, она стала позиционироваться как «якорь стабильности» в мире. Это предполагало смещение центра тяжести в деятельности Альянса с передовой зоны ответственности (в рамках «сдерживания» СССР, его союзников) вовне, в том числе на значительном удалении. Первые признаки стали заметны с начала 1990-х гг., превращаясь в тенденцию с 1990-х гг.: это десятилетие явилось *предтечей* для придания использованию НАТО глобального характера.

Возможность для Альянса апробировать новые функции возникла на постъюгославском пространстве. Оно одновременно располагалось за пределами тогдашней зоны ответственности Альянса и примыкало к ней. Блок реализовывал двухкомпонентную схему по вмешательству и обеспечению влияния на ход конфликта. Первая составляющая – силовая операция, которая виделась в НАТО как крат-

кая по времени; она представляла способ давления на оппонента подхода «западных демократий» к решению конфликта. Второй компонент – небоевая миссия, длительная, с целью обеспечить ход урегулирования в соответствии с интересами «западных демократий». Впервые схема была апробирована в Боснии и Герцеговине (БиГ): за военно-воздушной операцией *Deliberate Force* против Республики Сербской (30 августа – 20 сентября 1995 г.) последовала выработка Дейтонских соглашений 14 декабря 1995 г. и развертывание наземной миссии НАТО по поддержанию мира *IFOR* (с 1996 г. – *SFOR*). В следующий раз – на косовском направлении. Здесь, однако, имело место затягивание военно-воздушной операции – *Allied Force* (24 марта – 10 июня 1999 г.) как способа давления на Сербию; выработка резолюции Совета Безопасности ООН № 1244 открыла возможность для появления сил Альянса *KFOR* в крае Косово. В бывшей югославской республике Македония НАТО ограничилась лишь второй компонентой схемы. После заключения Охридского соглашения (2001) был проведен комплекс сменивших друг друга операций по поддержанию мира (*Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, Allied Harmony*) [27, р. 54, 64–73].

С точки зрения эффективности для обеспечения влияния НАТО добилась заметных результатов. В блок вошли Словения (2004), Хорватия (2009), Черногория (2017), Северная Македония (2020). В Боснии даже после смены *SFOR* миссией ЕС *Althea* (2004) НАТО как организация сохранила инструменты контроля над ситуацией. Миссия *KFOR* к середине 2020-х гг. осталась единственной действующей группировкой Альянса вне зоны ответственности [28], представляла своеобразный «минимум» для этой деятельности в целом. Но вопросы вызвала результативность усилий НАТО для самого урегулирования. Создаваемая с активным использованием Альянса архитектура постъюгославского пространства оказалась не столь устойчивой: в середине 2020-х гг. заметно дистанцирование от «западных демократий» и особенно Альянса не только Сербии, но и Республики Сербской как энтитета БиГ; обострение ситуации вокруг Косово [6]. Но к 2000-м гг. Запад считал свои успехи на Балканах безусловными и бесповоротными.

На таком фоне проявилось желание продемонстрировать дееспособность НАТО уже вдали от Европы. Расширенные возможности возникли в контексте антитеррористической борьбы после событий 11 сентября 2001 года. Под эгидой Альянса учредили миссию *Active Endeavour* для борьбы с перевозками боевиков, взрывчатых веществ, оружия в Средиземном море (с апреля 2003 г.) [20]. В августе 2003 г. Альянсу перешло от ООН руководство Международными силами содействия безопасности (МССБ; *ISAF*) в Афганистане [14]. Таким образом, стартовал *первый* полноценный этап в глобализации деятельности блока (2003 г. – конец 2000-х гг.). Но процесс столкнулся с рядом препятствий. Их отчасти породили сами «западные демократии». Так, I западная антитеррористическая коалиция была создана уже осенью 2001 г., а НАТО как институт подключилась лишь весной – летом 2003 года. Почему? Осенью 2001 г., сразу после актов мегатеррора, администрация Дж. Буша-мл. предпочла задействовать не механизм НАТО (что предложили лидеры европейских стран, особенно канцлер Г. Шрёдер), но формат «коалиции желающих». Тем самым США подчеркивали степень влияния на партнеров, готовых помогать Белому дому под эгидой структуры, которая почти не была регламентирована международным правом. Но администрация Дж. Буша переоценила достигнутый эффект. В феврале – марте 2003 г. США и Великобритания инициировали военно-политический кризис вокруг Ирака, обвинив его без должных доказательств в пособничестве международному терроризму и распространению ОМП. Белый дом рассчитывал уже задействовать НАТО для масштабной наземной кампании. Но группа «старых» континентальных государств – членов блока во главе с Германией (канцлер Г. Шрёдер) и Францией (президент Ж. Ширак) выступила против войны с Ираком, привлечения к ней Альянса. США и Великобритания вынужденно обратились вновь к «коалиции желающих», осуществили вторжение в Ирак (20 марта – 1 мая 2003 г.). Оно привело к фактическому развалу страны [25]. Заметный кризис трансатлан-

тической солидарности был обусловлен различиями в подходах между англо-саксонскими и континентальными западноевропейскими державами к боевому, особенно масштабному наземному, применению НАТО вдали от зоны ответственности. Но речь в принципе не шла об отказе придавать деятельности НАТО глобальный характер; вопрос состоял в определении спектра форм (тактик) достижения этого, особенно релевантности силовых операций.

Логично, что обе стороны стремились преодолеть кризис февраля – марта 2003 года. Во многом поэтому НАТО было передано руководство такими миссиями I западной антитеррористической коалиции, как *Active Endeavour* (с апреля 2003 г.) и особенно *ISAF* (с августа 2003 г.). Более того, в Ираке с 2004 г. стартовала деятельность Альянса, но исключительно небоевая: по подготовке кадров войск новых властей в Багдаде [18]. При этом миссия *Enduring Freedom (OEF)*, включая ее компоненту, действовавшую параллельно с *ISAF* в Афганистане, была сохранена под управлением «коалиции желающих» во главе с США. Вплоть до начала 2010-х гг. именно в рамках *OEF* выполнялась основная нагрузка в Афганистане – по борьбе с «Аль-Каидой»* и «Талибаном». Этим Белый дом одновременно подчеркивал собственные военные возможности и учитывал проявленную весной 2003 г. неготовность ряда партнеров к силовому наземному применению НАТО.

В отличие от *OEF*, *ISAF* были сфокусированы на выполнении намного более широких, но де-юре небоевых задач по обеспечению мира и порядка. МССБ должны были создать благоприятные условия для воссоздания вертикали государственной власти, системы органов управления на уровне провинций, национальных сил безопасности [14]. Ареал ответственности *ISAF*, изначально ограниченный районом Кабула, в 2003–2006 гг. охватил всю территорию страны. К 2009 г. МССБ насчитывали свыше 51 тысячи военных, которых предоставили государства-члены и партнеры блока [12]. В середине – второй половине 2000-х гг. афганское направле-

* «Аль-Каида» – организация, признанная террористической и экстремистской, запрещена на территории Российской Федерации.

ние утвердилось как ключевой трек для НАТО вдали от зоны ответственности.

Это положение упрочилось на *втором этапе* (начало 2010-х гг.) глобализации деятельности НАТО как гаранта безопасности для стран происхождения конфликта на БСВ. На Лиссабонском саммите НАТО (2010) была согласована ее стратегия по Афганистану. Сначала происходил масштабный, но лишь на 2 года, рост численности *ISAF* до 130 тысяч военных [13] – как войсковых частей, так и инструкторов. Все эти меры должны были помочь Кабулу сосредоточиться на обучении резко увеличиваемых армии и полиции. Затем именно они должны были перенять от сил НАТО основную нагрузку по обеспечению порядка [7], то есть де-юре произошла бы частичная национализация (афганизация) урегулирования. Присутствие НАТО должно было остаться в принципе, уменьшиться и отчасти видоизмениться по формам. В последнем случае Альянс рассчитывал следовать по тому же пути, что и на Балканах с 2000-х годов.

Параллельно с 2011 г. НАТО, как и США в национальном качестве, свернула присутствие в Ираке, посчитав, что реформа сектора безопасности проведена [18]. Притом, как и в Боснии после 2004 г., Альянс сохранил встроенный контроль над ситуацией в Ираке через свои штабы.

На фоне «Арабского пробуждения» страны-участницы НАТО под ее эгидой провели военно-воздушную операцию в Ливии (19 марта – 31 октября 2011 г.) с целью разгрома сил М. Каддафи и поддержки оппозиции. Примечателен состав де-юре ключевых инициаторов: Великобритания при Д. Кэмероне и Франция при Н. Саркози [25]. Формально администрация Б. Обамы играла вспомогательную роль (на практике – координирующую), учтя опыт США 2003 года. Теперь ситуация качественно изменилась, что показал пример Франции. Германия одобрила использование эгиды НАТО, но воздержалась от отправки контингента. В военном отношении кампания Альянса была успешна кратковременно – в плане обрушения власти М. Каддафи.

На таком фоне уже сами США в августе 2013 г. инициировали военно-политический кризис вокруг Сирии, без должных доказательств обвинив официальный Дамаск в при-

менении химоружия. Но добиться консенсуса среди «западных держав» по вопросу боевой операции не удалось: в Великобритании против выступил парламент; Германия заняла уклончивую позицию (схожую с линией по Ливии), лишь Франция заявила о готовности. Оказалась сведена к минимуму возможность использовать эгиду НАТО вне зоны ответственности для военно-воздушной кампании. Кейс военно-политического кризиса вокруг Сирии (2013) уникален в череде таковых, что были инициированы «западными демократиями» после 1991 г.: он стал первым, который был политически урегулирован, а не перерос в силовую операцию (как это было в 1995, 1999, 2003 и 2011 гг.). Причина тому – инициатива Президента РФ В.В. Путина по устранению невоенным путем повода для кризиса (уничтожение химического оружия властей САР под международным контролем).

Тактически такое решение позволило избежать признаков раскола внутри НАТО. Стратегически последствия для Альянса оказались скорее отрицательными, особенно для перспектив дальнейшей глобализации его деятельности. В последующее десятилетие (2014–2023) «западные демократии» вне зоны ответственности НАТО не инициировали ни одного военно-политического кризиса против малого или среднего государства, не проводили масштабных силовых операций под эгидой Альянса. Будучи благом для международной безопасности, это положение демонстрировало де-факто возникавшие четкие пределы для дальнейшего расширения географии при применении НАТО, стало отличительной чертой *третьего этапа* процесса (*середина 2010-х гг.*).

Во многом это было обусловлено распадом института единого государства после силовой операции не только в Ираке (2003), но и Ливии (2011): в последнем случае, в отличие от первого, эгида НАТО была задействована, а, следовательно, Альянс нес полную ответственность, хотя и не признавал этого. В обеих странах появились и стали укрепляться структуры международного терроризма, что не получило должного отпора со стороны блока. В Ливии он вообще не участвовал в решении проблем безопасности после своей операции 2011 года. В Ираке «Ислам-

ское государство Ирака»** возникло вскоре после старта миссии НАТО по реформе сектора безопасности (2004–2011), а резко усилилось после ее свертывания (2011). С 2013 г. «Исламское государство Ирака» переименовало себя в таковое для Ирака и Леванта (ИГИЛ ***). Это произошло на фоне крупных успехов ИГИЛ в Ираке и Сирии, дружественных группировок в Ливии и Мали, что стало представлять экзистенциальную угрозу для европейских «западных демократий». Однако даже столкнувшись с проблемой массового неконтролируемого притока беженцев и ростом терактов, государства-члены НАТО в середине 2010-х гг. не задействовали механизм Альянса ни на Ближнем Востоке, ни в Северной Африке.

Отчетливой становилась и ограниченная способность НАТО контролировать ситуацию на ключевом для нее направлении – афганском. Нарастание *ISAF* (2010–2012) не дало ожидаемого эффекта. Оно было жестко очерчено по времени, недостаточно увязано с развитием обстановки; критического ослабления оппонентов НАТО (прежде всего, талибов) не произошло. Альянс не смог достичь перелома в деле стабилизации, но попытался создать эффект этого. К концу 2014 г. из Афганистана было выведено большинство войсковых подразделений, но сохранена основная часть военных советников и инструкторов; размер присутствия сократился с предельных 130 тысяч до 13 тысяч военных к 2015 г. [22], то есть кратно. Вместо *ISAF* с января 2015 г. была запущена миссия *Resolute Support* («Решительная поддержка»; *RSM*) с сохранением под управлением блока. По сравнению с МССБ круг ее задач сузился: *RSM* сосредоточилась на обучении, консультировании и оказании содействия афганским армии и полиции. НАТО пыталась продолжать курс на афганизацию урегулирования в увязке с сохранением на перспективу своего присутствия. На практике ситуация с безопасностью в Афганистане деградировала: прежде всего, происходило распространение на севере Афганистана бое-

виков ИГИЛ (с 2015 г.). Главной трудностью оставалось усиление «Талибана».

Хронологически параллельно нарастали отмеченные препятствия на пути глобализации в использовании НАТО и возникла, став динамично развиваться, конфронтация Евро-Атлантического сообщества с РФ. Растущая роль в ее «сдерживании» возлагалась на Альянс [24], означая его перефокусирование на деятельность вовнутрь зоны ответственности. Попытки наделить Альянс функциями гаранта безопасности для стран происхождения вооруженного конфликта на БСВ встречались с препятствиями уже в 2011–2012 гг., заметно отчетливее в 2013 г., то есть до начала конфронтации с Россией. Решение вывести основные силы *ISAF* было в основе спланировано еще на Лиссабонском саммите (2010), а конкретизировано – на Вашингтонском (2012) [22]. Отнюдь не фактор конфронтации с РФ оказал решающее воздействие на неудачи реализовать стратегию начала XXI в. по наделению НАТО глобальной субъектностью. Ключевое значение имела неспособность Альянса (тем «западных демократий» в целом) достичь перелома в урегулировании тех вооруженных конфликтов, где блок провозгласил себя ответственным.

Переход к «сдерживанию» РФ отнюдь не остановил попыток Альянса найти новые тактики в реализации рассматриваемой стратегии на *четвертом этапе (конец 2010-х гг.)*. На афганском направлении в 2018 г. произошло небольшое наращивание *RSM* (с 13 до 16 тысяч) [23]; в их состав были включены подразделения ССО – фактически для силовой поддержки Кабула в борьбе с «Талибаном» и местным ИГИЛ. Де-юре миссия *Resolute Support* оставалась исключительно небоевой с фокусом на консультировании и обучении. Как и в период *ISAF*, при *RSM* США параллельно вносили вклад в миссию НАТО (самый крупный; 8,5 тысяч военных к 2019 г.) и действовали в национальном качестве (5,5 тысяч солдат и офицеров) – прежде всего, используя ССО на юге и востоке Афганистана [10,

** «Исламское государство Ирака» – организация, признанная террористической и экстремистской, запрещена на территории Российской Федерации.

*** ИГИЛ – организация, признанная террористической и экстремистской, запрещена на территории Российской Федерации.

р. 1–3]. Именно эти войска во многом обеспечивали рамочные условия для *RSM*.

В июле 2018 г. после перерыва (с 2011 г.) в Ираке была воссоздана военно-тренировочная миссия НАТО [17]. Этот механизм возник в результате передачи в его подчинение уже находившихся здесь групп инструкторов и советников; они действовали здесь с 2014–2015 гг. в национальном качестве как часть сил II западной антитеррористической коалиции. Соответственно, лишь через 4 года после создания (сентябрь 2014 г.) к ее деятельности подключился Альянс. Для I коалиции этот срок составлял 1,5–2 года. В Афганистане НАТО была вовлечена только после того, как коалиция в 2001–2002 гг. нанесла сильные поражения «Аль-Каиде» и «Талибану» (то, что эти удары не привели к их полному разгрому, а в последующем талибы восстановили потенциал, стало ясно позже). В Сирии и Ираке, чьи территории представляли единый ТВД с ИГИЛ, остановить и тем более отбросить его в середине 2010-х гг. «западные демократии» не смогли. На таком фоне альянс как институт продемонстрировал бы ограниченную способность бороться с международным терроризмом. Вовлечение блока могло стать прологом к постановке вопроса о проведении боевой операции под флагом Альянса, то есть совершенно иной международно-правовой эгиды и жесткостью обязательств для стран-участниц, чем у «коалиции желающих». Показателен пример ФРГ: она присоединилась к деятельности II западной антитеррористической коалиции с запозданием (более года спустя создания, в декабре 2015 г., лишь после терактов в Париже), реактивировала ст. 42 договора о ЕС, а не аналогичную ст. 5 Вашингтонского договора, избегала боевых форм использования бундесвера [5].

Чем обусловлено изменение подхода к использованию НАТО в Ираке летом 2018 года? На фоне нараставшего кризиса в трансатлантических отношениях, в том числе скепсиса 45-го президента США в отношении самого Альянса, его европейские страны-участницы стремились подчеркнуть практическую ценность и дееспособность НАТО. Учитывая особенности внешней политики при Д. Трампе, вероятность постановки вопроса США о боевых операциях под эгидой Альян-

са в Ираке (как и в Афганистане) была близка к нулю, то есть в данном случае риск для проявлявших осторожность государств был минимален. Не менее важны результативные усилия РФ, официального Дамаска и ИРИ по критическому ослаблению ИГИЛ в Сирии. Это вынуждало его перебрасывать сюда силы из Ирака. Поэтому смогли достичь успеха не только пешмерга и войска официального Багдада, но и поддерживавшие их «западные демократии». Так, был завершен длительный штурм Мосула (март 2016 г. – июль 2017 г.). Подключение Альянса в антитеррористическую борьбу становилось возможным; желательным это являлось также для «сдерживания» РФ и ИРИ на Ближнем Востоке. Они стали ключевыми гарантами безопасности для Сирии; в такой ситуации «западные демократии» пытались сохранить за собой аналогичную роль в Ираке. Данной логике отвечало решение объединить под эгидой НАТО национальные миссии по реформе сектора безопасности.

Эта мера дополняла наращивание усилий *RSM* в Афганистане. Параллельно продолжали функционировать войсковые миссии НАТО: наземная по поддержанию порядка в Косово (*KFOR*) и морская по мониторингу ситуации в средиземноморской акватории (*Sea Guardian*, которая с 2016 г. сменила *Active Endeavour*) [21]. Увеличенный в 2018 г. набор группировок вне зоны ответственности НАТО представлял новую попытку наделить Альянс глобальной субъектностью в урегулировании конфликтов. В Ираке и Афганистане, то есть в обоих географически наиболее удаленных миссиях, речь шла почти исключительно о задачах обучать и консультировать, но уже отнюдь не проводить деятельность по поддержанию порядка. Соответственно, были задействованы лишь группы инструкторов, советников, а не войсковые части. Изменение форм влияло на сокращение масштабов использования сил НАТО вне зоны ответственности (несколько тысяч военных, а не десятки тысяч, как в случае *ISAF*). Миссии *KFOR* (с середины 2000-х гг. резко уменьшенная численно) и *Sea Guardian* были войсковыми, но небольшими [21]. Такое изменение вкупе с сохранением далекой от успокоения ситуации в Ираке и Афганистане [14; 17] символизиро-

вало не повышение эффективности (как на это рассчитывали в НАТО), но, напротив, деградацию системы присутствия.

В основе она развалилась в 2021 г. из-за решений США по Афганистану. Если в 2017–2018 гг. администрация Д. Трампа считала целесообразным нарастить усилия [10; 23], то в 2019 г. стала склоняться к «сделке» с талибами, видя бесперспективность попыток их разгромить. 29 февраля 2020 г. было выработано соглашение между США и «Талибаном», включавшее положение о выводе войск первых из Афганистана. Это на практике делало неизбежным и свертывание миссии Альянса. Соглашение (2020) следует признать ключевым для отказа от попыток наделить НАТО глобальной субъектностью по стратегии 2000–2010-х годов. Ряд ведущих европейских государств – членов НАТО (Германия, отчасти Италия и Великобритания) противился «сделке» от 29 февраля 2020 года. Надежды на ее срыв особенно возросли после смены администрации в США. Однако, взяв паузу для осмысления ситуации, Белый дом при Дж. Байдене в апреле 2021 г. решил имплементировать соглашение с «Талибаном». К 4 июля 2021 г. последовала экстренная эвакуация RSM, что сопровождалось стремительным развалом армии и полиции ориентированного на Запад руководства в Кабуле. «Талибан» стремительно взял власть, захватив массу ВиВТ производства стран-участниц блока. Это стало символом обрушения позиций НАТО в Афганистане и в целом усилий по глобализации ее деятельности 2000–2010-х годов.

Новая стратегия (с середины 2020-х гг.). Глобальное присутствие НАТО в контексте «сдерживания» круга оппонентов из числа государств не-Запада. НАТО фокусировалась на использовании своего потенциала либо в пределах зоны ответственности, особенно в передовой части (в прошлую «холодную войну»), либо в отдалении от нее (особенно в 2000-е – начале 2010-е гг.). В середине 2010-х – самом начале 2020-х гг. Альянс попытался активно действовать на обоих огромных направлениях. Однако НАТО постигала неудача; важной ее причиной внутри Альянса была расценена ограниченность сил в его распоряжении. Эта трудность преодолевалась прежде всего посредством перехода к новой

модели сил НАТО [9; 19]. Одновременно предполагалось обеспечить намного большую взаимосвязь стратегической активности внутри и в отдалении от зоны ответственности блока.

На саммите Альянса (2021) декларировалось расширение компетенций на новые для него сферы: экономическую, энергетическую, экологическую, вопросы гендерной повестки [2]. Речь де-юре шла о частичной «экономизации» повестки для НАТО, что де-факто свидетельствовало о «политизации» мировых торгово-хозяйственных процессов в контексте вовлечения в них ранее абсолютно непрофильного игрока – Альянса. Одновременно был впервые обозначен вызов со стороны КНР [5, с. 128]. Тем самым был прочерчен *будущий вектор для новой стратегии* по глобализации деятельности Альянса географически – в контексте «сдерживания» широкого круга оппонентов вне-Запада. Это произошло именно тогда, когда прошлая стратегия на фоне утраты позиций в Афганистане обрушилась. Соответственно, элиты «западных демократий» осуществляли ребрендинг имиджа НАТО: вместо гаранта безопасности для стран происхождения вооруженного конфликта Альянс позиционировался как актер, способный противодействовать «угрозам» от наиболее активных держав не-Запада [16, р. 3–5]. Сыграв ключевую роль в свертывании присутствия в Афганистане, администрация Дж. Байдена стала побуждать европейских партнеров искать пути компенсировать утраченное через вовлечение в конфронтации не только в Европе, но на Дальнем и Ближнем Востоке. На Вашингтонском саммите (9–11 июля 2024 г.) был расширен список объектов для «сдерживания» посредством включения в него ряда дружественных РФ, КНР и ИРИ государств, а именно: Беларуси, КНДР, то есть информационно обосновано глобальное по охвату использование НАТО.

К июню 2021 г. прошло 7 лет со старта конфронтации с РФ, то есть срок, равный трети времени одного поколения (20 лет). За это время элиты государств-членов НАТО провели большую работу по убеждению своих обществ (аудитории) в том, что некая «российская угроза» требует большого напряжения сил для противодействия. Демонизируя Россию, особенно после начала ее вынужденной СВО,

«западные демократии» пытались обозначить «токсичным» любое продвинутое сотрудничество с РФ в сфере безопасности и обороны, через это порицая развивающие его государства, в том числе ИРИ и КНР. Одновременно они начали признаваться источниками угроз и сами по себе. Это двусоставное объяснение необходимости их «сдерживания» в отшлифованном виде было представлено на Вашингтонском саммите (2024) [28]. На тот момент прошло уже 10 лет (половина расчетного поколения) с начала конфронтации с РФ и 3 года с утраты позиций в Афганистане – срок, минимально требуемый, чтобы попытаться предать забвению эту неудачу как осевой элемент прошлой стратегии по глобализации деятельности НАТО. Притом все еще остававшиеся от нее формы присутствия вне зоны ответственности блока (в Косово, Средиземном море, Ираке) были не просто сохранены, но стали органично интегрироваться в новую систему [28]. Ее основу составляют не уже имевшиеся, но создаваемые элементы – например, политические представительства блока стратегического значения. К середине 2020-х гг. все эти компоненты логично группировались по следующим направлениям.

В Европе восточнее зоны ответственности блока – прежде всего, в западной и южной частях постсоветского пространства. Пост спецпредставителя НАТО по Украине сочетался с созданием фонда для оказания ей военной помощи, подключением Альянса к координации поставок ВиВТ и подготовки кадров для ВСУ [28]. Тем самым происходило резко расширение вовлеченности НАТО в оказание поддержки Украине. Данная тенденция крайне опасна, имея следующим вероятным этапом ввод войск под флагом Альянса на территорию этой страны постсоветского пространства, что приведет к скачкообразной эскалации напряженности с РФ.

Воспринимая НАТО как «тяжеловес», ее государства-члены считали до Вашингтонского саммита (2024) чрезмерно провокационным активное подключение эгиды Альянса для военной поддержки властей в Киеве. Для ее организации использовались «коалиции желающих». Это формат «Рамштайн» для координации поставок в целом с созданием конкретной же коалиции по конкретным видам

тяжелых ВиВТ; для обучения кадров ВСУ – миссии *Interflex* под руководством Великобритании и *EUMAM Ukraine* ЕС [15, р. 8, 34–35]. Но наличествовала логика поступательного развития конфронтации – постоянный рост ударной мощи поставляемых ВиВТ. Одно из проявлений – деятельность НАТО на тех треках, которые ранее, вследствие своей провокационности, считались уделом лишь для «коалиций желающих» и ЕС.

Североатлантический альянс на постсоветском пространстве стремится не только к углублению своих позиций (на Украине), но и расширению. Речь идет об обеспечении связанности на НАТО не только Молдавии (де-юре имеет нейтральный статус) и Грузии (сложностью стала неготовность правительства И. Кобахидзе полноценно участвовать в конфронтации с РФ), но и Армении – государства-члена ОДКБ. Показательны переговоры 19 марта 2024 г. генерального секретаря НАТО и премьер-министра Н. Пашиняна.

На Ближнем Востоке в дополнение к штабам НАТО в Ираке учреждались представительства Альянса в Иордании и Кувейте [28]. Территории этих стран активно использовались для размещения военных сил США, других «западных демократий». Создаваемое присутствие во многом будет нацелено на «сдерживание» Ирана и дружественных ему сил – в Сирии, Ливане, Йемене. В феврале 2024 г. для противодействия хуситам в Красном море в дополнение к силам Великобритании и США была развернута военно-морская миссия их европейских континентальных партнеров *Aspides* под флагом ЕС, но отнюдь не НАТО. Не исключено, что в данном случае речь шла о реализации в основе той же схемы, что имела место с подготовкой кадров ВСУ: сначала для весьма провокационной деятельности использован формат «коалиции желающих» (с ведущей ролью у англосаксонских держав) и ЕС, а затем, по мере развития конфронтации, уже подключается НАТО как «тяжеловес».

В декларации Вашингтонского саммита (2024) в принципе не был упомянут палестино-израильский конфликт, несмотря на масштаб и остроту для международной безопасности его «разморозки», особенно наземной операции ЦАХАЛ в секторе Газа. Тем самым

Альянс как институт дистанцировался от нее (притом в национальном качестве США и другие страны-участницы оказывали Тель-Авиву разноплановую поддержку), стремясь создать свой благожелательный образ для Арабского Востока.

Планы по расширению присутствия на Ближнем Востоке являлись частью таковых по отношению к Глобальному Югу в целом: был учрежден (2024) пост спецпредставителя НАТО по взаимодействию с последним [28]. Но показательно, что в декларации Вашингтонского саммита не была в принципе упомянута Африка [28]. Основная причина этого отнюдь не в отсутствии интереса НАТО к этому континенту в современных реалиях (учитывая внимание к Глобальному Югу в целом, миссии в Средиземном море) [28]. Важнее сохранение в Африке памяти о разрушительной по последствиям военно-воздушной операции НАТО в Ливии (2011) в увязке с тем, что де-факто урегулирование здесь не завершено. Роль в неупоминании Африки на саммите НАТО (2024) сыграл и уход группы стран-участниц во главе с Францией и ФРГ из Мали, сопредельных Буркина-Фасо и Нигера в 2021–2023 годах.

На *Дальнем Востоке* (точнее, в терминологии Альянса в *Индо-Тихоокеанском регионе*, ИТР) декларировались задачи вовлечь НАТО в «сдерживание» КНР и углубление сотрудничества с Австралией, Новой Зеландией, Южной Кореей и Японией. Однако здесь планы были очерчены не столь четко.

На какую структуру из созданных в ИТР могут опираться США при вовлечении НАТО в конфронтацию на Дальнем Востоке? Едва ли это будет *QUAD*, учитывая наличие Индии как страны-участницы. На первый взгляд, наиболее возможным представляется формат *AUKUS*, менее вероятно – «треугольник» Южная Корея – США – Япония (тем более что в первую очередь он нацелен на «сдерживание» КНДР). Однако *AUKUS* – структура с участием исключительно англо-саксонских держав, едва ли можно ожидать расширения состава [1]. Возможно, эта роль будет отведена формату *Partners in the Blue Pacific* (*PBP*, «Партнеры в Голубом Тихом океане»). Он был создан 24 июня 2022 г., буквально накануне Мадридского саммита НАТО, на котором блок решено было наделить огромной

военной мощью, а одной из задач стало «сдерживание» КНР. *PBP* учредили четыре англо-саксонские страны (Австралия, Великобритания, Новая Зеландия, США) и Япония, притом структура была открыта для расширений: уже к 2024 г. странами-участницами стали Канада, РК и ФРГ [3]. Добавление Берлина означало начало подключения европейских континентальных стран. Функционально *PBP* должен был прежде всего обеспечивать процветание и безопасность островов на Тихом океане [3]. Но это отнюдь не препятствует превращению *PBP* в контрагента НАТО в ИТР: в компетенцию блока вопросы экологии входили с 2021 года. Притом первоначальное обращение именно к ним могло снизить жесткость реакции КНР на старт использования НАТО на Тихом океане; кроме того, блок получал возможность обозначать влияние на обширных просторах. Все эти положения удобны, чтобы убедить опасующиеся резкого спада диалога с КНР европейские страны-участницы поддержать этот вектор глобализации деятельности блока.

Результаты. Создание и совершенствование системы присутствия НАТО вне, особенно вдали, от зоны ответственности ее государства-члены с 1990-х гг. неизменно считали важным индикатором западноцентричности миропорядка. На Балканах в 1990-е гг., а затем в 2000–2010-е гг. на Среднем и Ближнем Востоке, в Северной Африке НАТО пыталась обеспечить присутствие прежде всего в субъектах, географически занимавших центральное место в каждой из региональных подсистем (Босния и Косово; Афганистан; Ирак; Ливия). От двухкомпонентной схемы по использованию потенциала (силовая операция, а затем уже небоевая деятельность) в середине – второй половине 1990-х гг. НАТО как институт с начала XXI в. перешла к однокомпонентной. Ключевой вехой стал кризис с использованием механизма Альянса для вторжения в Ирак (2003). Притом единственная оставшаяся составляющая могла быть как небоевой (в Афганистане и Ираке), так и силовой (в Ливии 2011 г.); последняя перестала временно находить применение после военнополитического кризиса вокруг Сирии (2013). С середины 2010-х гг. на БСВ НАТО попыталась сосредоточиться на использовании групп

инструкторов и советников, минимизируя до того масштабное в Афганистане применение войсковых единиц. Ни на одном из направлений повышенной активности НАТО не смогла уверенно утвердиться в положении гаранта безопасности для страны происхождения конфликта, обеспечить ее переход к мирной стадии: этого либо не происходило, либо осуществлялось без Альянса.

В теснейшей увязке со «сдерживанием» РФ для НАТО вне зоны ответственности была выработана новая стратегия (к 2025 г.). Она предполагала постановку перед Альянсом еще более ответственных, чем ранее, целей, притом намного более соответствующих природе блока – участию в системе конфликтов с оппонентами Запада. Получая в

свое распоряжение огромную военную мощь, НАТО в новом качестве стала наращивать позиции на постсоветском пространстве и Ближнем Востоке, готовить это на Дальнем Востоке. Этот подход в целом отвечает интересам новой администрации Д. Трампа, которая стремится рационализировать использование ресурсов самих США, возлагая растущую нагрузку в противодействии оппонентам на партнеров.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ

¹ В статье под зоной ответственности НАТО понимается совокупность территорий и территориальных вод ее государств-членов.

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PEACEKEEPING AS A POWER PROJECTION: UNITED STATES GEOPOLITICS IN AFRICA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY

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Abstract. *Introduction.* Since the inception of the United Nations peacekeeping missions in 1948, the United States has been involved in them through significant financial contributions and on-ground logistical support. This trajectory of dependence on the US has also shaped the scope, strategy, and objectives of peacekeeping, reflecting a political overture of the United States' geopolitical interests. *Methods and materials.* Through contextual analysis of the National Security Strategy of the United States and other relevant documents on peacekeeping, as well as a significant body of academic literature, this article examines the United States' evolving position regarding the UN peacekeeping missions in the case of peacekeeping missions in Africa. *Analysis.* At present, the United States no longer views UN peacekeeping as a cooperative space. On the contrary, it pursues involvement in missions in conflict zones as a strategic maneuver to secure its own interests. *Results.* The merging of the peacekeeping missions with the regional security agenda due to the US' influence can turn them into hybrid missions that combine peacekeeping with counterterrorism or stabilization efforts in the region. *Authors' contributions.* D. Pushkina defined the research focus of the article, examined academic literature on USA administrations' policies towards the United Nations, defined the main vectors of the research, examined UN materials, and contributed to conclusions. H. Singh identified research materials, analyzed official U.S. documents, and contributed to conclusions.

Key words: United States of America, United Nations peacekeeping missions, United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, hybrid missions, geopolitics.

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ПОДДЕРЖАНИЕ МИРА КАК ПРОЕКЦИЯ СИЛЫ: ГЕОПОЛИТИКА США В АФРИКЕ И ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ МИРОТВОРЧЕСКИХ МИССИЙ ООН В XXI ВЕКЕ

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Аннотация. *Введение.* С момента создания миротворческих миссий Организации Объединенных Наций в 1948 г. Соединенные Штаты принимали участие посредством значительных финансовых взносов и материально-технической поддержки. Эта траектория зависимости также сформировала масштаб, стратегию и цели миротворчества, отражая политическую увертюру геополитических интересов Соединенных Штатов. *Методы и материалы.* На основе контекстуального анализа «Стратегии национальной безопасности США», иных документов США по вопросам миротворчества, а также научной литературы по теме в данной статье рассматривается меняющаяся позиция Соединенных Штатов в отношении миротворческих миссий ООН на примере миротворческих операций в Африке. *Анализ.* В настоящее время Соединенные Штаты не рассматривают миротворчество ООН как пространство для сотрудничества. Более того, они рассматривают свое участие как стратегический маневр в зонах конфликта для обеспечения собственных интересов. *Результаты.* Такое слияние миротворческих миссий с повесткой дня региональной безопасности, вызванное влиянием США, может превратить их в гибридные миссии, которые сочетают миротворчество с борьбой с терроризмом или усилиями по стабилизации в данном регионе. *Вклад авторов.* Д.Б. Пушкина определила исследовательскую направленность статьи, рассмотрела научную литературу по политике администраций США в отношении ООН, определила основные направления исследования, рассмотрела материалы ООН, сделала выводы. Х. Сингх проанализировал официальные документы США, сделал выводы.

Ключевые слова: Соединенные Штаты Америки, миссии ООН по поддержанию мира, миротворческие операции ООН в Африке, гибридные миссии, геополитика.

Цитирование. Пушкина Д. Б., Сингх Х. Поддержание мира как проекция силы: геополитика США в Африке и трансформация миротворческих миссий ООН в XXI веке // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. – 2026. – Т. 31, № 2. – С. 20–29. – (На англ. яз.). – DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2026.2.2>

Introduction. The African continent is considered by many researchers to be one of the most conflict-affected regions in the contemporary international system. With prolonged military presence, multilateral cooperation, and extensive peace support operations, Africa's transition from post-independence statehood to broader developmental consolidation has faced persistent structural obstacles, including weak state capacity, recurring intrastate conflicts, and governance challenges [26]. These challenges increasingly appear within the security framing of the United Nations peacekeeping objectives, particularly where mission mandates intersect with geopolitical competition involving major powers [18]. While UN peacekeeping was not designed to wield force, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter [8], the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the mandate to take collective action during conflict through active measures aimed at prevention, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. To execute the task, the peacekeeping missions were seen as an alternative to direct military intervention, promoting a more diplomatic, more operationalized, and less militarized resolution to address the conflict [27].

Since its inception, the United Nations peacekeeping missions have been under scrutiny concerning the organization's effectiveness in

establishing peace, as early as the mediation missions of the UN Truce Supervision Organization [35] in 1948 to observe the peace process between the State of Palestine and Israel and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949 to resolve the conflict, as both of them have failed to produce meaningful resolutions.

To conduct the operations, the peacekeeping force carries them out when in compliance with the core traditional peacekeeping principles that include the necessary invitation by the conflict state, the consent of conflict parties for UN PKO (peacekeeping operations), the maintenance of impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense. The success of the missions depends on the political cooperation shaping the region; however, it is also largely shaped by the resources, on-ground manpower, and state mandate [28]. The Charter does not have specific provisions that mandate the PKO to resolve the conflicts, so the PKO evolved to address such instability.

Through the Cold War era, the United States pursued a balanced position on UN peacekeeping, where it largely abstained from voting on UN missions when the Soviet Union's and the People's Republic of China's interests were at play [7], often embracing a policy of not committing large combat forces to UN missions, preferring European or

Commonwealth troops and providing the diplomatic support. Since the 1990s, the new geopolitical reality has been engulfed with intrastate conflicts with far-reaching complications.

Between 1989 and 1994, the number of UN peacekeepers grew rapidly to over 70,000 in 10 missions [29]. This expansion in numbers and appearance of unipolarity on the international stage once again brought UN peacekeeping under scrutiny, as the new American geopolitical mantle began to restructure the institution in combination with Article 42 of the Charter's Chapter VII [9]. This article has become important for intrastate conflict resolution since it stated that the UNSC has the right to enforce peace against the consent of the conflict parties, which erodes the essence of the core principles of traditional peacekeeping. However, the limited funds and peacekeeping staff to resolve complex situations led the UN to shift from traditional partnership intervention to a hybrid system of operations where the UN carried out the operation in tandem with the regional organization. This trend is reflected in the UN peacekeeping's own trajectory for the future and expressed in "The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities" published in 2024 [38].

Methods and materials. This research employs contextual analysis as a core method to investigate the United States' evolving stance on UN peacekeeping, its missions, and the challenges it poses for UN peacekeeping. By analyzing a variety of texts such as the US National Security Strategy policy documents under recent presidential administrations; the Fiscal Year 2026 Discretionary Budget Requests; as well as the UN Security Council Resolutions and a significant body of academic literature about the topic, this study aims to examine how the US involvement in UN peacekeeping missions affects the missions and their nature. The US policy is based on the internal political context within the US, and the subsequent alterations in their strategic interests on the global arena affect the rest of the world, particularly the regions where the UN peacekeeping missions are currently deployed, such as Africa.

Hybrid missions, which blend traditional peacekeeping with military operations, present unique complexities. Since the United States weaves its strategic interests into peacekeeping

objectives by way of financial and material leverage in the UN, peacekeeping missions drift from traditional apolitical intervention to a hybrid model where the outreach of the mission is significantly defined by the political objectives of Washington rather than structural conditions, as is the case in a number of UN PKOs in Africa. Therefore, it is relevant to analyze the long-term consequences of hybrid missions and their stability in reducing violence in the African region by using the case studies of the ongoing PKOs on the continent.

Several significant documents have been examined. The document "US Funding to the UN System" highlights the financial role of the US in UN peacekeeping and the underlying strategic calculations that influence funding decisions. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018) [34] focuses on improving the accountability and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions, shedding light on the operational challenges of hybrid missions. UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013) [33] established the first offensive UN peacekeeping force, the Intervention Brigade, within the MONUSCO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, signaling a shift towards more militarized peacekeeping. National Security Strategy (NSS) Reports offer insights into the strategic priorities that shape US involvement in international peacekeeping. The analysis of US National Security Strategy policy documents provides the Presidential Administration's position on peacekeeping [24].

By examining these documents, the authors are better equipped to understand the extent to which the UN has engaged in hybrid missions and US participation in such missions through finance and troops [36]. By contextualizing these missions within legal and political frameworks, this study provides insight into the relationship between the United States and UN peacekeeping missions in Africa in recent years with a focus on prospects, exploring how this relationship may evolve in the coming years.

Analysis. This article analyzes the following research question: how has US geopolitical strategy transformed UN peacekeeping missions from a cooperative endeavor into a tool of strategic leverage? With evolving geopolitical dynamics, the existing research lacks an in-depth analysis of the political nature of peacekeeping

missions and how they oscillate between peace and stability with strategic and geopolitical interests. This research argues that US commitment to UN peacekeeping missions is often momentary and dependent on the United States' pursuit of its own strategic interests, which, due to the significant influence that the US holds over UN Peacekeeping, compels the latter to engage in hybrid missions.

The relationship between US foreign policy and UN peacekeeping has generated a substantial body of scholarship. Karlsrud [19] offers a comprehensive treatment of how multipolar geopolitics is reshaping UN peacekeeping mandates and operations, identifying the growing tension between the US' preferences and the rising contributions of China and other powers. Loidolt [23] specifically addresses the dimension of strategic competition, analyzing how the United States increasingly views UN peacekeeping as a platform for managing geopolitical rivalry rather than a purely normative endeavor.

The financial dimension of US engagement is analyzed by Attramadal [4], who tracks how US contributions fluctuated between the Obama and Trump administrations as a function of political conditions. Schaefer [30] examines the legacy of the Helms – Biden Act and calls for a new framework governing the US–UN financial relations, while the US Government Accountability Office [36] has documented the cost-effectiveness advantages of UN peacekeeping relative to unilateral US military deployments.

On hybrid missions specifically, Pelz and Lehmann [25] provide the foundational conceptual framework, defining hybridization as the integration of UN peacekeeping with regional organizations within a single mandated operation. Kumar [21] examines the UNAMID mission in Darfur as a case study of the practical and political limitations of the hybrid model. Soderberg [32] provides a baseline analysis of US support for UN peacekeeping prior to the major strategic shifts of the late 2010s, highlighting a model of limited but supportive engagement that contrasts with the more conditional and strategically driven approach observed after 2017. The trend towards hybridization of UN peacekeeping missions has been noted by many contemporary researchers of UN peacekeeping, particularly in the case of UN PKOs in Africa. Adekera [1], Furlow [15],

Bokeriya, and Khudaykulova [6] all conclude that successful conflict resolution in the African region will depend on how effectively UN peacekeeping cooperates with regional organizations that often serve as a “middleman” between the UN and local governments, distrustful of the organization due to the perceived high influence of the USA on the UN and its peacekeeping efforts [31].

The Obama administration's approach to externalizing the military burden is examined by Krieg [20], who frames it as part of a broader doctrine of indirect intervention. The strategic implications of the 2022 National Security Strategy for peacekeeping are assessed by Hamid et al. [16], who highlight the explicit linkage between multilateral engagement and great-power competition with other major powers. Cai et al. [7] analyze the evolving role of the UN Security Council in maintaining peace during geopolitical transition, contextualizing US behavior within a broader pattern of great-power rivalry.

Despite the existing body of literature, the field lacks an integrated analysis that traces US policy across administrations and connects funding conditionality, hybrid mission design, and strategic competition in a single analysis. This article aims to address that gap.

With the expanding geopolitical interests and growing points of contestation, peacekeeping missions have weighed more on political consensus, limiting the traditional peacekeeping principles. The United States no longer views UN peacekeeping as a cooperative space but as a strategic maneuver to secure its interests through its involvement in conflict zones [23]. The emergence of new security challenges and new regions of contestation has transformed peacekeeping operations.

In particular, the United States has begun to use UN peacekeeping as an extension of its global strategy. Under the Obama administration, UN missions were seen as a cost-effective alternative to US military intervention and a viable investment [20] to advance American security interests, which is confirmed by a report published by the US Government Publishing Office stating that peacekeeping missions concluded the operations for which the US military would have required double the budget [4].

In recent times the US participation in UN peacekeeping missions has significantly reduced,

measured by the fact that just 24 US peacekeepers serve as military staff officers in six ongoing UN peacekeeping missions – a downward trajectory from its highest number of 115 peacekeepers in 1993 [19]. This raises a question about US' continued interest in the UN peacekeeping agenda and impacts the ongoing processes and credibility of UN PKOs such as Sudan UN peacekeeping mission that concluded in 2021 and was seen as a failure to de-escalate the ongoing violence [21].

The United States has been the most significant financial contributor to UN peacekeeping [17], providing 26.95% of the budget in the financial year of 2024–2025. The analysis of the conditions that lead US to support or withhold funding is a direct result of the US president and congressional consensus that has oscillated at a peculiar pace, responding to the trend of politics that has been established by Trump's first administration since 2017 and which has proved to be an interesting development in American policy towards the United Nations.

This strategic interest vested its power through the US position in the UN Security Council that shapes peacekeeping mandates and priorities. The role of domestic political polarization in shaping US policy toward UN peacekeeping may become a more prominent theme, as the research sheds light on the United States seeing the UN peacekeeping missions as a strategic leverage to address logistical burdens while addressing the emerging geopolitical competition. This has been seen as a challenge, exacerbating existing tensions and insecurity that have limited the on-ground success of the missions [19]. The strategic interests of the United States define the level of commitment; for example, the United States has supported missions that have geopolitical stakes, which could be seen in Africa (e.g., MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo) and in the Middle East (e.g., UNIFIL in Lebanon).

The growing influence of China and other emerging powers in UN peacekeeping may lead to studies on how the US adapts its policy to maintain its leadership. The limitations of UN peacekeeping with US policy settings come when academic literature often critiques the inefficiencies and limitations of UN peacekeeping, especially in being slow to adapt to complex

conflicts, lacking sufficient resources, and struggling with unclear mandates. These inefficiencies often hinder mission effectiveness and prolong conflicts.

To combat these inefficiencies, the US has pushed for the integration of advanced technologies, such as drones for surveillance, data analytics for conflict prediction, and communication tools to enhance situational awareness. The issue of abuse by peacekeepers has been addressed [11] since the US has supported measures to strengthen accountability mechanisms, including stricter vetting, transparency, and victim support systems.

Another area that researchers are skeptical about is the hybrid missions that combine traditional peacekeeping with counterterrorism, stabilization, or state-building efforts. These missions are becoming more frequent in conflicts involving the intersection of political instability, terrorism, and armed groups. These operations often encounter difficulties, including maintaining civilian safety, managing complicated political environments, and striking a balance between the use of force and peacekeeping ideals. The United States has frequently provided financial, logistical, and intelligence support for hybrid missions. However, political and strategic factors occasionally restrict their direct involvement [19].

By finding an equilibrium, the US pursues the hybrid models within the spectrum of conventional peacekeeping efforts, which poses a question of how well the hybrid missions will accomplish long-term stability and peace if political interests and domestic policy uncertainties are involved, particularly in the last decade. Some operations have combined US strategic interests in a novel way when operating the UN peacekeeping missions by adopting a hybrid element, where the United Nations works jointly with one or more non-UN actors within a single mandated operation. For illustration, the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur was formally co-managed by the African Union and the United Nations, sharing command strategies and fiscal budget [21].

The integration involves parallel deployments to fully integrated command forces, blending the UN peacekeeping with regional forces to achieve high efficiency in operation execution, such as G5 Sahel forces. These missions add capabilities and regional expertise but also frustrate coordination

and cast skepticism over the operational mandate. The strategic objectives that the United States seeks to achieve are rooted in the NSS, which consistently appeals to American primacy, where the United States retains the hegemonic leadership while rhetorically framing to preserve a free and open world. This rhetorical juxtaposition has become a recurring feature of US foreign policy rather than an anomaly. In practice, US strategy prioritizes security maximization, economic interests, and strategic hedging against competing powers, thereby shaping both the selection and conduct of UN peacekeeping missions [19].

The United Nations Peacekeeping was designed as an impartial mechanism for conflict resolution. However, United Nations peacekeeping missions have been one of the cornerstones for “Multilateralism in Action,” an essential yet underutilized instrument in navigating peace and security in recent years. With the emerging geopolitical interests of the United States, these peacekeeping missions serve its security agendas, particularly through hybridization, merging traditional peacekeeping with counterterrorism and stabilization. In the National Security Strategy, one of the priorities was to “...isolate governments that refuse to act as responsible partners in advancing hemispheric peace and prosperity” [3], while embracing principled realism, as it acknowledges the central role of power in international politics, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines national interests.

The UN peacekeeping missions act on the mandate of the UNSC and intervene on the invitation of the state to monitor, examine, and collaborate with the state organization to de-escalate violence and ensure regional stability. The UN peacekeeping mission’s effectiveness is often defined by the political circumstances on the ground and the extent of political and financial support to the designated mission, demonstrating the UN peacekeeping mission’s dependence on stakeholders [25] such as China and the United States.

The United States has shown a long-lasting commitment to the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, supporting the hybrid missions in Sudan and Mali with the assistance of the African Union. These missions aim at realizing peace and stability in the region, while for the United States,

it reduces the cost of operations and burden on the United States military not to engage directly while securing the strategic interests in the region [36]. For instance, the study published in 2018 titled “UN Peacekeeping: Cost Estimate for Hypothetical US Operation Exceeds Actual Costs for Comparable UN Operation” [30] revealed that UN peacekeeping can be up to eight times more cost-effective than deploying US troops to a conflict zone. Despite the absence of direct impacts on the United States’ security, regional instability poses the capacity to harbor, nurture, and expand the non-state actors’ network, which could threaten the United States’ interests in the region.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a shift in the US approach towards securitization. The Bush administration’s “war on terror” heavily relied on “coalition-led militaries” rather than UN-mandated peacekeepers. This era witnessed ambivalence towards UN institutions and continuous scrutiny of failure to successfully conclude the missions. The era of unipolarity has been definitive, which is also reflected at the congressional level. Congress enacted the Helms – Biden Act in 1999 to cap the US contribution to the UN budget, fixed at 25 percent [22].

Under the Obama administration, there was constant engagement through multilateral institutionalism, which resulted in a surge in US contributions, however, within the mandated funding cap, as well as participation in training and intelligence sharing [13] for the missions in Africa and Asia. The focus remained aligned with US foreign policy objectives of reinstating American primacy through multilateralism.

Under the Biden administration, the promises of the Obama administration were reaffirmed by engagement with allies through international institutions, including the United Nations. In 2022 the US National Security Strategy highlighted the reassurance of the United States in its commitment to support the UN peacekeeping missions, stating, “We will work with allies to strengthen UN peacekeeping, ensuring missions are appropriately mandated, resourced, and accountable” [37], while advocating for modernization of the peacekeeping missions to address new threats such as cybersecurity and drone warfare [11]. Thus, National Security

Strategy 2022 [14] explicitly established an international peacebuilding approach as a broader part of counterterrorism efforts, while signaling that the US support for UN missions will now be considered in light of the existing strategic rivalries with other major powers.

Both of Trump's administrations took a skeptical stance towards multilateralism, especially towards the United Nations, which is reflected in the "Fiscal Year 2026 Discretionary Budget Request" [13] that includes eliminating US funding for all UN projects, including UN peacekeeping missions, citing "the United States has a history of paying for more than its fair share of international peacekeeping activities" as the reason. To meet the objectives, the United States leverages UN peacekeeping budgeting authority as a lever to demand readjustment in peace operations.

The US continued to express dissatisfaction with the ongoing missions and proposed funding cuts, which, under Trump's second administration, have been accelerating. The common thread is that the US has tied its participation to its strategic and geopolitical considerations, which allows it to wield influence, secure resources, and continue the great power rivalry [16].

The United States practiced different methods to implement its strategic partnership with UN peacekeeping throughout various geographic areas. It conducted the majority of its hybrid mission assistance to African conflicts through its support of three specific operations, which include UNAMID in Sudan, MINUSMA in Mali, and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as African conflicts present both strategic interests and a chance to share financial expenses with African regional organizations. To illustrate, the United States categorized jihadist violence in the Sahel region of Mali as an immediate danger to its national security interests, which resulted in active US embassy efforts to develop local military capabilities [2]. The United States backed MONUSCO's Intervention Brigade which became the first offensive UN force through Resolution 2098 (2013) [33] because it supported American objectives to bring stability to a country with critical geographic importance.

The UNMISS operation in South Sudan demonstrates how peacekeeping efforts interact with the great power competition that exists

between major powers. China used UNMISS to safeguard oil fields, owned by Chinese firms, because UN peacekeeping operations protect commercial interests, according to Bodetti's analysis [5]. The United States responded to the mission by pursuing its own agenda during the Security Council's discussions, which aimed to reduce Chinese power within United Nations operations.

The United States has chosen to engage strategically only in areas where its national interests are most essential to protect. For example, it preferred to conduct its operations through NATO instead of United Nations mandates during the 1990s Balkans missions because of its operational needs, while in Central America it implemented standard peacekeeping operations through observer missions that used limited hybrid elements because US observers perceived lower strategic threats in the region.

Results. The United States is the largest contributor to the UN budget, which means that around 1.3 billion dollars [14] of American taxpayers' money goes to UN peacekeeping. This grants the United States de facto leverage over the UN peacekeeping missions while slashing the military expenditure by half to achieve the identical security objectives in those regions by substituting the military forces through peacekeepers. This dynamic is also evident in the Security Council.

Another area of US interest is the counterterrorism strategy, which has become a central pillar of the US security policy. Through financial leverage and political influence over UN peacekeeping operations, UN PKOs in conflict-prone regions often intersect with terrorism, giving the US another reason to reaffirm its hegemonic leadership [10]. As was previously mentioned, Mali is a case in point where the jihadist violence in the Sahel has been framed by US policy as a direct threat to American security, which triggered an immediate response by the active involvement of the US embassy in capacity-building measures of the regional forces to eliminate the jihadist threat to American security interests in the region. The counterterrorism imperative also assists in providing a comprehensive understanding of US cooperation with other actors through the United Nations peacekeeping operations, such as Sahel [2], highlighting how the US counterterrorist agenda shapes peacekeeping by justifying the US

to assert strategic control over United Nations deployments at the extremist hotspots.

Finally, the United States sees UN PKOs as a domain of rivalry with other major global leaders such as the People's Republic of China, as their growing role in the United Nations [12] and African region has been a particular concern. In recent years Beijing has dramatically increased its peacekeeper contributions, assumed the second position in the funding of UN peacekeeping, and has used peacekeeping operations to protect its investments overseas. The most glaring illustration was the South Sudan case, where China leveraged UNMISS to defend oil fields in which Chinese companies held an equity [5]. The U.S. responded not by withdrawing support, but by pushing its own agenda and expressing its position in Security Council debates.

Over the last thirty years, the US has aspired to shift its financier role in UN peacekeeping to a more assertive strategy due to the resurgence of geopolitical realities. This manifestation of leverage by the United States over funding, counterterrorism imperatives, and rivalries has reoriented many UN missions from purely cooperative endeavors to instruments of strategic influence through hybridization of peacekeeping missions, blending traditional peacekeeping with military operations.

At the central stage, the US continues to hedge its deep engagement within the UN peacekeeping to design and steer the UN peacekeeping operations in the direction of the American security goals. This transformation, on the one hand, brings resources and capabilities by insisting on robust mandates and accountability. The United States declares that it wants to ensure

that UN peacekeeping has clear objectives and support among the allies. On the other hand, treating peacekeeping as a geopolitical instrument undermines the normative nature of UN peacekeeping by superseding the political consent and leading to the crisis of legitimacy in missions, as was illustrated by PKOs in the African region. The UN interests are moving towards more flexible funding, as stated in the UNSC Resolution 2719 [37], and that could accommodate US preferences for burden-sharing with allies.

In conclusion, the US has aspired to change the character of UN peacekeeping in the 21st century by steering the UN peacekeeping operations into aligning with American strategic interests, as the peacekeeping missions continue to drift from politically neutral and consent-based interventions into hybrid models whose agenda is determined by the objectives of the major political powers, such as the United States, that use them as leverage to address their interests abroad. However, American hegemonic leadership might be on its way to decline, as the new geopolitical rivals challenge the long-standing American primacy. Moving forward, a delicate diplomatic engagement and confidence-building measures among the UNSC members and between UN peacekeeping and regional organizations will be pivotal for the smooth functioning of the UN peacekeeping missions in the future.

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A FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY'S FORMATION BY UNITED STATES PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP IN 2025

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The presidency of Donald Trump's second term is significantly different from his first term. Therefore, the article's objectives were to analyze a foreign policy strategy's formation and the political technologies used by the American president's administration on the international arena in cooperation with other countries in the first year of his presidency. *Methods and materials.* The scientific principle of objectivity and the evolutionist scientific approach were used as methodology in the article. E.M. Primakov – M.A. Khrustalev's method of situational analysis in international relations was used as the main scientific method. The article's author used some materials from American news publications, official White House reports, and American analysts and experts' opinions from other countries. *Analysis.* A comparative analysis revealed changes in the United States' foreign policy approaches and new American political technologies both in the field of international trade and in maintaining its hegemony. *Results.* The study showed that the United States faced new challenges in world politics in 2025 and was not ready to solve them. The United States itself has added the problem of tariffs to the international trading system. The United States has not been able to develop a sufficiently flexible foreign policy strategy or doctrine. The political technologies used by the United States in international relations are still insufficiently effective and efficient. "The art of the deal" in world politics used by Donald Trump is faced, if not with misunderstanding, then in many cases with rejection because it allows the United States to change previously adopted agreements. In addition, the American principle of getting the desired result "through force" does not work in many cases, especially in relations with China, Russia, Iran, and other countries. Formally, "The United States Foreign Policy Strategy 2025," adopted and published in December, outlined the path in the foreign policy of the President Donald Trump administration for the remainder of his second term, which is to maintain the principles of national conservatism bequeathed by the United States founding fathers.

Key words: United States, Israel, Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Donald Trump, trade tariffs, international conflicts.

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ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ СТРАТЕГИИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТОМ США Д. ТРАМПОН В 2025 ГОДУ

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Аннотация. *Введение.* Президентство второго срока Д. Трампа значительно отличается от его первого срока. Поэтому задачей статьи стал анализ формирования внешнеполитической стратегии, используемой администрацией американского президента на международной арене по взаимодействию с другими странами в первый год своего президентства. *Методы и материалы.* В статье в качестве методологии были использованы: научный принцип объективности и эволюционистский научный подход. В качестве основного научного метода применялся метод ситуационного анализа в международных отношениях Е.М. Примакова –

М.А. Хрусталёва. В статье были использованы материалы американских новостных изданий, официальные сообщения Белого Дома. *Анализ.* Сравнительный анализ позволил выявить изменения во внешнеполитических подходах США, новые американские политические технологии как в сфере международной торговли, так и в вопросе поддержания своей гегемонии. *Результаты.* Проведенное исследование показало, что США в 2025 г. столкнулись с новыми вызовами в мировой политике и оказались неготовыми к их разрешению. Сами США добавили себе проблему тарифов в международной торговой системе. США не смогли выработать достаточно гибкую внешнеполитическую стратегию или доктрину. Используемые США политические технологии в международных отношениях пока недостаточно эффективны и результативны. «Искусство заключать сделки» Д. Трампа в мировой политике наталкиваются если не на непонимание, то во многих случаях на непринятие, потому что оно позволяет США менять ранее принятые договоренности. К тому же американский принцип получение нужного для себя результата «через силу» – во многих случаях не работает, особенно в отношениях с Китаем, Россией, Ираном и другими странами. Формально «Внешиполитическая стратегия США, 2025», принятая и опубликованная в декабре месяце, наметила путь во внешней политике администрации президента Д. Трампа на оставшееся время второго срока президентства, заключающейся в поддержании принципов национального консерватизма, завещанных отцами-основателями США.

Ключевые слова: США, Израиль, Иран, Россия, Украина, Д. Трамп, торговые тарифы, международные конфликты.

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Introduction. Foreign policy initiatives of the second term of the presidency of D. Trump began to appear in the public space immediately after his election on November 5, 2024.

As for the future foreign policy strategy, D. Trump declared himself as a peacemaker who will stop hostilities in Ukraine “in 24 hours” and “centers on hardheaded dealmaking” [23] and reduce possible systemic risks among opponents and allies who may represent these countries. He even portrayed NATO allies “as free riders enriching themselves under U.S.” [23; 68, p. 225].

It should be noted that all D. Trump's statements were not formed at the level of any specific programs, concepts, and doctrines but constituted his intuitive sense of the need to completely change the policy of Joe Biden's democratic administration [68, p. 227].

Methods and materials. The article uses the scientific principle of objectivity and an evolutionist scientific approach. The method of situational analysis in international relations by E.M. Primakov – M.A. Khrustalev was used as a scientific method.

The situational analysis's use in the study of D. Trump's American foreign policy strategy made it possible to establish its stages and nature formation, peculiarities of using political technologies to pressure partners and rivals, and forecasting individual specific international political situations.

There are materials from American news publications, official reports of the White House, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America-2025, and opinions of American experts and analysts from other countries that were used as materials in the article.

Analysis

D. Trump's foreign policy statements after his election in the period of November 6, 2024 – January 19, 2025

Elected on November 5, 2024, US President D. Trump, before taking office on January 20, 2025, used the possible foreign policy intentions of his administration in the public space (in speeches and on the Truth Social network).

So on December 20, 2024, he threatened to impose duties: on the European Union if the bloc does not purchase large volumes of American oil and gas to compensate for the growing trade deficit with the United States; on Mexico and Canada, 25 percent duties in order to tighten border controls on their part; as well as an additional 10 percent duty on China as punishment for fentanyl exports [34].

On Christmas days in 2024, D. Trump on the Truth Social network pointed out the injustice that has developed in the operation of the Panama Canal, where Panama and China, and not the

United States, became the beneficiaries. At the same time, he criticized Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, saying that he could cut taxes in his country “if they’d be oh so kind enough to become our ‘51st State’” [19].

On January 6, 2025, D. Trump reiterated his decision to introduce universal trade duties, which will extend the tax benefits he introduced in 2017 for a new period [21]. On January 14, 2025, D. Trump announced that he would create the External Revenue Service (ERS) “to collect our Tariffs, Duties, and all Revenue that come from Foreign sources” [26].

In January 2025, D. Trump began to openly talk about the need to transfer Greenland to US control, refusing to exclude military or economic force to achieve this goal. Greenland’s annexation was justified by both the national interests of the United States and the creation of geopolitical stability in the Arctic region [11].

As a result, we can say that D. Trump, before the start of the second presidential term, successfully created for himself a new image of the American nation’s father, which can return the justice and prosperity of the “Gilded Age” by imposing duties, as measures of political and economic pressure, contributing to the return to the homeland of American TNCs, creating a perspective for the territory’s expansion of the United States, and preserving American hegemony by increasing the obligations and expenses of its Western allies to preserve the existing world order.

D. Trump’s intentions in US foreign policy even began to be compared to “like a Swiss army knife: a tool for every occasion” [20].

***Approaches to US foreign policy
for the first 100 days
of D. Trump’s presidency
(January 20 – April 28)***

In America, it is customary to measure the effectiveness and evaluate the results of the newly elected president in the next hundred days, especially during the first year of work in office. Indeed, if we compare these periods of President D. Trump, we can find significant differences in the foreign policy approaches of the presidential administration we are considering.

The nature of the first 100 days of D. Trump’s presidency can be called, on the one

hand, intuitive and almost completely opposing Joe Biden’s foreign policy and, on the other, destroying the international structure of the existing world order [3, p. 443]. It is no coincidence that for the first time during his presidency, D. Trump signed decrees canceling many important international agreements and decisions of the American government related to foreign policy.

Moreover, in the regional direction, the main issues include the deportation of illegal migrants to their countries of origin [2; 10]; the creation of special prisons for migrants abroad [57]; the self-deportation mechanism for migrants from the United States [5]; the introduction of fines for disrupting the announced self-deportation from 998 up to \$1 million per day or confiscation of property [31]; the termination of temporary protected status for migrants from Venezuela [47], then for Haiti and Cuba, and at the end of the 100-day period for Ukrainians. At the same time, President D. Trump exerted tariff pressure on Mexico and Canada [22; 28; 33] and carried out provocative actions in relation to Greenland.

On March 4, 2025, the BlackRock consortium made a deal worth US \$22.8 billion to buy two large ports of the Panama Canal owned by the Hong Kong conglomerate amid intense pressure from US President D. Trump over alleged Chinese interference on a critical trade route [12]. BlackRock acquired a 90% stake in current owner CK Hutchison’s subsidiary, which operates the two ports, bringing both ports under US jurisdiction.

A separate direction in world politics should be considered the intention of President D. Trump to stop hostilities between Hamas and Israel in Gaza [38] and military actions between Ukraine and Russia [3, p. 444; 17], and the threat of not making a “deal” according to President D. Trump should have led to punishment of Russia [54; 59].

The US president actively intervened in the domestic politics of other states. So on February 3, 2025, he announced that he would cut aid to South Africa due to the land reform carried out by the government of President S. Ramaphosa [1].

On March 3, 2025, D. Trump signed a memorandum in which he indicated that the United States does not support the so-called “Global Tax Deal” recommended by the OECD countries, and as for the European Union, he promised to introduce 25% duties on the export of goods [56].

On April 2, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order to levy tariffs on imported goods during an event in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, announcing the introduction of a 10 percent total duty on all imports to the United States, with the exception of Canada and Mexico, as well as targeted duties for dozens of other countries [8]. The basis for this was the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), which gives the president broad powers to regulate various economic operations after the declaration of a national emergency [69].

Having caused shock among Western trading partners and opponents among developing countries, a week later, President D. Trump imposed a 90-day pause on retaliatory duties on foreign trading partners, with the exception of China, to which they were set at 125% [65]. The introduction of the pause by Trump was adopted in the spirit of his commercial ideas about making deals, outlined by him in the book "The Art of Making Deals" [71]. On April 9, 2025, President D. Trump said that "the US is earning '\$2 billion a day' from tariffs" [41].

On April 25, 2025, D. Trump gave an interview to "Time" magazine at the end of the first 100 days of the second term's presidency. In terms of foreign policy, he confirmed that his opinion about Canada joining the United States as the 51st state is not trolling but an objective necessity for Canada itself [46]. In the same place, he said that the promise to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours was a "joke" [46].

Thus, summing up the first 100 days of D. Trump's presidency, it should be noted that the foreign policy course in the regional dimension was tougher than the course on the world stage. Although he continued, on the one hand, to declare American peacekeeping and, on the other hand, to conduct military operations in violation of international law.

So in February 2025, Trump ordered an air attack on ISIS cave complexes in the semi-autonomous Puntland region of Somalia with fighters launched from the Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier located in the Red Sea. An important and visible result of the first 100 days of D. Trump's presidency was the cessation of immigrant lines' movement on the US-Mexican border towards the United States, which decreased by 95–99% [53].

On April 28, 2025, in an interview with "The Atlantic," Donald Trump assessed the first 100 days of his second presidency: "The first time, I had two things to do – run the country and survive; I had all these crooked guys. And the second time, I run the country and the world" [66]. He gave the same high praise in an interview on Meet the Press [52].

***Forming US foreign policy doctrine
during the second 100 days
of D. Trump's Presidency
(April 29 – August 6)***

Immediately, we note that the second 100 days of D. Trump's presidency have become more saturated with foreign policy initiatives. On May 8, 2025, President D. Trump announced a trade agreement with Great Britain, noting that it was "the first of many." It included a 10 percent tariff on imports from the UK, but supplied cars will be taxed at a reduced rate [72].

From May 13 to 16, 2025, President D. Trump undertook a tour of the Middle East's monarchies [6]: Saudi Arabia [27]; Qatar [18], where he noted its mediation role in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict [63]; and the UAE [60], where it was decided to create an AI data center with the participation of American companies [16]. The UAE has pledged to invest a 10-year "investment contribution" in the amount of USD 1.4 trillion in the United States [30].

The main expectations of this tour for D. Trump were receiving billions of dollars in investment for the United States; promoting the "New US Policy in the Middle East" [42]; and discussing the possibilities of a more active regional policy of the monarchies at the regional level [27], including in relations between Israel and Iran.

As for trade deals on tariffs, by June 3, 2025, the presidential administration had only one real deal with the UK, so the US trade representative "sent this letter to all of our trading partners just to give them a friendly reminder that the deadline is coming up" (July 9, 2025) [51]. On June 27, 2025, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent admitted that Donald Trump's trade negotiations are likely to continue until September [50], as many countries are in no hurry to conclude trade agreements with the United States [32].

The 51st G-7 summit was called "One Against Six" in the American media and became

important and indicative in relations between the United States and its closest Western allies.

It took place from June 15 to June 17, 2025, in the village of Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada. The summit got its name due to the growing contradictions between Western allies and the United States in world politics. If D. Trump is ready to put an end to the war in Ukraine, then European countries are ready to provide military assistance to Ukraine to the last Ukrainian to defeat Russia.

At the summit, D. Trump suggested that Russia be admitted again to the group. He also said that the war in Ukraine would not have happened if Moscow had remained in the club [75].

An irritant for D. Trump was also Macron's demonstrative arrival at the summit in Canada via Greenland. The United States has blocked a proposed G-7 statement calling on Israel and Iran to de-escalate the conflict, highlighting the distance formed between President D. Trump and the other block's members [74]. The American president left Kananaskis ahead of schedule, the day before the end of the summit [37].

An important foreign policy event was the participation of the United States in the Iranian-Israeli conflict, which began on June 13, 2025, with an unprecedented Israeli military operation against Iran with strikes on nuclear facilities, military bases, and command personnel. This attack, dubbed "the Nation of Lions," was a response to a growing nuclear threat from Tehran, according to Israeli authorities.

On the night of June 22, the United States attacked three Iranian nuclear facilities – in Isfahan, Fordo, and Natanz. As D. Trump himself said, these bombings were supposed to fulfill two goals: to eliminate nuclear facilities in Iran [4; 35] and to stop the deadly exchange of missile strikes for the population of both Israel and Iran [7]. But in opposing D. Trump, it can be argued that the actions of the United States were illegitimate [36; 70] and dangerous [55] and could have consequences for the United States itself [56].

On May 15, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requested 20,000 National Guard troops to assist the Trump administration with immigration enforcement at the US-Mexican border [45] and to expand the repatriation of migrants. The administration also began using the State Department's \$3 billion

"America's First Opportunity Fund" to encourage more countries to take back their citizens who are residing illegally in the US [67].

Thus, summing up the second 100 days of D. Trump's presidency, we can say that the US foreign policy strategy slowly but fully completed its design with bomb attacks on Iranian territory and thus confirmed continuity in foreign policy, despite the change of administrations. Good intentions to end conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine have failed. The unconditional support of the United States for Israel and the increase in spending by NATO countries to 5% of GDP clearly speak of the militaristic nature of D. Trump's American administration.

As for the constant American threat to impose trade duties with all countries, their months-long process of introducing them has clearly shown that the main issue for Trump is the possibility of political pressure and the ostentatious nature of American power in the world, but not economic benefits.

The US foreign policy strategy during D. Trump's third 100 days (August 7 – October 15)

"We will measure our success," Mr. Trump announced in his Inaugural Address, "not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end – and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into" [73]. But by the 300th day of his presidency, the United States had bombed Iran in violation of international law, supplied weapons and intelligence to Ukraine and Israel, and armed European NATO members, effectively forcing them to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP [49].

During the six months of D. Trump's presidency, the number of American troops abroad has not decreased, except "to withdraw several hundred soldiers from some vulnerable positions in Syria" [73], neither American military bases, nor military alliances, nor the number of weapons sold.

Deferred tariffs, which entered into force on July 9 and others on August 1, 2025, became an instrument of coercion and power not so much in the economic sphere as in the political one [25; 15]. So, for India, import duties were established in the amount of 50%, with 25% as secondary duties for the purchase of oil from Russia [62; 46]. In addition, by his decree, President

D. Trump imposed a special tariff of 40% on goods supplied to the United States through other countries [64]. The introduction of duties on imports to the United States, incomplete for all countries, reduced America's trade deficit to \$60.2 billion, or 16.0%, in June 2025 [9].

Moreover, American tariffs have become an instrument of interference in the internal affairs of some Latin American states. So, the United States established 50% duties on Brazil for the trial of former Brazilian President J. Bolsonaro [24; 40] and Colombia for the trial of former President A. Uribe [43; 13]. Brazilian beef exporters alone could face US \$1 billion in lost sales in the second half of 2025 [14].

The same situation for South Africa. S. Ramaphosa tried to maintain a civilized relationship with D. Trump. But the undisguised interference of the American president in the agricultural reform's process in an African country is interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state [61].

In his peacekeeping actions, US President D. Trump uses double standards. If, in relation to Israel, he admits the possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza (stopping the Arabs from receiving humanitarian food aid), then on the part of Russia, conducting its Special War Operation (SWO) in Ukraine, there is the possibility of ultimatum demands to end the conflict [58]. From the beginning, the deadline for D. Trump's ultimatum to end hostilities in Ukraine was set until September 2, which is almost a month, and then reduced to 10 days until August 8, 2025 [76]. As an additional pressure on Russia, D. Trump "directed two US nuclear submarines be positioned in "appropriate regions" [29].

As a result, the following conclusions can be drawn. During the third 100 days of D. Trump's presidency, approaches and mechanisms have finally developed in the conduct of the American foreign policy strategy. Like past strategies, it has continuity, and its main goal is to maintain American hegemony through force, including in the use of military force against weak opponents. A new and significant difference is the use of economic mechanisms in this strategy, such as trade duties, for conducting a foreign policy to comply primarily with national interests among both allies and opponents. The declared American peacemaking has double standards and is

conducted in the collective West's interests. As international experts rightly point out: "The United States now has only one single uncritical ally – Israel" [39, p. 100].

***"US Foreign Policy Strategy 2025,"
as the theoretical basis of the second term
of the presidency of D. Trump
and the outcome of the first year in power***

On December 5, 2025, the White House released a new National Security Strategy [48]. The strategy proposes to actually return to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 – the idea of US dominance in the Western Hemisphere, due to the impossibility of ensuring global hegemony, which was imposed by past administrations on America and which went beyond the national interests.

Analysis of NSS 2025 certainly requires separate consideration, but here we can say that new and important provisions of the strategy were the recognition of the Indo-Pacific region as a key field of future geopolitical battles; identifying China as an economic challenge to the US; the need to prevent direct conflict between the United States and China, including the situation around Taiwan; the Middle East's declining importance in US foreign policy; and the priority of border protection and the fight against mass migration, which is called an existential threat to the United States and Europe.

Results. The study showed that despite the preparation of Project 2025, the formation of a foreign policy strategy by US President D. Trump in the first year of his second presidency was chaotic and idiosyncratic. America faced new challenges in world politics, the most difficult of which were the conflicts between Israel and Hamas, as well as between Russia and Ukraine. The United States itself has added a tariff problem to the international trading system.

An analysis of numerous sources showed that in the United States, in three 100-day periods of 2025, the final foreign policy strategy of the new American administration was developed. The strategy's essence remained the same – the preservation of American hegemony in the world. The new foreign policy mechanisms were geopolitical threats and trade duties, which radically changed the international trading system. The results of these changes are not yet obvious,

but it should be assumed that in the future they will have a negative impact not only on the countries for which duties were imposed but also on the United States itself.

As for international conflicts, the deep causes of conflicts were not affected in their resolution, and their ending is not enshrined in international law. D. Trump's "art of making deals"

in world politics comes across, if not as misunderstanding, then in many cases as non-acceptance, because it allows the United States to change previously adopted agreements. In addition, the American principle of obtaining the desired result "through force" does not work in many cases, especially in relations with China, Russia, Iran, and other countries [44].

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BEYOND US HEGEMONY: SINO-RUSSIAN NETWORKED SECURITY AND THE RISE OF AN ARCHIPELAGIC GLOBAL ORDER

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The current paper studies the networked security cooperation between China and Russia within the emerging fragmented world order, where American hegemony is on the verge of decline. A multipolar structure relies on the heart of this emerging order, in which clusters of states form autonomous, interlinked “archipelagos” based on shared strategic interests. *Methods and materials.* Using the theory of Networked Security Complexes (NSC) as the theoretical framework, this study looks at how China and Russia respond to changing geopolitical patterns by creating interconnected security architectures that challenge conventional U.S.-dominated alliances. The study is seeking to answer the question of why and how China and Russia have significantly strengthened their security cooperation, constructing a strategic partnership, and how this partnership contributes to the new archipelago-based world order. To answer this question, methodologically, the research adopts a qualitative approach, integrating discourse analysis of official documents, joint statements, and strategic policy papers with process-tracing of key diplomatic and military engagements between Beijing and Moscow from 2010 to 2024. *Analysis and results.* The paper views Sino-Russian cooperation in contemporary world politics as a strategic deployment to fragmentation, suggesting an alternative version of regional stability, which, in turn, puts emphasis on sovereignty, non-interference, and mutual security guarantees over unipolar security leadership. Finally, the study comes to the conclusion that the aforementioned Sino-Russian network signifies not only contestation against Western-led global governance but also the alignment with the autonomous security balancing strategy, highlighting the rise of a polycentric and archipelago-based security governance system as the defining feature of the present-day international system.

Key words: Sino-Russian cooperation, China, Russia, Archipelago-based World Order, NSC.

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ЗА ПРЕДЕЛАМИ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ГЕГЕМОНИИ: КИТАЙСКО-РОССИЙСКАЯ СЕТЕВАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ И СТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО ПОРЯДКА АРХИПЕЛАЖНОГО ТИПА

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Аннотация. *Введение.* В данной статье рассматривается сетевая безопасность и сотрудничество между Китаем и Россией в условиях формирующегося фрагментированного мирового порядка, в котором американская гегемония находится на грани упадка. В основе этого нового порядка лежит многополярная структура, в рамках которой группы государств образуют автономные, взаимосвязанные «архипелаги», основан-

ные на общих стратегических интересах. *Методы и материалы.* Используя теорию сетевых комплексов безопасности (Networked Security Complexes, NSC) в качестве теоретической рамки, исследование анализирует, каким образом Китай и Россия реагируют на изменяющиеся геополитические конфигурации посредством создания взаимосвязанных архитектур безопасности, бросающих вызов традиционным союзам, доминируемым Соединенными Штатами. Исследование направлено на ответ на вопрос о том, почему и каким образом Китай и Россия значительно усилили свое сотрудничество в сфере безопасности, сформировав стратегическое партнерство, а также о том, каким образом данное партнерство способствует становлению нового мирового порядка, основанного на принципе «архипелагов». Для ответа на этот вопрос в методологическом плане исследование использует качественный подход, объединяя дискурс-анализ официальных документов, совместных заявлений и стратегических программных материалов с методом process-tracing ключевых дипломатических и военных взаимодействий между Пекином и Москвой в период с 2010 по 2024 год. *Анализ и результаты.* В статье китайско-российское сотрудничество в современной мировой политике рассматривается как стратегический ответ на глобальную фрагментацию, предлагающий альтернативную модель региональной стабильности, которая, в свою очередь, делает акцент на суверенитете, невмешательстве и взаимных гарантиях безопасности вместо однополярного лидерства в сфере безопасности. В заключение исследование приходит к выводу, что вышеупомянутая китайско-российская сеть означает не только оспаривание западнцентричного глобального управления, но и согласование с автономной стратегией балансирования безопасности, подчеркивая рост полицентрической системы управления безопасностью как определяющей характеристики современной международной системы.

Ключевые слова: китайско-российское сотрудничество, Китай, Россия, мировой порядок, базирующийся на архипелаге, NSC.

Цитирование. Джавади Р. За пределами американской гегемонии: китайско-российская сетевая безопасность и становление глобального порядка архипелажного типа // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. – 2026. – Т. 31, № 2. – С. 40–50. – (На англ. яз.). – DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2026.2.4>

Introduction. In recent decades, the liberal international order dominated by the United States has encountered significant challenges, gradually giving rise to a fragmented global system marked by regional powers asserting greater autonomy in international affairs [14, p. 8]. This shift has intensified as American hegemony has weakened, notably following the financial crisis of 2008, creating a geopolitical vacuum that allowed for the emergence of multiple power centers [19, pp. 205–206]. Within this multipolar reality, states have begun aligning themselves into distinct clusters or “archipelagos,” prioritizing cooperation based on mutual interests and shared strategic goals rather than adherence to overarching global norms established during US predominance [1, p. 32].

At the forefront of this emerging structure, China and Russia have notably deepened their strategic partnership in East Asia, becoming principal architects of what scholars now characterize as “networked security.” This approach to international security governance differs markedly from the US-centric model, as it emphasizes bilateral and multilateral coordination without a clear hegemonic center [18, p. 18]. As American influence recedes, Beijing and Moscow have consciously positioned

their relationship as a counterweight to Western dominance, capitalizing on their complementary strengths to address regional and global security challenges collaboratively.

The paper sets the starting point of the study from 2010 primarily because this period marked a notable intensification in Sino-Russian relations, especially following the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Around this time, China and Russia accelerated cooperation within frameworks like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and subsequently initiated coordinated responses to events such as the Arab Spring (2011) and the geopolitical tensions following the Ukraine crisis (2014). Furthermore, China’s ascendance to the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 solidified its global influence and created a new environment and perception of this state in the geopolitical arena. During this period, China and Russia aligned their interests in opposing U.S.-led security and economic frameworks, establishing a solid foundation for these two states to deepen their involvement in developing stronger security cooperation.

Addressing the strategic convergence between Russia and China requires a theoretical

lens capable of encapsulating today's complex world politics. The framework of Networked Security Complexes (NSC) proposed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever provides such a lens, explaining how security interdependencies between states can outweigh traditional boundaries, leading to the formation of clusters of interlinked security relationships [7, p. 45]. This theory explains not only the Sino-Russian mutual interaction but also their broader engagement within multilateral frameworks such as the SCO and BRICS. Networked security thus implies a layered structure of bilateral agreements and multilateral engagements that collectively shape a coherent security architecture resistant to external hegemonic pressures [7, p. 47].

The recent evolution of Sino-Russian relations underscores how discursive alignment facilitates practical cooperation. A thorough examination of official joint statements and strategic policy papers reveals shared language promoting multipolarity, sovereignty, and non-interference. This common discourse explicitly criticizes Western interventionism and unilateralism, framing NATO expansion and US-led alliances as destabilizing forces within the international system [15]. For instance, the pivotal joint declaration signed by President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping during the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022 emphasized the rejection of "Cold War mentality" and NATO's eastward expansion, underscoring a mutual commitment to reshape international security governance according to principles opposed to Western hegemonic dominance [15].

Discursive convergence between Russia and China translates into concrete diplomatic alignment and military coordination. Diplomatic cooperation has been notably visible in multilateral forums such as the United Nations Security Council, where both countries have consistently coordinated their vetoes on critical issues ranging from Syria to North Korea, effectively challenging Western-backed resolutions aimed at regime change or sanctions [3, p. 112]. These joint positions reflect a strategic calculation aimed at preserving sovereignty norms and preventing precedents of external intervention, which both nations view as existential threats to their internal stability and international standing.

In tandem with diplomatic alignment, Sino-Russian military cooperation has markedly intensified, reinforcing their shared discourse. Since the early 2010s, joint military exercises have become much more common and complicated. For example, the Vostok-2018 exercises were the first time China took part in a large-scale strategic military drill on Russian soil [34, p. 2, 8]. Further demonstrations of military cohesion include joint naval exercises across strategic waterways like the South China Sea, East China Sea, Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean, deliberately aimed at sending geopolitical signals to the United States and its allies regarding Sino-Russian military interoperability and mutual support [31; 34, p. 4].

Such activities are underpinned by extensive arms trade and technological cooperation, with notable transactions including China's procurement of advanced Russian defense systems like the S-400 missile defense system (2015–2020) and Su-35 fighter jets, indicating a significant leap in bilateral trust and strategic alignment [6, p. 6; 28].

The significance of Sino-Russian networked security cooperation extends beyond mere bilateral engagement; it signals a broader strategic intention to reshape the global order into a polycentric system of governance. This evolution, marked by growing regional autonomy and clusters of strategic cooperation, contrasts sharply with the post-Cold War unipolar moment characterized by US preeminence [19, p. 207]. Sino-Russian strategic alignment, therefore, represents a deliberate response to perceived deficiencies and threats within the Western-led global order, promoting instead a multipolar configuration based on decentralized, networked interactions [18, p. 20].

Ultimately, analyzing Sino-Russian cooperation within the fragmented global context provides critical insights into how contemporary powers adapt strategically to a world marked by declining hegemony and increasing regionalization. This analysis highlights not only how these states coordinate to challenge Western dominance but also how they proactively establish alternative structures for global governance. By emphasizing a multipolar world order that prioritizes sovereignty and an "archipelago-based" order instead of a hegemonic order, China and Russia offer an attractive counter-narrative to states seeking

alternatives to Western-led alliances and governance mechanisms, effectively contributing to the ongoing decentralization of global power and reshaping contemporary international relations [1, p. 115].

Methods and materials. As for the methodology, the study has shed light on the discourse analysis and process tracing of diplomatic and military engagements between China and Russia from 2010 and 2024. In international relations, discourse analysis focuses on examining how language and official narratives shape political realities. For analyzing Sino-Russian relations, the primary documents include joint statements, official speeches, strategic policy papers and doctrines, statements within international forums (e.g., UN Security Council). Here are the specific sources assessed for the core of the study:

1. Joint Statement on International Relations and Global Sustainable Development (2022): Issued during the Xi-Putin summit in February 2022, this document clearly opposed U.S.-dominated international governance and advocated multipolarity, sovereignty, and non-interference. Furthermore, the statement showed that Moscow and Beijing were backing each other on issues like Ukraine and Taiwan, reflecting an important strategic alignment. On the other side of the ledger, they criticized NATO expansion as destabilizing, which highlighted a notable rhetorical coordination between the two countries [15].

2. Russia's Foreign Policy Concept (2023): This document explicitly picks Beijing as Moscow's primary strategic partner for establishing a fair, multipolar world order, highlighting the collective efforts to pragmatically oppose the Western hegemonic practices that hinders the collaborative efforts among the nations [22].

3. China's Global Security Initiative (2022): Introduced by President Xi Jinping in April 2022 at the Boao Forum for Asia, this foreign policy framework put forward the idea of "indivisible security," reflecting Russian views and directly challenging the U.S.-led security order, which empowered the ideological alignment between Beijing and Moscow. At the same time, it expressed its firm stance against bloc politics, unilateralism, and "Cold War mentalities" [21].

4. United Nations Security Council Vetoes and Statements (2011–present): During 2011–

2026, Russia and China's concrete actions in the UN, summarized in their repeated coordinated vetoes on resolutions regarding Myanmar and the Syrian civil war, further underline their commitment to sovereignty and non-interference. They have used their veto powers on important international issues, specifically in conflict zones, to show their shared opposition to the Western-led interventions [32].

5. National Security Strategy of the United States (2025): This document clearly confesses to the wrong positioning of the U.S. during the Cold War and endorses a multipolar world in which the U.S. is no longer a hegemon [33, p. 1].

Process tracing of diplomatic and military engagements is another tool to investigate and explore the links between the two countries in question. Process-tracing is a method that tracks causal mechanisms through key events and interactions, clearly revealing how and why actors choose certain policy paths. Key examples of diplomatic engagements between the two states include the high-level summits and exchanges (2014–2024) and SCO and BRICS summits (2010–present). Regular meetings between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, notably post-Crimea annexation in 2014, the Vladivostok summit (2019), and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, symbolized consistent bilateral strategic solidarity, particularly in opposition to Western sanctions and geopolitical pressures [5]. In addition, SCO and Brics summits, as multilateral platforms, have become vehicles for articulating alternative economic and security visions opposing Western-led governance. Both nations leveraged these forums for coordinated diplomatic messaging [27].

The two states' responses to international crises can also be categorized by shared interests and engagements. Regarding the Ukraine crisis (2014 – present), China abstained from condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea and maintained diplomatic neutrality during Russia's invasion of Ukraine (2022), indirectly supporting Russia's diplomatic positions [17, pp. 233-252; 26, p. 148]. Also, in the Syrian Civil War (2011 – present), consistent joint vetoes against Western-backed resolutions at the UN highlighted unified diplomatic strategies protecting mutual interests against regime change policies [9].

The two countries have also enjoyed joint military exercises and military/technology

cooperation. Vostok-2018 is the prominent engagement between the two countries in which China's extensive participation in Russian strategic military exercises demonstrated a significant enhancement of military trust and operational interoperability [30]. Additionally, Zapad/Interaction-2021 military exercises, conducted in northwestern China, notably tested the strategic coordination and interoperability between the two militaries, underscoring the depth of their strategic partnership [29].

While direct arms sales from China are not publicly acknowledged, exports of dual-use technologies have gone under sharp increase through complex intermediary networks [26, p. 148]. Moreover, joint collaboration in missile defense, cybersecurity, and early-warning systems indicated mutual strategic trust and a shared interest in countering perceived U.S. military dominance [35, p. 107].

In the path to analyze the military and security engagement of China and Russia, the integration of discourse analysis and process-tracing demonstrates mutual reinforcement between ideological narratives and tangible diplomatic and military cooperation. Joint narratives of multipolarity and non-interference legitimize security and diplomatic coordination, indicating intentional Sino-Russian alignment against U.S.-led security alliances. This partnership illustrates pragmatic cooperation driven by shared strategic objectives rather than ideological convergence alone in a decentralized global order.

Networked Security Complexes (NSC)

Theory. The study has utilized Buzan and Wæver's theory of Networked Security Complexes (NSCs) as the theoretical framework of the study. This theory is considered a comprehensive and evolutionary version of their earlier Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). The difference between these two is that, while RSCT concentrated on geographically connected clusters of states with interlinked security concerns [7, pp. 44-47], NSC theory goes beyond this narrow emphasis and extends this logic to embrace the multi-layered and transregional networks of security interdependencies that move beyond the rigid regional geographical boundaries [8, pp. 28-33].

Furthermore, NSC theory argues both state and non-state actors are participating in

overlapping, and multifaceted security arrangements in a network-based world in the post-Cold War era. These networks reflect the complexity and fragmentation of contemporary global politics, characterized by:

1. The emergence and rise of non-hegemonic, multipolar, or polycentric orders in which the power is distributed across multiple centers.

2. The formation of security coalitions and partnerships that are issue-specific, flexible, and often informal, rather than strictly territorial.

3. The intertwining of regional and global security concerns, producing cross-cutting networks that challenge traditional state-centric paradigms [8, pp. 139-142].

This conceptual shift is critical in understanding the emerging Sino-Russian security partnership, which defies the classic notion of a security complex confined to geography alone. Instead, the Sino-Russian relationship is best analyzed as a networked security complex, wherein both states coordinate across multiple military, energy, cyber, and diplomatic domains to counterbalance U.S. hegemony and shape a new order. This partnership illustrates how networked security dynamics foster polycentric governance, where multiple centers of authority interact horizontally and vertically, fragmenting the formerly U.S.-dominated international system [2, pp. 67-69; 8, pp. 145-150; 12, pp. 39-41].

NSC theory offers a practical framework for understanding how Sino-Russian security collaboration contributes to the undermining of U.S. dominance while fostering an archipelago-based world order marked by distributed but interconnected centers of governance. This approach highlights the significance of transregional networks and non-hierarchical security arrangements in shaping today's international relations [10, pp. 81-83; 16, pp. 352-355].

Analysis. In analyzing Sino-Russian networked security cooperation within an archipelago-based world order, several key insights pop up; this will be discussed in detail. The central puzzle is related to understanding why and how China and Russia, despite a historical legacy of competition and mutual suspicion, have substantially deepened their security cooperation, forming a strategic partnership that endures despite divergent long-term geopolitical

objectives, and how this partnership contributes to the emerging archipelago-based world order.

A central finding of this research is that the Sino-Russian partnership reflects not merely a reactionary alignment against the West but represents a sophisticated strategic calculus aimed at mutual reinforcement of each nation's international standing and security. As the US-led global order weakens, China and Russia increasingly view security interdependence as a pathway to safeguarding sovereignty and regional influence [18, p. 42]. Indeed, the emergence of networked security between these two states is grounded in shared perceptions of threat, primarily the expansive nature of U.S.-led alliances and institutions such as NATO and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and secondarily in fears related to regime security and domestic stability influenced by external interference [3, p. 119]. China and Russia share a common strategic objective: "to ensure a balance of power among major countries and to prevent the formation of a unipolar international system. Establishing a balance against the pressures exerted by the West, led by the United States, and promoting a multipolar system are among the key external factors driving the development of relations between these two nations" [26, p. 151].

One striking aspect of Sino-Russian networked security is its comprehensive nature, spanning diplomatic coordination, military interoperability, economic integration, and ideological synchronization. Looking from the military perspective, both of the nations have increased their involvement in joint exercises and arms exchanges since the mid-2010s. Operations such as Vostok-2018, Tsentr-2019, and Zapad/Interaction-2021 demonstrate not only the growing level of mutual military trust but also function as strategic signals aimed at countering Western influence [34, p. 2].


According to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China ranks as the fifth-largest exporter of major arms globally for the 2021–2025 period. Chinese weapons and armaments are now considered more advanced, and Beijing has been the main contributor to Moscow's defense industry by exporting dual-use items, electronic components, and raw materials used in Russian drone production, according to Center for European

Policy Analysis (CEPA). Back in April 2024, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was at pains to reiterate that "China is currently the main contributor to Russia's defense industrial base. We observe China providing machine tools, semiconductors, and other dual-use items that have assisted Russia in rebuilding its defense industry, which sanctions and export controls had severely undermined" [25, p. 9]. On the other side of the ledger, Russia is also exporting arms to China, serving as the main foreign supplier to Beijing. Russia's share of Chinese total arms imports between 2000 and recent years stands at around 77 percent. Chinese imports of Russian military hardware in 2025 were estimated at approximately 25 million trend-indicator values (TIV). Even prior to that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, around 25 of the total value of trade between Russia and China was related to sales of Russian arms to Beijing [26, p. 156].

The expansion of joint naval exercises, notably the Joint Sea series initiated in 2012, further underscores this cooperation. This maritime cooperation has progressed into tangible military alignment, encompassing the sharing of strategic operational doctrines and increasing interoperability between the Russian Navy and China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) [11, p. 71].

Delving more into the defense collaboration between the two states, between 2012 and 2014, Beijing and Moscow conducted nine joint military exercises, according to the data provided by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A decade later, from 2022 until August 2024, they held fifteen according to the graph below.

The military-technical cooperation between Russia and China has equally significant implications for global power dynamics. China's assistance to Russia's defense sector encompasses sensitive technologies, navigation systems for helicopters, parts for fighter jets, jamming equipment, radar and optics, components for drones, excavators for trench construction, as well as electronics, microchips, machinery, vehicles, and a variety of essential metals and chemicals for the defense industry [26, p. 156]. These arms deals not only reinforce mutual security interests but also help both nations counterbalance technological and military advancements within U.S.-led alliances,



Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

China-Russia Military Exercises Have Grown More Frequent.
Number of Bilateral Military Exercises (as of August 2024)

particularly those involving U.S. deployments in the Indo-Pacific region [6, p. 11].

Diplomatic coordination has mirrored military cooperation. The two states' coordination at the UNSC further illustrates a shared commitment to a vision of global governance that respects state sovereignty and non-intervention, directly challenging Western liberal narratives that justify humanitarian interventions or regime-change operations [4].

Economically, Sino-Russian relations have significantly deepened, providing a material underpinning for security cooperation. Russia's strategic pivot to Asia after 2014, prompted by Western sanctions following the annexation of Crimea, accelerated its economic integration with China, leading to increased bilateral trade, substantial Chinese investments in Russia's energy and infrastructure sectors, and collaborative ventures within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) [13]. Economic interdependence has thus created structural incentives for continued cooperation, binding both states together through shared strategic infrastructure projects and energy supply chains, which reinforce their geopolitical alignment [13].

Ideological synchronization is another critical element driving Sino-Russian networked security. Both countries articulate a shared discourse emphasizing multipolarity, sovereignty, and

opposition to Western universalism. Joint statements repeatedly criticize the Western "double standards" in global governance and human rights discourse, thus providing a normative framework that legitimizes their bilateral cooperation and appeals to other states disenchanted with Western liberal hegemony. China's position in the international system has evolved from that of a "detached spectator" who used to "accept and learn" the international rules to an active participant in the development of new rules that will "break the Western moral advantage" [24]. Accordingly, the East Asian country, along with Russia, has always opposed the Western block. For instance, the 2022 Joint Statement during Putin and Xi's meeting explicitly framed NATO's expansion and Western unilateral sanctions as principal threats to international security, underscoring ideological alignment between Moscow and Beijing [15].

Yet, despite significant alignment, Sino-Russian cooperation is characterized by certain complexities and limitations. Historical mistrust and long-term strategic divergences persist beneath their public unity. For example, Russia remains wary of China's growing economic and military influence in Central Asia, traditionally considered Moscow's sphere of influence [20, p. 74]. Similarly, China carefully avoids explicit endorsements of Russian military actions in

Ukraine, maintaining a diplomatic balance to protect its global economic interests [36, p. 33]. These nuances highlight that their networked security partnership is pragmatic rather than ideological, driven by mutual interest rather than shared long-term visions.

Addressing the central puzzle – why this cooperation thrives despite underlying tensions – the findings suggest that the fragmentation of the global order creates a context where mutual strategic threats outweigh bilateral competition. The uncertainty stemming from declining U.S. hegemony incentivizes both China and Russia to manage their differences pragmatically, fostering cooperation that enhances their collective leverage against external pressures [2, p. 112]. In other words, the threat posed by a fragmented yet still assertive Western alliance structure, particularly NATO's posture towards Russia and U.S. Indo-Pacific policies targeting China, binds Beijing and Moscow into closer cooperation than historical rivalry might predict [2, p. 117].

Regarding the decline of the unipolar world, the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly acknowledges the limits of American global dominance, noting that “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country.” It also continues that “[the US] elites badly miscalculated America's willingness to shoulder forever global burdens to which the American people saw no connection to the national interest” [33, p. 1]. The document further asserts that “the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over” [33, p. 13], signaling a formal recognition of declining unipolarity.

These statements provide a context for understanding the emergence of multipolar security networks, as states such as China and Russia increasingly pursue autonomous and interconnected strategies in response to the diminishing certainty of U.S.-led security. The NSS also emphasizes that U.S. alliances must now be transactional and interest-driven. It observes that American elites “overestimated America's ability to fund, simultaneously, a massive welfare-regulatory-administrative state alongside a massive military, diplomatic, intelligence, and foreign aid complex” [33, p. 1] and that partners

have “offload[ed] the cost of their defense onto the American people” [33, p. 1]. This focus on regional priorities and shared responsibility underscores the structural space for alternative security arrangements, such as the Sino-Russian networked security cooperation, which aligns with the rise of polycentric, archipelago-based governance systems.

In a nutshell, the Sino-Russian partnership represents a strategic adaptation to an evolving international order characterized by fragmentation and multiple centers of power. The aforementioned partnership cannot be classified as a traditional alliance nor as a purely transactional relationship; instead, it functions as an adaptive, networked security complex, following the archipelago-based world order and responding to shifts in the global distribution of power. Future research on this relationship should continue to consider the broader geopolitical context, assessing whether the partnership can sustain its cohesion amid the ongoing and unpredictable evolution of global power dynamics.

Results. Amidst shifting global power structures characterized by declining American dominance and the simultaneous rise of regional power centers, the strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow emerges as a compelling example of pragmatic realignment shaped by shared vulnerabilities and mutual strategic advantages. The emergence of this networked security cooperation and partnership between the states (such as China and Russia or other states in the East and West) creates an archipelago-based world order, in which the states are benefiting their mutual connection inside the archipelago. Afterwards, there can be witnessed several archipelagos (composed of different countries that share strategic interests) that are located in different parts of the world and might be for or against each other, based on their collective interests [23].

The Sino-Russian alignment, grounded in historical challenges and external pressures, strongly appeals to the domestic nation, which views the bilateral cooperation as an affirmation of national dignity and authority. The leadership systems of China and Russia have successfully constructed narratives about their mutual cooperation that value the collective memories and speak directly to cultural perceptions of resilience against external domination.

According to the Chinese discourse, from Beijing's perspective, closer ties with Russia symbolize a strategic stance against perceived threats from U.S.-led military and economic containment, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. While China's growing economic and military capabilities are considerable, they do not fully eliminate its susceptibility to coordinated Western pressure. Hence, in this context, the partnership with Russia offers essential diplomatic leverage and opportunities for military and technical cooperation, improving China's ability to manage these strategic challenges. At the same time, this alignment sends significant symbolic messages to the domestic Chinese people, emboldening the legitimacy of Xi's leadership and fostering nationalist sentiments that depict China as a rising global power, capable of contributing to the reshaping of the international order by the help of Russians.

On the other side of the ledger, Russia's tendency to consider China as its principal strategic partner reflects Moscow's calculated reaction to sustained Western isolation and economic sanctions following its special military operations in Ukraine. Russia's "pivot east," which was followed very cautiously by Moscow previously, has now become a cornerstone of Moscow's foreign policy, aimed at countering NATO's eastward expansion and Western time-to-time intervention into its political affairs. The Russian policymakers see China's support not just as diplomatic backing but as crucial to maintaining their country's global influence and strategic independence. Beyond symbolism, the partnership offers tangible benefits such as economic alternatives, access to advanced technologies, and military cooperation that strengthen both Russia's international position and its domestic political credibility.

After all, the current strategic alignment between China and Russia remains a significant geopolitical reality contributing to the shaping of

global order. By articulating a vision of international relations grounded in multipolarity, sovereignty, and non-interference, Beijing and Moscow present an alternative paradigm to Western liberal hegemony. This approach resonates with numerous states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that share similar historical experiences of colonialism and external domination, fostering an informal network of like-minded actors disenchanted with the status quo. As such, Sino-Russian cooperation extends its influence far beyond bilateral interests, shaping broader geopolitical alignments and contributing to the ongoing fragmentation and reconfiguration of the global order.

By contributing to the elements of a world order rooted in multipolarity and non-interference, Beijing and Moscow are on the path of offering an alternative to Western-dominated liberal norms. This approach resonates particularly with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, many of which have histories of colonialism or foreign domination and are skeptical of the current international order. Over time, this cooperation has begun to create a loose network of like-minded states, extending influence well beyond bilateral ties and nudging global alignments in new directions, contributing to the archipelago-based international system.

The study shows just how adaptable and pragmatic states can be when navigating today's complex international relations arena. Both China and Russia seem keenly aware of what their partnership can and cannot achieve, approaching it with a practical, rather than ideological, mindset. They don't aim for full alignment in worldview or policy, but they share a clear recognition of their mutual vulnerabilities and overlapping strategic interests in an increasingly unpredictable world. Watching how these two manage their relationship offers a window into how states negotiate uncertainty in practice, revealing both the possibilities and the limits of cooperation in an archipelago-based world order.

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PREREQUISITES FOR THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA AT THE TURN OF THE 20th – 21st CENTURIES

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The Central Asian region has attracted the attention of international terrorist organizations since the end of the 20th century. These organizations gain the support of the local population, increase the number of participants, and put pressure on legitimate political institutions. The radical changes they propose are supported by the youth community. *Methods and materials.* The methodological basis of the study is the theory of social constructivism and the theory of securitization, which ensured the consideration of Islamist terrorism as a socio-political construct that poses a threat to destabilize the region. The political-historical approach and the theory of R. Putnam contributed to consideration of the geopolitical situation in the analysis of the growing influence of terrorist organizations. *Analysis and results.* The authors note the following as factors of sustainability of the ideology of terrorism: religious and educational conditions contribute to increasing incompetence in matters of religion and belief in the words of spiritual leaders without sufficient grounds and, as a consequence, receptiveness to radical ideas. Nation-building processes based on cultural revival reinforce the secular nature of religious-state relations and freedom of conscience. This leads to the growth of diverse religious organizations and public dissatisfaction with the declining influence of Islam, the traditional religion in the region. The quest for control over religious organizations leads to contradictory and unconstructive political decisions. The misalignment of geographic and state borders contributes to the emergence of ethnic enclaves and ethno-religious conflicts. The results of this investigation will allow optimizing counterterrorism measures and developing effective management solutions in the state-religious sphere. *Authors' contribution.* D.N. Gergilev developed the theoretical and methodological framework for the study and interpreted the data obtained on the activities of international terrorist organizations. T.V. Izluchenko analyzed the dominant trends in ensuring the security of states of Central Asia, revealed the established approaches in scientific discourse, and identified factors of sustainability of the spread of Islamist ideas.

Key words: Islamist terrorism, Central Asia, ethno-religious conflicts, religious education, propaganda, Islamism.

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**ПРЕДПОСЫЛКИ РАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЯ ИСЛАМИСТСКОГО ТЕРРОРИЗМА
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Аннотация. *Введение.* С конца XX в. Центрально-Азиатский регион привлекает внимание международных террористических организаций. Они получают поддержку населения, увеличивают количество участников и оказывают давление на легитимные политические институты. Предлагаемые ими радикальные изменения находят содействие в молодежной среде. *Методы и материалы.* Методологической основой исследования стали социальный конструктивизм и теория секьюритизации. Исламистский терроризм рассматривается социально-политическим конструктом, который позиционируется угрозой безопасности региона. Политико-исторический подход и теория Р. Патнэма способствовали учету геополитического положения при анализе непрекращающегося влияния террористических организаций. *Анализ и результаты.* В качестве факторов устойчивости идеологии терроризма авторами отмечается следующее. Первое, религиозно-образовательные условия способствуют усилению некомпетентности в вопросах вероисповедания и убежденности в словах духовных лидеров без достаточного основания и, как следствие, восприимчивости к радикальным идеям. Процессы национального строительства на основе культурного возрождения закрепляют светский характер религиозно-государственных отношений и свободу совести. Это приводит к росту разнообразных религиозных организаций и недовольству населения снижением влияния традиционной для региона религии ислам. Стремление к контролю над религиозными организациями приводит к противоречивым и малоконструктивным политическим решениям. Несовпадение географических и государственных границ способствует возникновению этнических анклавов и этнорелигиозных конфликтов. Полученные результаты позволяют оптимизировать антитеррористические меры и разработать эффективные управленческие решения в государственно-религиозной сфере. *Вклад авторов.* Д.Н. Гергилев разработал теоретико-методологическую базу исследования, интерпретировал полученные данные по деятельности международных террористических организаций. Т.В. Излученко проанализировала доминирующие тенденции в обеспечении безопасности государств Центральной Азии, выявила сложившиеся в научном дискурсе подходы и определила факторы устойчивости распространения исламистских идей.

Ключевые слова: исламистский терроризм, Центральная Азия, этнорелигиозные конфликты, религиозное образование, пропаганда, исламизм.

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Introduction. International terrorism is a key issue addressed in contemporary research on societal and state security. It poses a threat to socio-political stability, civil liberties, and ethno-religious identity [21]. Various international agreements (Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention against Terrorism, 2009; Decision of the Committee of Secretaries of the Security Councils of the Collective Security Treaty

Organization, 2016) and national legislative acts (National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, 2021; Law of Republic of Tajikistan on Combating Terrorism, 1999) are devoted to countering it. International terrorist organizations are particularly active in Central Asia. Radical ideas and terrorist ideology have remained persistently widespread among Central Asian youth for three decades.

The geographical location of Central Asia determines its strategic importance as a space where global players implement their geopolitical and geocultural projects. By launching relevant socio-political initiatives, it is possible to influence the nature of interactions between Central Asian countries and their neighbors in the international arena. Thus, some states vying for political control in the region (the United States, Great Britain, and France) are using Islam, the traditional religion of the local population, as a tool of political pressure: exacerbating political crises, growing cultural nationalism, and fueling ethnoreligious conflicts. This has resulted in the emergence of Islamist terrorist organizations and their attempts to establish quasi-religious states with medieval customs.

Many researchers identify factors that are generally associated with the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new independent states in the region as the basis for the ongoing growth of terrorist tensions in Central Asia [6, pp. 86-87]. First, the socioeconomic situation of the population, characterized by a low standard of living, economic stagnation, unemployment, and, consequently, social tension. Second, the ideological vacuum that arose after the rejection of Soviet ideology and atheistic positions. Third, the proximity of states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria, where various Islamist terrorist organizations operate, makes Central Asia a transit territory for the spread of terrorist ideology to Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. However, the sustainability of Islamist terrorist ideas as a tool of political intervention and control remains poorly understood. The need for constructive proposals has been emphasized by the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (Ashgabat). The goal of our study is to identify the factors that ensure the persistence of the perception and dissemination of Islamist terrorist ideas among the local population. The findings will contribute to the development of optimal management solutions in countering terrorism at the international and national levels, taking into account regional specifics.

Methods and materials. Within the framework of social constructivism, Islamist terrorism is viewed as a phenomenon of social reality, jointly constructed by the international community, experts and researchers, the general public, religious organizations, and the participants themselves. Perceptions of this phenomenon are

historically shaped by the communications system and reflect the needs and interests of specific social groups in Central Asia. Barry Buzan's securitization theory contributed to the understanding of Islamist terrorist organizations as a security threat, designated as such by the states of the region but insufficiently perceived by the population. The influence of geopolitical factors on the spread of Islamist sentiments among regional communities, influenced by global economic processes and globalization trends, was examined through a political-historical approach. Robert D. Putnam's political theory allowed for an analysis of the socio-religious dynamics of the region, identifying structural and functional changes and the political transformation of state institutions.

Analysis. After the collapse of the USSR, the territory of Central Asia became accessible to international research. Western specialists are particularly interested not so much in economic factors as in cultural specifics and the relationship between religious tradition and contemporary social trends. Liu Y. Morgan demonstrates the formation of ideological principles (idioms) and ethnic identity under the influence of urban space. This is manifested in architecture, language, communications, and behavioral patterns. Islamic revival is positioned as a restoration of pre-Soviet ancestral values in the process of nation-building. This results in the creation of communities of trust between people of different social statuses united by their affiliation with a common faith. Relationships between government and citizens are based on trust and symbolic capital [22, p. 267]. Martha B. Olcott emphasizes the role of Islam as a key factor that allows states in the region to structure domestic policies, organize international cooperation, and strengthen public authority. Containing an Islamic revival among young people is more difficult than combating the secular opposition [23, p. 63].

Western researchers' focus on cultural specifics stems from their intention to identify conflict zones and established patterns of ethnoreligious interaction. This data is necessary to enhance the effectiveness of international institutions and the nonviolent promotion of the political interests of third countries in the region. These initiatives are being implemented in a practice-oriented manner through the establishment

of educational institutions specializing in the social sciences and humanities and the training of local intellectual elites. For example, the mission of the American University of Central Asia (Bishkek) is to promote critical thinking and education in the traditions of the humanities and civic engagement with the goal of educating a new generation of citizens [2]. Westminster International University (Tashkent) publishes the journal "Silk Road: A Journal of Eurasian Development." It advances research in the fields of social science and public policy, making the countries of the Great Silk Road an area of particular interest.

The activities of international terrorist organizations are studied in the context of the interrelationships between violence and religion. Mark Jurgensmeyer notes the absence of precedents free from violence of religious traditions. He argues that violence is not directly generated by religion but is used as a performative event, carrying the perpetrators' symbolic statement. Religious tradition, in turn, provides the ideology of terrorism with the meaning of cosmic warfare, incorporating violence into a system of rules and sacred history. Thus, a "culture of violence" is formed, which is based on alternative interpretations of religious concepts, in particular jihad [17, p. 35]. Earthly conflicts are interpreted as a reflection of the confrontation between good and evil, truth and lies, and the struggle of supernatural actors – God (Allah) and the devil (Dajjal). Shukhrat G. Gaiibnazarov emphasizes the artificiality of the term "Islamist terrorism," created by Western researchers. They note that this phenomenon is an essential distortion of the tenets of Islam, "so that while maintaining external similarities... the internal meaning is changed beyond recognition" [11, p. 420].

In connection with the above and the references to sacred texts, as well as the justification by religious doctrine, it is correct to speak of the phenomenon of religious terrorism, specifically Islamist or Islamic terrorism. Jacob Rogozinsky advocates the use of the latter term. Noting the artificiality of the term "Islamism" in the West, he argues that "the tiny '-ism' supposedly allows us to separate the wheat from the chaff and distinguish Islam from this horrific Islamism... Alas, in the Muslim world such a distinction is hardly applicable" [26, pp. 24-26]. Leonid R. Syukiyaynen also justifies the use of

the term "Islamic extremism." He emphasizes that Islamic concepts form the core of the ideological justification and that members of Islamist terrorist organizations are guided by Islamic tenets and legal concepts [27, p. 477].

Igor P. Dobaev takes the opposite position regarding references to Islamic tradition. He defines Islamism as a political phenomenon that includes an ideological doctrine and socio-political practice. In this context, "true Islam" is contrasted with the so-called "infidels," both external and internal. As a result, systems of values and principles are formed that become the basis for ideological, political, and military confrontation [7, p. 132]. Noa Gur-Arie points out that in Russia the term "Islamism" is used primarily for political movements based on the principles of Islamic fundamentalism, and the term "Wahhabism" is used for ideas that are not of the Hanafi madhhab [13, p. 178]. Leonid E. Grinin and Andrei Korotaev propose a definition of Islamism as a political trend and ideology based on the superiority of Islam and the need to apply its principles in everyday life. "Islamism is not something superficial, but the deepest and most comprehensive substance of Islamic societies" [12, pp. 84-85, 91].

Among Western researchers, the term "jihadism" predominates to describe radical manifestations and the ideology of terrorism that refers to Islam. It emphasizes an extremely radical interpretation of Islamic tenets, which is embodied in acts of violence around the world. According to Colin Clark and Assaf Moghadam, jihadism has a common narrative for all participants. It shapes the perception of an ongoing clash between Islamic society and military, political, cultural, and religious attacks by numerous usurpers (crusaders, Zionists, and apostates). The ideology of jihad enjoins every "true Muslim" to defend Islam within the framework of armed jihad, which in the modern era has acquired an offensive, pre-emptive character [5, p. 348]. Tor Benjaminsen and Ba Boubacar point out the importance of taking into account local political and environmental contexts, which determine the basis for popular support for the idea of social justice promoted by terrorists [4].

In our view, identifying the religious affiliation of members of terrorist organizations seems to be a feasible and methodologically effective action for the researcher. First, it emphasizes the intrinsic

side of expressing the interests and needs of religious terrorists. Second, it points out Islam as a religion whose doctrine is “debased” through a return to archaism and violence. Third, it reveals the desacralization of sacrifice and how terrorists frame themselves as victims. Fourth, it exposes the manipulation of religious concepts to justify violence. Islam, like other religions, has the resources to justify deeds, bolster the moral convictions of followers, and legitimize their actions. Terrorist organizations are taking advantage of these resources. They motivate and integrate the participants by exercising social control over them, as well as performing behavioral acts, positioning their activities as part of sacred historical narrative.

The selection of appropriate terminology to describe this phenomenon (Islamist, Islamism, Islamic, jihadist, fundamentalist) should be context-dependent. The chosen term must accurately reflect the researcher’s conceptual understanding of the relationship between political and religious factors and align with their academic tradition. Thus, in our research, the term “Islamist” highlights two key aspects: a) the political dimension of religious movements in the Central Asian region; b) the transformation of Islamic tradition in accordance with promoted sociopolitical projects, such as the establishment of a global caliphate. When examining the religious foundations of terrorism, one should not overlook nonreligious factors, whose significant influence is particularly evident at the regional level.

One particular topic in discussing Islamist terrorism in Central Asia is the causes of its spread. Albert Beloglazov identifies the following factors:

first, political conditions that include, on the one hand, the exploitation of Islam as a policy instrument to create a new national identity and build sovereign states, and, on the other hand, Islam serving as the basis for opposition activities, with governments accused of departing from established traditions; second, socioeconomic conditions determined by oppositional attitudes and the desire for social mobility among young people; and third, cultural and ideological conditions that allow Islam to function as a new unifying force in the region [3, pp. 20-22]. Many researchers identify the political factor as a key driver for spreading the Islamist ideas, linking this trend to the process of state-building and political system formation in newly independent states of the region following the USSR collapse. Konstantin Polyakov emphasizes the growing influence of international terrorist organizations such as “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”*. This is due to the weak political power in the region and the incorporation of Islam into the political opposition as a basis for accusing the government of deviating from ancestral traditions. For example, the terrorist organization “Islamic Movement of Turkestan”** proclaims its goal to be the forcible overthrow of the “apostate” rulers [24, p. 9]. Andrey Suleimenov conducted a SWOT analysis of the opposing spatial strategies of terrorist organizations “Al-Qaeda”*** and “Islamic State”4*. The political division of the region has been identified as an opportunity for their realization. It is precisely this that enables the establishment of an umbrella organization for ethno-religious terrorist groups united by anti-Western ideas and the project of a global caliphate [28, p. 121]. Fachri Aidulsyah characterizes the appeal of radical Islam,

* Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated February 14, 2003, No. GKPI 03116 – to designate Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation) as a terrorist organization and to prohibit its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160108040711/http://nac.gov.ru/content/3934.html>

** Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated February 14, 2003, No. GKPI 03116 – to designate the Islamic Party of Turkestan (formerly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) as a terrorist organization and to prohibit its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160108040711/http://nac.gov.ru/content/3934.html>

*** Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated February 14, 2003, No. GKPI 03116 – to designate Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization and to prohibit its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160108040711/http://nac.gov.ru/content/3934.html>

4* Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of December 29, 2014, No. AKPI14-1424S – to designate the international organization the Islamic State as a terrorist organization and to prohibit its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=ARB&n=417350#5vAqWIVolleDBN8w1>

particularly “urban Salafism.” He notes that it facilitates the blending of urban youth groups’ pop culture with the Islamic tradition of Arabism, as well as the organizing of mass campaigns that promote Islamic narratives and cultural values in a hybrid style [1, p. 257].

However, the positions considered above do not fully explain the sustainability of the acceptance of Islamist ideas and the involvement of Central Asian youth in the activities of Islamist terrorist organizations. The demand and attractiveness of the project to create an Islamic theocratic state (a world caliphate) remain open, which leads to violations of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the commission of criminal acts. To achieve this goal, young people are ready to radically change their patterns of thinking and behavior and organize their daily lives in accordance with medieval norms. This occurs against the backdrop of the global fight against terrorism, which significantly worsens their political and economic situation and complicates their social lives.

Results. Solving the problem of Islamist terrorism is for the states of Central Asia not only an item on the political agenda but also a necessary condition for sustainable development, formation of civic identity, reduction of ethno-religious tensions, and separatist sentiments. Numerous terrorist organizations justify and legitimize their violent activities by appealing to Islamic tradition, which is deeply rooted in the local culture. The socio-political projects they promote – such as the establishment of a global caliphate – entail a fundamental repainting of the political map, which is already fragmented and contested in many regions. The terrorist acts (Andizhan, 2005; Bishkek and Osh, 2002–2003) attest to the struggle between terrorist organizations for control over this territory. This conflict exacerbates the complex situation and prompts political institutions to make ambiguous decisions in the state-religious sphere.

We highlight the following groups of factors that contribute to the acceptance, relevance, and popularity of Islamist ideas among Central Asian youth. Note that these factors have not previously been considered in terms of the sustainability of the ideology of terrorism and the activities of Islamist terrorist organizations in this region over the last three decades.

Religious and educational conditions represent the first group. In the Central Asian

region, there is a limited number of official religious education institutions. Thus, the MiriArab madrasa in Bukhara – established in 1946 and enrolling only 40 students by 1961 – and the Tashkent Islamic Institute, named after Imam al-Bukhari and founded in 1971 [10, pp. 42–43], could not satisfy the religious expectations of the local population and prepare qualified personnel in the necessary number to develop a civilized traditional version of Islam. It would raise the general level of religious education, thereby reducing the appeal of terrorist ideology in the long run.

The demand for religious education provokes the growth of illegal educational institutions (khujr), which deal with Islamic upbringing and spiritual training for all interested individuals. This tradition of home-based religious education – particularly at the primary level (maktab) – is widespread among communities with Arab-Muslim cultural heritage. This tradition functions under the authority of a spiritual leader without formal confirmation of his professional training. For centuries, maktabas have been established in mosques and private houses. They were respected by the masses, supported by donations and income from waqf lands. According to Muslim cultural norms, education in such institutions was traditionally conducted separately. Girls were taught by the imam’s wife, a qadi, or a woman proficient in Arabic and experienced in teaching, while boys were taught by the imam, a qadi, or the most capable of his students [9, p. 943]. In this context, neither state authorities nor community bodies can ensure proper monitoring of educational program content or qualification of teaching staff.

At the end of the 20th century, these institutions became places where Central Asian youth were extensively exposed to radical Islam and Islamism and recruited into international Islamist terrorist organizations. The older generation of believers lacked sufficient experience and expertise in theological matters to effectively counter such extremist indoctrination, while the official Islamic clergy had limited authority among young people, who viewed them as accomplices of political regimes and supporters of the status quo. Under these conditions, it was impossible to discern the distinction between historically familiar local interpretations of the union of political and spiritual authority (exemplified by the Emirate of Bukhara and the

Khanate of Khiva) and the project of a global caliphate propagated by Islamists.

The second set of factors includes nation-building processes and the development of civil society. The state promotes the belonging of individuals or groups to a political and/or socio-cultural community in order to democratize and institutionalize rights and duties at different political levels. Civil society provides a space for constructive dialogue and consultation. However, this space may be restricted because of security threats posed by terrorism [25, p. 146]. As Rustam Haydarov notes, national unity is a supreme value that indicates the importance of each nation, political independence, and protection against the subversive influence of religious-political extremism [14, p. 115]. While agreeing with this view, it is crucial to recognize that strong national identity and intercultural dialogue within a multiethnic society also ensure religious identity. Currently, religious identity is growing among Central Asian youth, despite living in a multicultural environment that has been shaped by modern Western European values. These values encourage multiple identities – a context that contrasts with traditional Islamic norms. Young people emphasize that their practice of Islam is their personal choice, made as a reflection of religious beliefs. They acknowledge the cultural tension between their religious identity and dominant individualistic values [8, p. 34].

Soviet atheist propaganda in Central Asia has led to a lack of basic knowledge among the local population about Islam, their own culture, and the traditions of other peoples who have lived together for many centuries. This situation has created a crisis of religious identity, manifested in a) the search for religious truths among adherents of Islam and leaders of Muslim movements in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and b) the rise of cultural nationalism. The crisis was exacerbated by secular governments' attempts to construct a civic identity, ignoring the population's historical religiosity but emphasizing ethnic cultural identity. However, young people seek clear behavioral models that are reinforced by religious values. Thus, the goal of the concept for the development of civil identity "Kyrgyz Zharany" in the Kyrgyz Republic for 2021–2026 is defined as fostering a cohesive civic community of citizens, transcending ethnic, cultural, and religious differences, united

by the desire to strengthen the sovereignty of the country and its welfare [20]. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan declares over two thousand years of statehood, continuity of democracy from the steppe peoples, and the key role in shaping the nation of the epic "Manas." Local researcher Misirali Koldoshev emphasizes that some elements of the epic reflect ethnic customs and values that modern youth should strive to follow in their lives and draw moral lessons from them [19, p. 67].

After the collapse of the USSR, the newly independent states of Central Asia declared a political course for the revival of ethnic, religious, and spiritual historical values. It has been accompanied by a reevaluation of historical narratives, notably regarding the region's incorporation into the Russian Empire and its role within the Soviet state. Thus, in Uzbekistan, the educational course "The Idea of National Independence: Basic Concepts and Principles" was introduced in 2001. Its objectives are defined as follows: (1) To unite the population with a common vision for national development, (2) To foster pride in the nation's ancestral heritage, enduring spiritual values, and time-honored traditions, (3) To cultivate civic responsibility and devotion to the homeland [15, pp. 6-7]. In 2012, a decree was issued "On the Establishment of a Commission for the Development of Historical Science under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Creation of the Fund for the Historical and Cultural Heritage of the People of Kyrgyzstan 'Muras.'" In 2016, this commission held a commemorative event titled "1916–2016: The National Liberation Uprising and the Great Urkun," marking the centenary of the 1916 Central Asian uprising, with a particular focus on Kyrgyzstan and the tragedy of the Great Urkun.

The third group of factors encompasses contradictory decisions by governments in Central Asian states regarding state-religion relations. On the one hand, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have proclaimed policies of religious tolerance and affirmed the secular status of the state. On the other hand, these governments have tightened regulatory control over religious organizations, including measures such as censorship of religious literature and bans on the registration of new religious groups. These policies generate public discontent, impede the development of religious literacy, and render citizens more vulnerable to Islamist propaganda.

In 2010, the Committee on Religious Regulation of Traditions, Celebrations, and Rituals under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan was established. Its responsibilities include coordination of the election of imam-khatibs and imams of mosques, as well as overseeing the regulation of traditions, celebrations, and rituals. Even the ambivalent state support for religious organizations exercising the right to freedom of conscience – particularly those perceived by the population as challenging Islamic traditions – is often interpreted as undermining ancestral culture and departure from historical roots in favor of foreign influences (notably Russia, the USA, and Iran). For example, citizens of Tajikistan demonstrate misunderstanding regarding the active work of Zoroastrians, in particular Abdulkadir Talbakov's attempts to register the relevant organization.

The fourth set of factors is the geography of the region. Geographical conditions historically determine the specifics of economic activity, ethnic-based settlement patterns, and the nature of interethnic interaction. In the context of modern geopolitical realities, they have begun to contribute to the emergence of ethnic enclaves and interethnic conflicts. The Fergana Valley exhibits a mosaic type of ethnogeographical configuration. Within the context of acute socioeconomic challenges, this spatial arrangement significantly amplifies the region's conflict potential. Some ethnic groups are not territorially organized and segregated. However, they harbor strong social cohesion and separatist tendencies. Others, while possessing a titular state, nonetheless maintain significant populations in neighboring countries [18, p. 55]. In 2010, the Osh conflict erupted in the city of Osh, Kyrgyz Republic. This event has clearly demonstrated that the mismatch of traditional economic activities of the local Uzbek population and natural boundaries of the Fergana

valley with state borders can exacerbate nationalist sentiments.

The sustainability of Islamist ideologies in Central Asia is also facilitated by the following factors: (a) The geographical proximity of states where active terrorist activities are carried out and theocratic social-political projects (creation of a global caliphate), (b) Opening to the local population the training centers of major international Islamist terrorist organizations. In the 1990s, combatants from the Tajik Civil War (1992–1997) were ideologically supported and redirected into terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, over the past decade, the primary source of such influence has shifted to the Syrian Arab Republic. Within its borders, numerous international terrorist organizations, such as the "Jebhat al-Nusra"*, the "Islamic State"** and the "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham"***, which unite ethnic groups of people from Central Asian countries, operate. Strict anti-terrorism measures prevent Islamist terrorism from openly interfering with public policy. However, these measures are not able to limit the growth of illegal activities, the functioning of informal madrassas and mosques, or participation of citizens along ethnic lines in international terrorist organizations based abroad [16, p. 296].

Conclusion. In summary, it is worth noting the complexity of the problem of the spread and resilience of Islamist ideas in Central Asia. This is largely due to the historical events of the late 20th and early 21st centuries and the specific nature of nation-state formation in complex ethnoreligious conditions. Nation-building measures do not always take into account the need of young people for religious identity and social activism. Gaps in state youth policy are being exploited by Islamist terrorist organizations, whose calls for a radical change in social reality and proposed behaviors and mindsets resonate with a large share of young people. Their

* Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of December 29, 2014, No. AKPI14-1424S – to designate the international organization Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization and to prohibit its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=ARB&n=417350#5vAqWIVolleDBN8w1>

** Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of December 29, 2014, No. AKPI14-1424S – to designate the international organization the Islamic State as a terrorist organization and to prohibit its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=ARB&n=417350#5vAqWIVolleDBN8w1>

*** Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of June 4, 2020, No. AKPI20-275S – to designate the organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization and to prohibit its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. URL: <http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm>

sociopolitical projects – such as the creation of a global caliphate – substitute concrete proposals for social justice and improvement of living conditions with abstract assertions and violent methods. The violent activities of Islamist terrorists are accompanied by the incitement of interethnic conflicts and the violation of state sovereignty. The use of familiar narratives about a just state

and the heroic deeds of ancestors, as well as low levels of religious education, ensures support and approval of Islamist ideas among young people.

The presented results highlight the need for more specialized research and underscore the necessity of developing effective counterterrorism programs targeting religiously inclined youth and fostering a competitive worldview.

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KAZAKHSTAN'S MULTI-VECTOR GEOPOLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF A GLOBAL HYBRID WAR

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Abstract. *Introduction.* This article examines the issues of Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy in the context of a global hybrid war, which is deployed and implemented through various methods of political-diplomatic, financial-economic, information-psychological, and information-technical pressure on the country from such superpowers as the USA, Russia, and China. The peculiarity of such a hybrid war is that all countries are involved in it through their inclusion in the global information space. Kazakhstan has been in such a difficult situation since February 24, 2022, to the present. Prompt response to external threats will allow Kazakhstan to build a proactive foreign policy. *Methods and materials.* The authors conducted a systematic analysis of three dominant vectors of Kazakhstan's foreign policy in the context of a global hybrid war based on the concept of Kazakhstan's foreign policy outlined by Zh.-K. Tokayev and official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan published after February 24, 2022. *Analysis and results.* In this article, three dominant vectors in Kazakhstan's foreign policy were chosen as the main focus for the study: 1) Western (USA, Western countries, EU); 2) Russian (Russian Federation); 3) Chinese. Based on the main provisions of the concept of balance of power and the presence of international organizations and alliances reflecting the interests of all actors in the system of international relations, priority partners in Kazakhstan's foreign policy were identified: the USA, EU countries, Russia, and China, and their spheres of influence and interests were highlighted. A comprehensive assessment of the implementation of the multi-vector course of Kazakhstan's foreign policy confirmed that in the context of global destabilization, this is the only acceptable strategy of the country's foreign policy, ensuring its sovereignty. *Authors' contribution.* The research of methodology development, source selection, and collection of empirical data were carried out by S. Yu. Petrenko. The analysis of Kazakhstan's foreign policy across its main foreign policy vectors, as well as the preparation of analytical conclusions, was conducted by I.P. Ivanov.

Key words: Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy, global hybrid war, China, Russia, USA.

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МНОГОВЕКТОРНАЯ ГЕОПОЛИТИКА КАЗАХСТАНА В УСЛОВИЯХ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ ГИБРИДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ

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Аннотация. *Введение.* В статье проводится системный анализ многовекторной внешней политики Казахстана в условиях глобальной гибридной войны, которая развернута и реализуется через различные методы политико-дипломатического, финансово-экономического, информационно-психологического и информационно-технического давления на страну со стороны таких супердержав, как США, Россия и Китай. Особенностью такой гибридной войны является то, что все страны втянуты в нее посредством включения в глобальное информационное пространство. В такой сложной ситуации находится и Казахстан с 24 февраля 2022 г. по настоящее время. Оперативное реагирование на внешние угрозы позволит Казахстану выстроить проактивную внешнюю политику. *Методы и материалы.* Авторами проведен системный анализ трех доминирующих векторов внешней политики РК в условиях глобальной гибридной войны по концепции внешней политики РК, изложенной Ж.-К. Токаевым, и официальным документам министерства иностранных дел РК, опубликованным после 24 февраля 2022 года. *Анализ и результаты.* В данной статье основным фокусом для исследования были выбраны три доминирующих вектора во внешней политике Казахстана: 1) западный (США, западные страны, ЕС); 2) российский (Российская Федерация и другие страны СНГ); 3) китайский (КНР). Опираясь на основные положения концепции баланса сил и наличия международных организаций и альянсов, отражающих интересы всех акторов системы международных отношений, были определены приоритетные партнеры во внешней политике Казахстана: США, страны ЕС, Россия и Китай, выделены сферы их влияния и интересов. Комплексная оценка реализации многовекторного курса внешней политики Казахстана подтвердила то, что в условиях глобальной дестабилизации это единственно приемлемая стратегия внешнеполитического курса страны, обеспечивающая ей суверенитет. *Вклад авторов.* Разработка методологии исследования, подбор источников и сбор эмпирического материала осуществлены С.Ю. Петренко. Анализ внешней политики Казахстана по основным внешнеполитическим векторам, а также подготовка аналитических выводов выполнены И.П. Ивановым.

Ключевые слова: многовекторная внешняя политика Казахстана, глобальная гибридная война, Китай, Россия, США.

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Введение. Внешнеполитический курс страны вырабатывается исходя из имеющихся ресурсов, необходимости их защищать и преумножать. Поэтому еще на заре независимости была выбрана многовекторность внешней политики Казахстана, которая позволяла выстраивать сотрудничество с разными акторами мирового политического процесса. Рустем Курмангужин отмечает, что «...сама многовекторность казахстанской внешней политики была, как известно, предопределена современным геополитическим окружением независимого Казахстана. Однако специалистам приходилось также учитывать и исторический опыт событий, связанных в том числе с периодом правления казахских ханов» [6, с. 50].

Таким образом, основным фокусом для исследования были выбраны три традиционно доминирующих вектора во внешней политике Казахстана:

– западный (США, западные страны, ЕС);

– российский (Российская Федерация);
– китайский (КНР).

Глобальные игроки, находящиеся в состоянии гибридной войны друг с другом, усиливают давление на Казахстан. Западные страны стремятся усложнить взаимодействие Казахстана с Россией и Китаем, угрожая в том числе и санкциями. Китай и Россия в свою очередь стремятся усилить влияние на Казахстан. На этом фоне Астана всеми силами стремится сохранить статус влиятельного регионального игрока, равноудаленного от кризисов и конфликтов. 8 августа 2024 г. Касым-Жомарт Токаев опубликовал статью «Ренессанс Центральной Азии: на пути к устойчивому развитию и процветанию» (см.: Токаев К.-Ж. Ренессанс Центральной Азии: на пути к устойчивому развитию и процветанию // Казахстанская правда. 2024. 8 авг. URL: <https://kazpravda.kz/n/renessans-tsentralnoy-azii-na-puti-k-ustoychivomu-razvitiyu-i-protsvetaniyu/>), в

которой отметил перспективы региона к интеграции (далее по тексту – Токаев К.-Ж. Ренессанс Центральной Азии...). Была высказана идея к усилению сотрудничества стран региона друг с другом. Президент Казахстана отметил: «Вектор развития Центральной Азии – приверженность традиционным ценностям вкупе со стремлением к модернизации и передовым знаниям. Это делает наш регион самодостаточным и влиятельным участником обновляющейся международной системы. Сегодня мы нацелены на укрепление своей роли как евразийского эпицентра международных геополитических и геоэкономических преобразований» (см.: Токаев К.-Ж. Ренессанс Центральной Азии...). Очевидно, что инициативы по объединению усилий с южными соседями должны позволить Казахстану усилить свои переговорные позиции с ключевыми международными партнерами. Исходя из этой проблематики возникает вопрос: сохранит ли Казахстан многовекторную политику в условиях глобальной гибридной войны?

Методы и материалы. В работе использованы системный анализ трех главных векторов внешней политики РК и основные положения теории реализма в международных отношениях, в частности, два инструмента, которые были предложены Гансом Моргентау, и могут обеспечить глобальную стабильность и снизить уровень насилия в международном сообществе. Первым является концепция баланса сил, второй – наличие международных организаций и альянсов, отражающих интересы всех акторов системы международных отношений [17]. А также концепция гибридной войны, предложенная Мартином Либицки, который является одним из разработчиков способов применения информационных технологий в системе национальной безопасности США [11].

1. *Теория реализма* используется для объяснения внешнеполитических решений Казахстана с точки зрения национальных интересов, силы и выживания государства в условиях глобальной неопределенности. Согласно Моргентау государства действуют в международных отношениях исходя из принципа баланса сил и рационального выбора. Этот подход помогает проанализировать, как Казахстан адаптируется к вызовам гибридной

войны, распределяя свои ресурсы и выстраивая дипломатические стратегии.

2. *Концепция гибридной войны* (М. Либицки) применяется для объяснения изменяющихся условий международного взаимодействия, в которых традиционные и нетрадиционные формы конфликта (экономическое давление, кибератаки, информационные войны) воздействуют на политику стран. Это позволяет рассмотреть, как Казахстан отвечает на вызовы гибридной войны, сохраняя многовекторность своей внешней политики.

Применение этих инструментов на практике позволяет дать объективную оценку сложившегося баланса сил и разглядеть потенциальные угрозы для Казахстана в реализации внешнеполитического курса страны. Данный теоретический подход дает возможность сфокусироваться на определении влияния контекста гибридной войны на внешнюю политику Казахстана и благодаря этому определить изменения по отдельно взятым направлениям (векторам). В нашем случае рассматриваются западный, российский и китайский векторы. В результате этих подходов и системного анализа было выявлено ключевое преимущество многовекторной политики Казахстана, проявившееся в условиях современной гибридной войны. В итоге заполняется пробел в академическом дискурсе о влиянии гибридной войны на внешнюю политику Республики Казахстан.

Внешняя политика Казахстана на современном этапе является предметом исследования известных казахстанских экспертов по международным отношениям. Среди них следует выделить труды ведущих специалистов в области внешней политики Казахстана, внесших значительный вклад в развитие академического дискурса, посвященного анализу внешней политики Республики Казахстан: М.Т. Ламулина [10], Б.К. Султанова [21–23], Р. Курмангузина [6] и Е.В. Тукумова [26].

Среди российских ученых, исследовавших многовекторную политику Казахстана на современном этапе, следует отметить работы прикладного характера М.Ю. Кучерова, И.В. Вохминцева, И.Д. Кравчука, в которых изучаются внешнеполитические предпочтения Казахстана с 2022 г. с помощью контент-анализа и других методов [7].

Среди западных исследователей, занимающихся регионом Центральной Азии, и, в частности, многовекторной политикой Казахстана, можно назвать следующих авторов: профессор Оклахомского государственного исследовательского университета Руэл Р. Хэнкс [4], Юсуф Неби Бастас (Норвегия) [1], директор Института Центральной Азии и Кавказа С. Фредерик Старр [20], но в их работах обозначаются лишь основные направления внешней политики РК, отсутствует анализ каждого вектора.

Материалами, на которых основывается исследование, являются академические публикации, аналитические материалы, официальные документы и статистические данные по вопросам внешней политики, геополитики и региональной безопасности. Используются положения внешней политики Республики Казахстан, изложенные Президентом РК К.-Ж. Токаевым, а также официальные документы Министерства иностранных дел РК, опубликованные после 24 февраля 2022 г. [26]. Кроме того, используются материалы официальных интернет-ресурсов государственных органов Республики Казахстан, Китая и международных аналитических платформ [14–16].

Анализ. Контекст гибридной войны.

На современном этапе вся система международных отношений посредством глобальной гибридной войны превращается в сложную многополярную хрупкую динамическую систему, которая порождает неопределенное количество «черных лебедей» (в терминологии выдающегося философа современности Нассима Талеба), труднопрогнозируемых социально-политических и экономических катастроф [24]. Считается, что термин «гибридная война» (англ. *hybrid warfare*) появился в США в конце 1990-х гг. и в современной науке нет единого мнения о сущности гибридной войны. Таким образом, создается объективный фон для многовекторной внешней политики современного Казахстана.

В данной статье под гибридной войной понимается вся совокупность методов политико-дипломатического, финансового-экономического, информационно-психологического и информационно-технического давления, осуществляемых по единому плану высшими

органами управления одного государства в отношении страны-мишени [2].

Еще в 2001 г. в своей статье Мартин Либицки (Martin C. Libicki) писал: «Если информационные технологии полностью преобразили гражданский мир, не должно ли их влияние в военной сфере быть столь же глубоким? Однако принесет ли это пользу или нет, может зависеть от того, кто первым распознает и использует новый потенциал» [11].

Важной частью этого фона является обострение отношений стран Запада с Китаем и попытки США организовывать скоординированные меры воздействия на Пекин (см.: Токаев К.-Ж. *Ренессанс Центральной Азии...*). Наряду с привычными информационными атаками на Китай страны Запада используют экономические ограничения и усиление военно-стратегического давления посредством создания новых военных альянсов (AUKUS) и расширения функционала старых (NATO). В сентябре 2023 г. состоялся визит министра иностранных дел Китая в Москву, где он провел ряд встреч. Секретарь Совета безопасности России Николай Патрушев и глава МИД Китая Ван И отметили, что «...создание США блоков и разделительных линий в АТР и усиление присутствия НАТО в Тихом океане подрывает безопасность в регионе» [18].

Формат AUKUS является своего рода продолжением формата НАТО для контроля военно-силового пространства Тихого океана. Дмитрий Мосяков в одной из своих работ пишет: «Многие аналитики сразу же отметили еще одну особенность AUKUS – отличие от СЕАТО¹ и АНЗЮК². Дело в том, что ни одна страна, собственно, из региона Большой Восточной Азии не захотела и не стала принимать в этом блоке участие. Получился чисто западный, а точнее англосаксонский военно-политический союз, который намерен самым активным образом действовать в Азии исходя при этом якобы из интересов государств Азии» [15].

Усиление геостратегического противостояния приводит к важным «тектоническим сдвигам» в глобальном балансе сил, которые ставят под сомнение устоявшуюся с начала 1990-х гг. систему международных отношений. Необходимо обратить внимание на возросшую роль в международных отношениях формата БРИКС, который противопоставля-

ется более привычному формату G7, а также возрастание роли стран глобального Юга.

На прошедшем в 2023 г. саммите G20 страны Запада продемонстрировали решимость развивать торговое сотрудничество со странами Юга и построить новый торговый коридор, который позволит соединить Индию с Европой, несмотря на предстоящие финансовые затраты. «Экономический коридор Индия – Ближний Восток – Европа (ИМЕС), продвигаемый как многонациональный железнодорожный и морской проект, который соединит Индо-Тихоокеанский регион с Ближним Востоком и Европой, ставится под сомнение из-за его стоимости и того, что он состоит из сухопутного и морского участков» [3].

Западный вектор внешней политики Казахстана. 2022 г. стал новой точкой отсчета в противостоянии между условным российско-китайским альянсом и странами Запада. Зоны столкновения этого конфликта, которые можно обозначить как линию боевого соприкосновения, разбросаны по всему миру. В местах этих столкновений бои переходят из плоскости торговых войн в горячую фазу народных протестов, для подавления которых власти применяют силовой ресурс. Кроме того, происходят военные действия в рамках гражданских войн и открытых межгосударственных вооруженных конфликтов. С учетом опыта январских событий 2022 г. руководство Казахстана должно сделать все возможное для того, чтобы не превратить территорию страны в одну из точек такого «горячего» столкновения ³.

С начала 2024 г. Казахстан стал позиционировать себя в качестве «средней державы». Этот статус был озвучен «Фондом науки и политики» (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / SWP), опубликовавшим аналитический сборник «Средние державы – важные акторы в международной политике», где Казахстан впервые включен в список мировых «средних держав». Данная публикация оказала влияние на самопозиционирование Республики Казахстан в системе современных международных отношений [12].

Важно понимать, что географически Астана зависима от хороших отношений с Москвой и Пекином больше, чем они от хороших отношений с Астаной. При этом Респуб-

лика Казахстан находится в геополитическом окружении государств, занимающих центральное место в системе стратегических вызовов и угроз для США, к числу которых относятся Китай, Россия, Иран и Афганистан. Напряжение в отношениях Вашингтона с Москвой, Пекином, Кабулом и Тегераном все еще не спадает.

В 2021 г. американцы фактически проиграли афганскую войну движению Талибан. Таким образом, находящийся под контролем талибов Афганистан стал частью геополитического расклада, в котором Астана должна маневрировать между развитием отношений с Кабулом и сохранением хороших отношений с Вашингтоном.

Можно по-разному относиться к внешней политике Ирана формата БРИКС, но факт, что Вашингтон сталкивается с сильным сопротивлением со стороны Ирана, можно считать бесспорным. Достаточно вспомнить, как Иран нанес ракетные удары по американским военным базам в Ираке ⁴ в начале 2020 г., однако Вашингтон проявил слабость и отсутствие решимости и не предпринял ответных военных мер. Прямые военные столкновения с Ираном в 2025 г. и начале 2026 г. не принесли Соединенным Штатам желанного решения вопроса по устранению регионального конкурента.

Геополитика Казахстана на американском и в целом западном векторе исходит исключительно из этих общемировых обстоятельств. Поэтому президент Республики Казахстан Касым-Жомарт Токаев высказывается за поиск дипломатических решений в конфликтах и отмену взаимных санкций: «Казахстан против санкционного противостояния, поскольку политически мотивированные ограничения отравляют общую атмосферу международных отношений и не способствуют развитию торгово-экономического сотрудничества между государствами. В то же время мы вынуждены учитывать санкционные ограничения в региональной политике. Считаю, что пришло время конструктивной дипломатии для поиска взаимоприемлемой формулы мира и сотрудничества» [8].

Сегодня уже стало очевидным, что глобальное противостояние Востока и Запада больно бьет по торговым связям, ставя под

вопрос прибылей от транспортировки казахстанских энергоресурсов в Европу и США. Поэтому актуализируется работа по созданию новой логистики, которая сможет обеспечить быструю и безопасную поставку казахстанской нефти в страны западного мира.

Можно сделать вывод, что внешнеполитическая стратегия Астаны на западном направлении должна включать в себя поиски вариантов максимальной диверсификации торговых потоков. Особую роль здесь необходимо отвести Азербайджану, через территорию которого Казахстан может транспортировать нефть в обход территории России. Особенности стратегическому значению Азербайджана придаст полноценное функционирование Зангезурского коридора. «Зангезурский коридор станет второй (после “Баку – Тбилиси – Карс”) транспортной артерией глобальных грузоперевозок в направлении “Восток – Запад” через Южный Кавказ. Прямые выгоды от его запуска получают Россия, Азербайджан, Армения, Иран и Турция, а также любые вне-региональные игроки, которым потребуется быстро и надежно доставить товары с восточного берега Каспия в Евросоюз и в обратном направлении» [19].

Сотрудничество с Вашингтоном может проходить по всему широкому спектру взаимодействия. 20 сентября 2023 г. в рамках формата C5+1 прошла встреча президента США Джоозефа Байдена с лидерами стран Центральной Азии. Говорили они практически обо всем, заявляя о необходимости укреплять стратегическое партнерство и в экономике, и в обеспечении безопасности. Важно отметить, что Казахстан так же, как и все страны региона, заинтересован в американских инвестициях. Кроме того, необходимо и дальше развивать сотрудничество в гуманитарной сфере. Еще Казахстан заинтересован в поддержке со стороны США имиджевых проектов, таких как создание в городе Алматы Регионального центра ООН по целям устойчивого развития для Центральной Азии и Афганистана.

В свою очередь Астана рассматривала отношения с Соединенными Штатами и Евросоюзом в качестве стратегического направления своей внешней политики, не забывая играть «собственную игру» в отношениях с Вашингтоном. Мурат Лаумулин по этому по-

воду отмечал: «Казахстан располагал некоторым ресурсом для политического маневра в своих отношениях с США. Этот ресурс ему давало наличие советского ядерного оружия на казахстанской территории, в уничтожении которого кровно были заинтересованы США. Так, на Каспий пришел “Шеврон”, а затем другие западные и транснациональные компании. Эти события имели серьезные геополитические последствия» [10].

Исходя из сложного взаимодействия Казахстана со странами западного мира в непростых условиях можно выделить ряд направлений их внешней политики в отношениях с Казахстаном. Европа и США нуждаются в казахстанских ресурсах, поэтому будут поддерживать диверсификацию их поставок. Приоритетом западной политики в отношении Астаны будет оставаться попытка способствовать разрыву всех видов сотрудничества Астаны с Москвой и Пекином.

Для реализации этой цели западные партнеры должны будут предложить расширение сотрудничества с Казахстаном и подкрепить свое видение увеличением инвестиций в казахстанскую экономику. Развитие многостороннего сотрудничества с Казахстаном, безусловно, потребует информационного сопровождения со стороны известных западных СМИ, которые продолжают работать над формированием негативного образа России и Китая.

После инаугурации Дональда Трампа, который вновь стал Президентом Америки, возможно лишь смещение акцентов американской политики в отношении региона. Например, основной целью информационной войны может стать политика Китая в Центральной Азии. Новая администрация, пришедшая в Белый дом уже в феврале 2025 г., продемонстрировала готовность обсуждать с Россией круг вопросов⁵, связанных с глобальной безопасностью. Однако говорить о завершении гибридной войны на данный момент преждевременно в силу стремления западных элит закрепить за собой глобальное доминирование. На практике это означает, что Астана будет и дальше сохранять многовекторный курс внешней политики.

Российский вектор внешней политики Казахстана. Второй президент Казахстана в своем труде «Дипломатия Республики

Казахстан», изданном в 2001 г., подводя итоги первому десятилетию развития дипломатических отношений с Россией, отмечает: «Благодаря кропотливой дипломатической работе, подкрепленной встречами и контактами высших руководителей, Казахстан и Россия создали беспрецедентный потенциал взаимовыгодного сотрудничества и вошли в XXI век стратегическими союзниками, которые объединены узами вечной дружбы. Это в высшей степени важно для будущего сосуществования народов двух государств» [25].

Сотрудничество Казахстана с Россией является объективной необходимостью. Это сотрудничество многогранно и проходит в разных областях. В числе приоритетных сфер сотрудничества можно выделить две основные, которые являются первостепенными, и от эффективности и качества сотрудничества в этих сферах во многом зависит качество устойчивого и поступательного развития Казахстана.

К таковым относятся:

1. Сотрудничество в экономической сфере, включающее в себя самые разные направления. Важную роль играет рост товарооборота между странами, а также то, что Казахстан использует инфраструктуру, расположенную на территории Российской Федерации для транзита энергоресурсов в Европу. Россия открывает для Казахстана возможность использовать трубопровод и порты для реализации экспортного потенциала. «Общий товарооборот с Россией за пять месяцев 2023 г. достиг \$10,5 млрд (\$9,59 в аналогичный период 2022 г.). Доля России в товарообороте Казахстана выросла с 18,6 до 18,8 %. В целом в январе – мае 2023 г. товарооборот Казахстана со странами ЕАЭС вырос на 10,5 % до \$11,43 млрд (\$10,34 млрд за пять месяцев 2022 г.)» [9].

2. Сфера обеспечения безопасности включает в себя сотрудничество как по линии ОДКБ, так и двустороннее взаимодействие на уровне министерств обороны и специальных служб. Несмотря на сложную международную обстановку, Москва остается важным и во многом не заменимым партнером. «Президент К.-Ж. Токаев, еще до занятия поста президента Казахстана заявлял, что Казахстан и Россия являются союзниками» [23].

После событий 2014 г., связанных с присоединением Крыма к России и с тем, что начались боевые действия на Донбассе, отношения граждан Казахстана к России стало меняться. В 2022 г., после начала боевых действий на территории Украины, политическое руководство Казахстана оказалось в очень сложной геополитической ситуации. С одной стороны, Астана связана интеграционными процессами с Москвой, с другой стороны, фактически начавшаяся гибридная война России и Китая против глобального Запада в силу объективных причин несет серьезные риски для Казахстана.

Современные геополитические реалии таковы, что внешнюю политику России в отношении стран, расположенных на евразийском континенте, необходимо рассматривать в контексте борьбы с коллективным Западом. Особенно остро эта специфика стала проявляться после знаменитой «Мюнхенской речи» Владимира Путина, которая содержала вызов проамериканскому миропорядку. Известный казахстанский политолог Б.К. Султанов в одной из своих публикаций отмечает: «Так, тогдашний государственный секретарь США Х. Клинтон заявила о том, что американские власти намерены помешать созданию новой версии Советского Союза и найдут эффективный способ для замедления или предотвращения этого процесса. Неудивительно что западные эксперты стали рассматривать евразийский проект как попытку ресоветизации на пространстве новых независимых государств» [23].

Противодействие сотрудничеству Казахстана с Россией наиболее остро проявляется в информационном поле. В казахстанском дискурсе появились ярко выраженные антироссийские нарративы, которые массово распространяются в социальных сетях и тем самым создают рычаг давления на политическое руководство страны с целью затормозить или вовсе пересмотреть реализацию вектора внешней политики на российском треке. Кроме того, казахстанское руководство рискует столкнуться с применением экономических санкций в отношении Казахстана за сам факт развития сотрудничества с Россией. Объективная реальность глобальной гибридной войны заставляет Астану встать перед сложным внешнеполитическим выбором.

Если делать этот выбор исходя исключительно из экономических потребностей и потребности в обеспечении безопасности, то этот выбор кажется не таким уж и сложным. Казахстан имеет самую протяженную в мире сухопутную границу с Российской Федерацией. Гипотетический конфликт с Россией может нанести Казахстану значительный ущерб, даже если это будет конфликт чисто экономический, без использования военной силы.

Сегодня ни одна страна не способна предложить Астане реальную альтернативу экономическому сотрудничеству с Москвой. «Для Казахстана и России – единственных в мире стран, у которых совместная граница составляет почти семь тысяч километров, интеграция нашла отражение в формировании транзитного коридора Европа – Западный Китай, проходящего от Санкт-Петербурга через Казань, Оренбург, Актюбинск и Алматы до границ с КНР, и серьезно укрепляет не только транспортную инфраструктуру России и Казахстана, но и обеспечивает более выгодные маршруты между Азиатско-Тихоокеанским регионом и Европой» [28].

Даже с учетом всей сложности современных международных отношений, допущения о выходе из совместных с Москвой интеграционных форматов оставляют без ответа вопросы о путях транспортировки нефти из Казахстана в страны Европейского союза и вопрос обеспечения безопасности страны. Потому что при всех своих недостатках, членство Астаны в Евразийском экономическом союзе способствует экономическому развитию Казахстана, а союзники по формату ОДКБ сыграли главную роль в стабилизации внутриполитической ситуации в Казахстане во время январских событий 2022 года.

Для формирования транзитных коридоров, которые могли бы стать альтернативой российскому транзиту, необходимо будет потратить время и вложить в эти проекты финансовые ресурсы. Однако ухудшение геополитической обстановки в современных условиях этому явно не способствует. Несмотря на то что в 2023 г. Азербайджан смог восстановить свою территориальную целостность, вопросы обеспечения безопасности на Кавказе еще остаются актуальными. Сухопутные торговые маршруты в регионе все еще не

функционируют в полном объеме в силу неурегулированности отношений Баку с Ереваном. Использование транзита через территорию Ирана тоже не является безопасным в силу того, что Тегеран находится под международным давлением и на данный момент времени нельзя исключать вариант дестабилизации Ирана. У Ирана очень много врагов, которые не скрывают своих намерений по дестабилизации обстановки в этой стране. Кроме того, нельзя исключать военного конфликта с участием Ирана. Несмотря на глобальный контекст, Москва все еще остается первоочередным и ключевым стратегическим партнером для Астаны. Транзит энергоресурсов через российскую территорию все еще остается прибыльным.

Подводя итог описанию сотрудничества Казахстана с Россией, необходимо отметить объективные обстоятельства, стимулирующие двусторонние отношения. Членство в Евразийском экономическом союзе и Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности, возглавляемой Россией, показывает, что геополитическая ориентация Астаны прекрасно коррелирует с ее геополитическим положением [27]. Практическая реализация внешней политики Казахстана показывает зависимость экономики страны от хороших экономических отношений с Россией. На текущий момент отсутствуют серьезные основания для того, чтобы подвергнуть сомнению сложившиеся в предыдущие годы партнерские отношения между странами. Даже принимая во внимание санкционную политику стран Запада, направленную против России, есть все основания утверждать, что партнерские отношения между Астаной и Москвой как минимум сохранятся, а как максимум будут развиваться в позитивном ключе.

На данный момент времени отсутствуют какие-либо основания для того, чтобы казахстанско-российские отношения деградировали. Вне зависимости от того, кому конкретно будет принадлежать власть в Казахстане, всегда будут сохраняться два объективных фактора, выступающих в качестве катализатора сотрудничества. Первый фактор – это протяженная общая граница. Этот фактор стимулирует сотрудничество двух стран в сфере безопасности и полномасштабного пригранич-

ного сотрудничества. Второй фактор – это фактор экономической взаимозависимости, выступающий катализатором в развитии сотрудничества двух стран. Таким образом, при любых внешних геополитических и геоэкономических потрясениях, стороны находят пути и механизмы для реализации партнерского взаимодействия.

Китайский вектор внешней политики Казахстана. Казахстан занимает ключевое место в геополитике Китая, потому что открывает восточному соседу выход на транспортные коридоры через Каспийский регион. Кроме того, территория Казахстана богата энергоресурсами. Развивая торговые отношения с Казахстаном, Китай укрепляет свою энергетическую безопасность на тот случай, если в современных геополитических реалиях доставка грузов в Китай по морю окажется под вопросом.

18 октября 2023 г. Касым-Жомарт Токаев принял участие в церемонии открытия III Форума международного сотрудничества «Один пояс, один путь». В своем выступлении К.-Ж. Токаев подчеркнул, что «...сейчас около 85 процентов всех наземных транзитных перевозок из Китая в Европу приходится на Казахстан. Придавая большое значение развитию транзитно-транспортной отрасли, за последние 15 лет мы направили на эти цели свыше 35 миллиардов долларов. Запущены такие крупные инфраструктурные проекты, как казахско-китайский логистический центр в Ляньюньгане, сухой порт “Хоргос”, транзитная магистраль Западная Европа – Западный Китай, железнодорожный коридор из Китая в Иран» [19].

Казахстану жизненно необходимо развивать торговое сотрудничество с Китаем, потому что главным итогом этого сотрудничества является экономический рост. В январе 2023 г. на сайте Посольства Республики Казахстан в Китайской Народной Республике опубликовано короткое сообщение с цифрами роста товарооборота с Китаем за 2022 год. В сообщении отмечается также, что «...по итогам года товарооборот между РК и КНР достиг рекордных 31,2 млрд долларов. Высокая динамика роста взаимной торговли в 23,6 % в годовом исчислении в основном достигнута за счет увеличения поставок Казахстаном в Китай сельскохозяйственной продук-

ции на 133,7 %, сырьевых энергетических продуктов – 58 %, химической продукции – 25,2 %. В свою очередь, Казахстан увеличил на 45 % импорт из Китая пластмассы и каучука, на 23,4 % текстиля и текстильных изделий и на 21,4 % машин и оборудования» [16].

Если к этим цифрам добавить транзитный потенциал и ресурсные возможности Казахстана, то можно констатировать, что Астана является главным геополитическим партнером Китая в Центральной Азии. Это косвенно подтверждается символическим церемониалом III Форума международного сотрудничества «Один пояс, один путь», где Президенту Казахстана отводилась одна из центральных ролей.

Для Казахстана Китай является приоритетным торговым партнером по самым разным причинам. Современный Китай – передовая держава, обладающая высоким потенциалом в науке, транспорте, инфраструктурном развитии и развитии информационных технологий. Индустриальная мощь второй (по некоторым показателям и первой) экономики мира позволяет Пекину конкурировать с Вашингтоном за право возглавить глобализацию. И сотрудничество с Китаем имеет не только большое количество плюсов, но и огромный потенциал для дальнейшего развития.

Потенциальное развитие кризиса вокруг Израиля, который обострился в октябре 2023 г., ставит под угрозу стабильность цен на энергоресурсы и безопасность доставки грузов из стран Ближнего Востока в Китай. Эти риски служат дополнительной мотивацией для китайского руководства развивать сотрудничество с Казахстаном, территория которого по-прежнему остается безопасным местом для добычи ресурсов, транспортировки грузов и ведения бизнеса.

Пекин оказывает Астане поддержку, выходящую за рамки торгового сотрудничества между соседями, способствуя продвижению интересов Астаны на глобальном уровне. Как отмечает политолог и китаевед Адиль Каукенов: «Новым доказательством высокого уровня политического доверия между нашими государствами стало предложение Пекина выдвинуть Казахстан в число полноценных членов, участвующих в работе одного из крупнейших мировых объединений БРИКС+,

куда входят пять стран – Бразилия, Россия, Индия, Китай, ЮАР. Это весьма серьезная заявка, ведь данную организацию называют достойным конкурентом таких глобальных клубов, как G7 и G20, но уже с учетом новых растущих экономик и новой расстановки сил на мировой арене. А то, что Казахстан выдвигается при поддержке второй экономики мира, придает его участию в БРИКС+ весомый кредит доверия» [5].

Руководство Китая выстраивает доверительные партнерские отношения в рамках реализации инициативы «Один пояс, один путь». От реализации данной инициативы и от количества участников зависит финансовая прибыль китайских компаний и количество доходов в китайский бюджет. Любая конфронтация с участием Китая может поставить под сомнение репутацию страны и эффективность реализации этой инициативы. Следовательно, Китай не заинтересован в проявлении агрессии и участии в любой конфронтации с соседями, потому что придется терпеть убытки. Китай заинтересован в развитии равноправного и взаимовыгодного партнерства, которое будет служить лучшим гарантом безопасности мира и стабильности в Центральной Азии.

Поэтому Пекин может рассматриваться Казахстаном только в качестве надежного партнера, сотрудничество с которым принесит финансовую прибыль. Эта точка зрения проявляется в академических работах и официальной позиции Китая. Ряд исследователей отмечают, что китайско-казахстанское сотрудничество развивается преимущественно на основе прагматичного и взаимовыгодного партнерства. Как подчеркивают Гуань Лим и Николай Мурашкин, Казахстану удастся сохранять собственный суверенитет и многовекторный внешнеполитический курс несмотря на активное экономическое взаимодействие с КНР [13]. Данный подход находит подтверждение и в официальной позиции Пекина. В ходе государственного визита в Астану в сентябре 2022 г. Председатель КНР Си Цзиньпин заявил, что Китай поддерживает государства Центральной Азии в обеспечении политической безопасности и социальной стабильности, а также выступает за укрепление регионального сотрудничества и совместное противо-

действие внешнему вмешательству во внутренние дела стран региона [14].

Во время своего визита в Казахстан в июле 2024 г. Си Цзиньпин подчеркнул, что двусторонние отношения продолжают устойчиво развиваться, базируясь на основных важных принципах: взаимного уважения, добрососедства, взаимовыручки и обоюдной выгоды. Основными перспективами будущего сотрудничества является сфера высоких технологий: новые источники энергии, цифровая экономика, ИИ, трансграничная электронная коммерция, авиация и космос [16].

Если говорить о политическом векторе, то Китай остается верен своей многолетней стратегии мультилатерализма, то есть организации международных внешнеэкономических отношений, основанных на механизмах, позволяющих каждой стране пользоваться привилегиями в отношениях со всеми партнерами. В этой связи следует говорить о стратегическом партнерстве Казахстана и Китая, которые стремятся продвигать равноправную и упорядоченную многополярность мира. Китай выступает в качестве лидера этого процесса, а Казахстан как «средняя держава» поддерживает данную тенденцию по построению нового миропорядка [20].

Результаты. Исходя из проведенного анализа можно констатировать, что в современных геополитических условиях именно контекст глобальной гибридной войны определяет внешнюю политику Казахстана, не меняя ее многовекторную сущность. Страх перед санкциями стимулирует переговорный процесс по созданию новых механизмов торговли с соседями и поиску более совершенных механизмов обеспечения безопасности. Казахстанская дипломатия и бизнес приспособляются под новые реалии. Однако можно констатировать и то, что курс многовекторной внешней политики остается прежним.

Мы приходим к главному выводу о том, что концепция многовекторной политики Казахстана остается актуальной. Контекст глобальной гибридной войны не влияет на географию. Для понимания реалий внешней политики Казахстана необходимо исходить из его географического расположения и наличия у страны тех или иных ресурсов. Казахстан обладает большой территорией (2,724,900 км²) при срав-

нительно небольшой численности населения (19 921 425 человек по данным на 1 августа 2023 г.)⁶. Эти цифры говорят о недостаточном мобилизационном потенциале для реагирования на весь комплекс гипотетических угроз независимости и территориальной целостности.

Для усиления своих переговорных позиций с различными центрами силы Астана активно поддерживает различные форматы переговоров по формуле «С+». Как отметил Токаев в своей статье: «К настоящему времени состоялось девять саммитов и встреч на высшем уровне в данном формате. За последние два года проведены первые саммиты “ЦА – РФ” (Астана), “ЦА – КНР” (Сиань), “ЦА – США” (Нью-Йорк), “ЦА – ФРГ” (Берлин), две встречи глав государств ЦА и Европейского союза (Астана, Чолпон-Ата), первый саммит “ЦА – ССАГЗ” (Джидда), а также “ЦА – Индия” (в онлайн-формате)» (см.: Токаев К.-Ж. Ренессанс Центральной Азии...).

Преимущество многовекторного курса внешней политики Казахстана на современном этапе в том, что он позволяет адаптироваться к условиям переформатирования мирового порядка, оставляя за Казахстаном и статус ключевой транзитной точки в регионе,

и возможность усиливать свое влияние на безопасность региона. Астана будет и дальше сохранять многовекторный курс внешней политики, потому что это полностью отвечает национальным интересам Казахстана.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ

¹ Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Военно-политический блок стран Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона, существовавший в 1955–1977 годах.

² Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom. Блок стран, существовавший в 1971–1975 гг. в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе.

³ События начала января 2022 г., когда протесты в Казахстане переросли в массовые беспорядки.

⁴ Иран нанес удары по двум военным базам, где размещается военный и коалиционный персонал США в Асаде и Эрбиле, 8 января 2020 г. в ответ на убийство в Багдаде командующего спецподразделением «Аль-Кудс» генерала Касема Сулеймани.

⁵ 18 февраля 2025 г. в Саудовской Аравии прошли первые за несколько лет переговоры России и США на высоком уровне.

⁶ Официальный сайт Бюро национальной статистики Агентства по стратегическому планированию и реформам Республики Казахстан. URL: <https://stat.gov.kz/ru>

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PARTICIPATION OF KAZAKHSTAN YOUTH IN HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION PROJECTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EAEU

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Abstract. Introduction. The relevance of the topic is determined by the need to assess how youth initiatives are included in the humanitarian dimension of Eurasian integration and what place Kazakhstan occupies in these practices. The scientific novelty of this study lies in the development of a Kazakhstan-centric analytical framework for classifying these institutions based on their function, degree of institutionalization, format of participation, and verifiable outcomes. **Methods and materials.** The research is based on structural-functional analysis, comparative analysis, and case studies. The cases were selected according to four criteria: connection with the EAEU or the CIS-EAEU agenda, documented participation of Kazakhstan, availability of open sources, and humanitarian or youth orientation. The comparison was carried out by institutional status, target group, scale of Kazakhstani participation, continuity of the project, and presence of post-project support. The source base consists of regulatory documents from the EAEU and the CIS, materials from the Eurasian Economic Commission, reports from the organizers, and publicly available statistics. For the critical analysis of these sources, the views of researchers as reflected in the academic literature were also taken into account, including critical works on issues of Eurasian integration. **Analysis.** The article distinguishes institutional, forum, educational, media-cultural, and volunteer formats of cooperation. The participation of Kazakhstani youth is considered not a background element of the general EAEU agenda but three dimensions: representation, initiative, and infrastructure. **Results.** The study shows that Kazakhstan is regularly represented in key youth formats, but its participation is uneven and often quantitatively limited. The measurable effects of the initiatives are most reliably recorded at the level of contacts, project proposals, and institutional discussion, while claims about the formation of Eurasian identity or a stable community of leaders require additional sociological verification. The main problems are limited institutionalization, fragmented information support, barriers to academic mobility, and insufficient post-project support.

Key words: EAEU, Kazakhstan, youth policy, humanitarian cooperation, international youth projects, integration, youth forums, academic mobility.

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УЧАСТИЕ КАЗАХСТАНСКОЙ МОЛОДЕЖИ В ПРОЕКТАХ ГУМАНИТАРНОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА В РАМКАХ ЕАЭС

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Аннотация. Введение. Актуальность темы определяется необходимостью оценить, каким образом молодежные инициативы включаются в гуманитарное измерение евразийской интеграции и какое место в

этих практиках занимает Республика Казахстан. Научная новизна исследования состоит в разработке казахстаноцентричной аналитической рамки их классификации по функции, степени институционализации, формату участия и верифицируемым результатам. *Методы и материалы.* Исследование основано на структурно-функциональном, сравнительном и кейс-методе. Кейсы отбирались по четырем критериям: связь с повесткой ЕАЭС или сопряженными форматами СНГ – ЕАЭС, документированное участие Казахстана, наличие открытых источников и молодежно-гуманитарная направленность. Сопоставление осуществлялось по институциональному статусу, целевой группе, масштабу казахстанского участия, продолжительности проекта и наличию постпроектной поддержки. Источниковую базу составили нормативные документы ЕАЭС и СНГ, материалы Евразийской экономической комиссии, отчеты организаторов, открытая статистика. Для критического анализа источников также учитывалось мнение исследователей, отраженное в академической литературе, включая критические работы по проблемам евразийской интеграции. *Анализ.* В статье выделены институциональные, форумные, образовательные, медийно-культурные и волонтерские форматы сотрудничества. Участие казахстанской молодежи рассматривается не как фоновый элемент общей повестки ЕАЭС, а через три измерения: представительство, инициативность и инфраструктурный потенциал. *Результаты.* Показано, что Казахстан регулярно представлен в ключевых молодежных форматах, однако участие остается неравномерным и часто количественно ограниченным. Наиболее надежно фиксируемые эффекты инициатив проявляются на уровне контактов, проектных предложений и институционального обсуждения, тогда как выводы о формировании евразийской идентичности или устойчивого сообщества лидеров требуют дополнительной социологической проверки. Основными проблемами остаются ограниченная институционализация, фрагментарное информационное сопровождение, барьеры академической мобильности и недостаточная постпроектная поддержка.

Ключевые слова: ЕАЭС, Казахстан, молодежная политика, гуманитарное сотрудничество, международные молодежные проекты, интеграция, молодежные форумы, академическая мобильность.

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Introduction. Youth cooperation in the humanities within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) should be viewed as one of the channels for public and educational interaction that complements economic integration but does not replace its institutional and legal mechanisms. For Kazakhstan, this topic has practical significance: youth forums, academic mobility, project competitions, and media and cultural platforms create opportunities for cross-border contacts; however, their scale, sustainability, and actual effects require separate analytical examination.

In recent years, humanitarian cooperation among youth in the EAEU has become more prominent on the official agenda. The Union's strategic documents emphasize the need to involve citizens, public organizations, and business associations of member states in determining the future directions of Eurasian integration [3; 4; 12]. In December 2020, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council approved the Strategic Directions for the Development of Eurasian Economic Integration until 2025,

which outlines the expansion of cooperation in the fields of education, healthcare, tourism, and sports [32]. For Kazakhstan, as one of the founding states of the EAEU, youth cooperation forms part of its policy on human capital development and international humanitarian engagement. At the same time, the mere existence of such initiatives does not in itself prove their integrative effect; therefore, this article distinguishes between participation, institutional outcomes, and the anticipated impact on the youth community.

With the establishment of the EEC Youth Council in 2019, the first sustainable mechanisms for advancing the youth agenda emerged at the supranational level. These were aligned with EAEU policy documents, primarily with the Strategic Directions for the Development of Eurasian Economic Integration until 2025 [19]. In this article, these mechanisms are analyzed not as self-evident proof of the effectiveness of humanitarian integration but as institutional conditions that can facilitate youth participation provided there is funding, transparent selection procedures, and post-project support.

The aim of this study is to identify the specific characteristics and limitations of Kazakhstani youth participation in youth humanitarian cooperation projects within the framework of the EAEU and related CIS-EAEU formats. The research question is formulated as follows: what exactly constitutes the Kazakhstani component of these initiatives, what is its scope, and what results can be considered verifiable through open sources? The objectives include: 1) to clarify the conceptual framework and criteria for classifying initiatives; 2) to characterize the institutional and regulatory foundations of youth cooperation in the EAEU; 3) to compare key initiatives involving Kazakhstani youth in terms of scale, functions, and results; 4) to identify problem areas and constraints affecting Kazakhstan's participation.

The study covers the period from 2019 to 2025. The lower limit is determined by the establishment of the EEC Youth Council (2019) as the first permanent institutional mechanism for the youth agenda in the EAEU, while the upper limit is set by the documentation of current practices and results by the end of 2025, including the holding of the 3rd CIS and EAEU Youth Forum (Minsk, October 1–3, 2025) and the development of key educational, media, and project platforms in 2023–2024. The regulatory and programmatic context of the earlier period (the 2014 EAEU Treaty, the 2018 Declaration, and strategic documents through 2025) is considered as a preliminary background. To address terminological inconsistencies, the following working definitions are used. Humanitarian cooperation refers to educational, cultural, scientific, media, and volunteer practices aimed at developing inter-community ties. Youth integration is interpreted as the inclusion of young citizens in such practices through forums, academic mobility, project competitions, and networking initiatives. Eurasian identity is not treated in this article as a proven outcome of participation but is understood as a potential subject for future sociological research. Public diplomacy refers to informal and semi-formal channels of interaction among youth, universities, NGOs, and expert platforms.

The Kazakhstan-centric analytical framework comprises three dimensions: representation (the proportion and regularity of Kazakhstani delegations' participation), initiative

(the presence of proposals, projects, and organizational impetus from Kazakhstan), and infrastructural capacity (the role of Kazakhstani universities, technology hubs, and regional youth organizations in supporting cooperation). This framework allows us to avoid a mere retelling of the pan-Eurasian agenda and to highlight the specific features of the Kazakhstani case.

Methods and materials. The study employed a range of methods: structural-functional analysis, comparative analysis, and case studies. Structural-functional analysis was used to identify the functions of youth initiatives: institutional-communicative, educational, project-entrepreneurial, media, and volunteer. Comparative analysis was used to compare projects using a unified matrix of parameters: organizer and institutional status, target group, format of Kazakhstan's participation, number or proportion of participants (where data is available), documented results, post-project support, and limitations. Case studies were applied to those initiatives for which open sources are available and Kazakhstan's participation is documented.

The author uses the materials, which include regulatory documents of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that define the institutional and programmatic foundations of youth cooperation; informational and analytical materials from the Eurasian Economic Commission and the CIS Executive Committee; reports and communications from the organizers of youth forums, summits, and competitive projects; and open statistical data on educational mobility.

Academic studies on Eurasian integration, humanitarian cooperation, and issues in higher education help to represent all the critical points of view considering the integration process. The conceptual framework for research on Eurasian integration is provided by the monograph by E.Y. Vinokurov and A.M. Libman, which proposes an approach to Eurasian regionalism and identifies the factors influencing the sustainability of integration [2]. The post-Soviet legal architecture – from the CIS to the EAEU – is systematically described by Zh.M. Kembaev; his work allows for an account of the evolution of norms and institutions [12]. The study by

R. Dragneva and K. Volchuk is important for a critical analysis of the relationship between political agreements and formal rules in the EAEU [10].

The humanitarian dimension is explored in the works of G.I. Osadchaya: a monograph on the formation of the EAEU combines ideological foundations and institutional practice [25], while a later study focuses on human capital, demographics, and cooperation in education and culture [26]. M.V. Roslavytseva writes specifically about the value- and identity-based foundations of cooperation among young people, proposing operational indicators of social memory [33]. These works show that conclusions about identity require not a description of activities, but specific measurement procedures.

Youth policy within the EAEU framework is specifically addressed by A.V. Palamarchuk, who examines the role of Eurasian youth associations as a channel for public diplomacy [30], and by E.V. Kuznetsova, who considers forums, schools, and academic mobility as resources for humanitarian cooperation [13; 14]. For a critical assessment of the educational dimension, the works of T.V. Lebedeva, M.O. Govorchenko, G.I. Osadchaya, and T.N. Yudina are drawn upon, which identify barriers to the recognition of qualifications, inconsistencies in educational standards, limited funding, and low mobility [6; 16; 27].

Thus, the research materials are based on a combination of official documents, statistics, and academic literature. Official reports are used to document the facts regarding the conduct of events and the composition of participants, while scholarly works are used to interpret limitations, asymmetries, and conditions for effectiveness. This allows for maintaining analytical distance and prevents the study from merely reproducing the institutional rhetoric of the EAEU.

Analysis. The EEC Youth Council, established in 2019, is a fundamental institutional component of the EAEU's youth agenda. Its role is not only to provide informational support for integration but also to facilitate communication among young professionals, national youth organizations, and supranational bodies. For the Kazakhstani case, the Council's significance lies in the fact that representatives from Kazakhstan

are included in a permanent mechanism for discussing youth initiatives; however, mere participation in the Council does not automatically translate into influence over the country's youth community; such influence must be assessed based on the number of supported projects, the sustainability of communication, and the subsequent implementation of proposals.

The CIS and EAEU youth forums have become key practical platforms. The first forum took place on August 25–26, 2022, in Cholpon-Ata and brought together more than 250 participants from EAEU member states and Uzbekistan [29; 34]. For Kazakhstan, the forum is important as a platform for presenting proposals in the fields of education, youth entrepreneurship, tourism, volunteering, and the digital economy [7]. From an analytical perspective, its outcome should be assessed not through rhetoric of support but through the presence of subsequent institutional follow-up: the adoption of the Cholpon-Ata Action Plan, discussion of the mechanism for accepting youth initiatives, and the launch of specific educational projects [20].

The 2nd CIS and EAEU Youth Forum, held in June 2023 in Sochi, confirmed the regularity of this format. The Kazakh delegation participated in discussions on digital cooperation, startup initiatives, and academic and project mobility. At the same time, publicly available materials allow for the reliable documentation of, first and foremost, the fact of participation and the topics of proposals, whereas the degree of their subsequent implementation varies and requires separate monitoring. Therefore, the forum is viewed as a mechanism for placing initiatives on the agenda, rather than as a comprehensive tool for solving youth issues.

The 3rd CIS and EAEU Youth Forum took place in Minsk on October 1–3, 2025, and was organized into tracks related to the media sphere, education and science, youth initiatives, and innovative entrepreneurship [2]. Holding it following the meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council strengthened the link between the youth agenda and the intergovernmental level; however, the forum's reach remained limited compared to the scale of youth groups in the EAEU states. Consequently, the forum's significance lies primarily in the

institutional signal it sends and the selection of project ideas, rather than in the mass engagement of youth.

One of the most significant areas of cooperation in the humanities is education and science. EAEU strategic documents provide for the use of network-based approaches to implementing educational programs and the harmonization of qualification requirements [5]. For Kazakhstan, this area has a dual nature: on the one hand, the country is actively engaged in educational ties with Russia and other states in the Eurasian region; on the other hand, these ties are marked by significant asymmetry and are not always formalized as actual EAEU programs. Therefore, academic mobility is viewed as an important context for Kazakhstan's participation but is not equated with the outcomes of EAEU youth projects.

The 2023–2024 EAEU Global University Summit serves as a specialized educational platform bringing together students, young researchers, and representatives of universities, business, and integration institutions. In 2023, the summit addressed science, careers, student self-governance, and youth policy; in 2024, the increase in the number of applications indicated growing interest in the format [24]. However, the summit is not a representative indicator of overall academic mobility. It is more accurate to analyze it as a case of networked educational cooperation and as a mechanism for selecting motivated participants, rather than as a mass exchange program [28].

The data in the table reveal a marked imbalance in educational exchange between Kazakhstan and Russia. Even though some of

the figures are rounded, it is clear that the flow of citizens from the Republic of Kazakhstan to Russian universities significantly exceeds the corresponding flow of citizens from the Russian Federation to Kazakhstani universities. This imbalance is significant for the research topic: Kazakhstan has a substantial youth contingent already integrated into the Russian educational sphere; however, this contingent does not automatically become participants in EAEU humanitarian projects. To transition from educational migration to integration-oriented participation, special programs, clear information channels, and post-project support are necessary.

Kazakhstan's potential is linked not only to the scale of outbound educational mobility but also to its national infrastructure: universities, youth organizations, technology hubs, and regional initiatives. However, the impact of these tools specifically on intra-Union youth interaction requires documentary confirmation. Therefore, in this study, they are considered Kazakhstan's infrastructural capabilities rather than a proven integration outcome.

Joint research and educational projects – ranging from schools for young scientists to student startup incubators – receive support at the EAEU level [7]. Their value lies in fostering professional networks and project skills, but their effectiveness must be assessed using measurable indicators: the number of participants, the proportion of Kazakhstani involvement, the continuation of projects after the event, the availability of grant or mentoring support, and the incorporation of results into educational programs [31].

Table 1. Trends in educational mobility between Kazakhstan and Russia for the period 2022–2025

Year / period	The number of Kazakh citizens studying at universities in Russia	The number of Russian citizens studying at universities in Kazakhstan	Flow ratios (KZ to RU / RU to KZ)
2022	≈ 67 000	1 247	≈ 53,7: 1
2023	≈ 79 000	1 298	≈ 60,9: 1
2024	≈ 83 000	≈ 2 100–2 200	≈ 37,7–39,5: 1
2025	≈ 85 000	2 426	≈ 35: 1

Notes. Compiled by the author based on materials from [11; 15]. Data on citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan attending universities in the Russian Federation are presented as rounded estimates from open sources; data on citizens of the Russian Federation attending universities in the Republic of Kazakhstan are used as reported in available statistics. The ratio of student flows was calculated by the author as the ratio of the corresponding figures and is provided for reference purposes only.

Academic literature and publicly available materials point to persistent limitations on academic mobility within the EAEU: uneven recognition of disciplines and qualifications, differences in accreditation requirements, administrative barriers in arranging internships, and insufficient institutional support for exchanges. G.I. Osadchaya and T.N. Yudina note the fragmentation of practices and the inconsistency of educational standards [27]; T.V. Lebedeva links low mobility to differences in professional standards and legal regimes governing educational migration [17], while M.O. Govorchenko highlights limited funding and restricted student-faculty mobility [6]. These factors directly limit the participation of Kazakhstani youth in EAEU projects [16].

Cultural, volunteer, and media initiatives expand the scope of youth cooperation beyond university mobility. The “100 Ideas for the CIS” project is relevant to this topic as a collaborative platform involving young people from EAEU member states, including Kazakhstan [18]. Kazakhstani projects presented in the competition finals demonstrate the presence of initiative potential; however, publicly available materials more often document competition recognition rather than subsequent sustainable implementation. Therefore, it is advisable to view such projects as a stage for testing ideas and establishing contacts, rather than as completed integration products.

The “CIS Youth Capital” project creates additional infrastructure for youth engagement within the Commonwealth. It is significant for this study to the extent that Kazakhstan has proposed to substantively strengthen this format by holding international youth forums, thereby creating a link between the agendas of the CIS and the EAEU. At the same time, quantitative data on the number of participants are used only when source transparency is available; in other cases, the analysis is limited to documenting the project’s institutional role and the participation of delegations.

A comparison of publicly available information on competitions, forums, and educational projects reveals common areas of concern. Following competition finals, sustained post-project support is not always guaranteed: acceleration programs, mentoring, pilot implementation, and co-funding are not available in all formats. Access to information also remains uneven: announcements and application procedures

are scattered across various resources, and a unified digital platform featuring a calendar of opportunities and a “one-stop shop” approach to participation has not yet become a standard tool for all projects.

Media and educational projects have emerged specifically within the EAEU framework. In 2024, the Gorchakov Fund organized the international media school “EAEU-Media,” the in-person phase of which took place June 30 – July 4, 2024, at the “Mashuk” Knowledge Center in Pyatigorsk [9]. Participants included students from journalism and international relations departments, young bloggers, and student media staff aged 18–27, selected through a competitive process [22]. For Kazakhstan, this format could be useful as a channel for introducing young people to integration-related topics in a professional context; however, its effectiveness should be measured by subsequent media products, online connections, and continued professional collaboration, rather than by the mere fact that the school was held [1].

The “Eurasian Dialogue” forums are a scientific, educational, and expert discussion platform dedicated to exploring humanitarian cooperation, historical and cultural heritage, and integration processes [23]. Kazakhstani participants were represented at these events; however, in the absence of comparable lists and final reports, it is advisable to record the qualitative fact of participation rather than derive precise estimates of Kazakhstan’s share. The analytical significance of the format lies in supporting expert communication and discussing the humanitarian agenda, rather than in demonstrating a broad public impact.

The volunteer sector remains less institutionalized. At the CIS level, the Concept for the Development of Cooperation in Support of the Youth Volunteer Movement (2021–2030) has been adopted, and within the framework of EAEU youth forums, the idea of supporting volunteerism in an integration format has been discussed. For Kazakhstan, this area may hold promise thanks to the experience of youth organizations and regional initiatives; however, the creation of a Eurasian volunteer network should still be viewed as a recommendation rather than an already established mechanism.

A separate group consists of civil society youth initiatives that emerge with the support of grants and regional organizations. For example, the “Eurasian Express: Russia – Kazakhstan –

Tajikistan” project included a youth roundtable in Kostanay attended by students from Kazakhstan and the Chelyabinsk Region of the Russian Federation [21]. Such formats complement official events by fostering interpersonal and regional contacts, but their contribution to Eurasian integration should be assessed cautiously as the establishment of communication links rather than

as an automatically measurable institutional outcome [8].

Below it is a summary table of the main initiatives involving Kazakhstani youth. The table is organized according to analytical parameters: type of initiative, period and location of implementation, form of Kazakhstan’s participation, nature of the outcome, and degree of verifiability of quantitative data.

Table 2. Key Youth Humanitarian Cooperation Projects Involving Kazakhstan within the EAEU and Related Formats (2019–2024)

Project / Initiative	Date, location	Overview and Kazakhstan’s Participation	Kazakhstan’s Participation and the Degree of Data Verifiability
Youth Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission	Founded in 2019, Moscow	A permanent consultative and communication body for youth within the EAEU; the Council’s membership and activities include representatives from the Union’s member states, including Kazakhstan	Representatives from Kazakhstan participate in the Council’s work on a permanent basis. Quantifying their contribution requires an analysis of the minutes, the composition of the working groups, and the list of supported initiatives
“Made in the EAEU” Business Game	September 2020, online/in-person	A youth simulation program designed to promote an inclusive agenda and foster project-based thinking	According to publicly available information, teams from Kazakhstan participated in the competition. The exact number of applications and teams that passed the selection process requires further documentary confirmation; therefore, this figure is provided for reference only
The “Our Heroes” Project (Marking the 75 th Anniversary of Victory)	2020, CIS countries / Eurasian region	A commemorative and patriotic initiative involving young people from various countries; Kazakhstani volunteers and students participated in joint commemorative events, online activities, and creative projects	There is no officially comparable data on participants from all countries. Kazakhstan’s participation is recorded qualitatively, without any precise statistical conclusions
CIS and EAEU Youth Forums (I and II)	1 st Forum – August 25–26, 2022, Cholpon-Ata; 2 nd Forum – June 7–9, 2023, Sochi	Forum platforms for discussing initiatives in the fields of education, entrepreneurship, tourism, digital cooperation, and community projects. The Kazakh delegation participated in both forums and presented proposals	Cholpon-Ata 2022: approximately 20–25 delegates from Kazakhstan out of a total of over 250 (about 8–10%). Sochi 2023: approximately 20–30 delegates out of a total of about 150 (about 13–20%). The data show stable but limited representation
Eurasian Economic Union Global University Summit	May 2023, Moscow; November 2024, Moscow	An educational and expert discussion platform for universities, students, and young researchers from EAEU countries; in 2023, discussions focused on a networked master’s program and a university consortium	2023: An estimated 25–40 participants from Kazakhstan out of a total on-site contingent of over 300 (8–13%). 2024: An estimated 30–50 participants out of 350–400 on-site participants (8–14%). This estimate reflects a percentage rather than exact statistics
“Eurasian Dialogue” Forum	2023 – Brest; 2024 – Minsk	A forum for academic, educational, and expert discussion on humanitarian cooperation, integration processes, and the historical and cultural sphere	Representatives from Kazakhstan participated in the forums. In the absence of comparable lists of participants, it is more appropriate to note their substantive participation rather than provide a strict quantitative assessment
“EAEU-Media” MediaSchool	June – July 2024, Pyatigorsk	A two-phase educational project for young journalists, bloggers, and student media staff from EAEU countries. Kazakhstani participants were selected through a competitive process	A few representatives from Kazakhstan participated in the in-person session, an estimated 3–4 people out of 25–30 in-person participants. The online participation by country requires further confirmation
Youth Exchanges And Movements	On an ongoing basis, including between Russia and Kazakhstan	Student exchanges, camps, expeditions, festivals, grant programs, and educational initiatives that reflect the broader landscape of youth mobility	In 2024, approximately 83,000 Kazakhstani citizens were enrolled in Russian universities, illustrating the scale of educational mobility. For short-term exchanges, only qualitative estimates are available, as there are no comprehensive aggregate statistics

The data presented show that Kazakhstan's participation in EAEU youth humanitarian initiatives and related Eurasian formats is consistent but, in a number of areas, limited in scope. The most reliably documented platforms are major institutional and forum-based initiatives – the EEC Youth Council, the CIS and EAEU youth forums, and the EAEU Global University Summit. These formats reveal that the share of Kazakhstani participants typically accounts for less than one-fifth of the total number and more often falls within the range of 8–14%, suggesting not a dominant but a stable representation. In cases where official comparable statistics are unavailable, it is more appropriate to use qualitative descriptions or a disclaimer regarding the approximate nature of the assessment to avoid excessive categorization.

It is important to note that participation in youth humanitarian initiatives involves not only representatives from Astana and Almaty but also young people from the regions of Kazakhstan. This broadens the social base of integration efforts, reduces the concentration of opportunities exclusively in the capital cities, and contributes to the formation of a broader network of horizontal ties among young professionals from different regions.

Fig. shows the approximate ratio of participants from Kazakhstan to those from other countries in projects for which at least comparable

numerical data are available from open sources. These figures are used to illustrate the scale of representation and do not replace representative statistics on youth participation.

Source: Compiled by the author based on publicly available data from project organizers and the estimates provided in Table 2. Note: For projects with incomplete statistics, the median values of the published ranges were used; the figures are approximate.

Fig. 1 shows that the share of Kazakhstani participants in most of the formats examined remains limited. This allows us to refine the conclusion: Kazakhstan is present in key initiatives and, in some cases, puts forward proposals; however, this does not involve the mass engagement of youth, but rather targeted forms of participation focused on delegations, activists, students, and young professionals.

In terms of substance, Kazakhstan's participation takes several forms: delegation representation at forums, the participation of students and young researchers in educational platforms, the presentation of project ideas, and the inclusion of individual representatives in media and expert formats. This structure encompasses different categories of youth but remains dependent on competitive selection, quotas, funding, and the availability of information for regional participants.




Fig. Estimated ratio of participants from Kazakhstan and other countries in key youth humanitarian cooperation projects within the EAEU (2019–2024)

Notes. Compiled by the author based on publicly available data from project organizers and the estimates provided in Table 2. For projects with incomplete statistics, the median values of the published ranges were used; the figures are approximate.

At the same time, the analysis reveals some bottlenecks. Kazakhstan's representation at major forums and summits typically does not exceed one-fifth of the total number of participants, and the share is even lower when it comes to media coverage. There is a gap between large-scale educational flows (tens of thousands of Kazakhstani students in Russian universities) and the relatively low levels of participation in EAEU offline activities. This gap is exacerbated by delegation quotas, limited funding, and weak post-project support.

The analysis identified key systemic problem areas: asymmetry in educational mobility, insufficient institutionalization of certain youth formats, limited transparency of statistics, a fragmented information ecosystem, and the absence of a sustainable mechanism for supporting initiatives after forums and competitions. These issues are particularly significant for Kazakhstan, as the country possesses considerable youth potential, yet its involvement in EAEU projects remains largely sporadic.

Operational constraints on mobility after 2022 deserve special attention: changes in transport routes, more complex calculations, rising transaction costs, and administrative procedures.

Based on an analysis of regulatory documents, academic literature, publicly available statistics, and case studies involving Kazakhstan, recommendations have been formulated to improve youth humanitarian cooperation within the EAEU.

First, a systematic program for academic and project mobility is needed, backed by sustainable funding: scholarships, microgrants, travel quotas, and transparent selection criteria. Such a program would link Kazakhstan's large-scale educational mobility with specific EAEU integration projects.

Second, a unified digital platform for youth opportunities is needed under the auspices of relevant EAEU bodies: an events calendar, a "one-stop shop" for applications, localized materials, feedback, and open publication of final data. This is particularly important for young people in Kazakhstan's regions, who have less access to information channels in the capital.

Third, post-project support for competition winners and finalists should be developed: mentoring, acceleration, pilot implementations,

internships, and partnerships with universities, businesses, and technology hubs. Without such support, forums and competitions remain primarily event-based formats.

Fourth, procedural standards for academic mobility must be harmonized: recognition of disciplines and qualifications, internship regulations, academic calendars, and documentation requirements. Additionally, it is advisable to institutionalize volunteer programs and media support, including media literacy training and the bilingual presentation of materials.

Results. The analysis conducted showed that the humanitarian component of youth cooperation within the EAEU has gradually been institutionalized; however, it remains less developed than the economic and regulatory aspects of integration. The EEC Youth Council, CIS-EAEU forums, university summits, media schools, and project competitions form a set of interconnected but not yet fully synchronized tools.

The cooperation infrastructure encompasses the institutional level (EEC Youth Council), the event level (youth forums), and the educational level (summits, networking programs, and academic mobility), as well as media-cultural and volunteer formats. Its strength lies in the regularity of individual events and the opportunity for direct dialogue between young people and representatives of integration structures; its weakness lies in limited reach, incomplete statistical transparency, and insufficient linkage between events and subsequent project outcomes.

For Kazakhstan, participation in these projects has three distinctive features. First, it is consistently represented in key formats, but its scope is limited. Second, Kazakhstan acts not only as a participant but also as a source of specific proposals related to academic mobility, youth tourism, digital platforms, and project initiatives. Third, Kazakhstan's national educational and technological infrastructure has the capacity to support Eurasian youth projects, though this potential is currently being realized only in a piecemeal fashion.

Verifiable results of the initiatives are primarily evident in the organizational and communication spheres: the holding of regular forums, the emergence of project proposals, support for specific grant initiatives, and the expansion of contacts between universities, youth organizations, and expert platforms.

Kazakh participants gain experience in international communication, project work, and expert discussions. However, the scope of this experience is limited by delegation and competition formats. Therefore, the main practical conclusion is the need to transition from one-off events to ongoing programs: internships, online courses, microgrants, acceleration, and tracking participants' trajectories after the project concludes.

The direct participation of representatives from the executive branches of EAEU member states elevates the status of youth forums and allows proposals to be incorporated into the institutional agenda more quickly. At the same time, the mere existence of such dialogue does not in itself equate to program effectiveness. Effectiveness should be assessed based on which initiatives were selected for further development, which received funding, which were implemented, and which effects persisted after the event concluded.

The following challenges have been identified: differences in educational systems and procedures for recognizing qualifications, a lack of sustainable funding, bureaucratic barriers to internships and mobility, fragmented information support, limited delegation quotas, weak post-

project support, and insufficient institutionalization of volunteer programs. These challenges indicate that youth cooperation within the EAEU is still in its formative stage and requires stricter coordination and measurement of results.

Thus, humanitarian projects involving youth can be viewed as a promising but not yet sufficiently institutionalized tool for Eurasian cooperation. They create the conditions for interpersonal contacts, professional networks, and joint initiatives; however, conclusions regarding the formation of a Eurasian identity, a sustainable community of leaders, or the high effectiveness of humanitarian diplomacy require representative surveys, interviews using transparent methodologies, content analysis of media products, and long-term monitoring of participants.

The Kazakhstani case shows that the potential for participation is not limited to Astana and Almaty: regional universities, youth organizations, and local initiatives are capable of expanding the social base of cooperation. However, to confirm the regional impact, it is necessary to collect comparable data on the geography of participants, types of organizations, duration of participation, and subsequent project outcomes.

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SPECIFICS OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF TÜRKIYE'S FOREIGN POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

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Abstract. *Introduction.* This article is devoted to identifying the specific features of Türkiye's humanitarian policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite the fact that Türkiye's humanitarian policy in LAC is insignificant, it has been growing in recent years. The growing presence of Türkiye in Latin America and the Caribbean fits into the model of the country's multi-vector foreign policy. *Methods.* The authors determine the dynamics of official development assistance of Türkiye in Latin America and the Caribbean and Mexico in the period 2015–2021 and construct a matrix of the activities of the main institutions of the humanitarian influence of Türkiye in Latin America and the Caribbean (Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela). *Analysis.* The authors conclude that the specificity of Türkiye's humanitarian policy in Latin America and the Caribbean is the combination of cultural and humanitarian instruments (work with Muslim minorities and the promotion of Turkish culture and language) with socio-economic (primarily socially oriented and infrastructure) projects. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is the key executor of humanitarian projects in Latin American countries, while other institutions of the humanitarian policy operate in the background of its activities. The main target audience in LAC is the most vulnerable categories of the population (children, women, elderly people, and people with disabilities); victims of natural disasters; and categories of people associated with Ottoman and Turkish culture, as well as Muslim minorities of various ethnic origins. Türkiye's humanitarian policy in Latin America and the Caribbean is based on aid and support to communities that have, first of all, cultural and religious affinity, as well as a need for assistance.

Authors' contribution. Yu.A. Belous developed the theoretical and methodological basis and methodological design of the study; identified the basic characteristics of the phenomenon of Turkish humanitarian policy and development assistance policy; analyzed the Turkish understanding of humanitarian policy; summarized the results of the work; and formulated conclusions. E.Yu. Kosevich participated in the refinement of the general methodology and design of the study and revealed the key specifics of relations between Latin American countries and Türkiye in the context of development assistance. N.S. Kuliyeva collected and analyzed empirical and statistical data on Türkiye's official development assistance to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; worked with Turkish-language sources; compiled the matrix of the activities of Turkish humanitarian institutions in the region; and contributed to the interpretation of the results. The authors jointly prepared the content and results of the study. *Funding.* The study was funded by the Russian Science Foundation grant No. 22-78-10014 (<https://rscf.ru/project/22-78-10014/>).

Key words: foreign policy, humanitarian policy, development assistance, Türkiye, Latin America and the Caribbean.

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СПЕЦИФИКА ГУМАНИТАРНОГО АСПЕКТА ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ ТУРЦИИ
В СТРАНАХ ЛАТИНСКОЙ АМЕРИКИ И КАРИБСКОГО БАССЕЙНА

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Аннотация. *Введение.* Статья посвящена выявлению особенностей гуманитарной политики Турции, реализуемой Анкарой на современном этапе в странах Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна. Авторы отмечают, что несмотря на то что гуманитарное присутствие Турции в странах Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна незначительно, в последние годы оно все же растет, что вписывается в модель многовекторной внешней политики страны. *Методы.* Авторы определяют динамику официальной помощи развитию Турции в странах Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна и Мексики в период 2015–2021 гг. и составляют матрицу деятельности основных институтов гуманитарного влияния Турции в странах Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна (на примерах Аргентины, Мексики, Колумбии, Венесуэлы). *Анализ.* Авторы приходят к выводу о том, что специфика гуманитарной политики Турции в странах Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна заключается в комбинации культурно-гуманитарных инструментов (работа с мусульманским меньшинством, продвижение турецкой культуры и языка) с социально-экономическими (прежде всего социально-ориентированные и инфраструктурные проекты). Ключевым исполнителем гуманитарных проектов в латиноамериканских странах стало Турецкое агентство по сотрудничеству и координации (ТИКА). При этом остальные институты гуманитарной политики функционируют «на фоне» его деятельности. Основная целевая аудитория в латиноамериканских странах – наиболее уязвимые категории населения (дети, женщины, пожилые люди, люди с ограниченными возможностями здоровья), жертвы стихийных бедствий, категории лиц, связанные с османской и турецкой культурой, а также мусульманские меньшинства различного этнического происхождения. Таким образом, гуманитарная политика Турции в странах Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна основана на помощи и поддержке сообществ, имеющих в первую очередь культурную и религиозную близость, а также необходимость в помощи. *Вклад авторов.* Ю.А. Белоус разработала теоретико-методологическую базу и методический дизайн исследования, выделила базовые характеристики феномена турецкой гуманитарной политики и политики помощи развитию; проанализировала турецкое понимание гуманитарной политики; обобщила результаты работы и сформулировала выводы. Е.Ю. Косевич приняла участие в доработке общей методологии и разработке дизайна исследования, выявила основную специфику отношений стран Латинской Америки и Турции в контексте помощи развитию. Н.С. Кулиева занималась сбором и анализом эмпирических и статистических данных по официальной помощи развитию Турции странам Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна, работала с источниками на турецком языке, составила матрицу деятельности турецких гуманитарных институтов в регионе, а также внесла вклад в интерпретацию полученных результатов. Авторы совместно подготовили содержание и результаты исследования. *Финансирование.* Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 22-78-10014 (<https://rscf.ru/project/22-78-10014/>).

Ключевые слова: внешняя политика, гуманитарная политика, помощь развитию, Турция, страны Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна.

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Introduction. Traditionally the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have occupied only a peripheral place in Türkiye's foreign policy [20, p. 237], and relations were limited to rare diplomatic contacts. At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, Türkiye's interaction with the region began to intensify in three directions – economic, political, and humanitarian – while 2006 was symbolically declared the year of Latin America and the Caribbean. Therefore, we consider Türkiye's humanitarian policy in the LAC as an extra-regional player.

This article identifies the peculiarities of the humanitarian aspect of the Republic of Türkiye's foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean while the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was in power. To achieve this goal, the main recipients of Turkish humanitarian aid in the region are identified, the main mechanisms of its implementation are examined, the unique features inherent in the Turkish approach are substantiated, and the most striking cases are discussed. Among the methods used are auxiliary methods of statistical analysis (e.g., the dynamics of official development assistance of Türkiye in the LAC). A matrix of activities of the main institutions of Türkiye's humanitarian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (using the examples of Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela) is made.

The growth of the Turkish humanitarian presence in the LAC is driven by two main factors. Firstly, AKP's rise to power in 2002 and, as a consequence, the implementation of a new multidimensional foreign policy model. Secondly, Türkiye considers the strengthening of its presence in certain regions as a way to enhance its foreign policy autonomy.

Turkish understanding of humanitarian policy has its own specificity, which distinguishes the Turkish approach from the interpretation of Western authors [6, p. 119]. In a broad sense at the state level, Türkiye's humanitarian policy is interpreted as a policy that is people-centered and contributes to the improvement of their living conditions primarily in terms of security [4, p. 105]. In a narrow sense, Türkiye's humanitarian policy includes humanitarian assistance designed for a rapid response in times of need and development assistance, which is permanent and structural.

Davutoğlu equated the humanitarian aspect of Türkiye's foreign policy with "humanitarian diplomacy," defining it as something more than just humanitarian aid [9]. In this case, humanitarian diplomacy has three main dimensions: 1) the policy aimed at facilitating the lives of Turkish citizens and representatives of kinship communities ethnically close to Türkiye inside and outside the country [4, p. 102]; 2) Ankara's policy towards crisis regions of the world and providing them with humanitarian assistance with a focus on helping victims of natural disasters and conflicts [28, p. 163]; 3) the realization of international humanitarian responsibilities within the framework of multilateral mechanisms and promotion of the interests of populations in need of assistance [25, p. 184].

The current doctrinal basis of the foreign policy course of Türkiye was laid down in the concept of "strategic depth" by former Prime Minister Davutoglu [9, p. 125]. According to this concept, Türkiye's foreign policy should be based on the use of humanitarian or "soft power"¹ instruments. This implies broadening the foreign policy instruments and strengthening its humanitarian dimension. In the later period, the concept of the "proactive and humanitarian" foreign policy [31, p. 125] of the Turkish Foreign Ministry is becoming more popular, according to which humanitarian foreign policy is foreign policy in general, and humanitarian diplomacy is emphasized as an instrument of soft power on a par with cultural diplomacy.

Türkiye's ambitions were successfully "imposed" with the sharp change in the ideological landscape of LAC states, which since the late 1990s has been altered by the "left turn." In this context, LAC sought to form new models of foreign policy and maximize the diversification of their foreign relations through rapprochement with extra-regional powers, including Türkiye.

In its cooperation with LAC countries, due to Türkiye's more modest economic and military-political resources, it is not perceived as a potential hegemon or threat compared to, for example, the US. In such conditions, the entry barrier for Turkish companies or actors in education, culture, science, and so on is relatively lower than that of other extra-regional actors.

Today, Türkiye's humanitarian policy is the most effective and successful direction of

its foreign policies. The success of the Turkish humanitarian policy model is linked to its complex nature, which includes complementary elements of cultural, educational, and religious policy on the one hand and official development assistance and international development assistance on the other.

The basis of Türkiye's humanitarian policy is a combination of work with Turkic-speaking people (educational and religious politics, tourism, the unification of the "Turkic world"), support of Islam, and the promotion of Turkish culture. The provision of economic and humanitarian assistance to partner countries through various channels plays a great role: in recent years, Türkiye has maintained one of the leading positions in the world in terms of the ratio of humanitarian assistance to GNP (0.96% as of 2021) and its absolute volume (\$8.4 billion in 2021) [40].

Until recently, in Russian academic literature no significant attention has been paid to Türkiye's activities as an extra-regional actor in Latin America and the Caribbean. There are few works on Türkiye's policy in this region, and all of them describe it fragmentarily. Materials about the characteristics and instruments of the humanitarian component of Türkiye's foreign policy in Latin America are rare in the literature.

In the 2010s, there was an increase in the number of publications on Türkiye's relations with Latin America. However, there have been only a few studies by foreign researchers that examine the nature of Türkiye's relations with the LAC, for instance, at the level of diplomatic contacts. The intensification of contacts and activities in the LAC of Turkish foreign policy was seen as part of Türkiye's increasing attention to the countries of the Global South [29, p. 194].

A special place within the framework of Turkish-LAC cooperation was given to economic cooperation (South-South line) as a driver of Turkish policy in the region [11, p. 102]. In general, Türkiye's policy towards LAC has been characterized as a tool to strengthen Türkiye's international status, which seeks to implement an autonomous multidimensional foreign policy during the term of the AKP. At the present stage, the formation of an institutional foundation for cooperation with countries in the region (opening of diplomatic missions, the coordination offices

of specialized state institutions, and the launch of their projects) [43, p. 169].

Nowadays, there is increasing interest in the socio-economic, military, political, and humanitarian aspects of the interaction between Türkiye and the LAC. The literature in Turkish includes works on the issue of Türkiye's humanitarian diplomacy in the region. The forming of a sustainable model of interaction with LAC used to be focused on economic and political relations [32, p. 125], while today, humanitarian diplomacy is one of the most important foreign policy instruments to strengthen Türkiye's position in the region.

The role of TİKA as the leader in a group of institutions that carry out humanitarian activities in the region. The several groups can be identified as the main target audience of Turkish humanitarian diplomacy: 1) structures and institutions representing Ottoman and Turkish culture; 2) victims of natural disasters; 3) people in need (children, women, elderly people, and people with disabilities); 4) Muslim minorities of different ethnic origin. Thus, Türkiye's humanitarian diplomacy activities in the region are based on helping those in need, nourished by historical roots, as well as those in difficult life situations.

The activity of TİKA as the main one among the institutions responsible for the realization of the humanitarian aspect of Türkiye's foreign policy has become a separate subject of study [5; 28]. There are numerous articles devoted to the most illustrative country and regional examples, including Afghanistan [27], African countries [3; 10], and Turkic republics [26]. Despite the fact that the authors emphasize the provision of official development assistance as the main function of TİKA, its area of responsibility is not limited to this and also includes elements of public diplomacy [9] and, in a broader sense, soft power [7].

One of the unique elements of Turkish humanitarian policy in the region is the religious dimension. This direction is one of the most promising foreign policy tools, given the growing Muslim population in the LAC and the lack of support from other Muslim countries [21, p. 226].

Some authors also focus on country studies on bilateral interaction between Türkiye and particular LAC states, including Mexico [23], Venezuela [15], Cuba [2], and Brazil [17]. Among the factors of interaction between Türkiye and

Venezuela, economic ones (economic crises, sanctions) [24, p. 132] are highlighted. Among the factors that helped in the development of economic ties, for example, between Türkiye and Cuba, the authors highlighted the contribution of institutions and organizations working in the field of public and/or people's diplomacy [22, p. 14]. The general interaction of LAC with extra-regional players, including the Turkish case, has also been studied [16].

In recent years, the focus has been mainly on the political and trade-economic aspects of Türkiye's bilateral interaction with LAC, while the humanitarian aspects of this interaction did not attract significant attention. This study fills this gap in the understanding of the specific features of the humanitarian aspect of Türkiye's foreign policy during the AKP rule in LAC.

Methods and materials. This article analyzes statistical data that identify the dynamics of changes in the volume of Türkiye's assistance to LAC countries from 2015 to 2021 on the basis of quantitative indicators (the volume of official development assistance). A matrix of the activities of the main institutions of Türkiye's humanitarian influence in LAC (Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela) is made. The main actors and target audience of Türkiye's humanitarian policy in LAC are identified. Sources used: 1) official documents of the Turkish foreign policy agencies; 2) statistical data of Turkish foreign policy institutions (e.g., TIKa reports); 3) secondary sources devoted to the analysis of Türkiye's relations with LAC countries.

Analysis. The volume and scale of official development assistance from Türkiye to Latin American and Caribbean countries.

The regional distribution of official bilateral development assistance from Türkiye to the American region, comprising North, Central, and South America, is small compared to other regions (about 0.3% in 2021). Moreover, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are not among the top 20 recipients of Turkish bilateral aid.

Nevertheless, after 2021, there was a slight but overall increase in the amount of aid provided by Türkiye to countries in the region (Argentina, Ecuador, Haiti, and Mexico) (Table 1). Factors that influenced the increase in aid were economic crises (Argentina and Venezuela), sanctions pressure (Venezuela), and the COVID-19 pandemic (in all cases).

At the same time, it is worth highlighting a number of features in the definition of official development assistance to Türkiye. Bartenev and Glazunova [30, p. 162] note that Türkiye is an OECD member with an observer status in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In other words, such countries are guided by the OECD DAC and rely on the model of "traditional" donors when forming national development assistance systems.

Türkiye reports to DAC according to its methodology, so the data in Table 1 and Figure 1 are similar to those provided by the OECD [18; 19]. The categories of aid that can be taken into account in reporting vary from minor supplies (stationery for children, medical masks, etc.) and equipment to larger infrastructure projects (construction of schools, hospitals, etc.) [35, p. 3].

Depending on the specifics of the country and individual territory where the project is being implemented, the scale may vary. For example, the construction of a school for 100 people or a mosque for 250 people does not always require large sums of money. The highest costs are observed in countries where the actual presence of TIKa is established in the form of coordination offices (Mexico and Colombia), which have larger-scale projects, including construction projects.

The main actors of Türkiye's humanitarian policy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Turkish humanitarian policy is based on a wide network of organizations, among which the main ones are the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (TIKA), the Yunis Emre Institute, and the Maarif Foundation (Table 2). However, in all of Türkiye's involvement in humanitarian projects, TIKa has become the key organization providing development assistance in LAC.

For example, since 2014, TIKa has implemented 172 projects in such areas as education (support for schools), health (supply of medical equipment, and construction of health centers), agriculture (construction of farms and supply of equipment), infrastructure (construction of new schools), and women's employment and entrepreneurship (small and medium-sized enterprises) in LAC [34]. To accelerate its activities, TIKa has had coordination offices in LAC since 2014.

Table 1. Official development assistance of Türkiye to South America, Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico ² for the period 2015–2021 ³, million USD

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Belize	–	0,02	–	–	–	–	–	0,006
Cuba	0,25	0,05	0,06	0,02	0,09	0,02	0,01	0,236
Dominican Republic	–	0,03	0,07	–	0,04	0,02	0,01	0,002
Haiti	–	0,32	0,52	–	0,16	0,14	0,55	0,036
Jamaica	–	–	0,02	–	0,01	–	0,01	0,003
Saint Lucia	–	–	–	–	–	–	0,001	0,002
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	–	0,01	–	–	–	–	0,02	–
Costa Rica	–	0,01	0,04	–	0,01	0,04	0,04	0,145
El Salvador	–	–	0,02	–	0,01	0,51	0,02	0,199
Guatemala	–	0,01	0,09	–	–	0,08	0,01	0,107
Honduras	–	0,03	0,08	–	0,01	0,03	0,01	0,007
Mexico	0,09	0,56	0,55	0,91	1,57	0,45	0,63	0,612
Panama	0,13	–	–	–	–	–	–	0,104
Nicaragua	–	–	–	–	–	0,03	–	0,007
Argentina	0,02	0,01		0,09	0,04	0,10	0,21	0,063
Bolivia		0,01	0,07		0,02	0,06	0,03	0,042
Brazil	0,15	0,23	0,38	0,13	0,03	0,06	0,03	0,084
Chile	0,4	0,04	1,02	–	–	–	–	–
Colombia	0,34	1,14	2,62	0,61	1,12	1,45	1,30	0,566
Ecuador	0,05	0,33	0,08	0,02	0,12	0,09	0,21	0,111
Guyana	–	–	–	0,05	–	0,06	0,02	0,016
Paraguay	–	0,05	0,04	0,08	0,15	0,30	0,05	0,077
Peru	0,12	0,09	0,34	–	0,03	0,26	0,17	0,183
Uruguay	–	0,01	0,02	–	–	–	–	–
Suriname	0,3	–	0,03	–	0,01	–	0,01	0,020
Venezuela	–	0,06	0,14	0,6	0,08	0,67	0,30	0,254
Dominica	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0,002
Bahamas	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Saint Kitts and Nevis	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Antigua and Barbuda	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Grenada	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Trinidad and Tobago	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	1,85	3,01	6,19	2,51	3,5	4,37	3,641	2,884

Note. Source: Compiled by the authors based on TIKa annual reports⁴⁻⁵.




Fig 1. Structure of Turkish development assistance as of 2023, million USD

Note. Source: Compiled by the authors based on the TIKa report ⁶.

Table 2. Activities of the main institutions of humanitarian influence of Türkiye in Latin America and the Caribbean

	TIKA Coordination Offices	Cultural Centers of the Yunis Emre Institute	Activities of the Maarif Foundation
Argentina	–	Cultural center in Buenos Aires (2021)	–
Mexico	Mexico City Coordination Center (2014)	Cultural Center in Mexico City (2018)	–
Colombia	Coordination Center in Bogotá (2015)	–	–
Venezuela	–	–	9 educational institutions (2021)

Note. Source: Compiled by the authors based on reports by TIKa, Yunis Emre Institute, and Maarif Foundation ⁷.

Among the projects of TIKa and its coordination offices in LAC are the construction of a school in 2018 in Antioquia, Colombia [8]; the delivery of medical equipment and ambulances to Colombia; the opening of a neonatal intensive care unit at the hospital of Tijuana in Mexico; the construction of a health center in the city of El Espinal, Oaxaca, Mexico [34]; support to the Association of Women on the Road to Development (ACWV) in the poultry industry in Linares, Chile; the supply of textile equipment for women entrepreneurs in Pueblo Nuevo and Opeón in Medellín, Colombia; the supply of equipment for the Association of Quinoa Producers, created by local residents to help the indigenous Quechua and Aymara peoples in Bolivia in 2018 [34]; the construction of an alpaca farm called “Friendship Ranch Peru-Türkiye” in Peru in 2024; and

participation in the reconstruction of a historical school in Brazil in 2024 (equipping additional facilities – laboratory, library, cafeteria, and outdoor recreation areas) [35].

TIKA does not have regulations on the procedure and principles concerning the definition, implementation, completion, and follow-up of projects implemented by the institute. Nevertheless, the development of such a regulation is among the strategic objectives of the TIKa development until 2028 [36].

TIKA does not provide publicly available information on the cost of projects and the conditions under which they are implemented. TIKa’s reporting documents for the Latin American region provide information on the total amount of aid and the amount allocated for development assistance.

TIKA's activities are usually financed from the organization's budget. However, this does not exclude cooperation with local partners, such as the Alpaca Producers Association in Peru or individual organizations and agencies in Türkiye, such as the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD).

Cooperation is mainly implemented at the level of local government and through international organizations. The intensity of cooperation at the level of local government is higher than at the level of international organizations.

The assistance provided by Türkiye to countries in LAC [32] is directed, first of all, at the most vulnerable groups (women, children, elderly people, and people with disabilities). For example, representatives of Turkish humanitarian organizations provided food aid to victims of the earthquake in Haiti and helped women who lost their jobs after the COVID-19 pandemic in Colombia [32].

TIKA also has educational initiatives aimed at increasing the literacy level of the population of developing countries in the region. Among the TIKa projects are the organization of digital literacy courses for students in rural areas of Argentina and the creation of carpentry training centers for unemployed youth. TIKa projects in LAC countries also support sustainable development goals, particularly environmental ones. For example, at the Amazon Rescue Center in Peru, a veterinary clinic to care for endangered animals has been set up [40].

In addition to TIKa, the Yunus Emre Institute and the Maarif Foundation are also active in LAC. Although the Institute has been focusing on countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the Balkan states, for many years, there are also two offices in Mexico and Argentina. Representatives of the Yunus Emre Institute and cultural centers conduct activities aimed at spreading the Turkish language and culture in the region.

The projects implemented by the institute in Latin America and the Caribbean are mainly educational and allow the local population to learn about Turkish culture (events for the International Day of Turkish Coffee, a "Let's get acquainted" meeting within the framework of Turkish language courses, and the exhibition "Traces of Turkish Culture" in Buenos Aires) [44].

Since 2016, the Maarif Foundation has carried out the promotion of Turkish education abroad. The Maarif Foundation operates in 67 countries, including 9 secular educational institutions in Venezuela, where education is conducted in English, Turkish, and Spanish [41]. As noted in one of the speeches of the Foundation's representative in Venezuela, Maarif provides education to more than 700 students in the country [42]. The main tasks of the foundation included opening educational institutions and dormitories and realizing all activities related to education outside Türkiye, working closely with Turkish embassies and other institutions to promote Turkish education abroad [1, p. 64].

The activities of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), which aims to strengthen ties between Türkiye, its diaspora, and related communities abroad, with a focus on the younger part of the community, are also worth mentioning.

In 2022, YTB announced the launch of the Academic Research Support Program "El Turco Migration to Latin America." El Turco are descendants of Ottoman natives who migrated to LAC at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, mostly from the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire (present-day Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, and Syria). The representatives of this population category are not only or not so much ethnic Turks (mainly Arabs) or Muslims (mainly representatives of various Christian movements, including Maronites).

According to YTB, the program supports projects that meet such objectives as restoring the El Turco community's ties to Türkiye, strengthening the individual and collective memory of the El Turco community, identifying the historical, social, cultural, demographic, and political ties of the El Turco community to its historical homeland and roots and creating success stories of individuals/families of the El Turco community and their ties to their historical homeland and roots. Other tasks include determining the El Turco community's attitudes towards Turks/Ottomans, including in literary and artistic works, and mapping El Turco community areas.

It is mandatory for the projects supported by YTB to carry out field research in LAC, including work with local archives and interviewing representatives of the El Turco community.

Recently, more and more information has been published about the El Turco affiliation of famous representatives of LAC countries, including politicians (e.g., President of El Salvador Nayib Bukele, former President of Paraguay Mario Abdo Benítez, and President of the Dominican Republic Luis Abinader).

Another Turkish institute of humanitarian policy in the region is the Turkish Office for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), as well as the Turkish Religious Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı). These institutions ensure the maintenance of relations with the Muslim population of LAC. The fund provides food aid to the Muslim population of the region, including organizing *iftars* during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and food distribution on the occasion of the Eid al-Adha holiday. The fund also provides assistance to the Muslim population in disaster-affected areas.

A number of the Foundation's activities, such as distribution of food and aid to children, are carried out with a high level of consistency. The countries of the region became participants of the large-scale social assistance project "Erenler Sofrası" organized by TİKA [33], which provides food aid during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan to the needy in 87 countries (including Argentina, Chile, and Colombia).

More narrowly focused and specialized projects on Latin American countries are implemented infrequently and spontaneously and do not have a systemic nature. Among them, we can note such projects as, for example, the construction of a school in 2010 in Haiti for children deprived of the opportunity to receive an education after the earthquake or sending several students to Turkish universities to obtain higher education [12].

In 2014, the presidency supported the Summit of Muslim Religious Leaders of Latin America in Istanbul, which was attended by representatives of 40 countries (including Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Belize, and Barbados). The event identified the main problems faced by the Muslim minority in the countries of the region, which, according to the special report of the Foundation on South America, include 1) providing ritual services and organizing cemeteries in accordance with Islamic regulations; 2) insufficient number of mosques outside the areas of compact Muslim settlement;

3) religious educational institutions; 4) religious literature in Spanish and Portuguese; 5) religious leaders who speak Spanish and Portuguese.

A fundamental element of Turkish religious policy is the construction of mosques. Thus, in 2016, Diyanet built the Bukman Bukhara Mosque in Haiti, the first mosque in the country with a minaret with a capacity of 250 people [13]. In 2016–2018, TİKA helped rebuild the Al-Salam Mosque in the capital of Chile in 2016 [39]. For other countries in the region, intentions to build a mosque in Cuba [38] and Venezuela [37] have been discussed since 2014.

Target audience of the humanitarian policy of Türkiye in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Turkish humanitarian policy in Latin America and the Caribbean targets several categories of population: firstly, the most vulnerable segments of society (children, women, the elderly, and people with disabilities) and victims of natural disasters and emergencies [14]; secondly, foreign students and people who want to learn the Turkish language and culture and, in the future, visit and/or move to study, work, and live in Türkiye; thirdly, members of the Muslim minority of different ethnic origin in the region, migrants from countries with a Muslim majority, or representatives of local ethnic groups converted to Islam; fourthly, so-called "El Turcos" [10] (this category fits into a group of related communities, which refers to representatives of peoples, not always of Turkic origin, who have a historical, cultural, ethnic, or linguistic connection with Türkiye or the Ottoman Empire); and finally, in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, these are, although to a lesser extent, representatives of the Turkish diaspora, consisting of Turkish expats permanently residing in the countries of the region and having local citizenship, as well as Turkish citizens temporarily staying in the region.

Results. Thus, over the past decade, Türkiye has established an extensive network of aid and development institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean. Aid and development institutions are increasingly playing a key role in the foreign policy of various regional centers that lack resources comparable to the world's largest economies. The most obvious example has been Türkiye, which has rapidly expanded its official development assistance efforts around the world. Turkish organizations are among the world's top

ten providers of development cooperation, an integral aspect of its foreign policy.

A distinctive feature is that Türkiye is optimizing and systematizing its humanitarian policy in Latin America. In particular, since 2014 Türkiye has consistently opened a number of TİKA coordination offices, cultural centers of the Yunus Emre Institute, and educational institutions of the Maarif Foundation in Latin America and the Caribbean. The comprehensive nature of Türkiye's humanitarian initiatives in Latin American countries fits into Türkiye's model of multi-vector foreign policy.

NOTES

¹ This term is deliberately used in quotation marks, since the original interpretation proposed by Joseph S. Nye is rather misleading regarding the tools of the Turkish policy of humanitarian influence. In practice, it is more correct to talk specifically about a comprehensive humanitarian policy, understood as an integral instrument of foreign policy and inextricably combining both cultural-humanitarian (ideological) and social-humanitarian (aid) components.

² According to TİKA reports, the term "American region" includes 2 groups of countries – North and Central America and South America – but the reports also use the definition of Latin America and the Caribbean. For a number of countries in the region, data are presented only for some years or not presented at all (Bahamas, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, and Trinidad and Tobago).

³ The chosen time period is due to the availability of publicly available TİKA data.

⁴ Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) is a subordinate/ministry-affiliated institution that is responsible for organizing Turkish official development assistance and is subordinate to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and has a dedicated budget (Turkish Presidential Decree No. 4 dated 15.07.2018 on the Structure of Institutions and Organizations Subordinate, Related, and Affiliated to Ministries and Other Institutions and Organizations). URL: <https://tika.gov.tr/kurumumuz/mevzuat/teskilat-kanunu/>

⁵ Compiled by the authors based on: Türkiye Kalkınma Yardımları Raporları. *Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı*. URL: <https://tika.gov.tr/basin-odasi/yayinlar/turkiye-kalkinma-yardimlari-raporlari/>

⁶ Compiled by the authors based on: 2023 Yılı Türkiye Toplam Kalkınma Yardımları. *Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı*. URL: <https://tika.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/TR-Kalkinma-Yardimlari-Istatistikleri-Ozet-Tablo-2023.pdf>

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PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL POSITIONING OF BRAZIL IN THE 21st CENTURY**Julia A. Timofeeva**

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Abstract. Introduction. Today, the world is undergoing “revolutionary changes, and the formation of a more equitable, multipolar” world order continues. Against the background of globalization, the changing balance of power, and growing competition between different players, the issue of world order and the role of various states in it, especially regional leaders such as Brazil, remains relevant. **Methods and materials.** The author’s objective is to determine Brazil’s positioning in the post-bipolar world and whether its own vision differs from that of other actors in international relations. This is done through the analysis of a vast body of literature and sources, including theories and concepts that became widespread during the period under study and describe Brazil’s place and role in the world order and the foreign policy strategies of Brazil and its regional neighbors, the United States, the EU, the Russian Federation, and China, as well as the statements of political elites and the opinions of civil society representatives. The selection of materials is based on the context in which Brazil is mentioned, and the selection of countries is determined by the political and economic interests of the Brazilian state: South America is within Brazil’s direct sphere of influence, China, the US, and the EU are the country’s key trade and economic partners, and Russia (like China) is its strategic partner within the dynamically developing BRICS interstate association. The author focuses on sources and literature from the early 21st century, linking this to a new milestone in Brazil’s foreign policy after Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva came to the presidency, as well as the emergence of new centers of power on the world stage, which caused the active spread of theories about a multipolar world order. **Analysis and results.** The author searched for contextual and thematic references to Brazil and its characteristics in an extensive list of sources and literature. It was found that the issue of world order continues to be on the agenda in Brazil and elsewhere. Despite the South American republic’s desire to position itself as a power with global interests, most experts agree that it is a regional leader, and its neighboring states do not see it as such, which is reflected in their foreign policy doctrines. The dissonance between the perception of Brazil by other participants in international relations and its own positioning is a consequence of a) the lack of consensus within the republic itself on this issue, b) the negative impact of domestic political crises on the country’s image, and c) the diverging priorities of Brazilian and foreign administrations.

Key words: multipolarity, leadership, autonomy, diversification, international positioning, Brazil.

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**ПРОБЛЕМЫ ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЯ
БРАЗИЛИИ В XXI ВЕКЕ****Юлия Андреевна Тимофеева**

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Аннотация. Введение. Сегодня в мире происходят «революционные перемены, и продолжается формирование более справедливого, многополярного» миропорядка. На фоне глобализации, изменения балан-

са сил и растущей конкуренции между различными игроками актуальным остается вопрос мироустройства и роли в нем различных государств, особенно региональных лидеров, таких как Бразилия. *Методы и материалы.* Задача автора статьи – определить позиционирование Бразилии в постбиполярном мире и установить, отличается ли видение самой страны от ее восприятия другими участниками международных отношений. Это осуществляется на основе анализа обширного пласта литературы и источников, включая теории и концепции, получившие распространение в исследуемый период и описывающие место и роль Бразилии в миропорядке, внешнеполитические стратегии Бразилии и ее соседей по региону, США, ЕС, Российской Федерации и Китая, а также высказывания политических элит и мнение представителей гражданского общества. Критерием отбора материалов послужил контекст, в котором упоминается Бразилия, а выборка стран обусловлена политическими и экономическими интересами бразильского государства: Южная Америка входит в зону непосредственного влияния Бразилии, Китай, США и ЕС являются ключевыми торгово-экономическими партнерами страны, а Россия (как и Китай) – ее стратегическим партнером в рамках динамично развивающегося объединения БРИКС. Автор концентрируется на источниках и литературе с начала XXI в., связывая это с новой вехой во внешней политике Бразилии после прихода к власти Луиса Инасиу Лулы да Силвы, а также с появлением на мировой арене новых центров силы, что послужило причиной активного распространения теорий о многополярном мироустройстве. *Анализ и результаты.* Автором был осуществлен поиск контекстных и тематических упоминаний Бразилии и ее характеристик в обширном списке источников и литературы. Было установлено, что вопрос мироустройства продолжает оставаться на повестке дня в Бразилии и других странах. Несмотря на стремление южноамериканской республики позиционировать себя как державу с глобальными интересами, большинство экспертов сходится во мнении, что она является региональным лидером, причем соседствующие с ней государства не считают ее таковой, что отражается в их внешнеполитических доктринах. Диссонанс между восприятием Бразилии другими участниками международных отношений и ее собственным позиционированием – это следствие, во-первых, отсутствия консенсуса внутри самой республики по данному вопросу, во-вторых, негативного влияния кризисных внутриполитических ситуаций на имидж страны, в-третьих, несовпадающих приоритетов бразильских и зарубежных администраций.

Ключевые слова: многополярность, лидерство, автономия, диверсификация, внешнеполитическое позиционирование, Бразилия.

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Введение. Сегодня в мире происходят «революционные перемены, и продолжается формирование более справедливого, многополярного» миропорядка [37]. На фоне глобализации, изменения баланса сил и растущей конкуренции между различными игроками актуальным остается вопрос мироустройства и роли в нем различных государств, особенно региональных лидеров, таких как Бразилия.

Методы и материалы. Задача автора статьи – определить позиционирование Бразилии в постбиполярном мире и установить, отличается ли видение самой страны от ее восприятия другими участниками международных отношений. Это осуществляется на основе анализа обширного пласта литературы и источников, включая теории и концепции, получившие распространение в исследуемый период и описывающие место и роль Бразилии в миропорядке, внешнеполитические стратегии Бразилии и ее соседей по региону, США,

ЕС, Российской Федерации и Китая, а также высказывания политических элит и мнение представителей гражданского общества. Критерием отбора материалов послужил контекст, в котором упоминается Бразилия, а выборка стран обусловлена политическими и экономическими интересами бразильского государства: Южная Америка входит в зону непосредственного влияния Бразилии, Китай, США и ЕС являются ключевыми торгово-экономическими партнерами страны, а Россия (как и Китай) – ее стратегическим партнером в рамках динамично развивающегося объединения БРИКС. Автор концентрируется на источниках и литературе с начала XXI в., связывая это с новой вехой во внешней политике Бразилии после прихода к власти Луиса Инасиу Лулы да Силвы, а также с появлением на мировой арене новых центров силы, что послужило причиной активного распространения теорий о многополярном мироустройстве.

Бразилия в мире глазами научного сообщества

Анализ. Распад биполярной системы породил дискуссии относительно будущего устройства мира. Прежде всего они были связаны с местом и ролью США. Большое распространение получили концепции, отражавшие превосходство Соединенных Штатов и победу либеральной демократии [11; 26; 78]. После того как был подорван авторитет Вашингтона как единоличного доминанта после трагических событий 11 сентября 2001 г., и в связи с динамичным экономическим ростом стран-гигантов – Бразилии, России, Китая и Индии, начали активно распространяться теории о многополярности [38; 75]. Заметим, что первые концепции появились еще в прошлом десятилетии, например, сформулированная бывшим министром иностранных дел России Е.М. Примаковым (1996–1998) идея о многополярном мире. Государственный деятель отмечал, что Бразилия будет одним из новых центров силы, способных влиять на глобальные процессы. Он выдвинул идею «треугольника», то есть выстраивания тесного сотрудничества России, Индии и Китая, который позднее перерос в БРИКС, а совсем недавно – «БРИКС плюс» [57, р. 209]. В целом отечественные латиноамериканисты и специалисты по Бразилии начали исследовать различные аспекты становления Бразилии и ее роль в трансформирующемся мировом порядке [27; 48].

На Западе американский политолог Т. Барнетт представил идею о том, что Бразилия занимала срединное положение так называемого «шва» между «функциональным ядром» (безопасные страны с устойчивыми правительствами) и «неинтегрирующимся провалом» (бедные государства с репрессивными режимами и непрекращающимися конфликтами) [8]. Схожую роль «полупериферии» отводил Бразилии И. Валлерстайн в своей мир-системной теории, которая делила весь мир на четыре категории – «ядро», «полупериферию», «периферию» и «остальные страны» [75]. Бразилия, по его мнению, представляла собой классический пример занимающего срединное положение государства, стремящегося перейти в категорию стран «центра».

Были выявлены и более позитивные оценки места и роли Бразилии в мире. В частности, российский политолог Т.А. Шаклеина относил южноамериканскую республику к великим державам, хоть и слабым, в силу «молодости» на глобальной политической сцене, не полностью раскрытого военного потенциала и отставания в научной и образовательной сферах [64, р. 32]. А группа международных экспертов, которая брала за основу критерий вовлеченности страны в работу международных организаций и в дело урегулирования международного мира и безопасности, относил Бразилию к активным участникам нового мироустройства [49].

Статус региональной державы присваивался Бразилии учеными практически единогласно. В их числе были западные политологи Д. Нолте [50, р. 893], Б. Бузан и О. Вейвер. Последние постулировали, что многие латентные конфликты в Латинской Америке XX в. не проявились или не переросли в крупномасштабную войну из-за роли Бразилии как гегемона-стабилизатора, который выступает за сохранение статус-кво, предпочитает дипломатический путь решения конфликтов и заинтересован в региональной стабильности [13, р. 313].

В самой Бразилии вопрос о ее месте и роли в мире всегда стоял на повестке дня. Уже в начале XX в., при министре иностранных дел Рио Бранко, она позиционировала себя как регионального лидера и связующее звено между Латинской Америкой и США. Позднее эта идея подпитывалась концепцией «живых границ» [65, р. 88], планами строительства «Великой Бразилии» и теорией «бразилианизма» в годы правления военного режима (1964–1985 гг.) [53, р. 20]. Говоря непосредственно об исследуемом периоде, следует отметить работу ученых С. Веласко и Круса и Р. Сеннеса. Исследователи полагали, что для определения внешнеполитической стратегии Бразилии, которую они квалифицировали как «среднюю страну», необходимо было учитывать три фактора: лидерство США, особенно в военной сфере, растущую мощь Китая и укрепление политических позиций ЕС [73, р. 33]. Они разработали несколько сценариев развития событий в мире и полагали, что, вероятнее всего, произойдет конфликтный переход к многополярности, снизится экономическое и

политическое превосходство США, возрастет военная и экономическая мощь Китая и укрепятся политические позиции ЕС, Индии и России. Переход к многополюсной системе будет носить конфликтный и конкурентный характер, но благоприятный для встраивания Бразилии в мировой порядок и укрепления ее лидерских функций в деле южноамериканской интеграции. При составлении сценариев С. Веласко и Крус и Р. Сеннес опирались на прогноз «Бразилия на трех этапах: 2007, 2015, 2022», опубликованный в 2004 г. аналитическим центром при президенте республики «Ядро стратегических исследований». Он гласил, что к 2022 г. Бразилия должна укрепиться как лидер в Южной Америке со строгими обязательствами в области политики, экономики и безопасности [58].

В более поздних исследованиях ключевыми переменными геополитического уравнения продолжали оставаться США и Китай, однако признавалось наличие других значимых государств, включая Бразилию [68, р. 6]. В условиях неизбежного китайско-американского соперничества аналитики советовали бразильским властям реорганизовать внешнеполитическую стратегию и определить, как именно они хотят укреплять отношения с азиатским континентом. Вместе с тем исключалась возможность автоматического равнения на какую-либо державу [31, р. 10].

В докладе Бразильского центра международных отношений (CEBRI) рассматривалось современное мироустройство под названием «многомерная многополярность», при котором не только Пекин и Вашингтон имеют вес. Указывалось, что Бразилия, не претендуя на роль военной державы, оказывает значительное влияние в экономической и дипломатической сферах [25, р. 8]. Эта идея совпадает с точкой зрения уважаемого бразильского дипломата Р. Рикуперо, согласно которому историческая предрасположенность Бразилии к мягкой силе является отражением ее ограниченной способности добиваться уступок с помощью военных действий [61, р. 8].

Интересной представляется концепция «развивающегося донора» бразильских ученых М. Херст, М.Р. Соареш де Лимы и Л. Пинейро. Как и другие страны со средним уровнем дохода, играющие заметную роль в фор-

мировании новой повестки дня по линии Юг – Юг, Бразилия стремится стать влиятельным звеном в процессе технического сотрудничества с развивающимся миром и помогает наименее развитым странам избежать продовольственного кризиса [28, р. 35]. В самом деле, Бразильское агентство по сотрудничеству (ABC) реализовало сотни успешных проектов в области технического и гуманитарного сотрудничества на африканском [67, р. 3] и южноамериканском континентах [9, с. 35].

Неоценимый вклад Бразилии в дело региональной интеграции и посредничество в решении конфликтов породили концепцию «консенсусной гегемонии», разработанную в 2008 г. политологом Шоном Берджесом [12]. Он приравнивал гегемона к лидеру, который выполняет функции формулирования, организации и управления консенсусным порядком, создает ощущение инклюзивности и защищенности интересов остальных участников системы. Подход «консенсусной гегемонии» не рассматривал проект региональной интеграции, прежде всего МЕРКОСУР, как форму доминирования со стороны Бразилии, у которой, как считал Ш. Берджес, нет для этого достаточной власти и ресурсов.

Бразилия в мире глазами других международных игроков

На разных исторических этапах соседние государства оспаривали региональное лидерство Бразилии. Ярче всего это проявлялось в отсутствии их поддержки бразильского правительства в стремлении получить постоянное место в Совете Безопасности ООН, что является для Бразилии важной внешнеполитической целью. Давний конкурент Аргентина неоднократно устами своих должностных лиц высказывалась против реформы Совбеза в пользу Бразилии, то есть против увеличения числа постоянных членов этого органа, даже когда у власти в обеих странах находились представители левых сил [7]. В декабре 2004 г. президент Аргентины Н. Киршнер подписал совместную ноту с президентом Пакистана П. Мушаррафом, отмечая, что «увеличение числа непостоянных мест – это единственная реальная альтернатива успешной реформы Совета» [6]. Арген-

тину поддержали Колумбия и Мексика и с тех пор не меняли свою позицию [30].

В стратегических внешнеполитических документах соседних государств Бразилия представлялась следующим образом: держава второго эшелона, способная объединяться с себе подобными для выработки совместной стратегии [39] и стратегический партнер (Аргентина) [40], восходящая экономика (Эквадор) [54], важный сосед со схожим видением будущего Южной Америки (Перу) [42]. В Белой книге Чили отношения с Бразилией был посвящен целый абзац, но не давалась характеристика последней [41]. Ни в одном из документов Бразилии не присваивался статус регионального или глобального лидера.

Красной нитью через всю историю Бразилии проходят отношения с США, которые лучше всего определяет формула «сотрудничество и соперничество». Взгляды американских администраций на место и роль Бразилии в мире отражены в стратегиях национальной безопасности (СНБ). В них она представляла как страна, разделяющая общие с США приоритеты (2002) [69], региональный и глобальный двигатель роста (2006) [70]. Наиболее позитивно роль Бразилии описывала СНБ, принятая при Б. Обаме в 2010 г., где приветствовалось лидерство этой «влиятельной нации», которой впервые был посвящен целый абзац [71]. Последнее упоминание о Бразилии содержалось в СНБ 2015 г. в контексте необходимости укрепления двусторонних экономических отношений [72].

В 90-х гг., в поисках новых рынков и распространения европейских ценностей, свое внимание на Латинскую Америку обратил Европейский союз [62, р. 104]. В 2003 г. вступила в силу Европейская стратегия по безопасности. В ней Бразилия упоминалась как один из партнеров ЕС с возросшей значимостью [24]. Позднее европейская стратегия по укреплению отношений с быстроразвивающимися государствами увенчалась заключением стратегического партнерства с Бразилией вне рамок МЕРКОСУР в 2007 г., где она характеризуется как все более значимый глобальный игрок, региональный лидер, крупный латиноамериканский экономический актор и защитник интересов развивающихся стран [20]. Фактически европейские власти

пригласили Бразилию к вступлению в закрытый клуб своих стратегических партнеров и вывели отношения с межрегионального на двусторонний уровень [62, р. 110]. Глобальная стратегия ЕС по внешней политике и политике безопасности 2016 г., принятая в разгар внутривосточного кризиса в южноамериканской республике, не содержит упоминания о ней. В оборонной концепции «Стратегический компас» от 2019 г. латиноамериканскому континенту в целом был посвящен один абзац, а в версии 2022 г. в качестве приоритетных партнеров ЕС выделялись Колумбия и Чили [66].

Россия, стратегический партнер Бразилии, сегодня высоко оценивает роль последней в мире, но так было не всегда. В начале 90-х гг. XX в. Латинская Америка не была приоритетным для Москвы направлением. В Концепциях внешней политики 2000 г. [33] и 2008 г. [34] этот континент занимал последнее место на шкале российских внешнеполитических приоритетов. Издания 2013 г. [35] и 2016 г. [36] причисляли Бразилию к «ведущим государствам мира», а в разделе региональных приоритетов Латинская Америка поменялась местами с Африкой. В действующей Концепции внешней политики Российской Федерации 2023 г. в разделе «Латинская Америка и Карибский бассейн» – государств, обладающих «многоплановым потенциалом», Бразилия выделяется особо наряду с Кубой, Никарагуа и Венесуэлой [37]. Наконец, революционными, но вполне естественными, можно считать изменения в региональных приоритетах РФ: Европейский регион, США и другие англосаксонские государства следуют за Латинской Америкой и Карибским бассейном.

В конечном итоге не представляется возможным обойти стороной Китай, который уже более десяти лет является главным торговым партнером Бразилии. В 2011 г. председатель КНР Си Цзиньпин взял курс на возрождение сильной и процветающей китайской нации [83, р. 13]. Частью этой стратегии стало активное освоение южноамериканского рынка и сотрудничество с Бразилией в рамках БРИКС, Группы двадцати, ВТО. Внешнеполитические взгляды Китая изложены в Белых книгах и Стратегиях национальной обороны. Последняя версия Белой книги от 2019 г. постулирует, что

Китай стремится к развитию «всеобъемлющего партнерства» со странами Латинской Америки без конкретного упоминания Бразилии [77, р. 46]. Бразилия в основном фигурирует в китайских доктринах либо наряду с остальными латиноамериканскими странами [15; 17; 76], либо как партнер Пекина по военной и технологической линии в мире, который сегодня претерпевает «невиданные в предыдущие сто лет трансформации» [16; 18; 19].

Более конкретные формулировки в отношении Бразилии можно встретить в заявлениях китайского лидера. На встрече с вице-президентом Бразилии Жералду Алкмином 7 июня 2024 г. Си Цзиньпин заявил, что обе страны – это «добрые друзья-единомышленники» [80]. Из других его выступлений следовало, что Бразилия – «крупнейшая развивающаяся страна в Западном полушарии» [79] и «стратегический партнер» Китая [82], которая придерживается независимого и миролюбивого пути развития и играет важную роль в региональных и международных делах [81]. Впрочем, несмотря на общую позитивную риторику в отношении Бразилии, Китай является одним из самых ярых противников реформы СБ ООН [25, р. 16].

Видение Бразилии национальными политическими деятелями

Национальные политические лидеры традиционно отводили Бразилии важную роль на международной арене. Сегодня это находит отражение в триаде внешнеполитических документов – Стратегии национальной обороны, Политике национальной обороны и Белой книге национальной обороны.

В 2005 г. администрацией Луиса Инасиу Лулы да Силвы (2003–2010 гг., 2023 г. – н.в.) была принята Политика национальной обороны [55]. В разделе о международной обстановке говорилось, что по сравнению с эпохой bipolarности, современный мир стал более сложным и породил новые вызовы. Отмечалось, что Бразилия стремится играть первостепенную роль на международной арене, но не добивается установления гегемонии.

В Стратегии национальной обороны 2008 г. подчеркивалось особое положение Бразилии и стремление играть большую роль на

международной сцене [23]. Документ гласил, что, если она хочет занять достойное место среди великих держав, необходимо уделять должное внимание военной сфере, чтобы быть способной защитить себя от потенциальных угроз. Иными словами, доктрины отражали стремление Бразилии стать великой державой и не подвергали сомнению ее возросшую роль в мире.

Противоречивая внешняя конъюнктура отразилась на принятой в 2012 г. правительством Дилмы Руссефф (2011–2016 гг.) Белой книге [44]. В ней признавались неопределенность будущего и тот факт, что Бразилия должна быть готова к различному варианту развития событий и к более активной роли в строительстве многоуровневого мирового порядка, где в военной сфере единоличным лидером – США, в сфере экономики – США и Китай, а многополярность проявляется лишь в финансовых и иных вопросах, когда страны взаимодействуют в рамках таких форумов, как БРИКС, Большая двадцатка, ИБАС и др. Де-факто Бразилия, как активный участник многостороннего формата взаимодействия, встраивала себя в третий уровень.

Политика и Стратегия национальной обороны 2016 г., принятые президентом Мишелом Темером (2016–2018 гг.), аксиоматизировали, что в последние годы на первый план вышла борьба за мировое господство на фоне витающего военного конфликта между ведущими державами. В связи с этим Бразилия должна иметь возможность в полной мере реализовать свой потенциал сдерживания, поскольку история учит тому, что сила играет важную роль в межгосударственных отношениях [56]. Нашел свое отражение в Стратегии и кризисный период: рекомендовалось перенаправить часть усилий с внешней на внутреннюю политику.

Администрация Жаира Болсонару (2019–2022 гг.) обновила Белую книгу национальной обороны в 2020 году. Относительно мирового устройства появилось новое положение. Вместо трехуровневого мирового порядка речь шла о многополярном мире, в укрепление которого Бразилия должна внести свой вклад [45]. Из этого следует вывод, что США и Китай потеряли господство в военной и экономической сферах.

В декабре 2024 г. смешанная комиссия Сената одобрила проект обновленной внешнеполитической триады Бразилии – Политики и Стратегии национальной обороны и Белой книги. В них недвусмысленно делается акцент на необходимости подкрепить дипломатическую составляющую внешней политики военной и нарастить военный потенциал, который должен быть пропорционален политическому и стратегическому весу государства в мире на фоне усиливающейся стратегической конкуренции между великими державами и общей тенденции на значительный рост расходов на оборону [60, р. 4, 6]. Отмечается, что, хотя мир вступил в эпоху многополярности, «усиление стратегического соперничества между державами рискует перерасти в новую форму биполярности», поэтому Бразилии необходимо укреплять свои позиции в регионе и в мире [60, р. 41].

Помимо внешнеполитических доктрин, о позиционировании Бразилии в мире красноречиво свидетельствуют высказывания ее высших должностных лиц. Выступая перед Конгрессом в январе 2003 г., Лула да Силва заявил, что верит в великое будущее Бразилии, и уделил много внимания внешней политике на различных направлениях [59]. Кроме того, стала расхожей его фраза о том, что «XIX век был веком Европы, XX – веком США, а XXI станет веком Бразилии» [22]. Министр иностранных дел Селсу Аморим подчеркивал, что бразильские интересы носят глобальный характер [5, р. 7].

Действительно, приход к власти команды Лулы да Силвы ознаменовал собой новый этап внешней политики южноамериканской республики. Президент проводил напористую и активную внешнюю политику, которую в научных кругах окрестили «автономией через диверсификацию» [74] и «переходом от прагматичной институциональной парадигмы к автономной» [63, р. 14]. На деле такая позиция выражалась в неприятии Бразилией проекта Вашингтона АЛКА – о Всеамериканской зоне свободной торговли, в создании Союза южноамериканских наций (УНАСУР) и Сообщества стран Латинской Америки и Карибского бассейна (СЕЛАК) для создания противовеса Вашингтону, хлопковом и сахарном спорах против США и ЕС в ВТО и пр.

При правых в политическом дискурсе появилась критика идеологизации внешней политики. Заняв пост президента в условиях сильнейшего внутривластного и экономического кризиса после импичмента Д. Руссефф, М. Темер стал уделять меньше внимания внешней политике. В его первой речи в качестве главы государства он сделал единственную отсылку к глобальной роли Бразилии в контексте проведения Олимпийских игр 2016 года [29].

Ж. Болсонару во время инаугурации в январе 2019 г. высокопарно, но очень кратко говорил о роли Бразилии в мире. Внешней политике он посвятил лишь фразу: «Бразилия вновь станет страной, свободной от идеологических оков» [1]. Эта немногословность указывала на невысокую вовлеченность Бразилии в международные процессы в ближайшем будущем, что в итоге и произошло, включая ослабление региональных позиций.

Тем не менее внешнеполитический курс Ж. Болсонару претерпел изменения во второй половине его президентского мандата, что в первую очередь выразилось в смене министра иностранных дел Эрнесту Араужу на более прагматичного Карлоса Франсу. Вступая в должность, новый министр обозначил важность отношений с соседними государствами и МЕРКОСУР для Бразилии, что резко контрастировало с приоритетами прежнего главы бразильского МИДа – Итамарати [21], который негативно относился к соседним правительствам левого толка и выступал против МЕРКОСУР как такового в силу своих антиглобалистских взглядов [4, р. 33].

В своем выступлении на Генеральной Ассамблее ООН в ноябре 2023 г. [51], а также в победной речи после выборов в 2022 г. [3] Лула да Силва заявил: «Бразилия вернулась!». Произнося торжественную речь перед членами Конгресса в январе 2023 г., президент подчеркнул, что мир ждет, когда республика вновь станет лидером в социальной сфере и борьбе с изменениями климата [2].

Однако «вернуться» Бразилии оказалось не так просто. С тех пор, как Лула да Силва покинул пост президента в 2010 г., многое изменилось в мире, который сегодня переживает кризис многосторонности. Региональные интеграционные институты, которые рассмат-

ривались бразильскими властями как плацдарм для выхода на глобальные горизонты, стагнируют. Бразилия не имеет прежней экономической мощи, значительно ослабила свой авторитет среди соседей [47], политически поляризована и расколота как никогда [52, с. 21], а поддержка нынешнего президента не сравнится с рейтингом его одобрения в конце второго мандата. В борьбе за международное внимание Лула да Силва активно высказывается или выдвигает инициативы по проблематике конфликтов в регионах, которые не входят в непосредственную зону бразильского влияния: между Израилем и Палестиной (осуждая действия Израиля), Россией и Украиной (совместный с Китаем план «Друзья мира»), но пока без видимых успехов. В такой активной позиции Бразилии по израильско-палестинскому конфликту некоторые бразильские ученые даже видят разрыв с традиционной политикой равноудаленности [14, р. 64], а аналитики британского журнала *The Economist* охарактеризовали политику бразильского лидера как наивную и амбициозную [10].

Демократическая консолидация 90-х гг. открыла пространство для развития различных течений мысли, поэтому наряду с политиками о роли и месте Бразилии в мире дискутировали представители гражданского общества [63, р. 12]. Одна школа считала, что необходимо концентрироваться на экономической повестке с акцентом на региональную политику и очень ограниченно вмешиваться в дело международной безопасности. По мнению другой, более либеральной школы, Бразилии нет смысла концентрироваться на какой-то одной сфере, так как она способна действовать во всех областях. В частности, этой последней точки зрения придерживается известный бразильский дипломат Антониу Патриота, для которого Бразилия – это страна, «способная играть на всех инструментах» [68, р. 9].

Для перевода внешней политики в сферу демократических дискуссий в 2003 г. при поддержке ЕС в Бразилии был создан Совет экономического и социального развития [32, с. 51]. В 2013 г., по инициативе автономной группы анализа международных отношений (GR-RI), в федеральном университете АВС была организована Национальная конференция по новой

внешней политике и выдвинута инициатива о создании Национального совета по внешней политике (CONPEB). Предполагалось, что он будет следить за проведением внешней политики федеральной исполнительной властью и вносить свой вклад в определение ее общих направлений, институционально укрепит Итамарати в отношениях с другими правительственными структурами и усилит его переговорный потенциал за рубежом [43, р. 7]. Тем не менее CONPEB так и не был создан. Реакция представителей старой школы Итамарати была не слишком позитивной, так как вероятным следствием появления этого органа стало бы разделение полномочий по ведению внешней политики между расширенной группой заинтересованных сторон [46, р. 174].

Другими примерами партисипативных внешнеполитических конференций были серия Диалогов о внешней политике при поддержке фонда Алешандре де Гужмао и национальные конференции по культуре. На их полях обсуждались не только место Бразилии в меняющемся мировом порядке, но и вопросы региональной интеграции и торговой политики, а также способы продвижения бразильской мягкой силы.

Результаты. Путем анализа контекстных и тематических упоминаний Бразилии и ее характеристик в теоретической и источниковой базе исследования было выявлено отсутствие единого мнения как среди непосредственных соседей Бразилии, так и стран, не имеющих с ней общей границы, относительно статуса этой страны в динамично меняющемся многополярном мире. Однако преобладающая точка зрения заключалась в том, что Бразилия выступает в качестве региональной державы, играет особую роль среди стран Юга и располагает достаточным количеством ресурсов для того, чтобы оказывать влияние на международную повестку дня.

На практике проблема внешнеполитического позиционирования Бразилии многофакторна и включает в себя несколько важных составляющих. Во-первых, в самой стране наблюдается отсутствие консенсуса по поводу ее приоритетов на международной арене. Это явление затрагивает как политический истеблишмент с его меняющимися взглядами и интересами, так и гражданское обще-

ство. Власти стараются вовлечь различные группы населения в процесс выработки внешнеполитической стратегии и принятия внешнеполитических решений, однако недостаточно прорабатывают механизмы, позволяющие гражданам активно участвовать в этом важном процессе.

Во-вторых, транслируемый политиками образ Бразилии как регионального и глобального лидера нередко не совпадает с тем, как ее воспринимают другие субъекты международных отношений. Некоторые из них считают, что внешняя политика страны не соответствует ее политическому весу, воспринимают как конкурента или имеют отличные от Бра-

зилии внешнеполитические цели и приоритеты, и по этой причине не всегда поддерживают выдвигаемые ей инициативы.

Наконец, диссонанс между восприятием Бразилии другими участниками международных отношений и ее собственным позиционированием – это вероятное следствие негативного влияния кризисных внутривнутриполитических и внутриэкономических ситуаций. Дополнительную сложность в формировании объективной оценки роли и места Бразилии на международной арене создает тот факт, что в ряде случаев официальная риторика иностранных политиков не соответствует их реальным намерениям и интересам.

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БЛИЖНИЙ ВОСТОК

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HIERARCHY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS IN A SUBORDINATE POLITY: THE SHAH'S DEBACLE AND AMERICAN POLICY

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Abstract. *Introduction.* Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's (Shah) downfall in early 1979 raises questions about U.S. policy on regime change in its allies. Despite the Shah's expectation that the U.S. would intervene to support him against rising opposition, Washington made minimal efforts to restore his authority. This is surprising given the Shah's significant stockpiles of advanced American military equipment. The key issue is why the U.S. allowed the Shah's regime to collapse without decisive action, especially when intervention seemed possible. This paper *aims* to explore this puzzle through the lens of hierarchy theory, which offers a compelling framework for analyzing the behavior of great powers during revolutionary crises in allied states. This study seeks to advance our understanding of the dynamics at play when a dominant state (A) must decide whether to continue supporting an autocratic ruler (B) who is being challenged by opposition forces (C) in a subordinate polity. *Analysis and results.* It argues that when the autocratic ruler's survival and sovereignty appear unlikely, the dominant state may withdraw support and consider alternatives among the opposition. Consequently, the dominant state adopts a low-profile approach, aiming to influence the situation to preserve its own authority and reconstruct the political hierarchy through new alliances or arrangements. The focus shifts from the regime's immediate survival to reestablishing influence via alternative actors capable of maintaining stability and aligning with broader strategic interests. By applying "hierarchy theory," the paper sheds light on how the U.S. prioritized regional stability and influence over the Shah's regime's survival. *Authors' contributions.* This article is the result of almost equal participation of two authors. One of the authors (Muharrem Bagir) is a sociologist and has contributed to the article, especially regarding the socio-historical situation of the Pahlavi era in Iran. The second author (Hamed Pourhassan) studied international relations and has generally contributed to the political-systemic part of the article. The theory, research method, and generality of the article have been completed with the participation and consultation of the two authors.

Key words: hierarchy, US foreign policy, Shah, Iran, Middle East.

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ИЕРАРХИЯ И РЕВОЛЮЦИОННЫЙ КРИЗИС В ЗАВИСИМОМ ГОСУДАРСТВЕ: КРУШЕНИЕ ШАХА И ПОЛИТИКА США

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Аннотация. *Введение.* Падение Мухаммеда Резы Пахлави (шаха) в начале 1979 г. поднимает вопросы о политике США в отношении смены режимов в странах-союзниках. Несмотря на ожидания шаха, что США вмешаются и поддержат его в борьбе с растущей оппозицией, Вашингтон предпринял минимальные усилия для восстановления его власти. Это удивительно, учитывая значительные запасы современной американской военной техники у шаха. Ключевой вопрос заключается в том, почему США допустили крах режима шаха без решительных действий, особенно когда вмешательство казалось возможным. *Цель* данной работы – изучить этот вопрос через призму теории иерархии, которая предлагает убедительную основу для анализа поведения великих держав во время революционных кризисов в союзных государствах. Это исследование направлено на углубление нашего понимания динамики, которая происходит, когда доминирующее государство (А) должно решить, продолжать ли поддерживать авторитарного правителя (В), которому бросают вызов оппозиционные силы (С) в подчиненном государстве. *Анализ и результаты.* Утверждается, что, когда выживание и суверенитет авторитарного правителя кажутся маловероятными, доминирующее государство может отказаться от поддержки и рассмотреть альтернативы среди оппозиции. Следовательно, доминирующее государство принимает сдержанный подход, стремясь повлиять на ситуацию, чтобы сохранить свою власть и перестроить политическую иерархию посредством новых союзов или соглашений. В центре внимания оказывается не столько непосредственное выживание режима, сколько восстановление его влияния посредством альтернативных субъектов, способных поддерживать стабильность и соответствовать более широким стратегическим интересам. Применяя «теорию иерархии», статья проливает свет на то, как США отдавали приоритет региональной стабильности и влиянию над выживанием режима шаха. *Вклад авторов.* Мухаррем Багир проанализировал социально-историческую ситуацию эпохи Пехлеви в Иране. Хамед Пурхассан работал над политико-системной частью статьи. Выбор теории и метода исследования, а также подведение итогов работы осуществлены при участии двух авторов.

Ключевые слова: иерархия, внешняя политика США, шах, Иран, Ближний Восток.

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Introduction. At the Guadeloupe Conference held from January 4 to 7, 1979, Western allies concluded that the Shah of Iran must leave the country immediately [33]. Just eight days later, on January 16, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi departed Iran in tears, appointing Shapour Bakhtiar as prime minister in a final attempt to maintain control. On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran from exile, and within ten days, the Islamic Revolution succeeded through mass demonstrations, strikes, and street

clashes. The monarchy was abolished, and the Islamic Republic was proclaimed. Remarkably, just three days later, the Carter administration recognized the nascent Islamic state. However, in response to the Shah's admittance into the United States for medical treatment, on November 4, 1979, militant Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking 66 American diplomats hostage [3; 17]. These events signified the replacement of a pro-American regime with an anti-American one, positioning Iran on the

frontlines of the Cold War, adjacent to the Soviet sphere of influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. This geopolitical shift had profound implications for U.S. foreign policy, extending well into the post-Cold War era [5].

Methods. The Iranian Revolution has prompted extensive scholarly debate, with analysts seeking to unpack the complexity of the crisis. However, one critical question has remained largely unexamined within the framework of hierarchical international relations: why did the United States, despite its close alliance with the Shah and its long-standing military and financial support, fail to intervene decisively to preserve his regime? This paper aims to explore this puzzle through the lens of hierarchy theory, which offers a compelling framework for analyzing the behavior of great powers during revolutionary crises in allied states. By situating the Iranian case within this theoretical model, this study seeks to advance our understanding of the dynamics at play when a dominant state (A) must decide whether to continue supporting an autocratic ruler (B) who is being challenged by opposition forces (C) in a subordinate polity.

Hierarchy theory is particularly well-suited to this case due to the structured, dependent relationship between the United States and the Shah. For over three decades, the U.S. had provided the Shah with military, economic, and political support, most notably during the 1946 Soviet occupation crisis and the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. In return, the Shah aligned his regime with U.S. interests, adopting secular and militaristic policies and integrating Iran into American-led regional security arrangements [4, p. 621]. This enduring partnership exemplified the hierarchical pattern of dominant-subordinate relations, with the United States serving as the hegemon and Iran as a dependent ally.

Contrary to the developments outlined above, these hierarchical relations began to unravel in late 1977, as the Shah was increasingly challenged by a broad spectrum of intellectual and political opposition forces. As mass demonstrations, strikes, and civil resistance intensified, the Shah, unable to contain the unrest, turned to the United States for assistance in resolving the crisis. This moment marked a turning point in the triangular relationship between the U.S. (A), the Shah (B),

and opposition forces (C), presenting a critical opportunity to test and refine hierarchy theory. The interactions among these three actors during the crisis provide a valuable model for understanding how dominant states navigate challenges to their allies and how they prioritize strategic interests during periods of uncertainty.

Discussion. At the height of strategic relations, the Carter administration found itself entrapped in a profound dilemma stemming from the Shah's increasingly repressive autocratic rule and the widespread protests, including both right- and left-wing forces against his regime. Initially, President Carter offered strong rhetorical support for the Shah, calling Iran an "island of stability" in the region, while simultaneously urging political reforms. However, as the crisis escalated, the administration found itself caught between its strategic alliance with the Shah's regime and mounting international pressure to uphold human rights and promote political liberalization. This contradiction exposed the fragility of U.S. foreign policy, which struggled to reconcile its geopolitical objectives with its professed democratic values [41].

The Shah, confident in American support, initially resisted his opponents. However, as the unrest escalated, U.S. support began to quietly recede – shifting from overt backing to behind-the-scenes counsel. Ultimately, as strikes and protests paralyzed the Shah's regime, the United States adopted a mediation strategy, attempting to broker a resolution between the monarchy and moderate opposition forces – a strategy that eventually proved ineffective. When the Shah requested U.S. approval to implement a more forceful suppression strategy (commonly referred to as the "Iron Fist Policy"), Washington declined to provide the necessary political or material support [18, p. 95]. Although the Shah had long been considered a reliable ally, the U.S. refrained from offering decisive assistance during his regime's final crisis. This raises a central theoretical question: Why would a dominant power allow its preferred ally in a subordinate polity to collapse and instead accept an uncertain political alternative with potentially severe geopolitical consequences?

The Shah and President Carter emerged as key actors during the Iranian crisis of 1978–79, and their roles offer vital perspectives on U.S. conduct. In a 1980 interview, the Shah was asked

by a British journalist whether the U.S. and Britain could have done more to support him. He responded, “No, they couldn’t, but it was better to stop giving advice” – an ironic reflection of the perception that U.S. “tacit support” amounted to negligible aid [39]. A persistent view among many Iranians and analysts is that the United States could and should have done more to uphold the Shah’s regime.

President Carter echoed a nuanced stance in later interviews. In a 2007 conversation with Wolf Blitzer, Carter remarked, “The Shah was not overthrown by the U.S.; he was overthrown by his own people.” In another statement, he added: “If the Shah had remained in power, it would have been better for American politics.” These remarks suggest that, while the U.S. did not orchestrate the Shah’s downfall, his continued rule was seen as favorable for U.S. strategic interests.

While such political reflections are valuable, they often carry inherent biases and tend to obscure the deeper motivations underlying policy decisions. Scholarly debates on the crisis have typically fallen into two camps, as categorized by Haw (2013): orthodox critics, who argue that Carter’s foreign policy was ineffectual and overly idealistic, and revisionists, who adopt a more sympathetic or conservative view. Orthodox critiques often label Carter’s strategy as “amateurish,” “utopian,” or overly “ethical” [14; 21; 26; 28; 34; 37; 44]. Other scholars emphasize internal disarray within the administration, citing “inconsistency and divergence among advisers,” “policy confusion,” and “a lack of coordination” as key failures [23; 25, p. 235; 34; 40]. Carter’s “reluctance to make firm decisions,” “excessive caution,” and inability to act decisively until it was too late are frequently cited as contributing factors [17; 20; 30].

The debate continues to intensify in both academic and public spheres, particularly in three contexts: the declassification of new archival materials; the fluctuation in U.S. – Iran relations; and the emergence of new conceptual frameworks within international relations scholarship.

Despite extensive historical work on the crisis, relatively few international relations scholars have sought to construct testable, generalizable hypotheses that draw on the expanding empirical

literature. Historians, in some cases, may fall into the trap of retrospective bias, focusing on the consequences of U.S. inaction rather than its causes. In contrast, IR scholars tend to formulate broader assumptions about state behavior that can be evaluated across cases.

One notable example is the article “The Logic of ‘Offstage’ Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power Protégé Relations” by Roseanne W. McManus and Keren Yarhi-Milo. The authors argue that domestic political constraints in both the U.S. and Iran limited the ability of the Carter administration to issue overt signals of support during the 1960s and 1970s. While this approach offers an important theoretical insight, it falls short of systematically explaining the internal and external dimensions of these “domestic constraints” in both the patron and the client states.

This paper seeks to avoid moralistic interpretations or partisan blame and instead offers a testable hypothesis: When the survival and exclusive sovereignty of a subordinate (B) become unlikely, the dominant power (A) begins to withdraw support and explore alternative alignments among opposition actors (C). This hypothesis will be examined through the case study of the Carter administration’s policy choices during the Iranian crisis of 1978–79, with the aim of contributing to a broader understanding of hierarchy theory as applied to revolutionary transformations in allied regimes [46].

Hierarchy approach and revolutionary crisis in subordinate polities. Hierarchy theory, as introduced by David A. Lake (2009), challenges the traditional realist view of international relations as a domain of pure anarchy. Instead, it conceptualizes the international system as one characterized by varying degrees of political authority and control, wherein stronger states exercise legitimate authority over weaker ones. At the heart of Lake’s formulation lies a relational contract between dominant and subordinate states, involving elements of submission, domination, the partial transfer of sovereignty, and the provision of political order in exchange for compliance. In this framework, authority is defined as “a rightful rule in which an authoritative ruler has the right to command subordinates to perform certain actions, and because the commands are rightful, the ruled have a duty to comply” [27].

However, Lake's model represents only one influential strand within the broader landscape of hierarchy theories in international relations. Other scholars have advanced alternative and critical interpretations, challenging the emphasis on voluntary contractualism. For instance, Mattern (2005) argues that hierarchy is not solely grounded in material capabilities or institutional arrangements but is constituted through discursive power – the representational practices and narratives that socially construct and sustain authority. Donnelly (2006) similarly critiques the voluntarist assumption and draws attention to normative justifications and historical continuities of domination as key elements of global hierarchies.

From a postcolonial perspective, Hobson (2012) extends the critique further by asserting that international hierarchies are frequently upheld through racialized discourses and assumptions of civilizational superiority, which tend to be overlooked in rationalist and liberal accounts. These insights underscore the significance of non-material dimensions such as ideology, identity, and normative legitimacy in the reproduction of hierarchical orders [31].

By integrating both unit differentiation (how states are categorized and perceived) and stratification (their ranked positions), hierarchy theory offers a powerful alternative to the anarchy/order binary dominant in mainstream IR theory [29]. Yet, as the scholarship shows, there is considerable variation in how hierarchy is conceptualized – ranging from liberal institutionalist perspectives, which view hierarchy as a means of fostering order and cooperation, to critical and postcolonial approaches, which emphasize its coercive, unequal, and often exploitative foundations [10; 13; 24].

In hierarchical arrangements, it is commonly assumed that the dominant state will safeguard its preferred elite or institutional configuration within the subordinate polity, particularly when that polity faces internal or external threats [27]. However, such protection is neither automatic nor unconditional. The failure to provide adequate support during moments of revolutionary upheaval exposes the contingent and strategic nature of hierarchical relationships. Understanding the conditions under which protection is withheld necessitates attention to both the domestic political

dynamics of the subordinate state and the strategic calculus of the dominant state during periods of acute uncertainty.

Although this specific dilemma remains underexplored in the literature, some scholars have offered partial insights. McCormack (2012) contends that great powers stabilize subordinate states either by directly supporting preferred regimes or by threatening those who challenge the status quo. Similarly, Clapton and Hameiri [9, p. 68] argue that in the post-Cold War period, dominant states have embraced a form of risk management, selectively engaging in state-building efforts to mitigate de-territorialized security threats. Yet, these frameworks often lack specificity regarding how risk perceptions evolve and how such perceptions shape decisions to intervene or disengage.

Lake (2011) introduces an important distinction between democratic and autocratic subordinate states, proposing that democracies benefit from more stable hierarchical relations due to policy alignment, whereas in autocracies, the benefits are concentrated within elite circles, leading to narrower bases of legitimacy. Nonetheless, this model downplays the potential for political fluidity and contestation from below, especially in volatile authoritarian contexts. In response, McManus and Yarhi-Milo (2017) introduce the concepts of “frontstage” and “offstage” support, arguing that major powers often navigate public opinion and regime type by providing covert assistance to autocratic allies. The preference for secrecy in these relationships is typically driven by concerns over international legitimacy and potential domestic backlash within the dominant state.

While Lake's hierarchy framework remains largely anchored in inter-state dynamics, other scholars have advocated for more expansive approaches. Mattern and Zarakol [30, p. 631], for instance, conceptualize global politics as a multi-layered and fluid order, shaped by diverse actors operating at multiple levels of authority. They critique traditional, anarchy-based models for assuming fixed and unitary state sovereignty, instead emphasizing that sovereignty is increasingly negotiable, fragmented, and shared across supranational institutions, transnational networks, and non-state entities. Their hierarchical lens thus enables a more nuanced understanding

of global order beyond rigid state-centric frameworks.

Crucially, much of the existing hierarchy literature reflects a Western epistemological bias, often framing U.S. foreign policy through the lens of strategic rationality, calculated risk assessment, and system maintenance. By contrast, non-Western perspectives, particularly those informed by postcolonial and dependency theories, offer a more critical reading of hierarchical power. From this vantage point, U.S. involvement in Iran during the crisis of 1978–79 is not simply a matter of failed deterrence or calculated inaction but a manifestation of neo-imperial control, wherein the autonomy of the subordinate state is structurally constrained, and domestic transformations are preemptively suppressed.

Within this framework, the Shah's regime is not merely a client of the United States but a proxy through which hierarchical domination was exercised. The U.S. reluctance to intervene decisively during the revolutionary crisis, therefore, reflects not just a strategic miscalculation but a crisis of imposed legitimacy. This unraveling underscored the fragility of hierarchical systems that rely on authoritarian subordinates lacking broad-based domestic legitimacy.

Taken together, this paper contributes to hierarchy theory by proposing the following hypothesis: when the survival and exclusive sovereignty of a subordinate state (B) becomes increasingly untenable, the dominant power (A) is likely to withdraw support and begin evaluating alternative partners or political configurations (C). The 1978–79 Iranian crisis under the Carter administration offers a compelling case study through which to examine this dynamic, illustrating how hegemonic calculations, domestic unrest, and concerns over international legitimacy intersect to influence the dominant state's strategic choices in moments of acute political upheaval.

The Shah enforces, the US endorses: A historical background. The Shah's policies toward opposition forces between 1945 and 1978, along with the U.S. response to these policies, are fundamental to understanding both the configuration of political forces in Iran and the broader dynamics that culminated in the revolutionary crisis of 1978–79. This historical context also provides crucial insights into the nature and characteristics of hierarchical relations.

To address this topic, it is first essential to examine the modalities of U.S. relations with the Shah throughout his reign. Second, to set the stage for an informed exploration of the 1978–79 crisis, it is important to analyze the nature of the opposition forces and how both the Shah and the U.S. responded to their challenges. The core argument is that, as long as a pattern of command and compliance was regularly practiced between the Shah and successive U.S. administrations, the relationship between the dominant power (the United States) and the subordinate polity (Iran) remained within the bounds of hierarchical norms. Accordingly, in the broader confrontation between the Shah and domestic opposition, U.S. policy typically aligned with and supported the Shah's regime.

Historically, the relationship between U.S. presidents and the Shah was marked by mutual alignment and strategic congruence, shaped by hierarchical dynamics akin to a patron-client model in which authority flowed from the dominant to the subordinate. In this context, the 1970s stand out as a period during which the relationship between the United States and Iran could best be described as dependent but tense. While the U.S. sought to use Iran as a "regional gendarme" against Soviet expansionism, the Shah's authoritarianism, growing domestic opposition, and human rights violations caused increasing discomfort in Washington. Americans were therefore skeptical of the Shah's absolute monarchy, but the Shah depended on the United States for protection from the Soviet Union, financial aid to revive the economy, and arms to strengthen his army. Several American presidents advised him that the best way to preserve his dynasty was through economic reform and a broadening of his political base [47]. Under the political and security order provided by the United States, the Shah was able to consolidate his rule and weather multiple significant challenges such as the 1945 Anglo-Soviet occupation and the 1953 oil nationalization crisis. Hierarchical ties deepened through a range of bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the Baghdad Pact (1955), the Mutual Defense Agreement (1959), and robust cooperation in military, intelligence, and economic domains.

Following the 1953 coup and with full U.S. backing, the Shah declared himself Shahanshah (King of Kings) [4] and presided over an

increasingly autocratic regime. This authoritarian consolidation provoked growing intellectual and political resistance, giving rise to a diverse spectrum of ideologically distinct opposition forces. These groups criticized both the Shah's personal rule and the political structure he had imposed. However, from 1948 to 1978, the opposition had not yet acquired the organizational capacity or mass mobilization strength necessary to fundamentally challenge the Shah's authority. Consequently, across multiple administrations, the United States continued to endorse the Shah's strategies for managing domestic dissent.

Thus, it can be inferred that U.S. policy toward the Shah and his opposition between 1953 and 1978 was characterized by consistent support for the Shah – a commitment typical of a dominant state backing its preferred actor within a subordinate polity. Concurrently, American policy toward opposition groups was guided by the overarching goal of preserving the Shah's rule and maintaining political stability in Iran. While successive U.S. administrations encouraged the Shah to undertake limited political liberalization – particularly to accommodate royalist secular elites – they simultaneously endorsed his repressive measures against communist forces. U.S. policy toward nationalist actors, however, was marked by ambiguity: while the United States played a central role in orchestrating the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, it later viewed nationalist factions as a potential counterweight to the Shah and as agents of possible democratic reform. In contrast, American policy toward leftist groups focused squarely on enhancing the Shah's capacity to suppress communist threats – arguably the most explicit rationale for Washington's continued support for his regime. As for clerics and religious leaders, they were not prioritized in U.S. policy considerations, largely due to their lack of governance experience and their perceived irrelevance to U.S. strategic interests in Iran. This overarching American approach bolstered the Shah's confidence, enabling him to rule with near-total authority over Iran's political forces throughout his reign. The following sections examine how this endorsement-enforcement mechanism functioned with respect to nationalist, socialist, and religious factions during the period 1945–78, within the framework of hierarchical relations [42].

Throughout his rule, the Shah actively sought to minimize the political influence of secular nationalists. In contrast, during the early phase of U.S. involvement in Iran, American policymakers regarded nationalists as a useful counterbalance to the Shah's autocratic tendencies and as a bulwark against the left. Yet this perspective created a paradox within the hierarchical relationship: the nationalists' core values – anti-imperialism and constitutionalism – conflicted with U.S. authority in Iran, despite their secular and democratic inclinations, which otherwise resonated with American ideological preferences [25, p. 187]. In practice, the nationalist movement was seen as a threat to U.S. influence. Rallying around Mosaddeq, who became prime minister in 1951, nationalist forces pushed for democratic reforms and directly challenged the Shah's power, especially in the context of oil nationalization efforts [17, p. 58]. Faced with Mosaddeq's growing popular support and the Shah's diminished authority, the U.S., in coordination with MI6, orchestrated the 1953 coup that deposed Mosaddeq. His removal can be interpreted both as the consequence of his defiance of U.S. interests and as a reward to the Shah for his loyalty and compliance with American authority. Notably, his initial reign had been orchestrated by Britain, which had even imposed his prime minister [18, pp. 125-128]. Following the coup, the Shah moved swiftly to dismantle nationalist organizations and imprison their leaders, a practice he maintained from 1953 until 1978 [17, p. 223; 18]. Despite these repressive actions, the United States did not exert significant pressure on the Shah, though it continued to view the National Front as a potential balancing force – a contingency option if the Shah became untenable. Ultimately, because the Shah successfully ensured domestic stability, U.S. administrations were willing to tolerate his suppression of secular nationalist groups.

Alongside the nationalists, leftist forces represented a more immediate and significant threat to both the Shah's authority and American geopolitical interests. Iran's incorporation into the U.S.-led hierarchy was driven, in large part, by Cold War imperatives – particularly the containment of Soviet influence. As such, the Shah's principal role within this strategic framework was to eliminate socialist and pro-Soviet elements. The Tudeh Party, Iran's most

prominent leftist organization, advocated for a socialist political order and aligned closely with the Soviet Union. This orientation stood in direct opposition to both the U.S.-supported monarchical system and American strategic objectives. In the 1940s, the Tudeh Party played an active role in the Majlis and broader political discourse. However, by 1949, the Shah began a systematic campaign of suppression, confiscating party assets, dissolving affiliated organizations such as the Central Council, and arresting roughly 200 leaders and cadres [2]. Following the 1953 coup, the Shah officially banned the party, initiating widespread arrests, the dismantling of its organizational infrastructure, and the execution of 40 to 50 senior figures, an act described as effectively “destroying the Tudeh” [1, p. 92]. This pattern of repression continued throughout his reign and reflected strong U.S. approval. In this regard, what the Shah enforced, the United States endorsed.

The third, and politically lesser-known, force opposing the Shah and U.S. authority in Iran comprised religious intellectuals, clerics, and militant Islamist-socialist groups. These actors employed Islamic discourses to critique the Shah’s rule, with the central objective of liberating Iran from foreign domination and overthrowing what they perceived as an anti-Islamic regime. The Shah’s response to these groups followed the familiar pattern of repression: arresting, imprisoning, and exiling key figures [17, p. 34; 36]. Notably, a 1975 report by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) highlighted the growing importance of religious leaders and their ties to secular political currents in Iran. However, this perspective was largely dismissed by U.S. policymakers, particularly Secretary of State Henry Kissinger [16, p. 14]. Believing that religious forces lacked both the capacity and cohesion to mount a serious challenge to the Shah, U.S. officials continued to back the Shah’s modernization agenda, which included limited liberalization and social reforms.

In sum, the Shah’s approach to opposition forces throughout his reign was defined by the elimination of communist factions, the containment of nationalist movements, and the marginalization and demonization of religious elements. These efforts were enforced through SAVAK’s extensive surveillance and repression apparatus. Meanwhile,

the creation of symbolic political parties served only to manufacture a facade of political pluralism. Despite the Shah’s overtly autocratic governance, the United States refrained from applying meaningful pressure, as the Shah successfully maintained internal order and safeguarded American strategic interests in the region. Nonetheless, mounting concerns, especially during the Kennedy and Carter administrations, about the regime’s long-term stability led to calls for political liberalization. The Shah, however, emboldened by decades of American support, delayed genuine reforms until it was too late to avert collapse [6].

Thus, within the hierarchical relationship between the U.S. (A) and Iran under the Shah (B), the pattern of command and compliance was evident: directives or expectations from the dominant power were largely fulfilled by the subordinate, while repressive measures executed by the Shah were consistently endorsed by the United States. This hierarchical dynamic remained stable as long as the opposition remained ideologically fragmented, leaderless, and disorganized. American support for the Shah only began to waver once his monopoly on political authority faced an existential threat.

The alliance between the Shah and the United States was solidified in the aftermath of the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, after which Washington backed the Zahedi government in consolidating power through a combination of harsh repression and symbolic judicial actions. This period witnessed the systematic suppression of political opponents, including the National Front, the Tudeh Party, and tribal actors such as the Qashqai [21, pp. 85-86]. The United States actively assisted in the construction of a more centralized and authoritarian regime, believing this would foster long-term stability and position Iran as a strategic bulwark against Soviet expansion.

Indeed, the U.S. played a central role in supporting Mohammad Reza Shah’s regime from 1941 until his overthrow in 1979. During the Cold War, Iran was regarded as a critical ally in the containment of Soviet influence across the Middle East. The 1953 coup, orchestrated jointly by the CIA and Britain’s MI6, was aimed at toppling Mossadegh after his move to nationalize Iran’s oil industry and challenge monarchical authority. This intervention not only reinstated the Shah’s

autocratic rule but also secured Western dominance over Iran's political and economic trajectory [48].

Over time, this strategic alliance enhanced Iran's coercive capacity while anchoring the country firmly within the U.S.-led global order. The influx of American military aid and security cooperation emboldened the Shah to pursue a program of authoritarian modernization. This included the expansion of state institutions into nearly every facet of Iranian society, the suppression of dissent, and the marginalization of oppositional forces. What began as a Cold War strategic partnership gradually evolved into a hierarchical relationship: the Shah became increasingly dependent on U.S. political, military, and economic support, while Iran's autonomy in policy decisions was significantly constrained by its subordinate position in the alliance.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked a dramatic rupture in this alignment. The revolutionary movement, led by Ayatollah Khomeini and a coalition of clerical and secular actors, was rooted in anti-imperialist and anti-Western ideologies. From the perspective of the revolutionaries, the United States was not merely a foreign power but the chief enabler of the Shah's repressive apparatus. The revolution was thus conceptualized not only as a domestic struggle against tyranny but also as part of a broader resistance to Western imperialism. Following the revolution, Iran radically reoriented its foreign policy in opposition to the U.S. and the Western-dominated international order, casting itself as a vanguard of global resistance [15, p. 64].

Nevertheless, despite this rupture, Iran's geopolitical significance to the United States endured. During the Cold War, Iran had functioned as a linchpin in America's containment strategy. After the revolution and the subsequent collapse of the Shah's regime, Iran transitioned from a strategic ally to a central challenge to U.S. regional interests. In the post-Cold War period, as the U.S. emerged as a global hegemon in a unipolar world, Washington adopted the policy of "dual containment" to isolate both Iran and Iraq – two states that asserted their sovereignty in ways that defied American strategic objectives [4, pp. 275-276; 35, pp. 131-135]. This shift underscores how Iran, even as an adversary, remained central to the U.S. vision of regional and global order.

Beyond the geopolitical and structuralist analysis, several scholars have emphasized the cultural and postcolonial dimensions of the 1979 Revolution. In *Iran: A People Interrupted*, Hamid Dabashi situates the revolution within a larger, two-century-long struggle between competing visions of modernity – one shaped by Western colonial legacies and the other emerging from postcolonial resistance. Dabashi argues that the revolution represented not merely a political or religious uprising but a deep, multifaceted assertion of cultural and intellectual sovereignty. It sought to reclaim national identity from the legacy of Western domination, particularly that imposed by the United States and Europe. This interpretation challenges reductionist portrayals of the revolution as purely ideological or geopolitical, framing it instead as a culturally rooted act of postcolonial resistance [12].

Incremental strategies: The US leaves the Shah alone. In late 1977 and early 1978, U.S.-Iranian relations entered a period of crisis, primarily due to the Shah's increasingly autocratic rule. A broad spectrum of intellectual and practical opposition emerged to challenge the governance system under the Shah. In response, the Shah turned to his patron, the United States, seeking to quell the growing unrest and reassert his authority across the country. Although the Carter administration maintained a relatively low profile in the standoff between the Shah and the opposition forces, it carefully attempted to preserve the hierarchical relationship through a range of strategic responses during the crisis. This period provides fertile ground for the theoretical analysis of hierarchy within a case study framework.

According to hierarchy theory, the primary goal of any hierarchical relationship is the preservation of political order, wherein persons, property, and promises are protected within the subordinate polity [28]. In such relationships, it is assumed that the dominant actor (A) will come to the aid of the subordinate actor (B) when B faces internal challenges. However, this assumption is not always accurate, as the decision to provide support depends on several factors related to the political dynamics within the subordinate polity. Specifically, the dominant actor closely monitors domestic developments, as any significant change within the subordinate polity could jeopardize the hierarchical relationship.

Revolutionary movements are seen as a direct threat to this hierarchy, as they can undermine the authority of A within the subordinate polity.

When the preferred element in the subordinate polity faces internal political challenges, the dominant actor (A) typically adopts incremental strategies to preserve order. In examining U.S. behavior during the Shah's confrontation with opposition forces, this paper explores the pattern of behavior that A follows when confronted with a revolutionary crisis in the subordinate polity. The question of whether the United States could have saved the Shah is an intriguing and multifaceted issue. However, the gradual path toward the Shah's downfall was shaped by the strategies the U.S. adopted in response to the crisis.

It is argued here that support is not automatically extended by A to B when B's exclusive sovereignty fractures and its survival become unlikely due to revolutionary forces. In such cases, A evaluates alternative options aimed at ensuring that developments take a course that preserves its legitimate authority and retains the hierarchical structure. Conversely, A is more likely to offer support if the subordinate actor (B) demonstrates the capacity to restore order and maintain exclusive sovereignty and full authority across the country. The strategies adopted by the U.S. during the Shah's crisis were inextricably linked to the modalities of sovereignty and authority that the Shah held during this critical period.

In the following, it is explicated how U.S. strategies during the crisis were closely tied to the Shah's fluctuating levels of control and legitimacy. Through this analysis, it becomes clear that the support of the dominant actor is contingent upon the perceived ability of the subordinate actor to retain its grip on power and the broader implications this has for the hierarchical relationship.

The configuration of political alignments among the various factions in early Iranian politics during the initial stages of the crisis reveals that order remained fully operational. Three key factors indicate the functionality of this order. First, the relationship between the dominant state (the United States) and the subordinate polity (the Shah's regime) was functioning harmoniously. Second, the Shah retained the capacity to exercise full authority through governmental institutions,

and his exclusive sovereignty had not yet been significantly challenged. Third, opposition forces were fragmented, lacking ideological unity and coordinated efforts to overthrow the regime.

When these three conditions are present as foundational principles of relations, it suggests that the hierarchy operates in a regular and predictable pattern. However, when these conditions are transgressed, whether by the dominant state, the element in power, or endogenous opposition forces, it signals that the hierarchy is under threat.

In the early phase of the crisis, President Carter offered unequivocal support to the Shah, stating: "Under the Shah's brilliant leadership, Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troubled regions of the world" [20, p. 57]. This statement serves as *prima facie* evidence of the U.S.'s initial approach to the impending crisis in Iran. Examining the broader context, it becomes evident that this support was not arbitrary. The Shah's sovereignty had not yet been dramatically challenged, and his full authority over the country remained intact. He was still capable of restoring order, largely because opposition forces were ideologically divided and had not yet consolidated under strong leadership.

Moreover, opposition to the Shah, led primarily by conservative clerics and communist-oriented leftists, was equally antagonistic toward U.S. influence in Iran. Nationalists, though secular and democratic, were also viewed as a threat to U.S.-Iran relations due to their anti-imperialist stance. Although dissatisfaction with the Shah was growing across the country, according to a CIA report from late 1977, opposition forces were still in the minority, demonstrations had not yet spread widely, and the Shah retained the ability to restore order [16]. Admittedly, political tensions had heightened in the final three years of the regime due to the formation of the Rastakhiz Party and the significant increase in oil prices [2].

Above all, in line with all hierarchical relations, the Shah was playing the game within the boundaries set by the U.S., which included restoring internal stability, Soviet containment, oil policy, and regional stability. Although there were several worrisome issues that could potentially deteriorate relations, including Carter's human rights agenda, the Shah's high oil price policy, and U.S. arms sales to the Shah [16], these factors, by all accounts, were not at a level that threatened

dominant-subordinate relations, as the Shah was appointed as the gendarme of the region and a loyal ally to the U.S. in containing the Soviet Union. Therefore, hierarchical politics were in a fully fledged stage and functioning harmoniously [38].

Consequently, in an early challenge between the Shah and the opposition forces, U.S. policy was not caught in a multifaceted conundrum. Insofar as the U.S. had to choose the best partner, it would have been the Shah. Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that full support is provided by A to B when B complies with A's directives and can exercise full authority over the country. Likewise, mutual contentions are not at a level that threatens hierarchical relations. The opposition forces are equally hostile to the authority of A in the subordinate polity. They are divided in terms of ideologies and adopt various strategies to fight against the autocrat. Additionally, there is no coherent, planned course of action, and the movements suffer from a lack of strong leadership to guide them forward. Overall, the element in the subordinate polity can sustain order. Under these circumstances, A assures the autocrat of complete support in performing reforms and taking actions to restore order.

During the spring and early summer of 1978, protests against the Shah escalated across various cities, with Shia religious commemorations serving as an opportunity to criticize his regime [25]. The Shah responded with a heavy-handed approach, violently suppressing unrest and temporarily restoring order [32]. CIA reports from early summer 1978 assessed the situation as neither revolutionary nor pre-revolutionary [16], and the U.S. maintained its silence, signaling tacit approval of the Shah's efforts to regain control. However, despite this outward calm, there were growing concerns within the Carter administration about the Shah's long-term survival and continued sovereignty.

Looking at the background, indicators suggest that although the political order was still in practice, the Carter administration was increasingly suspicious of the Shah's ability to maintain exclusive sovereignty and power. While relations between the Shah and the U.S. were still in line with hierarchy, the U.S. was closely monitoring the dispute between opposition forces and the Shah through the embassy in Tehran. In fact, Carter pursued a dual policy toward the ruling regime in

Iran until its collapse. On one hand, he emphasized reducing arms exports and enforcing human rights regulations; on the other hand, he reviewed and pursued supportive programs. Additionally, Carter faced a political deadlock with the revolutionary forces and supported a transitional government [8; 45]. The configuration of political standings and the Carter administration's emphasis on human rights underscored the belief that the Shah's survival depended on liberalizing politics. Trapped between the human rights doctrine and supporting its repressive ally and witnessing the Shah's crackdown on opposition, the U.S. encouraged the Shah to liberalize politics and carry out reforms. This policy stemmed from a prevailing view in Washington that the Shah would survive the crisis through democratization [16]. Since the Shah could restore full authority across the country by taking necessary actions, the Carter administration kept a low profile in Iran's internal affairs during the spring and early summer. Accordingly, it can be inferred that as long as the autocrat can exercise full authority over the polity and sovereignty is not dramatically challenged, A maintains a low profile in the crisis, offering advice aimed at salvaging the element in the subordinate polity [42].

Mitigated for a short period during the spring, a series of events unfolded in August and September, such as the Rex Cinema fire and the Jaleh Square massacre, which compelled the Shah to declare martial law and resort to force in an attempt to alleviate the situation [1]. As demonstrations dramatically intensified, the U.S. Embassy became involved in negotiations with moderate and secular opposition groups, while concurrently encouraging the Shah to continue his liberalization efforts. Following U.S. directives regarding political liberalization and reforms, the Shah appointed Sharif Emami as prime minister to liberalize politics and satisfy both the U.S. patron and the opposition [16, p. 70].

In the background, it is evident that all political actors had mobilized to steer developments in their desired directions. The intuitive indicators suggest that the hierarchy was seriously at stake. Although opposition forces remained divided ideologically, the moderate wing was open to negotiating with the Shah, while radical factions gained popularity among a broader segment of the population. The Shah, as the central figure in the crisis, was losing authority across the country and was equally

suspicious of U.S. involvement in the protests, given the U.S. embassy's engagement with opposition leaders. Relying on CIA reports that had assessed the situation as still controllable, Carter contacted the Shah in September, offering his support. This prompted resentment from the opposition, particularly the clergy, who blamed Carter for both the unrest and the repression, as well as for the Shah's ability to cling to power. As Guerrero [22, p. 57] argues, "Carter was held responsible for both the unrest and the repression, as well as for the Shah's ability to cling to power." On October 11, Sullivan reported that moderate religious elements within the opposition and the National Front were open to negotiating with Emami's government to resolve the escalating unrest and strikes [20, p. 57]. However, as anti-American sentiment grew among the opposition, Carter was viewed as a power broker whose stance favored the Shah. Carter's support for the Shah and his engagement with opposition leaders reflected a belief within the Carter administration that the Shah could survive the revolution by liberalizing politics and sharing power with ideologically aligned opposition forces [44]. Thus, it can be inferred that Carter continued supporting the Shah based on the perception that he could survive the crisis if he took democratic steps to resolve the impasse.

Theoretically, it can be inferred that while A contacts moderate opposition leaders to help B maintain power, A urges B to implement reforms through political liberalization when the ruler's authority is significantly challenged by resolute dissident forces. Accordingly, A initiates a series of mediations and conciliations (both covert and overt), urging B to share power with the ideologically closest political forces. A assumes the role of a power broker in this situation. The opposition leaders are contacted by A, and diplomatic negotiations are conducted to salvage the autocrat's position. The autocrat takes democratic gestures and opens up the political sphere, inviting the ideologically closest opposition leaders to participate in forming the government. Although the opposition forces are united in their goal of overthrowing the autocrat, there remains a possibility of democratic power-sharing within a constitutional monarchy framework. Therefore, it is argued that if survival and sovereignty are deemed to be retained within the order through power-sharing

by B, A will mediate between the autocrat and the opposition.

As the democratic reforms and appeasement policies failed and strikes escalated to a nationwide level in the fall of 1978, Carter signaled support for any measures the Shah needed to restore order, while simultaneously encouraging him to persist with the liberalization program [20]. This message from Carter came at a time when divergent opinions had emerged in Washington, following Sullivan's telegram. While strikes in the oil and other sectors were intensifying and the opposition, largely unified around Ayatollah Khomeini in Neauphle-Chateau, gained momentum, Sullivan's telegram, titled "Thinking the Unthinkable: Iran Without the Shah," highlighted the possibility that the Shah might not survive the revolution and proposed three alternative courses of action [16; 34]. Sullivan's telegram reflected a situation where the political dynamics favored the opposition, suggesting that change was imminent.

In response, varying perspectives emerged among the embassy, the State Department, and the National Security Council. While the embassy and the State Department advocated for a conciliatory approach involving further liberalization, Brzezinski and the National Security Council believed that the Shah should be supported, even with military means, if necessary. Consequently, the Carter administration assured the Shah of its full support for his decision to establish a military government, viewing this as a temporary measure to restore order while eventually paving the way for liberalization. Accordingly, the Shah opted to implement a military government, explicitly acknowledging the reality of the approaching revolution [16, p. 96]. Following Carter's advice, the Shah reached out to the opposition to negotiate a deal in which he would remain in a ceremonial role within a constitutional democracy, but this proposal was swiftly rejected by the leading opposition figure, Ayatollah Khomeini [20, p. 116]. A close examination suggests that when democratic solutions falter and the survival of the preferred regime diminishes, A continues to advise B to restore order through more decisive measures.

By December, demonstrations and public marches had reached a scale where, despite differing ideological perspectives, the opposition

forces were united in their goal to overthrow the Shah. On December 26, amidst his dire predicament, the Shah asked Sullivan for guidance on what Carter wanted him to do. Sullivan informed him that the U.S. supported his efforts to restore order, but when the Shah inquired if Carter would back a harsh policy, even at the risk of widespread violence, Sullivan replied that he could not hold Carter accountable for decisions that were ultimately up to the Shah [20, p. 161]. While Carter, during his visit to Tehran in December 1977, ignored the statements of 29 leaders of opposition groups and instead spoke only about the Shah's sincerity and popularity [11], the worsening situation forced a shift in U.S. policy. On December 28, 1979, Carter sent a message to the Shah outlining three potential courses of action to end the crisis. The options included the following: if a new civilian government seemed unlikely, supporting a "firm military government" to restore order; if neither of these options was satisfactory to the Shah, recommending the establishment of a Regency Council, implicitly suggesting the Shah's abdication [20, p. 161]. The message clearly indicated that the decision was now the Shah's to make, and his support from the U.S. was waning. This support was insufficient and came too late to effectively counter the widespread demonstrations. The Shah's authority over both the public and private sectors had significantly diminished as protests, public marches, civil resistance, and governmental strikes reached an uncontrollable level. Ultimately, the Guadeloupe Conference determined the Shah's fate, with Carter declaring that the Shah must leave the country immediately [16, p. 100; 43]. The U.S. concluded that the Shah's continued sovereignty was highly unlikely, and that change was inevitable.

This shift in policy highlights the failure of the Shah's ability to restore order despite continued support from the U.S. Initially, Washington's strategy was to back the Shah and encourage reforms, believing that liberalization would help preserve the monarchy. However, as the situation worsened and the opposition gained strength, Carter's administration shifted to more pragmatic and less supportive options, culminating in the recognition that the Shah's sovereignty was unsustainable [44; 45].

In theoretical terms, it can be posited that when A (the external power) does not strongly advocate for B (the autocrat) to take extraordinary

measures against the opposition, it still exerts pressure on the autocrat to abdicate if B hesitates to act decisively and the opposition becomes significantly united in its efforts to overthrow the regime. In such scenarios, the opposition forces become highly determined, with strong leadership emerging and substantial popular support behind them. The prevalence of protests, mass demonstrations, civil resistance, and public strikes diminishes the feasibility of maintaining order. Thus, it is concluded that when the order is on the verge of collapse, the autocrat is compelled to abdicate and be succeeded by the closest opposition force.

During the last months of 1978, U.S. policymakers were evaluating plausible courses of action in which American interests could be preserved without the Shah. This underscores the notion that when harmonious functionality between the subordinate element and the dominant state is disrupted, the dominant state seeks alternative strategies to reestablish its authority. It endorses the assumption that when the harmonic functionality between the element in the subordinate polity and the dominant state is disrupted, the dominant state pursues strategies to reconstruct its authority through alternative options. This reflects the belief that hierarchy could be continued through different elements in authority within the subordinate polity. Secular nationalists, leftist groups, generals, Bakhtiar, and religious leaders were all subjects of U.S. scrutiny. At this point, Ayatollah Khomeini had emerged as the preeminent leader of the opposition, prompting the U.S. to engage with various opposition factions to facilitate an orderly transition in the post-Shah hierarchical structure.

During the early days of January, the political landscape was dominated by a struggle between generals loyal to the Shah, Bakhtiar (whose power was precarious), and the opposition forces under Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership. The political sphere at the time was drastically murky, with conspiracy theories suggesting a possible coup against Bakhtiar by generals in favor of the Shah. For this reason, aiming to orient developments in the desired direction, Carter sent General Huyser to Iran with the mission of preventing the army from resorting to any subversive action against Bakhtiar. Later, his mission evolved to mediating between the army and opposition forces [16, p. 108]. The U.S. priority was supporting Bakhtiar

to restore order and end the period of chaos, while simultaneously positioning him as a democratizing figure in Iranian politics. The United States feared that if a radical individual were to assume leadership of the military, they might contemplate a coup. Therefore, one of General Haig's key objectives during his trip to Iran was to assist General Gharabaghi in preventing a military coup against Prime Minister Bakhtiar [7, pp. 75-78].

This complex scenario highlights the delicate balancing act the U.S. faced in supporting the Shah's regime while trying to avoid further instability. The focus on Bakhtiar, despite his weak position, underscores a strategy of maintaining some semblance of order in the face of an increasingly likely regime change. It reflects a practical approach where the U.S. sought to preserve American interests while navigating the political volatility in Iran.

Notwithstanding, as Bakhtiar failed to appease the opposition and Khomeini rejected all negotiation offers – viewing Bakhtiar as a Shah-appointed figure lacking legitimacy – the United States began evaluating alternative strategies, including direct contact with Khomeini's camp, to manage a smooth transition. Consequently, Huyser's mission effectively neutralized the army in favor of the opposition, facilitating a relatively peaceful transfer of power. To allay concerns regarding the potentially hostile posture of the incoming revolutionary regime, the Carter administration reached out to Khomeini's representatives to secure assurances that the future Islamic Republic would not undermine U.S. interests or authority in Iran [19].

Together, Huyser's efforts to restrain the military, U.S. engagement with Khomeini's camp to preserve strategic interests, and Bakhtiar's political weakness contributed to a transition from monarchy to Islamic Republic that unfolded with limited violence.

Theoretically, this process illustrates how a dominant power (A) initiates intensive engagement with rising opposition forces when the collapse of a subordinate regime (B) appears imminent. A seeks to ensure a smooth transition by supporting actors with substantial popular legitimacy while marginalizing proponents of the former regime. During such periods of political uncertainty and ambiguity, A's strategy includes securing commitments from likely successors to

maintain continuity in strategic agreements, particularly where the subordinate polity holds significant military assets and plays a pivotal role in regional oil and security dynamics.

In early January 1979, the United States established communication with Ebrahim Yazdi, Khomeini's spokesperson, while Huyser maintained contact with key military leaders to prevent destabilizing actions. These efforts reflected A's intention to facilitate a peaceful transfer of power while minimizing the risk of an unpredictable or hostile regime change. Simultaneously, the incoming revolutionary forces remained cautious, suspecting potential subversion or interference from the dominant power to obstruct their ascension.

As a result, the dominant state, wary of the adverse implications of a hostile regime, pursued a strategy of accommodation. This included early recognition of the new leadership, abstention from antagonistic moves against former regime figures, and swift efforts to establish diplomatic relations. Interference or coercive measures were considered only as contingency options, to be employed if accommodation failed and the hierarchical structure collapsed entirely. Thus, following the revolution's success on February 11, President Carter moved swiftly to recognize the new regime and sought to rebuild diplomatic channels with the Islamic Republic.

Results. This paper has examined the behavior of the United States during the 1978–79 crisis in Iran, culminating in the Islamic Revolution. Employing a hierarchical framework, it sought to explain why the United States, as the dominant state (A), ultimately refrained from sustaining its support for its preferred element within the subordinate polity – the Shah (B) – in the face of revolutionary pressures from internal political forces (C). The primary objective was to advance a theoretical understanding of the modalities through which a dominant state calibrates its support for a threatened ally in a subordinate polity during a revolutionary crisis.

Methodologically, the paper identified three key indicators to analyze the evolving political dynamics: (1) the degree of harmonic functionality between the dominant state and the preferred element in the subordinate polity; (2) the extent of authority exercised by the regime across the country; and (3) the emergence of effective

leadership and unity among opposition forces. Together, these indicators reveal a triangular configuration of relationships that shaped the trajectory of U.S. policy.

The analysis demonstrates that the Carter administration initially maintained its support for the Shah as long as he retained considerable authority and the opposition remained fragmented. During this phase, the U.S. extended diplomatic support and engaged with moderate opposition elements to contain the crisis. However, as the Shah's grip on power weakened and a unified opposition emerged under charismatic leadership, the U.S. recalibrated its strategy. Support for the Shah was withdrawn, and attention shifted toward engaging opposition actors to preserve American interests through a managed transition.

Theoretically, the paper posits that when the continued rule of the incumbent (B) becomes implausible, the dominant state (A) disengages and begins evaluating alternative power centers among opposition forces (C). This pattern reflects a pragmatic adaptation to shifting political realities in an effort to maintain hierarchical influence through new actors.

This study opens several avenues for further research. First, the theoretical framework proposed here remains preliminary and warrants testing across a broader set of case studies. Revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Arab Spring provide fertile ground to explore dominant state behavior in similar hierarchical crises. Second, the question of legitimacy regarding the dominant state's support for embattled regimes presents an important normative and empirical puzzle. Third, the role of U.S. embassies and diplomatic staff in subordinate polities during crises offers a promising area for investigating the policymaking process and the role of on-the-ground intelligence in shaping responses.

Finally, this analysis underscores the significance of reconfiguring bilateral relations in the aftermath of revolutionary change. It highlights the strategic flexibility of dominant states as they seek to secure their interests amid geopolitical upheaval. Future research might examine the involvement of other global powers during this period, the domestic political constraints shaping U.S. foreign policy, and the long-term implications of the 1979 Iranian Revolution for U.S.-Iran relations and broader international dynamics.

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THE EUPHRATES SHIELD MILITARY OPERATION IN NORTHERN SYRIA (2016–2017): CAUSES, COURSE, AND GEOPOLITICAL RESULTS

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The paper examines the background, reasons, beginning, and course of Operation Euphrates Shield, which Turkey conducted in northern Syria in 2016–2017. The immediate reason for the operation was the terrorist threat in the territories bordering Turkey. *Methods and materials.* Due to the relative recency of the events, their historiography is in its infancy. The main source base for this study is news and analytical materials from American, British, Turkish, Arab, and Kurdish media, mainly published on the Internet. *Analysis.* The paper reconstructs the chronology of events and actions of the opposing sides and their allies during Operation Euphrates Shield. It also pays attention to the participation of Syrian rebel groups and the complex relationships between all parties to the conflict, including the US-led coalition and Russia. *Results.* The civil war in Syria and the rapid growth of the influence of terrorist groups gave Turkey the opportunity to extend its influence to the territory of a neighboring state by military means. Operation Euphrates Shield not only struck a blow at ISIS * but also cut through the territory of the Kurdish enclave, but Turkey failed to completely resolve the problem of the presence of Kurdish armed groups in the region.

Key words: Euphrates Shield, Turkey, Syria, Western Kurdistan, ISIS, Free Syrian Army, People's Defense Units, Syrian Democratic Forces.

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ВОЕННАЯ ОПЕРАЦИЯ «ЩИТ ЕВФРАТА» НА СЕВЕРЕ СИРИИ (2016–2017 гг.): ПРИЧИНЫ, ХОД И ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ИТОГИ

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Аннотация. *Введение.* В работе рассматриваются предпосылки, причины, начало и ход операции «Щит Евфрата», которую Турция вела на территории северной Сирии в 2016–2017 годы. Непосредственным поводом для этого стала террористическая угроза на пограничных с Турцией территориях. *Методы и материалы.* Ввиду относительной недавности событий основной источниковой базой данного исследования являются новостные и аналитические материалы американских, британских, турецких, арабских и курдских средств массовой информации, главным образом опубликованные в сети Интернет. *Анализ.* В работе реконструируется хронология событий и действий противоборствующих сторон и их союзников в ходе операции «Щит Евфрата». Рассмотрено участие сирийских повстанческих групп и сложные взаимоотношения между всеми участниками конфликта, включая коалицию во главе с США и Россию. *Результаты.* Гражданская война в Сирии и стремительный рост влияния террористических группировок

* A terrorist organization, whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation.

дали Турции возможность распространить военным путем свое влияние на территорию соседнего государства. Операция «Щит Евфрата» позволила не только нанести удар по ИГИЛ*, но расцезь территорию курдского анклава, однако полностью решить проблему присутствия курдских вооруженных отрядов в регионе Турции не удалось.

Ключевые слова: Щит Евфрата, Турция, Сирия, Западный Курдистан, ИГИЛ, Свободная сирийская армия, Отряды народной самообороны, Сирийские демократические силы.

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Introduction. The paper examines the background, causes, commencement, and progress of Operation Euphrates Shield, conducted by Turkey in northern Syria in 2016–2017. The military intervention was prompted by a terrorist threat: portions of the Syrian border territories had been seized by the terrorist organization ISIS, while more than half of the areas along the Turkish-Syrian border were controlled by the Kurdish paramilitary People's Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey considered an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), recognized as a terrorist organization by the Turkish state.

The article also examines the role of the Free Syrian Army and other Syrian rebel groups in Operation Euphrates Shield, the relationships between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) during the operation, and the impact of the operation on relations between Turkey and the international coalition against ISIS led by the United States, as well as with Russia.

Methods and materials. Since the events under study belong, in historical terms, to contemporary history, this imposes certain limitations both on the range of sources that can be used for research and on research methods.

The main source base of this study consists of news and analytical materials from mass media, primarily published on the Internet. These materials include reports from Russian, American, British, Turkish, Arab, and Kurdish media. These reports contain both official materials (excerpts from press releases, official statements by statesmen, and public officials) and journalistic work, as well as publications and interpretations of social media

content, videos, and other materials. Many media reports are currently unavailable via direct links, but their copies are preserved on internet archiving portals. Additionally, the paper utilizes a number of previously published studies, including works by A.I. Aliyeva, A.N. Rybalkin, et al.

The study is based on the principles of objectivity, a systemic approach, and historicism. Due to the specific nature of the sources, the primary research method used is the historical-chronological method, which allows for the reconstruction of the timeline of events and the actions of the opposing sides and their allies during Operation Euphrates Shield.

Analysis. In the second half of the twentieth century, relations between Turkey and Syria were tense. After the expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria, relations between the two countries began to gradually improve until the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011. Initially, Turkey, having accepted a large number of Syrian refugees, exerted diplomatic pressure on Bashar al-Assad to force concessions from the opposition but eventually joined the coalition of Assad regime opponents. In 2012, Turkey began proposing the creation of a no-fly zone in northern Syria, and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey authorized military operations on Syrian territory [3, pp. 793–795].

Turkey considered Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria to be the primary threat to its security. In 2011, B. al-Assad granted citizenship to Syrian Kurds, and in 2012, he withdrew government troops from Kurdish regions, enabling the Kurds to organize self-governance [2, p. 45]. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), linked to the PKK, and its armed wing, the People's Protection

* Террористическая организация, деятельность которой запрещена на территории РФ.

Units (YPG), became the dominant political force in the Kurdish areas. On November 12, 2013, the creation of an autonomous Kurdish administration in northeastern Syria was announced [42], covering three isolated enclaves centered around the cities of Afrin, Kobani, and Qamishli.

The war and instability in the region led to a rapid increase in the influence of radical extremist groups, the strongest of which, the Islamic State, quickly took control over significant territories in Iraq and Syria. In response to the terrorist threat, U.S. President Barack Obama in September 2014 announced the goal of destroying ISIS [47]. By that time, it was already widely recognized that the Kurdish YPG were among the most effective forces fighting the Islamic State [11], and thus their aerial support became a priority for the coalition against ISIS.

In 2015, the YPG's offensive in northern Syria caused strong concern in Ankara. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that his country would not allow the creation of a state uniting northern Syria and southern Turkey and accused Kurdish formations of expelling local populations from occupied territories [15]. A month later, a terrorist attack in the Turkish city of Suruç triggered a chain of events that ended a two-year ceasefire between Turkey and the PKK.

Simultaneously, relations between Turkey and the United States were deteriorating. From Ankara's perspective, the U.S. was arming and training a terrorist organization [67] that threatened the territorial integrity of both Syria and Turkey itself. In October 2015, with U.S. support, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) military alliance was formed, with the YPG as its primary fighting force. In the same month, Barack Obama announced the deployment of U.S. troops to Syria [46], whose main task was to train and support the SDF units. On April 28, 2016, during congressional hearings, U.S. Secretary of Defense A. Carter confirmed «substantial ties» between the YPG and the PKK, adding that the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization not only by Turkey but also by the United States [40].

On March 16, 2016, the creation of the Democratic Federation of Rojava was announced. This Kurdish political project aimed to unite the entire north of Syria, including the lands between Afrin and the Euphrates River occupied by ISIS. Despite their mutual hostility, both Damascus and

Ankara condemned the declaration of autonomy as an infringement on Syria's territorial integrity [48].

The U.S. administration's focus in the region, besides fighting ISIS, was directed toward signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear program. B. Obama was intent on building a broad coalition to fight the Islamic State, including Iran and Russia, Damascus's closest allies [61], while yielding to pressure from Iran, which demanded the preservation of Assad's regime [17]. Turkey suspected the Obama administration of intentions to eliminate the Syrian opposition: the government newspaper *Daily Sabah* in early 2016 described how the upcoming YPG advance along the Turkish border, with the support of Russian and American air forces, would cut opposition forces off from Turkey, leaving them without support in a circle of enemies [23].

Consequently, Turkey was categorically opposed to the presence of Kurdish forces on the west bank of the Euphrates, in lands predominantly inhabited by Arabs and Turkmens, and, citing the presence of the YPG, refused to support the SDF offensive on Manbij [43]. After its liberation from ISIS, Turkey demanded the withdrawal of Kurdish armed units to the east bank of the Euphrates.

The terrorist threat, repeatedly mentioned by Turkish leadership, was not merely rhetorical. In the first half of 2016 alone, the country suffered more than ten terrorist attacks, with a total death toll exceeding one hundred. For instance, on 19 August, in the city of Elazığ, a car loaded with explosives detonated near a police station, killing six people; the PKK claimed responsibility [36]. On August 20, in the city of Gaziantep, an ISIS suicide bomber detonated an explosive device at a street wedding, killing 57 people, 34 of whom were children [14].

In early August 2016, the Turkish leadership began preparations for a military operation code-named Euphrates Shield. The legal basis for its implementation was Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants states the right to self-defense. On August 25, after the operation had already commenced, Turkish Defense Minister F. İşık outlined its two primary objectives: to clear the territory of ISIS and to prevent the unification of Rojava's western and eastern cantons [52].

To conduct the operation, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces deployed the 2nd Field

Army under the command of Lieutenant General İ.M. Temel – specifically, the 5th Armored Brigade, which had been relocated closer to the conflict zone in 2012, the 20th Mechanized Brigade, and the Hakkari Mountain and Commando Brigade of the 7th Army Corps, stationed in Turkey's Kurdish regions near the Syrian border [30]. Lieutenant General Z. Aksakallı was appointed to command Operation Euphrates Shield on Syrian territory. The operation was preceded by extensive diplomatic preparation, including negotiations with Iran and Russia. R. Erdoğan issued an apology for the 2015 downing of a Russian aircraft and personally met with V. Putin in Saint Petersburg on August 9 [34]. This was also a demonstrative gesture toward Washington, signaling that Ankara could also reach agreements with Iran and Russia regardless of the interests of its NATO allies.

Operation Euphrates Shield commenced on August 24, 2016. Its first phase involved the capture of the border town of Jarabulus, toward which Turkey suspected YPG forces were advancing from Manbij. Before launching the offensive, the Turkish military shelled ISIS positions with artillery, while the Turkish Air Force struck at least 11 targets [22]. Subsequently, Turkish armor crossed the Turkish-Syrian border and linked up with FSA units. Within a few hours, Jarabulus was captured. The following day, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces deployed over 20 additional tanks into Syria to reinforce its positions.

At that time, the number of ISIS militants in the area from Azaz to Jarabulus was approximately 15,000–20,000. Furthermore, Abu Ali al-Anbari, an ISIS representative in Syria, deployed 500 militants from the so-called al-Quds special unit in the region [25], hoping to stall the Turkish advance until reinforcements could arrive, if at all possible to redeploy them to the conflict zone.

The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that “Moscow is seriously concerned by the developments on the Syrian-Turkish border” [27]. Syrian authorities condemned the invasion by Turkish troops as a violation of the country's sovereignty. Turkish officials, in turn, claimed they had notified Syria of the operation's start through Russian mediation [57]. U.S. Vice President J. Biden, who arrived in Ankara for a pre-scheduled visit, expressed support for the

operation and stated that Kurdish units must withdraw to the east bank of the Euphrates if they wished to retain U.S. support [9]. On August 25, U.S. Secretary of State J. Kerry informed Turkish Foreign Minister M. Çavuşoğlu that the Kurdish YPG had begun withdrawing east of the Euphrates River. Representatives of Operation Inherent Resolve also announced that Kurdish forces had retreated to the eastern bank of the Euphrates.

However, earlier on August 24, YPG spokesperson R. Xelîl had stated that Kurdish forces would not leave the west bank: “No one can order us to withdraw from our own lands” [68]. The Jarabulus Military Council (JMC), part of the SDF, announced its intention to retake the city from the FSA. One JMC member declared, “We will not allow some mercenaries to take over our city. We will liberate Jarabulus” [12]. On the evening of August 25, Turkish troops used self-propelled howitzers to shell an SDF unit advancing north from Manbij toward Jarabulus [55].

Following the capture of Jarabulus, Arab rebel groups allied with Turkey, specifically the Levant Front, a partner of the FSA in the fight against ISIS, announced that, in alliance with other opposition forces such as the al-Mutasim Brigade and the Turkmen Sultan Murad Division, they would attempt to launch an offensive westward against ISIS toward al-Bab [50]. Instead, however, pro-Turkish forces moved south toward Manbij, targeting SDF positions.

The SDF leadership, represented by General M. Abdî, decided to suspend the northward advance of its forces in Syria to avoid civilian casualties. Nevertheless, the Syrian armed opposition, supported by Turkey, began seizing villages previously under Kurdish control. During the offensive, the FSA and its allies occupied the villages of Mazaalah and Yousif Bayk [19], then made an unsuccessful attempt to take the strategically important hilltop of Amarna. In response, Arab units within the SDF, specifically the Northern Sun Battalion, stated they would send assistance to the Jarabulus Military Council. Later, one Turkish soldier was killed after a Turkish tank was struck by an anti-tank missile fired from the direction of the SDF Arab units.

On August 28, the FSA, supported by the Turkish military, launched a massive attack on SDF positions south of Jarabulus and, on the

second attempt, captured Amarna Hill and the village of Ayn al-Bayda. Subsequently, FSA forces seized the villages of Balaban, Dabisa, Jeb el-Koussa, Umm Routha, Qusa, Qiratah, and Maghayer, continuing their movement further south [6]. During the offensive, according to the Kurdish Firat News Agency, two Turkish army tanks were lost after being struck by anti-tank guided missiles.

According to SOHR and Aleppo24, at least 20 civilians were killed and 50 others sustained varying degrees of injury during the shelling and bombing of Jeb el-Koussa. Another 28 civilians were killed and approximately 30 injured when Turkish aircraft bombed the village of Saressat and the small town of al-Amarnah [13]. According to the SDF, their casualties during this period amounted to four fighters killed and 15 wounded. At the same time, Syrian monitoring groups reported that the total death toll for August 27 and 28, including civilians, reached at least 70 people [13]. The Turkish Anadolu Agency reported the elimination of 25 PKK and YPG militants [66].

On August 29, 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces, under the command of Lieutenant General Z. Aksakallı, reached the tributaries of the Euphrates north of Manbij. I. Ibrahim, chairman of the Rojava News Agency, stated that Kurdish forces in the Jarabulus and Manbij areas [60, p. 7] were receiving the necessary reinforcements to successfully resist both ISIS militants and Turkish aggression.

On the same day, B. Rhodes, an advisor to U.S. President B. Obama, stated that the U.S. government did not support the movement of Turkish troops deeper into Syrian territory [45] and opposed the actions taken by the Turkish military against the SDF, Washington's allies. U.S. Defense Secretary A. Carter, in turn, reported that representatives from the Pentagon and the presidential administration had repeatedly communicated on this issue with Turkish Defense Minister F. Işık and Chief of the General Staff H. Akar, urging the Turkish military to concentrate its forces against ISIS militants [20]. U.S. envoy to the anti-ISIS coalition, B. McGurk, emphasized during a briefing that the military confrontation between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Turkey, supported by FSA forces, was a source of deep concern for Washington [45]. Furthermore, he warned that clashes between the

SDF and FSA allowed ISIS to find new safe havens and prepare for future attacks.

In response, Turkish Minister for European Union Affairs Ö. Çelik declared that no one has the right to tell his country which terrorist organization to fight and which one to ignore [32].

Meanwhile, during new attacks, FSA units captured the remaining SDF positions north of the Sajur River [64] and, after crossing it, took several more settlements. As a result, more than twenty villages in the Jarabulus area came under FSA control.

On August 30, J. Thomas, a representative of U.S. Central Command in the region, reported that the SDF and Turkey had agreed to cease hostilities. That same day, the Jarabulus Military Council stated that, with U.S. mediation, they had also reached a temporary ceasefire agreement with Ankara [58]. The U.S. welcomed this pause in fighting. U.S. Army General J. Votel announced that Kurdish forces had moved east of the Euphrates in accordance with their obligations. However, according to Syrian opposition reports, the ceasefire agreement did not take effect, although there was a temporary lull as the parties regrouped their forces for new engagements. By the end of the day, the Turkish military reported that one of its tanks near the Sajur River had been hit by a missile fired by a missile fired by terrorists whose identity remained unknown [56].

On August 31, the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Army General H. Akar, rejected the ceasefire announcement made by the United States, stating that Ankara would accept no compromises regarding those it considers terrorists. In addition, Prime Minister B. Yıldırım confirmed that the operation would continue until all terrorists and separatists were eliminated and the threats to Turkey's borders and citizens were completely removed [49].

Meanwhile, ISIS militants launched a counter-offensive southwest of Jarabulus, capturing four previously liberated villages: al-Muhsinli, al-Bulduq, Arab Hassan Saghir, and Kiliyeh [24].

In early September 2016, Turkish explosive ordnance disposal specialists continued to clear mines and improvised explosive devices from territories retaken from ISIS. At the same time, Turkish authorities provided humanitarian aid

to local Arab and Turkmen tribes; however, the Kurdish civilian population, seeing no difference between the FSA and ISIS, fled the towns and villages entered by the Turks and their Syrian group allies [39].

The spokesperson for the ruling Justice and Development Party, Y. Aktay, speaking on behalf of the government, told reporters that Ankara regards all Western volunteers fighting within the ranks of Kurdish units as terrorists, regardless of their nationality, and stated they would be neutralized at any given opportunity [60, p. 9].

On September 2, the Turkish military published the weekly results of the military operation in neighboring Syria. Turkey and the FSA had conducted approximately 1,200 strikes against 271 targets of ISIS and Kurdish separatists, whereas the U.S.-led coalition struck only a few targets in the combat zone [54]. On the same day, the leader of the Liberation Brigade, a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, A.K. al-Obedi, defected to the Turkish armed forces. He was accompanied by approximately 50 fighters [51], as well as significant financial resources and military intelligence, specifically regarding the leading political and military role of the Kurds within the SDF.

On September 3, Turkey launched the second phase of Operation Euphrates Shield in the vicinity of al-Rai in the Aleppo Governorate, an area that had previously been the site of prolonged engagements between the FSA and ISIS. Turkish forces entered Syrian territory from the adjacent Kilis Province, which had frequently come under ISIS shelling. The reinforcement included 3,000 soldiers, 5 armored personnel carriers, 20 Leopard tanks, and around twenty trucks, with air support [33]. Simultaneously, the Hamza Division, a Turkish ally commanded by S. Balud, reported the capture of several villages, Kino, Lilawa, Najmat, and Fursan, located south of Arab Ezza in the Aleppo Province. During this period, the U.S.-led coalition utilized HIMARS systems to inflict significant damage on ISIS military objectives within the combat zone.

By the following day, Turkish forces advancing toward each other from Jarabulus and al-Rai linked up, securing all settlements along the Turkish border. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights confirmed that ISIS terrorists no longer controlled the Turkish-Syrian border. On

September 5, FSA forces, with Turkish assistance, occupied nine additional villages [31].

On September 7, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister N. Canikli informed the press that, despite U.S. assurances, Kurdish military units had not fully withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. That same day, at the initiative of the Turkish authorities, approximately 300 Syrian refugees returned to Jarabulus and the surrounding settlements.

Prior to the commencement of a new offensive, Turkish combat aircraft struck four terrorist targets in northern Syria. On the same day, Turkish Foreign Minister M. Çavuşoğlu urged the United States to declare a no-fly zone over northern Syria [10], arguing it would facilitate the return of refugees and allow local forces to undergo combat training for the fight against ISIS. Washington, however, rejected the proposal once again, maintaining that it would not resolve the issues on the ground and would ultimately benefit militants controlling northern Syria.

On September 9, Turkish artillery struck 15 ISIS targets in the locality of Kafr Ghan, whose positions had been used to shell settlements in the Kilis Province. A representative of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces also reported an aerial operation in the areas south of Wuquf, Tal Ali, and Tell al-Hawa, resulting in the destruction of enemy command posts. Furthermore, the Turkish military released a casualty report: after a week of fighting, Turkey had lost three soldiers killed and several severely wounded [1]. ISIS manpower losses for September 9 and 10 amounted to at least 20 militants, and three buildings in Tell al-Hawa used by field commanders as control centers were destroyed.

During the September battles of 2016, a scandal erupted between Turkey and the United States. The controversy arose because the Turkish military had integrated militants from the Ahrar al-Sharqiya Brigade into the FSA; these fighters were previously known as an-Nusra [44, p. 8] and had fought in alliance with ISIS against coalition forces. Under pressure from its NATO ally, the United States, Ankara had no choice but to withdraw this brigade from participation in Operation Euphrates Shield. Tensions between pro-Turkish rebel groups persisted throughout the second half of September 2016, as some groups

openly sympathized with ISIS and were willing to provide assistance if necessary. Consequently, one such group, the Mountain Hawks Brigade, was removed from the Jarabulus front and redeployed to less critical sectors in the Hama and Latakia provinces.

In mid-September 2016, the third phase of Operation Euphrates Shield commenced with the offensive against the city of al-Bab. In late September, FSA units liberated at least 20 villages; however, due to frequent militant counter-attacks, these settlements often changed hands, and casualties among pro-Turkish detachments were heavy. As a result, the advance on al-Bab was temporarily halted.

On October 1, 2016, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey extended for another year the mandate that authorized the use of the military abroad and granted the coalition the right to utilize Turkish airfields and infrastructure against terrorists.

After a week-long lull, hostilities resumed with the offensive of Turkish troops and the FSA against the salient centered around the town of Dabiq, which held symbolic importance for ISIS. Within a few days, the villages of Tallat al-Baydah, Turkman Bareh, and Hurdanah were liberated.

On October 5, FSA units captured several more villages and entered the small but strategically significant town of Akhtarín, severing the supply route between al-Bab and Dabiq [64]. Subsequently, the territory between Akhtarín, Mare, and Kafr Ghan was cleared. On October 16, FSA forces captured Dabiq, as well as the town of Sawran and several surrounding villages.

During this time, ISIS militants were hastily reinforcing al-Bab. Strategically, the city was nearly surrounded, yet the encircling forces were hostile to each other. Syrian government troops were the closest to the city at 10 km to the south, yet their main forces were preoccupied with the siege of Aleppo. From the north, the FSA, supported by Turkey, prepared an advance. Meanwhile, the SDF still had hope of uniting Rojava cantons by advancing on al-Bab from Afrin and Manbij areas simultaneously.

As a result, the second half of October witnessed a unique three-way battle in world history near the city of al-Bab, involving the

Turkish army and its FSA satellites, Kurdish insurgents, and militants of the ISIS terrorist organization. These opposing forces spent several weeks engaged in mutual attrition. Approximately three thousand people were killed in this battle, including at least 400 civilians [60, p. 7].

On October 18, the Northern Thunder Brigade, part of the Hamza Division led by S. Balud, issued an ultimatum to the “PKK” and the “Army of Revolutionaries” within the SDF, demanding they vacate the Tell Rifaat area within 48 hours [8] or face an attack. The following day, before the ultimatum expired, Syrian rebels recaptured villages from ISIS that had separated them from the SDF and, with Turkish air support, began advancing on the defensive line held by Kurdish units in the Tell Rifaat and Shahba regions.

During the clashes between the SDF and the FSA, both sides suffered significant losses without achieving substantial results. On October 20, the Turkish military reported the elimination of approximately 200 Kurdish YPG fighters. According to SDF spokesperson T. Silo, only 11 YPG fighters were killed in the battles, though there were numerous civilian casualties [60, pp. 9-10]. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported the deaths of 20 Kurdish fighters in the conflict with the Syrian rebels.

On October 22, 2016, FSA forces managed to surround the small town of Shaykh Issa, east of Tell Rifaat, while Turkish aircraft and artillery bombarded Kurdish positions. However, SDF units successfully repelled all FSA attacks over the following days. The pro-Turkish units were so demoralized that by late October they not only ceded several villages to the SDF but also began surrendering territory to Islamic State militants; this led the Kurdish side to allege coordination between pro-Turkish forces and ISIS [28].

Meanwhile, the SDF, in conjunction with Syrian government troops, launched an offensive on al-Bab from the west, starting October 28, from the area north of Aleppo. An advance toward al-Bab also commenced from Manbij.

Assessing the situation, the command of Operation Euphrates Shield resumed the offensive on al-Bab on November 6. Following heavy fighting on November 14, Syrian rebels entered the northern outskirts of the city but were unable to establish a foothold. However, they managed

to bypass the city from the west, thereby blocking the SDF advance.

On November 24, a strike on Turkish forces resulted in three Turkish soldiers killed and ten wounded [59]. The Turkish military stated that the attack was carried out by the Syrian Air Force. Turkish Prime Minister B. Yıldırım issued a stern statement addressed to the Syrian leadership, indicating that Damascus's actions would not go unpunished [5]. Syrian officials denied that their air force had bombed Turkish positions, while the Islamic State announced that the strike was carried out by its suicide bomber.

Throughout December 2016, positional battles for the city of al-Bab and its surrounding territories continued between ISIS and pro-Turkish forces. By the end of the year, the Turkish army had failed to capture the city, having sustained serious losses in personnel and equipment, and needed rest. Nevertheless, FSA detachments managed to bypass the city from both sides, severing the highway leading to Manbij. Although the SDF continued to advance toward al-Bab from both the west and the east, where the town of Arima was liberated from ISIS militants, the unification of Rojava was now becoming problematic.

On December 29, a ceasefire agreement between the Syrian government and the armed opposition, brokered by Russia in coordination with Turkey, was signed. Syrian Kurdish units were not included in the list of participants in the truce [35]. On January 2, 2017, Ankara reported that Russian aircraft were conducting strikes on ISIS positions in the al-Bab area. According to The New York Times, the agreement between Turkey and Russia for joint action against the Islamic State was a result of the lack of air support from the United States. The American side explained this by stating that Turkey had launched the offensive on al-Bab without coordination with its allies [21].

Heavy fighting for al-Bab continued throughout January. In the second half of the month, the Syrian government army launched an offensive on al-Bab from the southwest. Turkish and Russian aircraft, as well as the coalition air force, which had finally joined them, struck ISIS positions simultaneously. On February 9, Russian aircraft targeted ISIS positions but accidentally struck Turkish forces, killing three soldiers and

wounding eleven others [37]. Russian authorities issued a formal apology to Turkey, and the incident was considered resolved.

By this time, the Syrian government army was already within three kilometers south of al-Bab. Turkey announced that it had not agreed to hand over the city to the Assad regime, after which Turkish troops and their allies launched a decisive assault. Following heavy fighting on February 12, they managed to reach the city center [18] and capture a key objective, the ISIS hospital. According to the Turkish military, the full liberation of al-Bab was only a matter of time. Over the course of the week, Turkish sources repeatedly reported military successes in liberating the city, though reports from independent sources remained contradictory.

Meanwhile, Turkish President R. Erdoğan announced that the next objectives of Operation Euphrates Shield would be Manbij and Raqqa [16]. These plans were tied to hopes that the U.S. administration's policy would change following the inauguration of President D. Trump. Turkey continued to demand the removal of the YPG from the west bank of the Euphrates and proposed a joint offensive on Raqqa involving the FSA and the SDF, provided the latter consisted solely of Arab formations.

On February 20, during urban combat in al-Bab, Syrian rebels captured an ISIS field commander, A.I. al-Fransi [7], who was implicated in terrorist attacks across Europe. A powerful new assault followed on February 23, after which the city was finally fully secured. On the same day, the towns of Bizaah and Qabasin were also liberated.

The capture of al-Bab came at a high cost for the Turkish military; according to official data, at least 60 personnel were killed, several times more than in all previous phases of Operation Euphrates Shield combined, and over 10 tanks were lost, while the original force grouping had to be tripled during the course of the siege. Casualties among FSA fighters numbered in the hundreds.

On February 25, FSA forces reached the demarcation line south of al-Bab, which was already occupied by government troops advancing rapidly to the east. On February 27, the Syrian army linked up with SDF positions east of al-Bab, effectively blocking pro-Turkish forces from further advancement deeper into Syrian territory.

Despite Turkey's demands and its own assurances, the United States not only failed to withdraw Kurdish units from Manbij but also continued to train and equip them with hardware [62]. On March 1, in accordance with the operation's further objectives, FSA units began advancing from al-Bab toward Manbij; supported by Turkish artillery, they engaged in clashes with the SDF over villages in the Arima district, ending without result. On March 2, Turkish President R. Erdoğan reaffirmed: "Turkey's new target in Syria is Manbij. Manbij is a city which belongs to Arabs" [29].

However, on the same day, the Manbij Military Council announced that, through Russian mediation, an agreement had been reached to transfer settlements west of Manbij to Syrian government troops, who would serve as a buffer between Kurdish and pro-Turkish forces. The following day, General S.F. Rudskoy of the Russian General Staff and U.S. Secretary of Defense General J.N. Mattis confirmed the transfer of territory under Syrian army control [65]. Starting March 4, U.S. operational forces were deployed in Manbij, and a Russian humanitarian convoy entered the city [38]. By March 6, the Syrian government army began occupying positions west of Manbij, replacing SDF units along the line of contact [41]. Henceforth, both the SDF and Turkish forces with their Syrian allies complained of enemy shelling, yet no open hostilities occurred in the Manbij area.

On March 7, 2017, a meeting was held between Pentagon representative J. Dunford, Russian Chief of General Staff V.V. Gerasimov, and Turkish Chief of General Staff H. Akar to resolve the situation around Manbij [63]. On March 16, 2017, Turkish Defense Minister F. Işık stated that seeking a diplomatic solution to the Manbij problem involving the U.S. and Russia was a necessity, and a military approach would only be considered if diplomacy reached an impasse [53].

On March 29, Turkish Prime Minister B. Yıldırım announced the successful conclusion of Operation Euphrates Shield. He added: "If something threatening our security happens in the future... then this will be a new operation" [4].

Results. According to official data, during the operation, the Turkish army liberated at least 2,000 square kilometers of territory and

eliminated over 3,000 ISIS and YPG militants. Combat losses for the Turkish army amounted to 71 killed, while the allied Free Syrian Army suffered at least 500 fatalities, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights [26].

In terms of the objectives stated at the onset of the operation, it was a success for Turkey: Syrian border regions were cleared of ISIS, and the possibility of creating a unified Kurdish autonomy stretching from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea was practically eliminated. Furthermore, a safe zone was established for Syrian allies and for the return of some refugees, who represent a factor of social instability within Turkey. Turkey also positioned itself as a protector of Sunni Arabs and Turkmen.

However, the underlying problems that prompted the operation were not fully resolved. The terrorist threat was not completely eradicated. The threat of Kurdish separatism did not diminish, as the United States not only continued to support the YPG but also demonstrated a readiness to protect them regardless of the interests of its NATO ally. On the other hand, growing alienation from the U.S. created an opportunity for Turkey to act in its own interests, deciding the fate of its neighbor on equal terms with key players – the U.S., Russia, and Iran – and seeking advantages through various diplomatic configurations. Overall, the results of the operation for Turkey were ambiguous, creating the prerequisites for similar operations in the future.

The Kurdish Democratic Union Party and its armed units once again proved their combat effectiveness. The YPG retained Manbij and became the primary force of the coalition in the future Raqqa operation, from which Turkey's participation was now excluded, providing an opportunity to increase their influence in eastern Syria. However, their main political goal, a unified Syrian Kurdistan, became unattainable for the foreseeable future.

The primary losing party as a result of Operation Euphrates Shield was the United States, which squandered its political capital in an attempt to oppose Turkey, its traditional regional ally. The main winning party was Russia, which no longer faced a unified Western coalition but rather separate powers with distinct interests that could be negotiated with individually.

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THE NARRATIVE OF METUS HOSTILIS (“FEELING OF THE ENEMY”) AS THE BASIS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The article examines the features of current international processes in the Middle East region, which are largely associated with the ongoing antagonism of various regional actors. Arab-Israeli contradictions and the confrontation between Iran and the Arab states and Israel are one of the key variables in the analysis of the military-political situation in the Middle East. These collisions are often based on the narrative of metus hostilis (“feeling of the enemy”), which forms the corresponding agenda and is aimed at justifying the policy of a particular state. *Methods and materials.* During the preparation of the article, the authors used a scientific approach that interprets international relations through the emotional component (“geopolitics of emotions”). Also, the methodological basis of the work was the theory of securitization, which considers security as a form of discursive practice. *Analysis.* Currently, the Middle East region is experiencing a phase of escalation in relations between various states of the region, associated with the aggravation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and a direct clash between Israel and Iran, in which other countries of the region also took an indirect part. At the same time, before the new round of confrontation, Arab-Israeli and Saudi-Iranian peace initiatives were being implemented, which allowed us to speak with moderate optimism about a potential reduction in tensions in the region. However, the current events in the Middle East have once again actualized the metus hostilis principle in regional international processes. *Results.* The authors conclude that, despite the efforts made to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East, the region remains an arena of ongoing confrontation between various states. As practice has shown, the Arab-Israeli and Iranian narratives, due to their deep roots in many Middle Eastern processes, cannot be eliminated immediately and must undergo a long-term test of their durability and effectiveness. This is especially true in the context of a constantly changing regional agenda and a transforming external environment. The global context and the constant increase in tensions between leading international actors can also contribute to the continued relevance of the emotional component of Middle Eastern geopolitics. As a result, the current reshaping of relations between regional states is an attempt to address the most pressing and long-standing issues based on the narrative of metus hostilis. *Authors’ contribution.* D.A. Mirgorod developed the content of the article and carried out its general scientific editing. E.F. Parubochaya analyzed the features of modern international processes in the Middle East based on the influence of the “enemy feeling” factor.

Key words: Middle East, geopolitics of emotions, narratives, Arab-Israeli normalization, Iran-Saudi accords, metus hostilis.

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НАРРАТИВ METUS HOSTILIS («ЧУВСТВО ВРАГА») – ОСНОВА СОВРЕМЕННЫХ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ПРОЦЕССОВ БЛИЖНЕГО ВОСТОКА

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Аннотация. *Введение.* В статье рассматриваются особенности текущих международных процессов в регионе Ближнего Востока, которые в значительной степени связаны с продолжающимся антагонизмом различных региональных акторов. Арабо-израильские противоречия, противостояние Ирана с арабскими государствами и Израилем являются одной из ключевых переменных анализа военно-политической обстановки на Ближнем Востоке. В основе указанных коллизий нередко лежит нарратив metus hostilis («чувство врага»), который формирует соответствующую повестку и направлен на обоснование политики того или иного государства. *Методы и материалы.* При подготовке статьи авторами применялся научный подход, трактующий международные отношения через эмоциональную компоненту («геополитика эмоций»). Также методологическую основу работы составила теория секьюритизации, которая рассматривает обеспечение безопасности как форму дискурсивной практики. *Анализ.* В настоящее время Ближний Восток переживает фазу эскалации в отношениях между различными государствами, связанную с обострением палестино-израильского конфликта и прямым столкновением между Израилем и Ираном, в котором опосредованное участие принимали и другие страны региона. Вместе с тем до нового витка противостояния реализовывались арабо-израильские и саудовско-иранские мирные инициативы, которые позволяли с умеренным оптимизмом говорить о потенциальном снижении напряженности в регионе. Однако текущие события на Ближнем Востоке вновь актуализировали принцип metus hostilis в региональных международных процессах. *Результаты.* Авторами делается вывод, что, несмотря на предпринятые усилия по деэскалации напряженности на Ближнем Востоке, регион остается ареной сохраняющегося противоборства различных государств. Арабо-израильский и иранский нарративы, как показала практика, в силу своей прочной связи со многими ближневосточными процессами сохраняют свою актуальность и должны пройти длительный этап проверки на долговечность и дееспособность. Это особенно актуально в условиях постоянно меняющейся региональной повестки дня и трансформирующейся внешней обстановки. Глобальный контекст и постоянное обострение напряженности между ведущими международными игроками также могут способствовать сохранению актуальности эмоциональной составляющей ближневосточной геополитики. В результате нынешняя перестройка отношений между государствами региона представляет собой попытку решения наиболее острых и давних проблем, основанную на нарративе metus hostilis. *Вклад авторов.* Д.А. Миргород разработал структуру статьи и осуществил ее общую научную редакцию. Е.Ф. Парубочая проанализировала особенности современных международных процессов на Ближнем Востоке на основе влияния фактора «чувства врага».

Ключевые слова: Ближний Восток, геополитика эмоций, нарративы, арабо-израильская нормализация, ирано-саудовские соглашения, metus hostilis.

Цитирование. Миргород Д. А., Парубочая Е. Ф. Нарратив metus hostilis («чувство врага») – основа современных международных процессов Ближнего Востока // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. – 2026. – Т. 31, №2. – С. 142–152. – DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2026.2.12>

Введение. Анализ специфики развития Ближнего Востока позволяет говорить о том, что межгосударственные отношения в регионе во многом связаны с эмоциональной компонентой. Совокупность растянутых во времени

территориальных споров, межнациональных и межконфессиональных противоречий, своего рода наследственность цивилизационного противостояния за реализацию византийского – арабского – османского – европейского

(колонизаторского) – советского и иных миропроектов, борьба за региональное лидерство, вовлеченность в ближневосточные процессы значительного количества внешних участников породили сложную систему взаимоотношений между государствами региона, которая зачастую основывается на апеллировании к базовым коллективным «чувствам и эмоциям» при обосновании той или иной страной своей внешнеполитической стратегии. Так, «страх перед врагами (*metus hostilis*)» как на внутри-, так и внешнерегиональном уровнях во многом характеризует современную геополитику Ближнего Востока. Отметим, что «эмоция страха», как геополитическая категория, где страх употребляется в широком значении, а не только как «страх перед врагами», является воспринимаемой переменной угроз [34, р. 146], что позволяет нам использовать конструктивистский аппарат для описания сюжетов, относящихся, как считается, к традиционно реалистической парадигме международных отношений.

Новейшая история региона тесно связана с использованием указанного внешнеполитического мотива, ставшего одной из доминант ближневосточного геополитического конструкта. Текущий этап развития системы международных отношений на Ближнем Востоке позволяет говорить о том, что она так или иначе связана с постоянным поиском объединяющего врага, который консолидирует определенные региональные силы. Следует также добавить, что *metus hostilis* имеет и внешнюю проекцию, когда ближневосточные государства на основе «эмоций» выстраивают свои отношения с крупными внерегиональными игроками, которые, в свою очередь, также активно используют подобную аргументацию при реализации своей ближневосточной политики. Таким образом, целью настоящей статьи является выявление того как нарратив *metus hostilis* формируется и воспроизводится ключевыми акторами Ближнего Востока, а также детерминации его влияния на динамику современных международных процессов региона (эскалации и деэскалации конфликтов, построение союзов, легитимацию внешнеполитических решений и трансформацию регионального порядка).

Методы и материалы. Эмоциональная компонента, по мнению значительного количе-

ства авторов, является постоянным спутником международных отношений, формирование которых сопровождается регулярным поиском государствами необходимой аргументации при принятии внешнеполитических решений [13, р. 31–33]. Подобное обоснование требуется как для консолидации общества внутри страны, так и для трансляции мотивов во внешнюю среду. Научные направления современной теории международных отношений, связанные с вопросом эмоций, как правило, оперируют чувствами страха, унижения и надежды, которые нередко могут объяснять внешнеполитическую культуру различных государств [25]. В этом контексте одной из наиболее распространенных политических практик в истории является фиксация на наличии постоянной внешней угрозы, зачастую персонализированной в виде определенной страны (например, «империя зла»).

Фокусирование на конкретных угрозах, имеющих страновую принадлежность, соотносится в том числе с теорией секьюритизации, которая рассматривает обеспечение безопасности как форму дискурсивной практики [10]. Другими словами, практика секьюритизации предполагает выделение наиболее релевантных угроз безопасности на принципах политической воли и выбора конкретных акторов, отвечающих за процесс выработки и принятия политических решений. Для успешной секьюритизации определенной проблемы политический актор должен установить прочную связь с целевой аудиторией (внутреннее и международное сообщество), без которой реализация политики государства в области безопасности может оказаться провальной [2, р. 22]. Именно поэтому в международных отношениях нередко можно столкнуться с эксплуатацией коллективных комплексов, эмоций, включая «страх», которые быстрее находят отклик у «обывателя» и позволяют оперативнее воплощать в жизнь различные стратегические цели.

Определяющее значение в этом смысле, полагаем, обретает практический инструментарий, используемый для конкретизации предпринимаемых государством шагов на международной арене. В качестве такового могут выступать нарративы, которые получили широкое распространение в политической риторике и теории международных отношений.

В самом общем виде они представляют собой набор идеологических, информационных, коммуникационных и иных сопутствующих инструментов, которые политические акторы используют для продвижения своих интересов, ценностей и стремлений к определенному международному порядку, управляя ожиданиями целевой аудитории и изменяя дискурсивную среду [23].

Объединяющим различные эмоционально окрашенные подходы к международным практикам, полагаем, можно считать нарратив «страха перед врагами (metus hostilis)», который хорошо известен еще по историографии Римской Империи [17, р. 123] и который сохраняет свою актуальность и в настоящее время. В этой связи характеристика геополитических реалий современных международных отношений, включая их региональную составляющую, может основываться и на анализе различных эмоциональных аспектов внешней политики. Особенно актуален анализ нарратива metus hostilis для наиболее конфликтных регионов мира, подразумевающих наличие значительного количества обоюдных претензий между их государствами (например, Ближний Восток). Наряду с этим требуется указать на то, что само понятие «страх» в силу его абстрактного характера трудно внедрять в исследовательский аппарат для выявления осязаемых изменений в параметрах различных подсистем международных отношений. Однако выделение эмоционального компонента способно усилить комплексность анализа различных региональных процессов.

Анализ. В современном мире сложно представить себе регион, более изобилующий внутренними противоречиями и внешними претензиями, чем Ближний Восток. Особенности отношений государств региона зачастую строятся на основании конфликта нарративов, которые сформировались под влиянием суммы специфических религиозных, этнокультурных, исторических, логистических, ресурсных и иных факторов. Новейшая история международных отношений региона, которую, полагаем, целесообразно отсчитывать с момента обретения ближневосточными государствами независимости после распада колониальной системы, отличается частым обращением к эмоциям при выработке и принятии внешнепо-

литических решений [33]. При этом нарратив «страха перед врагами» на протяжении десятилетий оставался базовой чертой регионального политического развития.

Так, вплоть до краха популярного в постколониальных обществах региона проекта арабского национализма (панарабизма) в середине 1970-х гг., который должен был консолидировать и в перспективе интегрировать арабские государства Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки, главной движущей силой региональных международных отношений было арабское сплочение вокруг «сионистской угрозы» [27, р. 19–20]. Военные успехи Израиля, а также параллельные изменения в военно-политической и экономической иерархии арабских стран региона несколько смягчили остроту арабо-израильских противоречий, но полностью не смогли вывести эту переменную за скобки геополитического уравнения Ближнего Востока. Об этом, в частности, свидетельствуют опросы общественного мнения, проводимые в арабских государствах, в части из которых Израиль занимает первую строчку в списке стран, представляющих наибольшую угрозу региону и являющихся враждебными к арабскому миру [40]. Согласно «Индексу арабского мнения – 2025», политика Израиля рассматривается как угроза безопасности и стабильности региона [7]. Соответственно, арабо-израильский конфликт, основанный в том числе на чувстве «страха перед врагами», в значительной степени стал одной из констант, непременно учитываемых при анализе динамики региональных международных отношений [28].

Чувство враждебности на Ближнем Востоке традиционно имеет и религиозный подтекст. Суннитско-шиитское противостояние нашло свое воплощение не только во внутригосударственных кризисах (Ирак, Сирия, Бахрейн), но и в межгосударственных коллизиях. Отчетливая поляризация мусульманского мира в регионе прослеживается в формировании политико-географического проекта «шиитской оси» («шиитская дуга», «шиитский полумесяц»), который в настоящее время переживает кризисное состояние из-за смены власти в Сирии и ликвидации бывшего руководства Хезболлы в Ливане. Вместе с тем активные действия хуситов в Йемене позволяют говорить

о сохраняющейся актуальности данного проекта. По мнению многих экспертов, данный шаг стал реакцией Ирана на израильскую угрозу и на активный рост новых «суннитских» региональных держав [5]. Среди них можно выделить Саудовскую Аравию, которая смогла подкрепить свой естественный статус духовного центра политическими амбициями, связанными с приращением экономической и военной мощи. Зачастую именно обращение к конфессиональному аспекту – например, поддержка различными государствами радикальных религиозных группировок – становится причиной закрепления эмоциональных нарративов, в том числе *metus hostilis*, в геополитике Ближнего Востока. К этому следует добавить, что в регионе действует существенное количество международных террористических организаций, которые, хоть и являются акторами вне суверенитета, в значительной степени влияют на динамику международных отношений на Ближнем Востоке. При этом их функционирование напрямую связано с нарративом борьбы против «врагов» («неверных») [35, с. 212].

Арабо-израильский фактор и конфессиональный аспект в контексте эмоционального компонента формирования / трансформации региональной системы международных отношений могут иметь различный масштаб, что отражается как на связях между определенными государствами, так и на создании противоборствующих союзов и коалиций. Вместе с тем многие ближневосточные государства обладают длительной историей исключительно двусторонних отношений, основанных на эмоциях, в том числе «страха перед врагом». Например, Турция предпочла сотрудничать с Тегераном из-за недоверия Анкары к своим западным партнерам после попытки государственного переворота в стране в 2016 г. и поддержки США курдских вооруженных группировок в Сирии. В частности, произошло укрепление сотрудничества по линии взаимодействия в различных международных форматах в сфере урегулирования региональных кризисов (Астанинский процесс), дополнительно Анкара добивалась координации с Тегераном в вопросе противодействия РПК [12]. В то же время ситуация в Сирии ухудшает турецко-иранский диалог, что связывается и с постоянно меняющимся

эмоциональным фоном («страх», «гнев», «сострадание» и т. д.) при выработке и принятии внешнеполитических решений [20]. Здесь же можно упомянуть историю противостояний Ирака и Ирана (1980–1988 гг.), Турции и Сирии (с 2012–2024 гг.), Израиля и Ливана (2006 г.) и т. д. Каждый из указанных конфликтов в той или иной степени сопровождался использованием эмоциональных нарративов, необходимых для формирования каждой из противоборствующих сторон соответствующей дискурсивной среды.

Наконец, среди государств Ближнего Востока широко распространена практика мобилизации своих обществ против внешних участников регионального политического процесса. Так, в различные временные отрезки огромный массив публичных заявлений ближневосточных лидеров, а также научной литературы был связан с антизападными нарративами. До сих пор на Ближнем Востоке популярны обвинения в сторону США и коллективного Запада в том, что они развязали войну против ислама и арабского населения, а также прослеживается постоянное апеллирование к колониальному прошлому [37]. В этом отношении можно отметить и попытки представить Россию врагом всего мусульманского мира. Так, в 2012 г. известный исламский проповедник, многолетний духовный лидер фундаменталистской организации «Братья-мусульмане» в эфире программы на государственном катарском телеканале заявил, что «Москва стала врагом ислама и мусульман. Она стала врагом номер один ислама и мусульман из-за своего противостояния сирийскому народу» [26].

Таким образом, даже краткий анализ исторического комплекса взаимоотношений на Ближнем Востоке позволяет говорить о том, что нарратив *metus hostilis* является одним из ключевых факторов регионального развития. В настоящее время мы наблюдаем за очевидным сдвигом вектора геополитики эмоций на Ближнем Востоке, который обоюдно связан как с изменением точек приложения эмоций во внутренних связях, так и с текущими глобальными преобразованиями.

В последние годы на Ближнем Востоке различные политические игроки активно пытались трансформировать региональную

систему международных отношений, меняя прежние эмоциональные нарративы и коллективные социальные комплексы. Главной точкой отсчета этих процессов, полагаем, можно считать подписание при посредничестве США в 2020 г. «Соглашений Авраама», которые подвели черту под длительным переговорным процессом между Израилем и некоторыми арабскими государствами, принявшими решение нормализовать диалог с Иерусалимом [15]. Согласно этому документу ОАЭ и Бахрейн установили с Израилем полноценные дипломатические отношения. Марокко, также присоединившееся к Соглашениям, в настоящее время находится на пути согласования открытия посольств при условии, что Израиль признает контроль Марокко над спорной Западной Сахарой [22]. С привязкой к «Соглашениям Авраама» планируется подписание Израильско-суданского мирного договора, который должен стать первичным шагом на пути к налаживанию всесторонних дипломатических контактов.

Частью экспертного сообщества данное событие характеризуется как эпохальное [8]. Во многом это связано с тем, что отношения Израиля со странами арабского мира постоянно находились под давлением палестинской проблемы, которая лежит в основе арабо-израильского конфликта, долгое время определявшего эмоциональный фон ближневосточных международных процессов. С момента своего возникновения в 1948 г. Израилу удалось установить дипломатические отношения только с двумя арабскими государствами – Египтом и Иорданией в 1979 и 1994 гг. соответственно. Таким образом, «Соглашения Авраама» в контексте нарратива *metus hostilis* на момент их подписания рассматривались как действительно прорывные, поскольку они могли стабилизировать «эмоциональный фон» в регионе за счет постепенного размывания образа арабо-израильского конфликта, объединяющего арабский мир.

Произошедшее фактически стало попыткой полноценного внедрения Израиля в инициированный еще в 2004 г. Вашингтоном масштабный политико-географический и экономический проект «Большого Ближнего Востока». Часть аналитиков рассматривали этот шаг как имплементацию «выдвинутой

еще в 1993 г. тогдашним министром иностранных дел Израиля Шимоном Пересом формулы «нефть Персидского залива + египетская рабочая сила + турецкая вода + арабские капиталы + израильские мозги = так называемый Новый Ближний Восток», при ее адаптации к новым реалиям [4, p. 16].

Вместе с тем стремление снизить «эмоциональную нагрузку» на регион через нормализацию арабо-израильских отношений усилило нарратив *metus hostilis* в отношениях между частью ближневосточных государств с Ираном, который всегда негативно воспринимал американские региональные инициативы [3, p. 17]. Антииранская логика «Соглашений Авраама» заключалась в том, что у основных участников указанного переговорного процесса имелись различные мотивы усилить давление на Тегеран, исходя из собственного видения комплекса региональной безопасности. Например, Израиль мог обрести возможность постепенно разрешить палестинскую проблему без резко негативной объединенной реакции арабского мира и получить как минимум нейтралитет большей части арабских стран региона в случае военной эскалации в отношениях с Ираном. В свою очередь, монархии Аравийского полуострова усиливали возможности по нейтрализации / минимизации «иранской угрозы», исходящей из территории Йемена, где с 2014 г. продолжается гражданская война между частично поддерживаемыми Ираном шиитскими повстанцами (хуситами) и правительственными войсками [9]. США как внерегиональный участник ближневосточных процессов значительно расширяли круг стран, которые усиливали потенциал Вашингтона в сдерживании политических и военно-технологических амбиций Тегерана. Таким образом, арабо-израильские мирные инициативы актуализировала антииранскую повестку среди существенной части стран региона. Более того, аналитики и эксперты заговорили о фактическом оформлении полноценной антииранской коалиции на Ближнем Востоке [36, p. 14]. Все это, очевидно, провоцировало встречную реакцию со стороны ИРИ (например, активизация поддержки хуситов в Йемене).

Однако внешнеполитические шаги марта 2023 г. со стороны Эр-Рияда и Тегерана заставили пересмотреть «эмоциональную

нагрузку» во внешнеполитической стратегии стран современного Ближнего Востока. При посредничестве Китая, в Пекине было объявлено о восстановлении отношений между Саудовской Аравией и Ираном, а также урегулировании многих нерешенных и, более того, казалось, что никогда и нерешаемых, вопросов. Наличие подписанного письменного документа между государствами подтверждает их серьезное намерение начать новую главу в отношениях, основанную на взаимном уважении суверенитета друг друга и невмешательстве во внутренние дела других стран. Первым конкретным результатом соглашения станет обмен послами впервые после закрытия в 2016 г. посольств в Эр-Рияде и Тегеране, а также активация соглашения о сотрудничестве в области безопасности, подписанное между ними в 2001 году [38]. Помимо этого предполагается, что практическое воплощение процесса урегулирования саудовско-иранских отношений будет происходить через разрешение существующих споров двух государств по различным направлениям региональной повестки – Ливан, Ирак, Бахрейн, Сирия, Йемен.

В отношении Йемена стороны на официальном уровне объявили о готовности к диалогу и содействию политическому урегулированию йеменского кризиса путем переговоров со всеми сторонами конфликта [30]. Также на тот момент начались подвижки и к постепенному восстановлению отношений между Эр-Риядом и Дамаском. Об этом также свидетельствуют заявления государственных чиновников различного уровня и некоторые контакты между дипломатами Саудовской Аравии и Сирии [16]. Наконец, Сирия спустя двенадцать лет возобновила членство в Лиге арабских государств [38]. В настоящее время сирийский контекст претерпел значительные изменения из-за падения режима Башара Асада и приходу к власти протурецких сил во главе с Ахмедом аш-Шараа, который воспринимается региональными и глобальными акторами как абсолютно легитимный руководитель Сирии [1].

В случае с Саудовской Аравией и Ираном, полагаем, что одним из главных мотивов перезагрузки их отношений стала так называемая «дилемма безопасности», которая описывает парадокс, когда рост / ослабление без-

опасности одного государства могут вызвать опасения со стороны других государств даже при отсутствии реальной угрозы [11]. В условиях глобальной неопределенности, усталости от постоянной региональной конфронтации, поглощающей значительные ресурсы, Саудовская Аравия и Иран приняли стратегическое решение о нормализации двусторонних отношений [19, р. 112–114]. Данный шаг в контексте рассматриваемого нарратива *metus hostilis* в значительной степени стабилизирует эмоциональный ближневосточный внешнеполитический фон и перекраивает карту взаимоотношений как в регионе, так и за его пределами.

Однако атака ХАМАС на Израиль 7 октября 2023 г. и последовавшая за ним военная операция в Секторе Газа, а также начавшийся конфликт между Ираном и Израилем во многом аннулировали все дипломатические усилия, заставили другие страны региона пересмотреть свою позицию в отношении Тегерана и Тель-Авива. Соответственно жизнеспособность указанных выше соглашений выглядит достаточно недолговечной.

В рамках рассматриваемой проблемы геополитики эмоций Ближнего Востока главный вопрос лежит в плоскости долговременности и в целом жизнеспособности договоренностей, подобным «Соглашениям Авраама» и саудовско-иранским дипломатическим инициативам. Особенно в силу обширного массива взаимных «страхов». Они изначально многими оценивались скептически по нескольким причинам [32, р. 7–11]. Во-первых, среди арабских государств отсутствовал консенсус в отношении целесообразности налаживания контактов с Израилем без разрешения палестинского вопроса, который продолжает оставаться одним из основных пунктов региональной повестки, сохраняя инерционность идей панарабизма и обладая религиозным подтекстом. Этим и объясняется реакция арабов. Например, Египет, Марокко и Аравийские монархии поддерживали этот план, но с некоторыми оговорками. Алжир, Иордания, Ирак, Сирия и Ливан вошли в число несогласных. Остальные воздержались от оценок [31]. Во-вторых, значительная часть стран региона продолжает критиковать Израиль за отказ от уравнивания военных потенциалов ближневосточных государств, то

есть от односторонней денуклеаризации [24]. В-третьих, много вопросов вызывало посредничество Вашингтона, который, как и Иерусалим, обвинялся в стремлении реализовать свою антииранскую стратегию за счет втягивания в нее более широкого круга региональных акторов.

Сомнения в прочности «Соглашений Авраама» также связываются с усилением ультраправых политиков и их риторикой, что вызывает негативную реакцию со стороны арабских государств. Например, заявления министра финансов Израиля Бецалель Смотрич о том, что «нет такого понятия, как палестинский народ», ожидаемо спровоцировали шквал критики со стороны многих официальных лиц ближневосточных государств [41]. В дополнение к этому перспективам соглашений мешают жесткие действия Израиля в отношении Палестины, которые грозят перерасти в новую «интифад» и затрагивают соседние арабские страны, которые осудили «чрезмерные» действия Иерусалима в отношении мусульман-палестинцев. Наконец, взаимодополняющие друг друга «Соглашения Авраама» и договоренности между Саудовской Аравией и Ираном на практике имеют взаимоисключающий характер, о чем свидетельствует текущая региональная динамика. Таким образом, нарратив «страха перед врагами», в основе которого лежат арабо-израильские противоречия, способен с новой силой вернуться в перечень ключевых факторов, обуславливающих ближневосточную систему международных отношений.

Пекинские соглашения также являются весьма хрупкими. В первую очередь в силу множества точек пересечения интересов Эр-Рияда и Тегерана в регионе (Йемен, Сирия, Ирак, Ливан, Бахрейн) [18]. С этим соотносится и реалистичная оценка соглашения со стороны министра иностранных дел Королевства Фейсала бин Фархана Аль Сауда, который подчеркнул, что данное соглашение не означает разрешения всех споров между двумя странами. В той мере, в какой подробности о соглашении стали известны, оно больше похоже на пакт о ненападении, чем на подробный список решений вопросов и споров, которые необходимо урегулировать двум региональным державам, чтобы действительно снизить напряженность между ними.

Дополнительным фактором, способным подорвать указанные дипломатические успехи, является очевидное сопротивление им США, которые наверняка попытаются сохранить дееспособность своей конструкции региональной безопасности, связанной в первую очередь арабо-израильской осью.

Наряду с этим ключевую роль в долговечности пекинских соглашений будет играть глобальный контекст и будущий расклад сил на международной арене. Часть аналитиков увязывают налаживание диалога между Эр-Риядом и Тегераном с борьбой между ведущими международными акторами за определение контуров нового миропорядка [14]. Именно поэтому указанные мирные инициативы рассматриваются в качестве интенсификации «процесса деамериканизации» и роста политического присутствия Китая на Ближнем Востоке [39]. Параллельно иногда указывается на то, что Пекин продолжил дело Москвы и помог осуществить проект российской концепции обеспечения коллективной безопасности в зоне Персидского залива [21]. Следовательно, успехи России и Китая на глобальном уровне могут гарантировать и фундаментальность саудовско-иранских соглашений.

Вместе с тем нарратив *metus hostilis* в геополитике Ближнего Востока в состоянии усилиться за счет его интернационализации. Размежевание между глобальными центрами силы значительно усиливает идеологический компонент в мировой политике, что, безусловно, отражается на Ближнем Востоке. Данный тезис подтверждается восприятием арабскими обществами специальной военной операции России на Украине. Так, арабский народ в большей степени поддерживает действия Москвы, объясняя это необходимостью противостоять США и коллективному Западу [29]. Во многом это можно соотнести с новой внешнеполитической идеологией России, связанной в том числе с декларацией необходимости бороться с неокOLONIALНЫМИ амбициями западных государств [6].

Наконец, необходимо указать на то, что текущая ситуация не является для региона уникальной, поскольку Ближний Восток даже в новейшей истории уже неоднократно проходил через этапы эскалации / деэскалации как между группами государств, так и отдельными

странами. Однако особенность текущей фазы развития международных отношений в регионе заключается в попытке запараллеливания процесса «разрядки» двух ключевых ближневосточных конфликтообразующих треков (арабо-израильского, иранского), комбинирующих черты конструктивизма («эмоции») и политического реализма (национальные интересы).

Результаты. Подводя итог, следует подчеркнуть, что даже при наличии заметных попыток переосмысления региональной геополитики эмоций в виде «Соглашений Авраама» и саудовско-иранского сближения, с уверенностью говорить об устойчивом снижении фактора *metus hostilis* («чувство врага») в ближневосточных международных отношениях по-прежнему не приходится. Данный нарратив продолжает описывать региональную ситуацию, когда образ внешнего противника становится дисциплинирующим и консолидирующим механизмом для политического сообщества и его элит, упорядочивая внутренние траектории лояльности и детерминируя оппозицию «свой – чужой» в публичном дискурсе. Именно поэтому даже формальная дипломатическая нормализация не гарантирует размывания страха как политического ресурса. Так, логика «Соглашений

Авраама», опиралась схожее восприятие их участниками угроз (в том числе в отношении Ирана), то есть на общий контур опасений, а не на снятие глубинных конфликтных оснований. В результате любые новые всплески насилия и кризисы легитимности быстро возвращают в повестку язык угроз, а перспектива расширения нормализации упирается в риск общественной реакции при отсутствии прогресса по палестинскому треку и безопасности. Схожим образом саудовско-иранские договоренности, безусловно, снизили градус прямой конфронтационности в Персидском заливе, однако не сняли фундаментальные расхождения и накопленные противоречия между двумя центрами силы, а потому не могут рассматриваться как разрешение стратегического соперничества и полный отход от эмоционального наполнения внешней политики. Помимо этого, ни «арабо-израильские мирные инициативы, ни пекинские соглашения не разрешают существенного массива сохраняющихся межгосударственных, межнациональных и межконфессиональных противоречий, которые активно эксплуатируются политиками для формирования необходимой дискурсивной среды, в том числе через апеллирование к чувству «страха перед врагами».

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“CULTURE WARS” IN US AND CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES: A PARADIGM SHIFT

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Abstract. *Introduction.* This article analyzes the phenomenon of culture wars using events reflecting sociocultural conflict at universities in the United States and Canada over the course of half a century. It examines the evolution of the term “culture wars” in its theoretical and methodological implications. It outlines the main directions and trends in the contemporary historiography of “culture wars” and general issues concerning the evolution of higher education in the face of global challenges. The relationship between the student movement of the 1960s–1990s and the current crisis of neoliberal and postmodernist concepts of university evolution in the United States and Canada is demonstrated. *Methods and materials.* Systems-structural approach. Historical-comparative method. Content analysis. Social constructivism. Materials from university archives in the USA and Canada. Historical research and scholarly articles by historians, political scientists, and cultural scholars from the USSR/Russia, USA, Canada, and Great Britain. Periodical press materials. *Analysis.* This paper utilizes a systems-structural approach to identify a range of theoretical and methodological issues related to the phenomenon of “culture wars” in its historical dynamics. This paper analyzes the causes of the sociocultural crisis in Western society in general and in universities in the USA and Canada in particular, amidst the growing confrontation between neoliberal and globalist values, which poses a serious threat to academic freedom and the development prospects of the modern university in the near future. *Result.* Using the example of the “Ryerson case,” the extent of the influence of the ideology of historical revisionism and relativism emanating from the United States on events in Canada is demonstrated. The article concludes that the further introduction of such “culture war” markers as deplatforming, political correctness, the rejection of traditional cultural values, and historical revisionism could lead to a distortion of the concept of the “university mission” as a vital intellectual resource and a platform for preserving democratic principles in society as a whole. *Funding.* The study was funded by RSF, Grant № 22-18-00305-P “The images of enemy in Cold War popular culture: their content, contemporary reception and usage in Russian and U.S. symbolic politics”.

Key words: US and Canadian universities, sociocultural conflict, “culture war,” historiography, Cold War, historical revisionism and relativism, “cancel culture,” student movement.

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**«КУЛЬТУРНЫЕ ВОЙНЫ» В УНИВЕРСИТЕТАХ США И КАНАДЫ:
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Аннотация. *Введение.* В статье анализируется феномен культурных войн на примере событий, отражающих социокультурный конфликт в университетах США и Канады на протяжении полувека. Рассматривается эволюция термина «культурные войны» в его теоретическом и методологическом содержании. Обозначены основные направления и тенденции современной историографии «культурных войн» и общих вопросов эволюции высшего образования перед лицом глобальных вызовов. Показана взаимосвязь студенческого движения 1960–1990-х гг. с современным этапом кризиса неолиберальных и постмодернистских концепций эволюции университетов США и Канады. *Методы и материалы.* Системно-структурный подход. Историко-сравнительный метод. Социальный конструктивизм. Электронные материалы университетских архивов США и министерства образования Канады. Исторические исследования и научные статьи историков, политологов и культурологов СССР / России, США, Канады и Великобритании. Материалы периодической печати. *Анализ.* В работе использован системно-структурный подход, позволяющий выявить комплекс теоретических и методологических проблем феномена «культурных войн» в его исторической динамике. Анализируются причины социокультурного кризиса в западном обществе в целом и университетах США и Канады в частности в условиях нарастающего противостояния между неолиберальными и глобалистскими ценностями, что представляет серьезную угрозу для академической свободы и перспектив развития современного университета в ближайшем будущем. *Результат.* На примере «казуса Райерсона» показан уровень влияния идеологии исторического ревизионизма и релятивизма, исходящего из США, на события в Канаде. В статье делается вывод, что дальнейшее внедрение таких маркеров «культурных войн», как деплатформинг, политическая корректность, отказ от традиционных культурных ценностей, исторический ревизионизм могут привести к деформации понятия «миссия университета», как важнейшего интеллектуального ресурса и площадки сохранения демократических принципов в обществе в целом. *Финансирование.* Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 22-18-00305-П «Образы врага в массовой культуре Холодной войны: содержание, современная рецепция и использование в символической политике России и США».

Ключевые слова: университеты США и Канады, социокультурный конфликт, «культурная война», историография, холодная война, исторический ревизионизм и релятивизм, «культура отмены», студенческое движение.

Цитирование. Кубышкин А. И. «Культурные войны» в университетах США и Канады: смена парадигм // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. – 2026. – Т. 31, № 2. – С. 153–164. – DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2026.2.13>

Введение. Понятие «культурный конфликт» («Kulturkampf») как научный термин относится к историческим событиям позапрошлого века, а именно связан с борьбой правительства О.В. фон Бисмарка против идеологического влияния католической церкви в Южной Германии в 1870 году [1].

Применительно к событиям XIX – начала XX в. в современной интерпретации термин «культурная война» («Cultural War») также означает конфликт социокультурных практик между консерваторами и либералами. Социокультурный конфликт развивался, напри-

мер, в результате многочисленных волн иммиграции в США людей, которых европейские иммигранты ранее считали «иностранными», а себя – подлинными американцами. Это явление получило название «нативизм» («Nativism»). Кроме того, межкультурные конфликты повсеместно происходили и в результате культурных сдвигов в странах Запада в 20-х гг. прошлого века, в условиях модернизации и урбанизации общества, ускоренного развития новых форм искусства, средств массовой информации и т. д. В США и ряде европейских стран высшее образование стано-

вится более доступным для среднего класса, а университеты начинают играть все большую роль в социальной и политической жизни Европы и Северной Америки [6].

Отдельно следует напомнить об идеологической и культурной деформации университетов в Италии и Германии в условиях прихода к власти фашистов, а затем после поражения тоталитарных режимов в Европе последовавшей денацификации и демократизации, которые проходили в послевоенные годы в университетах Европы и способствовали возникновению предпосылок для создания всеевропейского образовательного пространства (Болонская система).

Что касается США и Канады, то в 50–60-е гг. прошлого столетия высшее образование там становится массовым и превращается в мощный интеллектуальный ресурс развития этих стран.

Очевидные проявления социокультурных конфликтов отразились в университетах США и Канады в начальный этап холодной войны, в период жесткого противостояния двух мировых систем, в том числе и в плане содержания университетского образования. Обычной практикой в «эпоху маккартизма» в США стали идеологические чистки, запрет прогрессивных студенческих организаций (клуб Джона Рида в Гарварде), доносы на либеральных профессоров и их увольнение, наконец, преследование студентов, участвовавших в антиядерном движении и демонстрациях против войны в Корее.

Радикальный пересмотр университетских ценностей и социокультурного содержания высшего образования имел место в период «культурной революции» в Китае в 1967–1970 гг. и, конечно, в стремлении студентов университетов Европы изменить природу и порядок буржуазного университета в эпоху «молодежной революции» 1968–1969 годов. Яркой иллюстрацией могут служить события «красного мая 1968 г.» в Париже, где студенты Сорбонны выступали против университетской архаики под лозунгом «Будьте реалистами – требуйте невозможного!».

Цель данной статьи заключается в определении динамики феномена «культурных войн», как социокультурного конфликта внутри университетского сообщества США и Канады.

Задачи исследования:

- краткое освещение историографии вопроса;
- характеристика генезиса «культурных войн» и их взаимосвязь с различными практиками функционирования современного университета, а также с такими формами межкультурного взаимодействия, как «культурная дипломатия»;
- выяснение причин распространения «культуры отмены» в университетах США и Канады, как проявление исторического ревизионизма и культурного релятивизма на примере «казуса Райерсона»;
- выяснение роли неолиберальных и глобалистских идей в развитии социокультурного конфликта в университетах США и Канады;
- характеристика политики администрации Д. Трампа в отношении высшего образования США, как попытки политики ревизии фундаментальных основ и принципов неолиберальной и глобалистской теории и практики университетского образования.

Хронологические рамки исследования: 1960–2020-е годы.

Историография. В начале 1990-х гг. термин «культурная война» был пересмотрен и конкретизирован известным американским социологом Джеймсом Дэвисом Хантером в его книге «Культурные войны: борьба за определение Америки» [16]. Автор подчеркивал, что термин «Cultural Wars» впервые утвердился в его нынешнем значении в научной литературе и общественном сознании лишь в 1960-х, и был связан с широким протестным движением, в частности, в университетских кампусах по всему миру.

В современной американской, канадской и британской историографии сосуществуют различные концепции «Cultural Wars» [23, р. 3; 3; 31], раскрывающие основные аспекты этого феномена – от тактики агрессивной политики вытеснения противоположных мнений до использования межкультурного конфликта в качестве инструмента «мягкой силы» в интересах неолиберальных глобалистов [31].

В российской историографии своеобразной реакцией на обсуждение проблемы «культурных войн» стала публикация полемической книги В. Крашенинниковой [4]. Автор утверждает, что российская политическая эли-

та не в полной мере оценивает влияние «мягкой силы» в продвижении интересов США и стран Запада на постсоветском пространстве и призывает к созданию эффективного механизма противодействия попыткам через культурные практики добиться благоприятных для Запада, и особенно для США, выгодных условий в плане экономического, политического и идеологического давления на современное российское общество [4, с. 4–5].

«Культурная война» согласно дефиниции российского политолога и культуролога М. Волчковой – это «система действий, направленная на слом и/или фундаментальную замену духовных ценностей, культурных образцов и норм, определяющих внутренние установки личности или целого народа» [2].

Несомненно, «культурные войны» как внутри западных обществ, так и вне их, резко контрастируют с теорией и практикой культурной дипломатии. Это положение полностью относится и к университетским проблемам.

В работах известного российского специалиста в области изучения публичной и культурной дипломатии Н.А. Цветковой принята успешная попытка проследить стратегию культурной дипломатии как воплощение «мягкой силы». Этот вид дипломатии включает в свою стратегию и элементы соперничества, и элементы сотрудничества ее основных акторов в зависимости от меняющейся политической и идеологической ситуации в странах-реципиентах на протяжении второй половины XX в., то есть в самые сложные периоды холодной войны. Особое внимание Н.А. Цветкова уделяет практикам культурной дипломатии в противостоянии политическим и идеологическим постулатам культурных конфликтов в университетах Европы, Азии и Латинской Америки на заключительном этапе холодной войны [8; 27].

В эпоху глобализации университет становится пространством как для межкультурного взаимодействия, так и для культурного (идеологического, социального, мировоззренческого) конфликта. По сути своей университетское образование подразумевает не только овладение высшим знанием, но и участие в выработке гражданского общественного сознания, выражающегося, в частности, в студенческом активизме [12].

Роль университетов в межкультурных коммуникациях и конфликтах как внутри кампусов, так и за их пределами – тема традиционная для американских и канадских ученых в последней трети прошлого столетия. В это время в университетские программы активно внедряются постмодернистские и релятивистские концепции, которые привели к усилению кризиса идей функционирования классической модели университета, что вызвало острую тревогу как у консервативной, так и либеральной академической общественности [21; 24].

Одним из наиболее известных критиков деформации содержания университетского образования в США ввиду внедрения постмодернистских практик в обучении студентов стал профессор Чикагского университета Алан Блум. В своей книге «Закат американской мысли», ставшей весьма популярной в академических кругах, он отмечал резкое снижение качества образования и научных исследований в американских университетах, где студенты в условиях замены канона классического образования релятивистскими теориями изучают «все ни о чем», а преподаватели занимаются имитацией методик предлагаемых курсов, избегая глубокого анализа их содержания. Этот конформистский порядок, по мнению А. Блума, неизбежно приводит к глубокому кризису университета и межкультурным и мировоззренческим конфликтам [11].

В начале 2000-х тему нарастающего социокультурного кризиса в американском образовании продолжила в своей популярной книге «Полиция языка» профессор Нью-Йоркского университета Диана Равич. Предметом ее аргументированной критики стала практика так называемой «политической корректности» (Political Correctness), повсеместно вводимая в 1990-х в школах и университетах США. Вербальная самоцензура, отмечает автор, привела к тому, что и студенты, и преподаватели избегали обсуждения острых актуальных проблем, одновременно сглаживая конфликтные ситуации и в то же время подвергая безосновательному осуждению признанные интеллектуальные и исторические ценности и традиции. Этот интеллектуальный конформизм, предполагавший смягчение различного рода межкультурных конфликтов, по

убеждению Д. Равич, на практике приводил к их обострению [18, р. 109].

Анализ причин и характера культурных конфликтов, сделанный А. Блумом и Д. Равич, вызвал широкие отклики академической общности как в США, так и Канаде и стал предметом обсуждения в сотнях публикаций, что подтверждает актуальность проблемы.

В условиях доминирования неолиберальных, постпозитивистских социокультурных моделей и острого кризиса идентичности западных институтов в начале нынешнего столетия в университетах США и Канады широко насаждается пресловутая «культура отмены» (Cancell culture или Deplatforming), весьма напоминающая практику идеологических чисток времен «культурной революции» в вузах Китая.

В современную эпоху деплатформинг широко используется в социальных сетях и Интернете как инструмент вытеснения оппонентов из информационного пространства, навязывания аудитории исключаящую иную (оппозиционную) форму коммуникации, манипуляции фактами [9].

В самом общем виде, по мнению, в частности, российского философа А. Магуна, деплатформинг можно определить, как «исключение из публичной сферы человека, чьи поступки сочтены аморальными (раньше это называлось «бойкот»), – политическое средство, к которому прибегают в ситуации крайней вражды, которая идет не на жизнь, а на смерть. Несостоявшийся лауреат Нобелевской премии, американский писатель Филип Рот в своем нашумевшем романе «Людское клеймо» ярко описал, как в результате ложно интерпретированного конфликта профессора Коулмена с двумя чернокожими студентками академическое сообщество отторгает его, а «культура отмены» ломает его карьеру и семейное благополучие, а затем и вовсе лишает жизни [7].

Современный американский кампус во многом превратился в площадку для широкой реализации принципов исторического ревизионизма и культурного релятивизма посредством акций студенческих организаций (активизм).

Повестка студенческих протестов в американских кампусах в 2000-х гг. сводилась к следующему:

– Ревизия учебных программ по историческим наукам и общественным дисциплинам в университетах, идеологическое «свержение кумиров» (отцы-основатели США, критика характера и итогов Войны за независимость и Гражданской войны в США 1861–1865, которые якобы ничего не дали афроамериканцам и другим национальным меньшинствам).

– Ревизия программ культурных исследований («Cultural Studies»), социологии в пользу национальных меньшинств, гендера, представителей гендерных движений.

– Организация компаний в поддержку Палестины и против политики Израиля, особенно после трагических событий в Секторе Газа в 2023 году.

– Наиболее заметные проявления «культурных войн» наблюдались в последнее время в университетах Нью Йорка (Колумбийский университет), а также в общественных университетах Калифорнии, Огайо, Флориды, Миннесоты, Джорджии и ряда других штатов. Выступления студентов зачастую носили леворадикальный характер и соответствовали идеологическим и социокультурным принципам Демократической партии. Студенты составляли солидную долю среди избирателей Б. Клинтона, Б. Обамы и Дж. Байдена.

С приходом в Белый дом в 2016 г. республиканца Д. Трампа содержание «культурных войн» в американских кампусах приобрело новые очертания, о которых речь пойдет ниже.

Методы и материалы. Статья построена на системно-структурном подходе, позволяющем комплексно рассмотреть широкий круг вопросов, связанных с историей и динамикой развития социокультурных конфликтов в Западном обществе. Наиболее продуктивными представляются историко-сравнительный метод, контент-анализ и социальный конструктивизм.

Основными источниками являются документальные **электронные материалы** университетских архивов США и Канады. Научные монографии и статьи историков, политологов и культурологов СССР / России, США, Канады и Великобритании, а также материалы периодической печати.

Анализ

Канадский вариант глобалистских дискурсов и казус Э. Райерсона

В Канаде на фоне многолетних дискуссий о национальной идентичности и мультикультурализме университетская политика строилась на основе теории «культурного разнообразия» («Cultural Diversity»). По своему характеру и исторической традиции канадские университеты в большинстве своем являются региональными, и сосредоточены на выполнении насущных образовательных и социальных запросов своих провинций. При этом в стране успешно функционируют и университеты мирового уровня, известные высоким качеством образования – Университет Торонто, МакГилл (его часто именуют «канадским Гарвардом»), университет Британской Колумбии. Глобалистские и неолиберальные процессы проникли и в их стены. В канадской научной литературе, как и литературе Соединенных Штатов, активно обсуждаются проблемы, связанные с кризисом канадской модели мультикультурализма на примере процессов, происходивших в университетах. Во многом эти дискуссии были вызваны публикацией в 1996 г. интересной и богатой по содержанию книги профессора Монреальского университета Билла Ридингса «Университет в руинах» [19]. Трагически погибший за два года до выхода своей книги канадский историк, подобно А. Блуму, констатировал упадок классического образования (идеалом для Ридингса представляются немецкие университеты XIX в.), подчеркивает деструктивную роль постмодернистских практик в образовании и опасность коммерциализации университетской деятельности.

– В главе о «культурных войнах» в канадских и американских кампусах Ридингс первопричиной называет культуру отмены здравого смысла и исторический ревизионизм [19, р. 93–105].

– В канадской историографии можно отметить несколько примечательных исследований о различных аспектах культурного противостояния в университетах страны. В первую очередь следует назвать книгу трех канадских историков, в которой дается содержательный анализ канадской системы высшего образования

под влиянием глобалистских и неолиберальных тенденций [10]. Причины кризиса и вызовы, с которыми встретился канадский университет в конце XX в., раскрывает профессор университета Торонто Х.Т. Вилсон [30].

Тема культурных конфликтов в канадских кампусах подробно рассматривается в содержательных работах П. Эмберлейна, Г. Гуда и других авторов [13; 15].

Тема расизма и межкультурных конфликтов, связанных с коренным населением Канады, детально раскрыта в коллективной монографии под редакцией Ф. Генри и К. Тэйтор, а также в работе профессора университета Дальхауз А. Стюарта [17; 25].

Проблемы современных канадских университетов, по мнению многих экспертов, можно суммировать следующим образом:

- недостаток государственного финансирования;
- неопределенные перспективы трудоустройства выпускников после окончания университета;
- заметное снижение уровня квалификации студентов;
- усиление конфликтного поля в кампусах на фоне распространения радикальных и ревизионистских идей;
- недостаточное внимание администрации университетов к новым технологиям и экономике образования;
- неопределенные перспективы развития высшего образования (фактор цифровизации и внедрения искусственного интеллекта) и изменения роли университетов и будущем;
- коммерциализация и «американизация» канадских университетов и усиления влияния идеологических концепций неолиберального толка.

Заметим, что за исключением четырех религиозных колледжей все канадские университеты являются общественными, находятся в ведении провинций и контролируются государством. Тем не менее «казус Райерсона» продемонстрировал, что «культура отмены» как составная часть «культурных войн» набирает силу в современном канадском обществе.

Даже учитывая региональную специфику, следует отметить, что в условиях открытого информационного пространства коммуникативных связей с США канадское студен-

чество в значительной его части находится под несомненным влиянием леворадикальных идей и эмансипационных концепций, пришедших из американских кампусов.

Эгертон Райерсон (1803–1882) – выдающийся канадский просветитель, педагог, основатель системы школьного и высшего образования в Верхней Канаде (Онтарио) [26]. Райерсон активно участвовал в создании Колледжа Верхней Канады в 1844 г. (впоследствии колледж стал составной частью Университета Торонто).

В своих усилиях по реформе всей системы образования в Онтарио Райерсон широко использовал опыт Ирландии, Пруссии, Франции, США. Он также приложил руку к созданию сети школьных библиотек и публикации специального журнала по вопросам образования. Э. Райерсон – обладатель степени почетного доктора Уэслианского университета (Коннектикут, США).

В ходе кампании исторического ревизионизма, захлестнувшего Канаду в последние несколько лет, Райерсон стал жертвой чудовищной обструкции. Против него были выдвинуты несправедливые и надуманные обвинения в расизме, сексизме и даже в причастности к смерти учеников католических школ для аборигенов, хотя обнаруженные в наши дни погребения появились годы спустя после смерти самого Райерсона.

Кампания по дискредитации выдающегося гуманиста, чей авторитет был непрерываем на протяжении полутора столетий канадской истории, вылилась в уничтожение (при активном участии студентов) памятника Райерсону и переименование названного в его честь университета в Торонто. Канадские журналы боятся публиковать статьи в защиту Райерсона и здравого смысла вполне в духе «культуры отмены». Ситуация вокруг Райерсона – один из наиболее ярких, но не единственный пример «культурной войны» в современной Канаде.

«Культурная война» Д. Трампа

У 45-го и 47-го президента США Дональда Трампа довольно своеобразное отношение к университетскому образованию. В отличие от своих ближайших предшественников, окон-

чивших элитные гуманитарные школы, Трамп получил степень бакалавра во второразрядном Фордхэмском университете в Нью-Йорке, где его любимым предметом была логика. Но, по собственному признанию будущего президента, он часто пропускал занятия и не участвовал в студенческих протестах, поскольку был увлечен бизнесом. Большого интереса к гуманитарному образованию он не испытывал. Позднее Трамп все же поступил в престижную бизнес-школу Уортон в Университете Пенсильвании (Penn) в Филадельфии. Так что отношение к образованию у него сложилось сугубо прагматичное, иными словами, чисто девелоперское [5].

В марте 2025 г. Д. Трамп объявил американское образование худшим в мире, не уточняя какое – школьное или высшее.

Действия администрации Трампа по отношению к высшему образованию, подчас непредсказуемые, тем не менее во время первого президентства позволили определить его основные задачи и намерения. Они заключались в следующем:

- разрушение фундаментальных основ неолиберальной политики внутри Соединенных Штатов и за их пределами, в том числе и в области высшего образования;
- борьба против идеологического влияния Демократической партии в университетах;
- борьба против «глубинного государства» в государственном аппарате и его влияния на внутреннюю и внешнюю политику страны;
- возвращение консервативных ценностей в социальную и духовную жизнь страны;
- сокращение финансовых расходов на «чрезмерные» социальные затраты Демократической партии, включая финансирование общественных университетов;
- пресечение нелегальной эмиграции и леворадикальных политических и социальных движений, в первую очередь в университетских кампусах.

Эта стратегия получила конкретные очертания и развитие после выборов 2024 года. Примером может служить появление Центра Чейза в Университете Огайо (Ohio State). Подтверждению одного из сенаторов штата Огайо, «создание Центра стало необходимым потому, что идеология подменила реальное изучение истории, и студенты в результате игно-

рируют традиционные принципы и идеалы американской истории. В результате левацкая идеология получила монопольное влияние в кампусах и вытесняет идеи интеллектуально-го разнообразия...» [20; 22].

Аналогичные Центры были созданы, в частности, в университетах Толидо, в университете Майами (Огайо), в университете Кливленда и университете Райта.

Таким образом, создавая подобного рода институции в ведущих общественных и частных университетах, администрация Трампа стремится ослабить влияние Демократической партии и леворадикальных кругов на основную массу студентов и усилить влияние республиканцев [12].

Речь идет о переформатировании преподавательского корпуса ввиду его явной нелояльности к политике администрации Трампа и лично к президенту. По данным известного американского культуролога Д. Горовитца, в начале 2000-х гг. традиционно большая часть профессуры (до 70 %) занимают леволиберальные позиции и голосуют за демократов [12]. Поэтому Трамп стремится максимально усилить давление на представителей поколения 1960-х (Baby-boom generation), отдавая предпочтение элитным частным университетам и бизнес-школам. Впрочем, бывают и исключения из этого правила. Нападки Трампа на Гарвард, который он обвинил в утрате американских ценностей и в засилье неолиберализма, еще больше усугубили культурный конфликт между президентом США и значительной частью академического сообщества.

Инициатива по созданию Центров Чейза предусматривает набор лояльных преподавателей с повышенной зарплатой, перераспределение учебной нагрузки в их пользу, отстранение неудобных и инакомыслящих профессоров, то есть пересмотр фундаментальных принципов академической свободы, укоренившихся в американских колледжах и университетах с середины 60-х гг. прошлого столетия.

По сути дела, «культурная война» Трампа – это зеркальный ответ на «культуру отмены» неолибералов и левых ревизионистов с плохо предсказуемыми последствиями [28].

Демократы не остаются в долгу и яростно критикуют политику Трампа в отношении

образования, не стесняясь в выражениях и именуя президента «фашистом, сексистом и психопатом». Трамп отвечает своим оппонентам, обвиняя их в приверженности к коммунизму, склонности к политическому экстремизму и аморализму.

Показательной иллюстрацией этой полемики может служить и публикация в сентябре 2025 г. книги одного из руководителей Союза преподавателей США Рэнди Вайнгартен «Почему фашисты боятся учителей?». Книга, в которой жестко и с либеральных позиций критикуются попытки республиканцев обрушить демократические ценности в американском образовании, прежде всего «свободу слова», вызвала оживленные отклики и стала бестселлером [29].

Дискуссия о «культурных войнах» продолжает идти по кругу, обозначенному А. Блумом и его многочисленными последователями, как в США, так и Канаде. В недавно опубликованной монографии Д. Флеминга «Академия во тьме» утверждается, что американские университеты в результате «культурных войн» на протяжении полувека находятся в перманентном социокультурном кризисе и содержится призыв охладить идеологические предпочтения и обратиться к здравому смыслу и взвешенному подходу в оценке будущего образования, в особенности гуманитарного, в условиях новых глобальных и национальных вызовов [14].

Знаковым событием, отражающим всю глубину социокультурного кризиса внутри академического сообщества и в стране в целом, стало убийство в кампусе университета штата Юта Чарли Кирка в сентябре 2025 года. 34-летний Кирк, которого считали надеждой Республиканской партии и одним из преемников Трампа, был горячим сторонником университетских реформ в духе трампизма и укрепления позиций республиканцев во всем образовательном пространстве.

Убийство Кирка, совершенное сторонником леворадикальных идей и одновременно поклонником Трампа, убедительно свидетельствует о глубине и противоречивости «культурной войны» Д. Трампа, в которой на первый план выходят политическая мотивация и идеологическая ангажированность обеих противостоявших сторон. Таковы горькие плоды культурного релятивизма и исторического ре-

визионизма, превратившие университетские кампусы США и Канады из «башен из слоновой кости» и хранилищ высокого знания и академической свободы в очаги интеллектуального разброда и идеологических шатаний.

Результаты

– В последние десятилетия университеты США и Канады продолжают развиваться в соответствии с глобальными трендами в условиях наметившегося кризиса идеологии, политической и экономической практики глобализма и неолиберализма.

– Академическая атмосфера в университетах США и Канады меняется по мере того, как университеты становятся менее идеалистическими и более прагматическими, по мере усиления коммерциализации и укрепления связей с промышленными и финансовыми корпорациями.

– Очевидна тенденция ослабления позиций гуманитарных наук наряду с усилением спроса на междисциплинарные методы обучения и преподавания. Теоретические дискус-

сии и практики «культурных войн» в кампусах свидетельствуют о появлении новых вызовов для основ академической свободы и вариативности моделей образования, особенно в ведущих университетах.

– В целом можно говорить и об усилении «американизации» канадских университетов, и углублении взаимосвязи с академической средой США.

– Последние события в университетах США и Канады убедительно демонстрируют проникновение деконструктивных концептов, отражающих изменения в восприятии исторических событий в духе эмансипационных теорий и «новой этики».

– «Культурные войны» наряду с экономическими, социальными и политическими факторами в немалой степени способствовали падению престижа высшего образования и значительному снижению численности студентов в университетах США и Канады в последние годы. Вопрос о сохранении духовных и интеллектуальных ценностей классического университетского образования приобрел вновь актуальность и достиг критического рубежа.

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HOMO AMERICANUS VS HOMO SOVETICUS: CONTEMPORARY RUSSIANS' AND AMERICANS' SOCIAL VIEWS ON THE COLD WAR IDEOLOGICAL CLICHÉS

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Abstract. *Introduction.* For the first time, the article examines the contemporary Russians' and Americans' social views on how the Soviet and US Cold War mass culture represented “us” and “them”. *Materials and methods.* The article is based on an analysis of data from an in-depth interview conducted in the USA and Russia ($n = 27$, autumn 2023 – spring 2024). To verify the results obtained, projective techniques were employed. *Results.* The interviewees from both countries demonstrated familiarity with the content of the Cold War ideological clichés; an understanding of the techniques by which these clichés are created; and awareness of the manipulative nature of their use. They identified the features through which mass culture juxtaposed Soviet and American ways of life, as well as the character traits and appearances attributed to *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus*. In general, Russian informants were slightly more knowledgeable about representations of the USSR in US mass culture than American counterparts were about representations of the USA in Soviet culture. The authors conclude that views on the ways of representing “us” and “them” in the Soviet and US Cold War mass culture are stereotypical, being simplified, shared, emotionally coloured and stable, and can be designated as “imagological stereotypes”. These stereotypes serve as a factor that influences Russians and Americans' mutual perceptions and indirectly affects contemporary international relations. *Funding.* The study was funded by RSF, Grant № 22-18-00305-P, “The images of the enemy in Cold War popular culture: their content, contemporary reception and usage in Russian and U.S. symbolic politics.”

Key words: Cold War, Russian-American relations, national stereotypes, Soviet cinema, US cinema, imagology.

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**НОМО AMERICANUS VS НОМО SOVETICUS:
ИДЕОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ КЛИШЕ ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ
В СОЦИАЛЬНЫХ ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЯХ РОССИЯН И АМЕРИКАНЦЕВ**

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Аннотация. *Введение.* В статье впервые исследуются представления современных россиян и американцев о том, как массовая культура СССР и США периода холодной войны репрезентировала «своих» и «чужих». *Материалы и метод.* Статья основана на анализе данных глубинного интервью, которое проводилось в США и России ($n = 27$, осень 2023 г. – весна 2024 г.). Для проверки полученных результатов применялись проективные методики. *Результаты.* Информанты из обеих стран продемонстрировали знание содержания идеологических клише холодной войны, понимание приемов, при помощи которых они создаются, осознание манипулятивного характера их использования. Они отметили характеристики, при помощи которых массовая культура создавала противопоставление двух образов жизни, советского и американского, а также черт характера и внешнего облика *Homo Americanus* и *Homo Sovieticus*. В целом российские информанты несколько лучше знают о репрезентациях СССР в массовой культуре США, чем американские – о репрезентациях США в советской культуре. Авторы делают вывод, что представления о приемах изображения «своих» и «чужих» в массовой культуре СССР и США носят стереотипный характер, будучи упрощенными, разделяемыми, эмоционально окрашенными и устойчивыми, и могут быть обозначены как «имагологические стереотипы». Эти стереотипы выступают фактором, который оказывает влияние на социальные представления россиян и американцев друг о друге и косвенно – на современные международные отношения. *Финансирование.* Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 22-18-00305-П «Образы врага в массовой культуре Холодной войны: содержание, современная рецепция и использование в символической политике России и США».

Ключевые слова: холодная война, российско-американские отношения, национальные стереотипы, кинематограф СССР, кинематограф США, имагология.

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Introduction. *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus* are terms that became popular in Cold War-era Western Europe [5; 7; 15]. They were designed to highlight both the differences between the two superpowers and European civilisation, as well as their certain similarities, though these comparisons tended to be negative. During the Cold War, in the mass culture of the USSR, the USA and other countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain, a huge number of images of

the Soviet man and the American man emerged as typical representatives of two social systems, giving rise to certain ideological clichés. *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus* represent kinds of imaginary Cold War American and Soviet archetypes in mass culture. These ideological clichés occupy a prominent place in social and cultural memory and thus obviously have an impact on contemporary international relations, which explains the great interest of modern

scholars in studying their content and their use in the symbolic politics of the Cold War, drawing on material from various forms of popular culture [1; 2; 4; 6; 9–13; 16; 18].

Our research focuses on a different issue – the extent to which contemporary Russians and Americans are familiar with the content of these ideological clichés, *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus*; how aware they are of the propaganda functions of these images; how aware they are of their manipulative nature; and how they understand the techniques used to create them. The main research questions of the study can be outlined as follows. What are the views of Russians and Americans on how the Soviet and American lifestyles are portrayed in the mass cultures of the two countries? How do they see the appearance and character traits of *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus*? What do they believe are the techniques used to construct these images? What are the similarities and differences between Russian and American perspectives? To what extent do these perceptions depend on the age and political preferences of the respondents? Finally, to what extent can these perceptions be described as stereotypes – i.e., simplified, shared, stable, and emotionally coloured? These issues are highly relevant as they allow us to assess the influence of the legacy of Cold War mass culture on contemporary public opinion.

The purpose of this article is to explore the perspectives of modern Russians and Americans on how the mass culture of the USSR and the USA during the Cold War portrayed “enemy number one” – *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus*, respectively.

An in-depth interview method was used, with interviews conducted online in the USA and in person in Russia between autumn 2023 and spring 2024 ($n = 27$). Two age groups were identified: one comprising individuals over 55 years old (who had their own memories of the confrontation between the superpowers) and another comprising young people under 35 whose knowledge of the period came solely from educational and academic literature or popular culture.

The second selection factor was the political preferences of the informants, as these were likely to influence their interpretation of past political events

and thus their attitudes towards “us” and “them”. The political preferences of the respondents were determined based on their self-identification and issue-based questions. We identified respondents in the USA as rather supportive of the Republicans and Democrats and respondents in Russia as rather “loyalists” and “liberals”. At the same time, we indicated the respondents’ self-identification in terms of their own political identity (LDPR, Yabloko, etc.).

The sample was formed in accordance with the standard procedure. When conducting in-depth interviews, it is sufficient to interview 20 people if the respondents’ opinions are homogeneous. The survey might be stopped once the same answer to a question is received regularly.

Projective techniques were used to verify the data obtained. We employed images from films released in the USSR and the USA (due to the exceptional role of cinema in the “struggle for hearts and minds”), asking to identify whether the characters depicted were Soviet or American. The films were presumably unfamiliar to them and contained no obvious signs of national identity, such as the hammer and sickle or the Stars and Stripes. In addition to frames from six Soviet and six American films containing images typical of visual representations of American and Soviet people in the popular culture of both countries, the informants were also shown one frame each from films that were atypical. The hypothesis was that if the representations are stereotypical, i.e., simplified and stable, they will produce an effect that prevents accurate evaluation of the atypical visual image.

The structure of the article is as follows. In the first part, we briefly outline the Russian and American informants’ views on the Cold War, its nature, its symbols, the role of propaganda in constructing the image of “enemy number one”, and the emotions that inhabitants of the USSR and the USA evoked in each other. The second part analyses the informants’ perceptions of the two lifestyles, Soviet and American, including elements such as interpersonal relations, family relations, the value placed on money, attitudes towards work, etc. The third part is devoted to the analysis of the data obtained through the use of projective techniques applied to visual representations of *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus*.

A brief overview of the Cold War: key events, symbols, and emotions. The logic of the study suggested that the first task was to identify the level of knowledge modern Russians and Americans possess about the specifics of the Cold War and their assessment of the Soviet-American confrontation. It is worth noting that all of our interviewees expressed confidence in discussing the specifics of the Cold War, offering explanations for its name (such as “there was no open armed conflict” or “it was mainly an ideological confrontation”) and identifying the aims of both sides in this war (for instance, “fighting for spheres of influence” or “protecting allies”). Russian and American respondents demonstrated the same level of knowledge about that time; the Cold War associative series, referring to the events, figures, and images from the period (such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Iron Curtain, and the space race), was also similar. Differences in responses depended more on the age of the respondents: younger participants relied on historical knowledge, while older individuals drew on personal memories. Political beliefs also played an important role: Russians with a positive view of the Soviet period depicted the USSR’s goals in the Cold War as more peaceful and altruistic than those of the USA. Conversely, American participants who were critical of their own government were convinced that the primary goal of the country was world domination, while the USSR aimed to ease international tensions.

In assessing the specifics of the representations of “us” and “them” in the mass culture of the two countries, most of our respondents noted that these images were largely mirrored, and the images of the enemy were predominantly negative. However, both Russian and American informants noted the ambivalent nature of the propaganda: it contained not only negative but also positive portrayals of the lifestyle on the other side of the Iron Curtain. According to the Russian respondents’ views, the mass culture of the USSR acknowledged the success of the United States in achieving a high standard of living, economic development and scientific progress and called for helping ordinary Americans. Conversely, American informants noted that the US mass culture did not ignore Soviet achievements in the social sphere – such as free education, healthcare, and housing – as

well as successes in culture, science, and technology.

Finally, in the context of this article, the respondents’ views on the feelings of the inhabitants of the USSR and the USA are of particular interest. American informants, more than their Russian counterparts, emphasised that mass culture was focused on generating fear as a key emotional component of the Cold War (“I think that you guys were very afraid that we would attack. I think Americans had that same fear” – Alice, 58, dem.). Russians believed that attitudes towards the United States in the USSR were more nuanced: older informants recalled experiencing a mixture of fear, admiration, pity, and envy towards America (only an overwhelming minority mentioned hatred). Some noted that they had negative feelings about the US political system and political elites but not about ordinary Americans (“I clearly understood who was who. Ordinary people – they live their lives, enjoy their lives... For example, I was happy for them that they live better than we do... Another thing is that their state, the elite, tried to interfere in the lives of others!” – Arsen, 55, “loyalist”).

Two ways of life in Soviet and US mass culture. Let us examine the perspectives of contemporary Russians and Americans on how the inhabitants of the USSR and the USA – and the two ways of life they represent – are portrayed in the mass culture of the two countries.

The “Empire of Justice” and the “Empire of Freedom” – these are how the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, position themselves, according to O.A. Westad [17]. In turn, “enemy number one” in this worldview embodied anti-values. In the Soviet mass culture, America was portrayed as a land of injustice, class inequality, racism, exploitation of colonial peoples, materialism taking precedence over spirituality, the cult of money, and cultural degradation. In the US mass culture, the USSR was portrayed as a society characterised by the omnipotence of the state and the disenfranchisement of the individual, total behavioural control, an inefficient economy due to the suppression of free enterprise, and a culture profoundly alien to America in terms of civilisation.

The interviews reveal that contemporary Russians and Americans are well aware of these ideological clichés. Russian informants tended to

contrast selflessness with greed, collectivism with individualism, kindness with cruelty, responsiveness with indifference, and adherence to social norms with disregard for them as typical markers of “Sovietness” and “Americanness” in USSR mass culture. They believe that Americans were portrayed as arrogant, selfish, calculating, concerned only with their own affairs, indifferent to other people’s problems, dishonest, vulgar, and arrogant. The following is a fairly typical opinion regarding the Soviet representations of ‘their mores’.

“[In the USSR] it was shown that... if we have one person as a friend for another, then there [in the USA] everyone is on their own; everyone is ready to step over you. No one there will help you in a difficult situation; on the contrary, they will do everything to rob you as much as possible and get what they can from you – that is the profit” (Anton, 22, “loyalist”, LDPR).

The overwhelming majority of the respondents highlighted racism as a key aspect of representations of the American way of life, contrasting this with the Soviet emphasis on internationalism and friendship among peoples.

For American informants, the main feature of the portrayal of the Soviet way of life in the US mass culture was the absence of freedom. Political freedom was emphasised above all; the absolute disenfranchisement of citizens under a repressive regime was a key focus. Popular themes included “lack of food”, “lack of property”, and “denunciation of neighbours leading to imprisonment”.

“The average Russian, I think, was portrayed as a kind of serf to the state or just as an oppressed individual living a not very decent lifestyle, at least compared to a Westerner” (Tony, 70, dem.).

An important feature of Sovietism for our American interviewees was atheism, which distinguished the USSR from the USA, where, as one informant pointed out, morality could not be separated from religion. Unsurprisingly, Soviet characters in US mass culture were often depicted as immoral, portrayed as murderers, liars, untrustworthy figures, and so on.

Other values that played an important role in the “cultural Cold War” are also associated with key ideologies. Labour, one of the most important values promoted by Soviet ideology, for Russian

informants proved significant in distinguishing between “us” and “them”, as they noted that mass culture in the USSR contrasted the Soviet love of work, instilled from childhood, with the American passion for work aimed at rapid enrichment.

“The Soviets work for themselves... That is why we had happy work, but there [in the USA], work was portrayed as the exploitation of man by man” (Irina, 59, “lib”, Yabloko).

At the same time, the Russians’ responses emphasised the different social value attached to work in the two countries, which they felt was reflected, for example, in Hollywood’s lack of interest in the lives of ordinary workers, labourers and peasants (“There are more superheroes... machos... cops... they weren’t hard workers” – Svetlana, 58, “loyalist”). Interestingly, the image of the steelworker Sasha Savchenko in a still from the film *Spring on Zarechnaya Street* (1956, M. Khutsiev and F. Mironer), shown to the Russian respondents during the use of projective techniques, elicited positive emotions (“one of ours!”, “a working man!”). In contrast, the American informants commented: “He looks like a poor American... a working American” (Kate, 71, dem.). According to the American interviewees, there were generally no differences in the portrayal of residents’ attitudes towards work in the two countries.

Attitudes towards money and personal enrichment represent another important difference between the two systems in the “struggle for hearts and minds”. As Nikita Khrushchev stated in his report to the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1959): “The spirit of individualism, personal greed, thirst for profit, hostility and competition – this is the essence of the morality of bourgeois society” (cit. in: [10, p. 49]). These Soviet representations of “their mores” were reflected in the responses of the Russian participants. Americans were portrayed as prioritising “money first and people second” (Arsen, 55, “loyalist”). The American informants showed awareness of this portrayal, with one commenting, “Soviet propaganda portrayed us [Americans] as greedy” (Joseph, 74, rep.).

As for the representations of the level of well-being in the mass culture and propaganda of the two countries, almost all the American interviewees noted that the narrative of terrible living conditions in the Soviet Union was discussed

in the United States – “The idea of sharing a kitchen with another family is so horrifying.” The notion of the absence of private property in the USSR was also prevalent (“You don’t own things; you only receive what the state decides to give you, whether it be clothing or food or housing too, and nothing could be worse than not having private property” – John, 28, dem.).

According to the Russian respondents, the high standard of living in the USA was acknowledged in the USSR, but strong property stratification in American society was emphasised as one of the clear manifestations of its injustice. One interviewee recalled that America was portrayed as a country of contrasts: “And the slums were shown... the poor were black and the rich were white... that is, ‘two worlds, two childhoods’, as we used to say: rich and poor. It is only the rich who have wonderful and good things there, but the poor who have terrible things; unemployed people who don’t know how to live...” (Svetlana, 58, “loyalist”).

An important issue in the “struggle for hearts and minds” was the question of the cultural level of the populations of the two countries, seen as an indicator of which social system – socialist or capitalist – provided the best conditions for the development of human potential. The image of a vulgar and poorly educated “Yankee” with no reverence for high culture was not uncommon in Soviet mass culture. The supposed primitivism of American popular culture and its emphasis on maximum simplification was meant to suggest that bourgeois society was not genuinely interested in human development.

One of the most important components of the images of “us” and “them” are representations of gender relations, canons of masculinity and femininity, and issues of love, marriage, and family [10]. Soviet propaganda portrayed gender inequality in the exploitative system as one of the manifestations of its injustice, while framing the resolution of the women’s question in the USSR as one of the main achievements of socialist society. Conversely, U.S. propaganda, interpreted gender relations in the USSR as a reflection of the perversion of human nature inherent in communism as an ideology.

According to the American interviewees, mass culture in the USA portrayed love in the USSR as deviant: “The Soviet people were

portrayed as if they had never loved anyone,” and the relationship of the Soviet people was seen as “only a relationship of patriotism” (Joseph, 74, rep.). According to the Russian informants, the Soviet depiction of male-female relations in the USA was intended to highlight the vices of American society – the cult of money and the commercial nature of interpersonal relations: “Everything is for sale, and everything is bought”; “Love is only for money”; “There is nothing sacred; there is no concept of family.” Relationships between Soviet men and women, on the other hand, were presented as ideal because they were based on true love: “The Americans represented free morals, and in the Soviet Union – sincerity, love, family!..” (Arsen, 55, “loyalist”).

Finally, representations of childhood. In the USSR, images of a happy childhood symbolised the achievements of socialism. Meanwhile, portrayals of childhood in the United States sought to highlight the vices attributed to the American way of life: exploitation, social inequality, pauperism, racial discrimination, militarism, the cult of violence, selfishness, hostility between people, and spiritual poverty. In mass culture, the world of children merged with the world of adults; an American child was seen as being accustomed from an early age to the fierce competition in the world of consumerism and the cult of money, fostering selfishness and egoism [8; 10]. In the U.S. mass culture, the lack of individual freedom and the presence of state control were defining features of the image of Soviet childhood, where total propaganda was seen as turning children into little robots [8, p. 51-60].

During the interview, it became clear that our interviewees’ assessments of the representation of childhood largely coincided with the researchers’ conclusions. According to the American informants, Soviet childhood in U.S. mass culture was portrayed as entirely regulated, with children depicted as overly obedient and indoctrinated. From the perspective of the Russian informants, one young participant characterised the portrayal of childhood as follows:

“[Soviet] children, who had camps, clubs, a slide in winter, skating, skiing, hiking in the mountains, and trips to the sea, were happy. They had activities, something to help them grow.

The child was presented as a person. The US was seen as a place where kids are encouraged to consume a lot but aren't given much education" (Vladimir, 20, "loyalist", KPRF).

Thus, the interview results demonstrate that contemporary Russians and Americans are well aware of the system of meanings attributed to "us" and "them" in the "struggle for hearts and minds" by both propaganda and popular culture in each country.

Visual clichés in representations of "us" and "them". In the Cold War mass culture, images of "us" and "them" functioned not only in an abstract sense but also in personalised forms; visual images of *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus* were particularly important. To explore informants' views on the visual stereotypes of mass culture, we used projective techniques with film images. The research findings allow us to conclude that the appearance of the characters in the films was generally decoded by the respondents as either Soviet or American without much difficulty. The decoding was based on the informants' perceptions of how these markers of "us" and "them" were (or could be) used as pictorial elements of the cultural Cold War. These perceptions reflect informants' understanding of how the mass culture of the two countries depicted the very essence of the differences between the two ways of life.

The still from *Ninotchka* depicts girls participating in a parade (Fig. 1). The main

character, played by Greta Garbo, was identified as a Soviet girl, primarily because all the participants in the parade wear the same clothes and have the same facial expressions. For the American informants, the "militarisation of the image" also contributed to this impression.

"A Soviet [girl], I think so mainly because of the identical dress and the identical presentation of the people in the image" (John, 28, dem.).

All groups of informants agreed that the Soviet Union was portrayed in the United States as a society where diversity was unwelcome and where individual freedom, such as the right to individuality, did not exist.

The depiction of the emotional world of film characters is also connected to the issue of suppressing personality and individuality. Our respondents repeatedly raised the portrayal of Soviet people as robots incapable of feeling ("Soviet people always acted like robotic types" – Joseph, 74, rep.). During the Cold War, the representation of "enemies" as mechanical figures was a common dehumanisation technique [11]. This is why the character of Ivan Drago, the Soviet boxer in the American film *Rocky IV* (1985, Sylvester Stallone), was described by both groups of informants as a machine created in a laboratory:

"He looks like he was designed in a lab. So I think that's what signifies the Soviet portrayals – this idea of machine-like, robotic-like things like that" (Sean, 39, non-partisan).



Fig. 1. A still from the film *Ninotchka* (1939, E. Lubitsch)

Note. The film *Ninotchka* was released in 1939 but was very actively used in anti-Soviet propaganda during the Cold War [14].

“Something made of stone. [He is] senseless, absolutely senseless, absolutely machine-like” (Olga, 59, “loyalist”).

One of the techniques used to characterise the emotional world of film characters is the use of facial expressions – particularly smiles. Joanne Sharp highlighted that the smile acted as a symbolic border guard, allowing the representatives of the free world to be distinguished from the robotic inhabitants of the “Evil Empire” [12, pp. 117-119; 10]. For our interviewees, the absence of a smile, coupled with the severity and unfriendliness of a Hollywood film character, was also a reason for identifying film characters as *Homo Sovieticus*, for example:

“Unpleasant, frowning for some reason... I think that’s how the Americans imagined us. A frown... a scary mouth, without a smile” (Svetlana, 58, “loyalist”).

“[Soviet people] are stoic; they don’t smile” (Sean, 39, non-partisan).

Russian informants sometimes interpreted the absence of a broad smile in Soviet characters as a sign of modesty rather than grumpiness. For example, the image of the unsmiling Ninotchka at the parade, discussed above, was interpreted by one older informant as the image of a modest Soviet girl (Said, 54, non-partisan).

In turn, the way the Soviet mass culture portrayed the American smile was also perceived by the Russian informants in the context of the Cold War. According to their assessment, the emphasis on the smile was a common way of portraying Americans. Determining the characteristics of smiles in the film frames often became the key feature for identifying the characters’ nationality: “Such an American image, a 33-tooth smile... it’s very wide”, “in all teeth, but at the same time unnatural”, “not only broad, but smug as well”, “the smile is so hypocritical, so ostentatious”, “typical American”, “Hollywood”.

Another visual marker that helps distinguish “us” from “them” is physical characteristics. Researchers have long pointed out that representations of physicality are connected to ideology, symbolic boundaries, and the establishment and maintenance of power and subordination. For example, Susan Bordo demonstrated that an overweight body is often labelled as uncultured, and its owner is deprived

of the most important value of modern culture – the ability to be self-disciplined [3]. When describing Hollywood’s use of physicality to create images of *Homo Sovieticus*, the Russian informants noted that Americans often portrayed military figures and officials as overweight, with a massive figure and “pot-bellied” appearances (e.g., “frowning, plump”).

Significantly, some of the Russian respondents identified the main character of *Ninotchka* as an American, arguing that she was too “elegant” to represent a Soviet woman. Recalling the images of Americans in cartoons (a “bourgeois” figure with a big belly, wearing a tailcoat and a top hat, contrasted with “our own” in the form of a healthy, fit, handsome man), many Russian informants stressed that Soviet film culture also offered another portrayal of Americans: sporty and stylish. However, they also made a reservation: the beauty of Americans was purely external, as it was accompanied by an unattractive moral appearance. One respondent commented:

“Smooth. Well-dressed... pleasant on the outside, but rotten on the inside... not like Soviet heroes. They were portrayed as duplicitous, their behaviour arrogant... showing their superiority over other people. A two-faced smile... ostentatious!” (Svetlana, 58, “loyalist”).

The U.S. respondents’ view of the Soviet hero’s appearance generally aligned with the Russian view described above. However, the most important insights relate to the key function of enemy image – the function of mobilisation, which suggests that this image should evoke a sense of grave danger and generate fear. When discussing the image of Ivan Drago, the American respondents did not doubt his nationality, citing features such as strength, muscular build, height, and ‘aesthetic perfection’. They explained that the enemy should appear as a very serious opponent.

“He’s bigger; he’s stronger. He looks like a bully, yes. And that’s how they would be depicted – as bullies. Bigger and stronger, and we have more ‘fight’, so we can beat them. That’s what they want you to think” (Joseph, 74, rep.).

The clothing worn by film characters could also serve as a symbolic border guard between the Soviet and American worlds. The American informants relied on ideological markers, noting elements of Soviet characters’ clothing, such as a pioneer’s tie or workwear, and associating them

with poverty, uniformity, and the militarisation of life in the USSR. The Russian respondents, on the other hand, identified American characters on screen by referring to their clothing style (“a free style of dress” and “more fashionable clothes”) and its high quality. Specific features of clothing or footwear were also seen as indicators of a character’s American identity – for example, a checked shirt, a double-breasted coat, cowboy boots, men’s shorts, or jeans.

Additionally, the respondents were also guided in distinguishing between Soviet and American film characters by their mannerisms. Americans were described as appearing freer, more relaxed, and more imposing (for example, the “feet on the table” pose was often interpreted this way). However, interpretations of such mannerisms varied. What the Russian respondents viewed as swagger was described by their foreign counterparts as ease and informality, qualities that they felt were inherently American.

As an example, we provide a discussion of the nationality of a character from a still from the children’s adventure film *Akvalangi na dne* (*Scuba Diving on the Seafloor* (1965, E. Sherstobitov)) – an American spy played by Gennadi Yukhtin (Fig. 2). None of the interviewees had seen the film. Therefore, the choice of signs to identify the nationality of the character is particularly significant.

The Russian respondents unanimously identified the character as an American, commenting on his “big smile”, “styling”,

“fashionable look”, and “relaxed look”. However, sunglasses were the most frequently cited marker of Americanness. Those American respondents who interpreted this film character as a Soviet man based their views on the conventions used in the mass culture of the USSR to create images of “us” and “them”: “He is happy, tan, and smiling. So if it’s Soviet media, then I’m assuming that they portray Soviet people as happy” (Sean, 39, non-partisan).

Thus, stereotypical representations helped the interviewees to identify the nationality of typical *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus* in the film images and interpret their characteristics in line with these representations. Next, the informants were shown one frame from a Soviet film and one from an American film that did not conform to the usual cognitive framework. In this context, we assumed that the respondents might encounter difficulty in identifying the nationality of the film characters.

One of these frames features the image of Alexei Kolchin, a Soviet sailor from the American film *The Russians Are Coming, The Russians Are Coming* (1966, N. Jewison), played by John Phillip Law. This film stands alone in the history of the cinematic Cold War [14; 10]. It became one of the most notable examples of the rehumanisation of “enemies”, achieved by endowing Soviet characters with traits such as politeness, friendliness, camaraderie, and a sense of humour. In the frame that the informants were asked to decode, the image of the hero is strikingly different from the images of *Homo Sovieticus* in U.S. cinema discussed above (Fig. 3).



Fig. 2. A still from the film *Scuba Diving on the Seafloor*, 1965

The reasoning of an elderly Russian woman illustrates how cognitive failure can occur. When trying to determine the nationality of the film character, the interviewee first noted the “simple face”, “kind face”, blue eyes, and blond hair, which she took as evidence that this was a Soviet character. However, upon learning that it was an American film, she changed her conclusion: “I think he’s American; he’s cute. They don’t make ours that sweet. With a good, open view” (Olga, 59, “loyalist”).

American informants – those who had not seen the film – used similar reasoning to convince themselves that the positive hero of the American film was most likely an American. This view was expressed by an informant even when no clear argument came to mind:

“I don’t know who it is, but it looks like an American. Why is that? I don’t know why. He just looks like an American. He’s neat” (Joseph, 74, rep.).

To analyse the atypical image of an American in Soviet cinema, one frame from the film *The Headless Horseman* (1973, Vladimir Vainshtok) was selected. It features the character of the mustanger Maurice Gerald, played by Oleg Vidov (Fig. 4). It is worth noting that the inclusion of not only negative but also positive American characters was almost mandatory in Soviet cinema throughout the Cold War. The image of the USA in the USSR mass culture was based on the idea of two Americas: a “reactionary” one, which included “exploiters”, and a “progressive” one, which included members of the Communist Party, the working class, peace activists, African Americans, and “ordinary people” [10]. Gerald belongs to the “progressive” part of American society (in particular, the film mentions that he fought against British oppressors for the freedom of Ireland).



Fig. 3. A still from the film *The Russians Are Coming, The Russians Are Coming*, 1966



Fig. 4. A still from the film *The Headless Horseman*, 1973

The vast majority of the Russian informants had not seen this film, so they relied on their own ideas of how “us” and “them” were typically portrayed. The identification of the film character as a positive figure led them to believe that it was a Soviet person. At the same time, “foreign clothes” and a “foreign hairstyle” raised some doubts but did not prove decisive. The Russian informants explained their choice in the following way: “Soviet. The look on his face is my guess. And his hair was somehow neatly done up” (Anastasiya, 20, “lib.”, Yabloko). Those respondents who identified the character as an American tried to find in his appearance those connotations that they believed to be negative in Soviet cinema: long hair, “sophistication”, [he is] “a bit feminine”, long eyelashes (“Russians can’t have eyelashes that long or hair like that...”).

As for the assessments of the American informants, many, like the Russians, were confused by the film character’s long hair. In addition, the character’s “not very happy look” served as an identifying marker – neither of which suggested that a Soviet man could be portrayed in a film made in the USSR. However, there were also those who identified the film character as “Russian”. What is interesting is that these respondents also expressed doubts and relied more on their intuition than on shared stereotypes of how Americans and Soviets were typically portrayed – stereotypes that had previously been easily and accurately applied. They looked for additional clues. For example, some found the film character’s expression looked “Russian”, though not all could explain why:

“The blonde hair. Just the look on him. Sometimes the look gives it away. I would think he’s a Russian... One of those piercing looks, like ‘Don’t cross me, or you’ll get yours’” (Joseph, 74, rep.).

Results. In summary, firstly, our respondents demonstrated confidence in identifying the techniques used to represent “us” and “them” in the mass culture of the two countries during the Cold War. They showed familiarity with the markers of difference used and an understanding of how certain characteristics contributed to the hierarchisation of characters, creating either positive or negative images, thereby revealing an awareness of the manipulative potential of these representational

techniques. In cases where the respondents lacked clear memories or precise knowledge, they resorted to a kind of deduction, inferring the most plausible characteristics based on their interpretation of the nature of the Soviet-American ideological confrontation.

Secondly, there were no noticeable differences in the understanding of the content and functions of using images of “us” and “them” based on the age and political preferences of the informants. In general, the Russian informants were slightly better at recognising the image of *Homo Sovieticus* in the U.S. mass culture than the American informants were at recognising the image of *Homo Americanus* in the Soviet culture.

Although the interview focused on the ideological clichés of the Cold War period and did not include the informants’ views on the extent to which these clichés corresponded to reality, the informants took the initiative to express their own position. In this case, the influence of political positions became quite noticeable. For example, Russian supporters of liberal ideology sometimes felt the need to comment on the hypocrisy of Soviet propaganda: “It’s a bit of a nightmare over there in the US, where... blacks are lynched and Indians generally get drunk, but here everyone’s equal” (Irina, 59, “lib.”, Yabloko).

It is worth noting that respondents’ ideas about the role of different specialisation markers varied due to their national and cultural backgrounds. Russian and American informants assessed the potential of these markers in contrasting “us” and “them” in different ways. For example, it did not occur to the U.S. respondents that images of smiles could carry negative connotations, whereas the Russian informants clearly understood this point. Another example is the aestheticisation and glorification of hard physical labour, as depicted in the still from *Spring on Zarechnaya Street* with the image of steelworker Sasha Savchenko, which was incomprehensible to the American respondents, who saw only harsh working conditions.

Thirdly, because the methods of representing “us” and “them” in the mass culture of the USSR and the USA proved to be separable, simplified, emotionally charged, and stable (as evidenced by their persistence over more than 30 years), they can be defined as stereotypical. A key indication of the influence of these ideas is that they created

obstacles for the interviewees in recognising and identifying atypical cases that did not fit into their usual cognitive frameworks. It can therefore be concluded that not only do national stereotypes (about the real inhabitants of one's own country and other countries) function in society, but also

shared, simplified, emotionally coloured, and stable ideas about how "us" and "them" are represented in culture – ideas that are "imagined". There are some that can be termed "imagological stereotypes". They include *Homo Americanus* and *Homo Sovieticus*, which are the focus of this article.

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SPORTS DISCOURSE IN (DE)CONSTRUCTING THE COLD WAR IMAGE OF THE ENEMY: COMPARING SOVIET AND AMERICAN MAGAZINES' REPRESENTATIONS OF OLYMPIC GAMES

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Abstract. *Introduction.* Using the example of representations of the Olympic Games, the article analyses the creation and deconstruction of the image of the enemy through Soviet and American sports discourse as a component of the Cold War. The relevance of the study lies in the need to explore both the technologies used to construct and deconstruct the image of the enemy in international politics and the historical dimension of Russia – USA relations. *Method and materials.* The materials consist of publications in the leading sports magazines of the USSR (Physical Culture and Sport) and the USA (Sports Illustrated) from 1948 to 1991 (approximately 200 issues in total). *Results.* Sports discourse was actively employed in the USSR and the USA, emphasising the values that each superpower claimed to defend. The qualities attributed to “us” and “them” reflected broader characteristics associated with the Soviet and American ways of life. Representations of the Games, which were presented primarily as a rivalry between the USSR and the USA, reflect these features of sports discourse. However, the Olympic ideals served as a constraint on the production of hostility. The American magazine exhibited greater variability in its portrayal of sporting rivalry between the USSR and the USA, whereas the Soviet magazine contrasted “overseas sports businessmen” with US athletes. Sports discourse thus functioned as a resource for constructing the Cold War images of the enemy. At the same time, it also contained the potential for deconstructing these images: sporting competitions were interpreted as a demonstration of the possibility of peaceful rivalry and cooperation between the USSR and the USA across various spheres. *Funding.* The study was funded by RSF, Grant No. 22-18-00305-P, “The images of the enemy in Cold War popular culture: their content, contemporary reception and usage in Russian and U.S. symbolic politics”.

Key words: Cold War, image of the enemy, sports discourse, Olympic Games, Physical Culture and Sport magazine, Sports Illustrated magazine.

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СПОРТИВНЫЙ ДИСКУРС В КОНСТРУИРОВАНИИ И ДЕКОНСТРУКЦИИ ОБРАЗОВ ВРАГА ПЕРИОДА ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ: СРАВНИВАЯ РЕПРЕЗЕНТАЦИИ ОЛИМПИЙСКИХ ИГР В ЖУРНАЛАХ СССР И США

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Аннотация. *Введение.* На примере репрезентаций Олимпийских игр анализируются создание и деконструкция образов врага при помощи советского и американского спортивного дискурса как составляющей холодной войны. Актуальность определяется потребностью изучения как технологий создания и деконструкции образа врага в международной политике, так и исторического измерения российско-американских отношений. *Материалы и методы.* Материалами являются публикации в ведущих спортивных журналах СССР («Физкультура и спорт») и США («Спортс Иллюстрайтед») за 1948–1991 гг. (в сумме около 200 выпусков). *Результаты.* Спортивный дискурс активно использовался в СССР и в США. В нем подчеркивались те ценности, которые защищала каждая из двух сверхдержав. Черты, приписываемые «своему» и «чужому» спорту, коррелировали с характеристиками советского и американского образа жизни в целом. В репрезентациях Олимпиад, которые были представлены как соперничество прежде всего СССР и США, эти черты спортивного дискурса находят отражение, однако олимпийские идеалы выступали фактором, ограничивающим продуцирование враждебности. Для американского журнала характерна большая вариативность взглядов на спортивное соперничество СССР и США, для советского – противопоставление «заокеанских дельцов от спорта» и американских спортсменов. Спортивный дискурс служил одним из ресурсов создания образов врага; вместе с тем он содержал потенциал и для деконструкции этих образов: спортивные соревнования интерпретировались как свидетельство возможности сотрудничества СССР и США во многих областях. *Финансирование.* Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 22-18-00305-П «Образы врага в массовой культуре Холодной войны: содержание, современная рецепция и использование в символической политике России и США».

Ключевые слова: холодная война, образ врага, спортивный дискурс, Олимпийские игры, журнал «Физкультура и спорт», журнал «Спортс Иллюстрайтед».

Цитирование. Рябов О. В. Спортивный дискурс в конструировании и деконструкции образов врага периода холодной войны: сравнивая репрезентации Олимпийских игр в журналах СССР и США // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. – 2026. – Т. 31, № 2. – С. 178–189. – (На англ. яз.). – DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2026.2.15>

Introduction. Various aspects of the role of sport in the Cold War have long been of interest to Russian and foreign researchers. Noting that sport was part of the “cultural Cold War” [4], scholars turn to such issues as its role in the “struggle for hearts and minds”; the influence of political events on the development of the international sports movement; sports diplomacy; and the representation of sporting rivalry between the two superpowers in the popular culture of that period [3; 6; 9; 10; 13; 14; 15; 18 and others]. The paper addresses a subject that has not yet been examined – the role of sports discourse in the construction, maintenance, and transformation of enemy images. While various resources contributing to the production of such an important component of the “cultural Cold War” as the enemy image – including political, historical, confessional, anthropological, and other discourses – are being actively examined [12], the role of sports discourse remains largely unexplored. The article thus pursues two aims: to examine the construction and deconstruction of the enemy image through representations of sports, and to conduct a comparative analysis of the role of sports discourse in the USSR and the USA as part of the “cultural Cold War”.

This article focuses on representations of the Olympic Games, as this phenomenon has always been not only athletic but also political, and above all, closely tied to the confrontation between the two superpowers. A total of 22 Olympic Games were held during the Cold War, with the Olympic teams of the USSR and the USA competing against each other in 17 of them. Additionally, two significant events in the “cultural Cold War” were the boycotts of the 1980 Moscow Games by the USA and its allies and the 1984 Los Angeles Games by the USSR and its allies.

The materials consist of publications from two sports magazines representing the USSR and the USA. The Soviet source is the monthly magazine *Physical Culture and Sport (Fizkultura i Sport, hereinafter FiS)*, published by the USSR State Sports Committee since 1928. As the country’s main sports publication, it played a key role in shaping official interpretations of events in the world of sports. The American source is the weekly magazine *Sports Illustrated (hereinafter SI)*, the most influential sports magazine in the USA, founded in 1954 by Henry Luce and published by Time Inc. Although sports journalism in the USA exhibited greater diversity

of opinion than in the USSR, and alternative perspectives were available, the selected magazines are broadly representative and appropriate for a comparative analysis of Soviet and American sports media. In total, around 200 issues from the period 1948–1991 have been examined.

First, we focus on methodological issues related to the imagological potential of sports discourse – its capacity to construct enemy images. Then, we examine how the Cold War sports discourse was formed in the 1940s–1950s, along with the views expressed in the two magazines regarding the role of the USSR and the USA in the Olympic movement. Next, as a case study, we analyse the coverage of the 1960 Winter and Summer Games, which were held six months apart in different international contexts. Finally, we trace the tendencies of the development of Cold War Olympic discourse in the 1960s–1980s.

The imagological potential of sports discourse. High-performance sport shares both common and distinctive features with other forms of mass culture. These features define its imagological potential, that is, its capacity to be employed in the production, dissemination, and consumption of images of “us” and “them”. First is its democratic and mass nature; even basic literacy is not required to consume sports entertainment. Moreover, sport generates, albeit temporary, the breaking of social barriers [2]. Secondly, sport is marked by the collective consumption of images of sports competitions. The energy generated by collective participation significantly amplifies emotional impact and, consequently, the propaganda effect. Thirdly, sport is associated with the military sphere. As George Orwell noticed, sport is war minus the shooting [1]. Sport serves as a substitute for war, since it is a form of fierce rivalry in which, as a rule, the victory of one side means the defeat of the other. Importantly, the confrontation occurs in real time (unlike cinema or satirical graphics), and the unpredictability of the outcome not only heightens audience interest, but also fosters a sense that it depends on their efforts. All of these factors contribute to the heightened aggressiveness of the sports entertainment industry, which is reflected, for example, in the significant presence of supporters of ultra-right ideologies among fan groups.

The most extreme form of ‘them’ is the enemy, and sports discourse can serve as a resource for fulfilling all the functions of the enemy image, including the reinforcement of collective identity, political mobilisation, the legitimisation of violence, the legitimisation of power, and the prediction of victory [12].

The function of strengthening collective identity is realised through the construction of the enemy as radically different from “us” and by drawing a symbolic boundary with “them”. Sports competitions are linked to appeals to collective identity, with a sharp division between “us” and “them”. At the same time, it is not only athletes who are involved in the competition but also those who identify themselves with them – sports fans. National categories of “us” and “them” evoke particularly strong emotions. Sport serves as a resource for the formation of national identity; victories in major sporting competitions generate national pride. That is why events in the sporting arena – especially in the era of sports’ televised broadcasts – attract the attention of a vast audience.

The function of political mobilisation involves generating a sense of the threat posed by the enemy to the most important values and interests of the community. Athletic performance alone does not provoke fear; however, in a particular context, it can be used to demonstrate the strength of an opponent (as will be discussed later).

The function of the legitimisation of violence requires representing the enemy in a manner that justifies negative attitudes towards them or even their destruction. The principal technique employed is the dehumanisation of the enemy, which takes two forms: animalistic and mechanistic [5]. Examples of using sports discourse to dehumanise the enemy include the comparison of the Soviet hockey team to a machine in the USA [11] or the attribution of bestial morals to American sports in the USSR.

The function of the legitimisation of power is linked to discussions about which political force is capable of eliminating the threat posed by the enemy to a community. This helps to explain the desire of the authorities to associate themselves with the victories of athletes in the sporting arena.

The realisation of the function of predicting victory is linked to portraying the enemy as weak, ridiculous, and destined for defeat – including on the sports field. This contributes to heightened

intensity in competitions involving athletes from countries with adversarial relations.

At the same time, it should be kept in mind that sport has become one of the factors of political dialogue, offering a model of relations that illustrates the benefits of peaceful cooperation. Sport functions as a means of intensifying international collaboration, serving as a tool for conflict resolution and the establishment of intercultural dialogue. Sport is used by states as an element of 'soft power', showcasing the capacity of their society to develop human potential.

All of this influenced the role of sports in the "cultural Cold War".

Forming Soviet Cold War discourse on the Olympics in 1940s – 1950s. The modern Olympic Games were revived in 1896 on the initiative of Baron Pierre de Coubertin. By the time the Soviet national team began participating in the Olympics, 12 Summer and 6 Winter Games had already been held. In the USSR, during the 1920s and 1930s, the prevailing opposition between "proletarian physical culture" and "bourgeois sport" led to a lack of interest in the Olympic movement¹. However, the post-war confrontation with the USA set new objectives for Soviet sport. A turning point was marked by the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), dated 27 December 1948, which identified the attainment of "world supremacy in major sports in the immediate future" as a priority [9].

This entry of Soviet sport into the international arena required ideological justification, and *FiS* magazine made a significant contribution to this process. The magazine emphasised that the sporting successes of the USSR demonstrated the superiority of the socialist system over its capitalist counterpart². The ideologisation of sport was further supported by assigning it the role of a necessary condition for communist construction, in line with Soviet political anthropology; on the pages of *FiS*, the idea that the canon of the new Soviet person should include physical perfection was substantiated³. The magazine highlighted within the Soviet sporting ethos such values as the dedication of athletes to communism, love for the Motherland, collectivism, comradeship, and gender equality. High-performance sport was constructed as an arena of confrontation between two worlds, the differences between which were represented as the opposites.

The *FiS* representations of US sport were characterised by features that aligned with broader depictions of America: the prioritisation of big business interests; social inequality in access to sport; racial discrimination; the exploitation of professional athletes by businessmen; the development of athletes' physical abilities at the expense of intellectual and moral qualities; individualism and the perception of the other only as a rival; dishonesty and the pursuit of victory at any cost; the cult of bestial cruelty and violence; and the militarisation of sport and its use in promoting American exceptionalism globally. At the same time, it is important to take into account the notion of "two Americas", a concept central to the Soviet worldview. Alongside portrayals of "reactionary" Americans, Soviet audiences were also presented with images of "progressive" Americans: communists, members of the working class, champions of peace, "people of goodwill", African Americans, and "ordinary people" [12]. This concept was also reflected in sports discourse; the struggle for peace of the "progressive figures of American sport" was a recurring theme of *FiS* publications⁴.

The representations of those Cold War-era Games in which Soviet athletes had not yet participated (the Winter and Summer Games of 1948 and the Winter Games of 1952) in *FiS* generally aligned with the noted trends in constructing the image of "enemy number one". For example, in reports on the 1948 Games in London – described as the "Olympics of athletes from bourgeois countries"⁵, – US athletes were accused of racism, a cult of violence, and dishonesty⁶. The magazine described the behaviour of the US hockey players at the 1952 Winter Games in Oslo as "shameless and hooligan-like"⁷.

The first Olympic appearances of Soviet athletes were presented in *FiS* as an epoch-making event. In its report on the Helsinki Summer Games, the magazine noted: "Although peace and friendship are the idea of the Olympics, until 1952 they were diluted in every possible way by the organisers of the Games, whose goals were very far from this noble idea." Thanks to the participation of the USSR national team, a new page had been opened in the history of the Games. After the end of the competition, the athletes travelled all over the globe, carrying in their hearts the belief that all nations could live peacefully, amicably and happily.

The Olympics were presented above all as a Soviet-American sporting rivalry. *FiS* emphasised the superiority of the Soviet Olympians over the Americans, which was eventually called into question only through dishonest methods – the machinations of “henchmen of overseas businessmen in the judging panels”. The enemy of the Olympic movement in the coverage of the Helsinki Olympics was the “warmongers”. They also created the myth of the Iron Curtain; meanwhile, “athletes from all countries, meeting with the envoys of the USSR, were convinced that they did not want war, that they were simple, cheerful, friendly, and peace-loving people”. That is, the most important aspects of conceptualising the Olympics as an effective means of promoting peace emerged, which during the Cold War became a hallmark of the USSR’s foreign policy and a cornerstone of Soviet identity [12]. Finally, representations of the Games contributed to the creation of the canon of the Soviet athlete – honest, peace-loving, and respectful of rivals – as a specific embodiment of the canon of the “New Soviet man”⁸.

Thus, the coverage of these Games in *FiS* outlined a range of themes that would remain central to subsequent representations of the Olympics: the role of the USSR and the USA in the Olympic movement; the motivations behind Soviet athletes’ participation in it; the ideal of the Soviet sportsman; the image of American athletes; the nature of sport in the USA; Soviet-American sporting rivalry; relations between Soviet and American athletes; and the conspiracies of the enemies of the Olympic movement.

With the expansion of cultural ties between the USSR and the USA in the mid-1950s, representations of the Olympics began to shift. The *FiS* report on the 1956 Winter Games reflected the warming of bilateral relations. In addition to highlighting the Games’ contribution to the struggle for peace and the “atmosphere of friendship, camaraderie, and fair competition” that prevailed at the Olympics, the magazine also noted, for example, “The US athletes visited the Soviet athletes”⁹. Even more optimistic were the reports from the Melbourne Games (1956), particularly emphasising that the “spirit of friendship” was visible to everyone “on the day of the opening ceremony of the Olympics, when American and Soviet athletes warmly applauded each other during the parade”¹⁰.

Forming US Cold War discourse on the Olympics in 1940s – 1950s. The image of the USSR in US sports discourse depended not only on the state of relations between the two countries, but also on the specific features of American sport. First of all, in the USA, high-performance sport was above all big business; representations of “us” and “them” were shaped in ways intended to engage audiences and generate income for business interests. Secondly, sport in the USA was highly decentralised. Thirdly, the most popular sports in the USA were those that were poorly developed outside the country. From the mid-1950s, US sport began to become more international, gradually overcoming its isolationism. However, this does not mean that sports discourse had not previously been deployed in the context of the Cold War. The sporting achievements of US athletes on the international stage were welcomed. Additionally, attitudes towards sports were used to label “Reds” within US society: during the McCarthy era, several films associated dislike for sport with pro-Communist views [12]. Sport also affirmed the values of the ‘Free World’ in whose name the Cold War was fought: freedom, individual responsibility, personal success, and patriotism [18]. The issue of racial discrimination was of particular importance in ideological battles. Consequently, propaganda that highlighted the sporting achievements of the US coloured population was used to demonstrate the positive dynamics in eliminating racism. Finally, the USA used sport in Third World countries in the context of cultural diplomacy [8; 15].

The sporting success of the USSR – particularly at its first Olympic appearance in 1952, when Soviet athletes competed with their US counterparts – generated both alarm and interest and forced them to pay attention to sporting developments behind the Iron Curtain. The president of the International Olympic Committee, US citizen Avery Brundage, visited the USSR in 1954 and was reportedly very impressed by what he saw¹¹. The most notable was a report published in *SI* in 1957, in which a US journalist, sharing his impressions of his travelling to the USSR, noted that sports were a common thing there, and that was reflected in impressive results. This was a consequence of government directives, active propaganda of sports, the absence of fees for using sports

infrastructure, and the availability of free time as a result of the establishment of an 8-hour workday in the USSR. The article was quite critical of the Soviet way of life, but sports helped change the author's negative opinion of "them": "I found many things in the Soviet Union which seemed strange and funny and also bad. But the people are great. They are quite a different people from the concept we have had of them for 40 years"¹².

The development of mass sports in the USSR also received different assessments. Of particular interest is the article "Soft American," published in *SI* in December 1960, authored by the president-elect John F. Kennedy. The politician emphasized the importance of mass sports for the country's security, noted the decline in the physical fitness of U.S. youth, and accompanied the securitization of American physical training with the image of a formidable enemy: "Our increasing lack of physical fitness, is a menace to our security <...> We face in the Soviet Union a powerful and implacable adversary <...> To meet the challenge of this enemy will require determination and will and effort on the part of all Americans." However, Kennedy did not at all call for becoming like the "enemy number one"; he emphasized the advantages of the American way of life over the Soviet one: the USA was a free country, and its citizens were not "forced to live their lives in the interest of the state": "We are, all of us, as free to direct the activities of our bodies as we are to pursue the objects of our thought"¹³.

The USA took a long time to come to terms with the effectiveness of high-performance sports in the "struggle for hearts and minds." It was only in 1956 that an article appeared in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine in which the author, as if a revelation, presented his point of view on the role of sports in Soviet propaganda: Soviet leaders believe that sports should serve state interests in the sphere of politics¹⁴. In addition to turning sport into a propaganda tool at home and abroad, the U.S. media accused Soviet sport of suppressing the individuality of athletes (which was reflected in the priority given to team sports in the USSR); repression against athletes and coaches; militarization; and widespread use of means that violated sports ethics, justified by the broader goals of Soviet-American confrontation.

The *SI* devoted considerable attention to the Olympic movement, whose values were presented

as those of the "Free World"; in contrast, the Soviet system was depicted as inherently hostile to Olympism. A key theme in the US image of the USSR was despotism: the totalitarian regime was seen as infiltrating every aspect of life, including sport. These views were reflected in *SI*'s discussion of three interrelated issues in Soviet-American Olympic rivalry: the amateur status of athletes from the USSR (which is a prerequisite for participation in the Games); the scoring system that prioritized the results of national teams over individual performances; and the close connection between sporting success and national prestige.

The transformation of sport into the main profession of Soviet athletes – some of whom were labelled *shamateurs* [16] – drew sharp criticism in the USA. It was seen as undermining the ideals of Olympism, with the USSR's desire to frame the Games as a contest between political systems presented as the main reason. *SI* repeatedly addressed this issue, attempting to determine the extent to which the USSR's approach posed a threat to Olympism¹⁵. The author of the article "Are we losing the Olympic ideal?" noted with regret that the "great international festival is becoming cannon fodder in the Cold War, with major stress on national pride, winning, scoring points, and beating Russia at all costs"; "sportswriters at the most recent Olympics in 1952 at Helsinki played up the Cold War in sports and used point scores as bait to attract readers." Meanwhile, interpreting the Games as a rivalry between nations, or even political systems, meant allowing the USSR to impose its approach to sport on the entire world. He called, "Let's not let Russia push us into doing likewise"¹⁶.

At the same time, the magazine also contained many comments more traditional to the Cold War rhetoric. Thus, before the Games in Melbourne, the *SI* cited the demand of a senator from Maryland related to Soviet state-subsidized sportsmen's participation in the Games: "We should do everything humanly possible to ban Russia and her barbaric goon squads from the 1956 Summer Games <...> These unprincipled disciples of the devil walked all over our youth at the Winter Olympics"¹⁷.

Squaw Valley vs Rome: The 1960 Games in the context of the Cold War. In this part of the article, we will analyze the representations of the two Olympic Games held in 1960: in February

in Squaw Valley, California, and in August in the Eternal City. The case is of particular interest because it enables a comparison not only of Soviet and American portrayals of “them” in the Olympic context but also of the representations of two sporting events held in different international settings.

The Winter Olympics were held in an atmosphere of hope for significant improvement in bilateral relations, following the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to the USA in September 1959 and the expected reciprocal visit of Dwight Eisenhower. However, following the 1960 U-2 incident in May, relations between the USSR and the USA deteriorated significantly, and the Rome Olympics took place under markedly different political circumstances.

In *FiS*, the account of the White Olympics was presented in a piece by the chief editor, bearing the telling title “Times Are Changing.” Representations of the USA in Soviet sports discourse were indeed undergoing change.

Firstly, the USA was portrayed in an exceptionally benevolent manner; there was no mention of either the vices of sport or the social scourges. In the following issue of *FiS*, in an article marking the anniversary of victory in World War II, a reminder is included: “In their struggle, the Soviet people were not alone. The sailors from San Francisco fought alongside them for the freedom of mankind.” The piece also contained an appeal: “We must not allow people who have forgotten the lessons of war to unleash a bloodbath again.” The magazine further recalls a recent example of cooperation related to the seven-week drift of Soviet sailors on a barge in the Pacific Ocean and their rescue by the Americans.

Secondly, the achievements of US sports were emphasized, as was the contribution of the USA to the development of international sport or the organization of sport within the United States.

Thirdly, Americans themselves were depicted with considerable sympathy. It is particularly noteworthy that these positive portrayals were no longer limited to “progressive” Americans; among the positively depicted figures were representatives of those social groups that had previously personified “reactionary” America: big businessmen, “corrupt journalists,” and pop culture magnates. The class-based approach is almost entirely absent. The image of former arch-

enemies of Soviet journalists – members of the American bourgeois press – was also undergoing transformation. “The staff of *FiS* visited their colleagues from *SI*, who, in introducing the Soviet journalists, said, ‘These are our Russian brothers, from the magazine *Physical Culture and Sport*.’” Probably, against the background of such representations of the USA, *FiS* readers could hardly disagree with the magazine’s conclusion that “the ice of the Cold War is crumbling more and more”¹⁸.

Fourthly, the image of American athletes was also undergoing change. This is how, for example, the US hockey players, who became champions for the first time, were portrayed: while noting that their victory was deserved, *FiS* journalists highlighted qualities such as “perseverance,” “the ability to fight selflessly until the last second,” and “remarkable courage”¹⁹.

Changes were also evident in the visual portrayal of athletes. *FiS* published a large photograph showing the celebrated speed skater Yevgeny Grishin in a conversation with a US female athlete. “A Russian matryoshka doll! This is a souvenir!” she exclaimed with delight. America was no longer depicted as a capitalist, warmonger, or wolf but instead appeared as a smiling young woman...²⁰

The “honeymoon” in Soviet-American relations, however, was soon coming to an end, and from the second half of 1960 onwards, the tone of sports representations of the USA in Soviet sports discourse began to change. Many features of the representations of the USA that had been established in Soviet sports discourse during the first decade of the Cold War were once again in demand.

The Summer Olympics in Rome took place against this political backdrop. It is hardly accidental that, when announcing the opening of the Games, *FiS* reminded readers it coincided with the 15th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima²¹. The results of the sporting competitions were used to draw conclusions about the rivalry between socio-political systems²². Of note, too, is the use of such characteristics to describe US athletes as “self-confidence,” “boastfulness,” and “self-promotion”²³. Finally, it is significant that military vocabulary was used to describe the competitions – for example, the victory of the USSR national athletics team was designated as the “Waterloo of America”²⁴.

“The Russians are Coming” was the title of an article about the Squaw Valley competition, published in the pre-Olympic issue of *SI* ²⁵. It described Soviet athletes as leaders of world sport – without any negative comments. The magazine presented highly positive portrayals of individual Soviet athletes ²⁶.

The issue of *SI* dedicated to the results of the Olympics emphasised that “the one indisputable, over-all winner at Squaw Valley was no individual or nation at all, but the world itself, the world of sport and the world of people”. The organisers had feared that the political tensions of the Cold War might spoil the event, but ‘the friendliness and affection that existed between the competitors was obvious to millions of viewers’. The article “The Games Were the Best” ²⁷ was accompanied by the subtitle “These were the most successful Winter Olympics of all, and the now-friendly Russians were the most successful competitors in them.” The author attributed the Soviet victories to “a massive sports programme enveloping schools and clubs and labour unions and the military service, state encouragement, frequent outright aid to the specially talented, a fierce desire on the part of the individual to triumph, less for himself or his organisation than for Mother Russia.” He also suggested that, between the 1956 Games and the 1960 Games, the Russians had changed. “They have become more human, ceasing to be muscles without minds or personalities and became individuals. Some of them were very impressive individuals, indeed.” He went on to cite Yevgeny Grishin as an example of a bright Soviet individual. It is also noteworthy that the magazine cited Olympic champion Bob Cleary’s statement about Soviet hockey players: “They don’t talk about Communism. Like us, they talk about hockey – and girls”. In other words, the rehumanisation of the image of Soviet athletes did not entail a change in attitude towards the Soviet political system or its policies in previous years.

As for the Summer Olympics, *SI*’s reports were imbued with a different tone. The magazine’s shift in position on key issues related to Olympism is particularly noteworthy: it called for legitimising the participation of professional athletes (presumably to eliminate the advantages held by athletes from socialist countries) and for official recognition of the fact that the Olympics were

not merely a competition for individual athletes but also for nations. The article “Why Not Wave the Flag?” argued that national sentiment could not be suppressed and that nationalism – judiciously mixed with the Olympic spirit, which aims to promote sports for sports’ sake – was beneficial for sport, nations, and individuals. “So right now we don’t feel at all abashed about urging our boys in Rome to go out and beat the pants off the Russians and everyone else” ²⁸. Thus, the Games were portrayed primarily as a Soviet-American rivalry. A noticeable negativity towards Soviet athletes permeated the coverage of many aspects of the Games. For instance, in its report on the opening ceremony, *SI* ridiculed the uniform of the USSR national team: “the Russians bulked muscularly in blue single-buttoned suits that suggested something you might see at a lawn party given by Khrushchev” ²⁹. The tactics employed by the Soviet basketball team in their match against the US national team were also satirised; while the Americans shot and scored points, the Russians were described as playing basketball much like ice hockey – relying heavily on passing and team play. This was interpreted by US journalists as a reflection of the suppression of individuality and the triumph of collectivism in the USSR ³⁰. The issue of September 12 opened with an article that did not say a word about sports but emphasised that “the citizen of a free and competitive economy always enjoys more of the fruits of his labor than the citizen of a communistic or socialistic state”. Yes, the author admitted, the USSR was ahead of the USA in space; however, what was happening on Earth was much more important, and on this planet America was more successful than Russia, and its standard of living was significantly higher... ³¹

Cold War discourse on the Olympic Games in the 1960s – 1980s. Subsequently, the “cultural Cold War” also actively exploited representations of high-performance sport, which highlighted the values championed by each of the superpowers: the USSR – communism, peace, social justice, Soviet patriotism, collectivism, comradeship, and gender equality; the USA – freedom, personal achievement, hard work, equality of opportunity, Americanism, racial harmony, and national unity.

All this is evident in the representations of the Olympic movement, whose important role in

the ideological battles of the Cold War was recognised in the leading sports magazines of both the USSR and the USA. *SI* positioned Olympism as the brainchild of Western civilisation, founded on principles alien to the Soviet system. In contrast, *FiS* evolved from an initially hostile stance towards the Olympic movement to its full support, ultimately symbolically sovietising Olympism by declaring its values to be aligned with the goals of Soviet societal development. Alongside the promotion of the Soviet Motherland's prestige and the demonstration of the superiority of the socialist system, various motives for the participation of Soviet athletes in the Games were highlighted in different times. These included the struggle for peace, the unification of all progressive forces, and the demonstration of the possibility of peaceful coexistence. The coverage of the 1964 Tokyo Games added to the context of the conceptualisation of the Olympics' such value of the Soviet Thaw as humanism, the highest embodiment of which was called Communism. The socialist countries were described as the most ardent champions of the Olympic ideas, which, in turn, were portrayed as "being in blatant contradiction to the very essence of imperialism"³². "Unlocking human potential" and "demonstrating youth cooperation and unity for peace, progress, and democracy" were highlighted as the most significant results of the Games in the messages that Alexei Kosygin sent on behalf of the USSR to the IOC in 1968 and 1972³³. At the beginning of *perestroika*, those Olympic values that resonated with the ideological trends of the time were foregrounded: in his speech at the reception in honour of Soviet Olympians, Mikhail Gorbachev referred to the Olympic movement as one of the universal values of humankind³⁴.

The USSR positioned itself as the flagship of the Olympic movement and a guardian of its principles, including its depoliticisation. Thus, during the 1980 Moscow Olympics, the US authorities became the target of criticism for violating the principles of Olympism by politicising sport through their boycott. The boycott of the 1984 Games in Los Angeles by the USSR and many of its allies was explained in *FiS* not as politically motivated but as a response to the fact that the so-called "Americaniada-84" was a commercial event staged in an "atmosphere of psychosis, hate and hostility", where the safety of athletes was at risk [7].

In the United States, the representations of competitions between athletes from the USSR and the USA as part of the Cold War were largely reactive, serving as a response to Soviet symbolic politics. As noted above, it was only from the mid-1950s that sports competitions began to be perceived as part of the "struggle for hearts and minds"³⁵. In *SI*, the tendency to resist this interpretation remained quite marked, yet ultimately the view of the Games as one of the theatres of the "cultural Cold War" came to prevail. This is especially noticeable in cases of sensitive failures, such as the defeat of the US basketball team in the final of the Munich Olympics (and the aggravated fiasco of the NHL players, which occurred on the same days during the Series-72 matches with the USSR hockey team). The author of one of the articles emphasised that the situation in Olympism was developing in "a direction advantageous to the totalitarian communities". The first factor that gave the USSR an advantage over the USA was government support for sportsmen³⁶. The use of national sentiments served as another factor; it is noteworthy that the author even refers to the image of the siege of Leningrad: "as the inhabitants of the city clearly preferred death from starvation or disease... to surrender to the Nazis, the representatives of the Soviet Union in basketball, and in hockey, and in chess, will clearly do their best for their homeland." Therefore, the problem in the author's eyes was that adjustment to the ethic of Olympic victory requires a correlative adjustment of domestic values which Americans were not willing to tolerate³⁷.

It's also notable how *SI* covered the victory of the USA hockey team over the Soviet team at the Olympic Games in Lake Placid in 1980 – known as the "Miracle on Ice". The *SI* report "Do you believe in miracle?" set a frame for assessing this event as the most important one for the confrontation of the Cold War³⁸. Moreover, in December 1980, the magazine named the entire USA hockey team "Sportsmen of the Year" and described the victory itself as "the main sporting event of the 20th century". The editorial decision was explained in an article with a title that hardly needs comments – "A Reminder of What We Can Be"³⁹. The author focused less on the Olympic gold medal and more on the symbolic triumph of young US athletes over the "Great Red Bear".

The coverage of the subsequent Olympic Games in Moscow was generally unfriendly. Particular attention was paid to the boycott by Western countries and to the protests during the opening ceremony of the Games. The magazine ridiculed the measures taken by the USSR leadership to present a brilliant image of the country – although it also included the views of those who considered it unacceptable to use the Olympic movement to achieve political goals, and it acknowledged the high level of sporting competition⁴⁰.

Results. Thus, sports discourse served as one of the key instruments for constructing the Cold War image of the enemy. Its imagological potential is determined by such features as the collective nature of the consumption of sports images, the democratism and mass character of sport, and its connection with the military sphere. At the same time, sports discourse contains the potential to deconstruct the enemy image: sports competitions could be interpreted as evidence of the similarities between representatives of different social systems and of the possibility of peaceful rivalry between the USSR and the USA, as well as cooperation in various spheres. The very possibility of seeing and portraying “them” as human beings – with strengths and weaknesses – undermined the Cold War’s practices of dehumanisation.

The Olympics were represented primarily as a rivalry between the USSR and the USA. In the meantime, the importance of Olympic ideals was consistently emphasised; a sort of “Olympic truce” served to soften the level of criticism directed at the antagonistic system, which was otherwise common in the discourse outside the context of the Games.

A case study of the coverage of the 1960 Winter and Summer Games – held six months apart in entirely different international contexts – demonstrated that representations of Soviet-American sporting rivalry generally reflected the state of relations between the two countries. The most favourable portrayal of “them” appeared in the coverage of the Squaw Valley Games in 1960, where both magazines conveyed the sense that the Cold War was coming to an end. Conversely, the worsening of international tensions was accompanied by increasingly negative depictions of athletes representing “enemy number one”.

These tendencies can be seen as more or less characteristic of both Soviet and American

representations of the Olympics. As for differences, US sports discourse was marked by a greater diversity of perspectives, even within the framework of one magazine. *SI*, for example, frequently acknowledged the sporting achievements of the USSR.

In the USSR, the idea of “two Americas” required an emphasis on the distinction between “reactionary” and “progressive” Americans. Criticism was directed primarily at the “overseas sports dealers” and the sports system itself; negative commentary on US athletes was virtually absent.

NOTES

¹ The evolution of attitudes towards sports in the USSR was studied in: [3; 10; 14; 15] and others.

² Sovetskije volejbolisty – lutshije v mire. *FiS*, 1949, no. 10.

³ E.g.: Samojlov D. Znachok molodykh patriotov. *FiS*, 1950, no. 9.

⁴ E.g.: Kostin P., Tarasov N. Vospitanije ubijts. *FiS*, 1952, no. 3.

⁵ Lin A. Sovetskij mirovoj rekord. *FiS*, 1950, no. 3.

⁶ Solovov G. Sistema rastlenija. *FiS*, 1949, no. 11.

⁷ Kostin P., Tarasov N. Vospitanije ubijts.

⁸ XV olimpijskije igry. *FiS*, 1952, no. 8.

⁹ Ekzamen vyderzhan! *FiS*, 1956, no. 3.

¹⁰ Olimpiada družby. *FiS*, 1956, no. 12.

¹¹ Thayer Ch. A Question of the Soul. *SI*, 1960, Aug. 15.

¹² Cooke J. Sports in the USSR. *SI*, 1957, Febr. 12.

¹³ Kennedy J.F. The Soft American. *SI*, 1960, Dec. 26.

¹⁴ Washburn J.N. Sport as a Soviet Tool. *Foreign Affairs*, 1956, vol. 34, no. 3.

¹⁵ E.g.: Bucher Ch.A. Are We Losing the Olympic Ideal? *SI*, 1955, Aug. 8 ; How to Try Too Hard. *Ibid.*, 1960, 15 Febr. ; Sportsmaster Brundage. *Ibid.*, Sept. 5.

¹⁶ Bucher Ch. A. Are We Losing the Olympic Ideal?

¹⁷ Events & Discoveries. *SI*, 1956, Apr. 16.

¹⁸ Glavnyi vopros. *FiS*, 1960, no. 5.

¹⁹ Sobolev P. Vremena menjajutsja. *FiS*, 1960, no. 4.

²⁰ Botashev M. *FiS*, 1960, no. 6, color plate.

²¹ Neugasimoje plamja. *FiS*, 1960, no. 8.

²² Golub i lavr. *FiS*, 1960, no. 2.

²³ Vtorzhenije v gegemoniju amerikantsev. *FiS*, 1960, no. 10 ; “Koroleva sporta” v Rime. *FiS*, no. 11.

²⁴ “Koroleva sporta” v Rime.

²⁵ The Russians Are Coming. *SI*, 1960, Febr. 15.

²⁶ E.g.: Terrell R. The Heroes of Squaw Valley. *SI*, 1960, Febr. 29.

²⁷ Terrell R. The Games Were the Best. *SI*, 1960, Mar. 7.

²⁸ Why Not Wave the Flag? *SI*, 1960, Aug. 15.

²⁹ Kane M. Splendor and Spleen. *SI*, 1960, Sept. 5.

³⁰ Passing vs. Points. *SI*, 1960, Sept. 12.

³¹ Stickler L. Meanwhile, Back on this Planet. *SI*, 1960, Sept. 12.

³² Gumanizm i sport. *FiS*, 1964, no. 11.

³³ Kosygin A. Chlenam Mezhdunarodnogo Olimpijskogo komiteta, Meksikanskomu organizatsionnomu komitetu, uchastnikam XIX Olimpijskikh igr. *FiS*, 1968, no. 12; Idem. Chlenam Mezhdunarodnogo Olimpijskogo komiteta, organizatsionnomu komitetu i uchastnikam XX Olimpijskikh igr. *Ibid.*, 1972, no. 10.

³⁴ M.S. Gorbachev: "Vashimi podvigami voskhishchajutsja milliony ljudej". *FiS*, 1989, no. 1.

³⁵ Moreover, as the highest political level, until Richard Nixon arrived in the White House, the US government showed little interest in exploiting the Olympism in the Cold War discourse [17].

³⁶ As an article published on the eve of the Winter Games 1972 pointed out, this system was now extended to all socialist countries; "East Germany had been converted into an athlete factory in recent years, drafting promising children and putting them into early training almost as if they were race horses". E.g.: Johnson W. Ice-Cold Games and Solid-Gold Girl. *SI*, 1972, Jan. 31.

³⁷ Buckley W.F. Strange Bedfellows. *SI*, 1972, Sept. 25.

³⁸ Do You Believe in Miracle? *SI*, 1980, Mar. 3.

³⁹ Swift E.M. A Reminder of What We Can Be. *SI*, 1980, Dec. 22.

⁴⁰ Fimrite R. Only the Bears Were Bullish. *SI*, 1980, July 28.

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IMAGES OF THE SYMBOLIC OTHER IN CULTURAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA DURING THE COLD WAR: A CASE STUDY OF “SEVEN DAYS IN MAY”

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The article examines cultural communication between the USSR and the USA from the 1960s to the 1980s. The case selected for the study includes criticism of the most significant aspects of the socio-political life of the USA – specifically, the political system, the institution of the presidency, and civic values – during the Cold War period. *Methods and materials.* The analysis uses historical constructivism and a range of supporting methods: descriptive analysis, discourse analysis, and semiotics. In addition to publicly available versions of the novel, plays, and films, the authors use unpublished archival sources. *Analysis.* The study focuses on the Soviet media campaign around the novel *Seven Days in May* by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II, which includes literary translations, plays, and films. The experience of “symmetric” film adaptations in the USSR and the USA has been studied. Particular attention is paid to the technique of on-screen modelling, which enabled the authors to offer a critical reflection on contemporary realities in the rival powers. *Results.* The analysed approaches to interpreting the novel, despite the variety of channels through which its content was disseminated, reveal commonalities and patterns in the construction of the symbolic Other. The criticism of the ambiguity surrounding political processes in the USA by the authors of the novel largely corresponded with established propaganda techniques employed by the Soviet media. The reflection of real processes in the relations between the two states is traced in the dynamic development of the images of the colonel, general, and president in the various versions of the novel. *Authors’ contribution.* Maksim Kazyuchits analysed a range of literary and media sources – the original novel *Seven Days in May* by Knebel and Bailey and its translations into Russian. He compared the translated versions with the source text and identified omissions in the 1966 and 1990 editions. His research also encompassed the radio play and the television production *The Last Argument of Kings*, as well as archival materials from the Russian State Archive of Cinema and Photo Documents and the Archive of the State Television and Radio Company. Nina Sputnitskaia worked at the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art, where she collected and analysed documents related to theatrical productions, studied the personal archives of the creators of media products, and examined both the television film *The Conspiracy* and the script *Hello, Comrade President!* *Funding.* The study was funded by RSF, Grant № 22-18-00305-P, “The images of enemy in Cold War popular culture: their content, contemporary reception and usage in Russian and U.S. symbolic politics”.

Key words: images of enemy, constitutive Other, Cold War, media campaign in the USSR, criticism of the institution of the presidency, *Seven Days in May*.

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ОБРАЗЫ СИМВОЛИЧЕСКОГО ДРУГОГО В КУЛЬТУРНОЙ КОММУНИКАЦИИ СССР И США ПЕРИОДА ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ: КЕЙС «СЕМЬ ДНЕЙ В МАЕ»

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Аннотация. *Введение.* Статья посвящена изучению культурной коммуникации СССР и США в 1960–1980-х годах. Выбранный для исследования кейс содержит критику наиболее важных сторон общественной и политической жизни США (политическое устройство, институт президентства, гражданские ценности) в период холодной войны. *Методы и материалы.* Анализ осуществляется с применением исторического конструктивизма и комплекса вспомогательных методов: дескриптивного, дискурс-анализа, семиотики. Авторы помимо общедоступных версий романа, пьес, фильмов привлекают неопубликованные архивные источники (РГАЛИ, РГАСФД, Архив Гостелерадио). *Анализ.* В фокусе исследования – советская медиакомпания романа «Семь дней в мае» Ф. Нибела и Ч.У. Бэйли, которую составили литературные переводы, пьесы, фильмы. Изучен опыт «симметричных» экранизаций в СССР и США. Особое внимание уделено приему моделирования на экране (построение нарратива на основе воображаемой, гипотетически возможной ситуации), который позволял авторам критически оценить современность в конкурирующих державах. *Результаты.* Проанализированные подходы в трактовке романа, при разнообразии каналов трансляции его содержания (театр, радио, кино, ТВ), позволяют говорить об общности и закономерностях в конструировании символического Другого. Критика структурной неоднородности и неопределенности государственных процессов в США авторов «Семь дней в мае» во многом согласовывалась с устоявшимися пропагандистскими приемами советских медиа. Отражение реальных процессов во взаимоотношениях двух государств прослеживается в динамичном развитии образов полковника Кейси, генерала Скотта и президента Лимена в различных версиях романа с 1960-х гг. вплоть до конца холодной войны. *Вклад авторов.* М.Ф. Казючиц проанализировал литературные источники – оригинальный роман Флетчера Нибела и Чарльза Бэйли «Семь дней в мае» и его переводы на русский язык (провел сверку версий с источником и выявил купюры в русском переводе 1966 и 1990 гг.); проанализировал радиопьесу и телевизионную постановку 1983 г. «Последний довод королей», провел работу с документами РГАСФД, Архива Гостелерадио. Н.Ю. Спутницкая провела работу в РГАЛИ, собрала и проанализировала документы по театральным постановкам, изучила личные архивы авторов медиапродуктов, провела анализ телефильма «Заговор» (1971) и сценария «Здравствуйте, товарищ президент!» (1990). *Финансирование.* Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 22-18-00305-П «Образы врага в массовой культуре холодной войны: содержание, современная рецепция и использование в символической политике России и США».

Ключевые слова: образ врага, конституирующий Другой, холодная война, медиакомпания в СССР, критика института президентства, «Семь дней в мае».

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Introduction. The problem of constructing the symbolic Other in the 1960s–1980s in literature and screen culture was developing rapidly and actively shaped by the context of international relations between the USSR and the USA. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the subsequent *détente*, and the nuclear arms limitation treaties were all reflected in the artistic culture and propaganda of both countries. The subject of this article is to examine the mechanisms of constructing the symbolic Other, especially the hostile Other, within the framework of artistic discourse, including theatre, radio, cinema, and television. The object of the research is the materials of the media campaign related to the release of the Russian-language translation of the novel *Seven Days in May* by Fletcher Knebel and Charles Bailey and its subsequent theatrical, radio, film, and television adaptations, which spanned nearly three decades, until the collapse of the USSR. The first Russian translation appeared at the height of the Vietnam War in 1964, and the final script, which was never filmed, dates back to 1990. This case is of particular interest not only because of its chronological scope, which encompasses one of the most dramatic periods in recent political history, but also due to the wide range of cultural channels through which the novel was disseminated. Taken together, these materials exhibit numerous characteristic features that make it possible to identify patterns in the construction of the symbolic hostile Other – an image that is heterogeneous, structurally complex, and historically dynamic – while simultaneously revealing the mechanisms through which Soviet identity was articulated.

Seven Days in May: Russian Translations of the Novel and the Foreign Policy Context

The first Russian edition of the novel *Seven Days in May* [1] was published by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR (Voenizdat), four years after the American edition and two years after the release of the eponymous film directed by John Frankenheimer. The translation was carried out by writers, diplomatic workers, and intelligence officers Pavel Viduetsky and Anatoly Gorsky. “To lift the veil on what the ‘American way of life’ and the

notorious ‘free world’ actually represent” [1, p. 18], Major-General A.M. Shevchenko noted in the introductory article. In the same piece, he briefly but pointedly noted the ambiguous reception of the novel in the United States. Shevchenko also sought to place the translation within the contemporary foreign policy context – specifically, the widespread public anti-militarist and anti-American sentiment surrounding the Vietnam War. In 1990, the second edition of the novel was published [2]. In the introductory article, it was framed within the new context of cultural and political relations between the USSR and the USA at the end of the Cold War. “Important agreements have been signed between our countries, diplomats are working tirelessly, and the new political thinking has made it possible to establish contacts in the military sphere as well,” [2, p. 336] Alexey Fayngar noted.

An analysis of the censorship edits in both editions reveals the content that shaped the image of the symbolic Other. First, the foreign policy context of the 1960s influenced the omission of all reference to China in the 1966 Russian translation. In the original novel, the relations between the USSR and China are assessed as a purely pragmatic alliance – if not equal, then at least suggesting that China would soon possess comparable military capabilities. However, it is the Soviet Union that did not inspire confidence among Americans as prone to political treachery.

In one scene, CIA Director Lieberman reports to President Lyman that the Soviets have begun secretly producing components for nuclear missiles in violation of an agreement and shows delivery routes on a map. The president speculates about possible China’s complicity:

“The lines multiplied and crisscrossed.

“Has anything like this turned up in China?” asked Lyman.

“Nope,” Lieberman said. ‘Maybe Feemerov’s cheating on his Peiping buddies, too.’

“If this is true,” Lyman said, ‘the treaty is dead. And maybe the world too’” [11, p. 211] (перевод: «Линии на карте росли, перекрещиваясь друг с другом.

– “Похоже, они направлены к Китаю?” – спросил Лимен. – “Нет”, – ответил Либбермен. – “Советский премьер, возможно, обманул и своих пекинских друзей”. – “Если это правда, то договору конец. А может быть, и

всему миру» [2, pp. 194-195]). The text in italics was absent from the 1966 edition.

The omissions suggest that by the second half of the 1960s, the Soviet Union was represented in its own propaganda as the constitutive Other for the peoples of all countries within its sphere of influence. China was no exception, as can be seen from the example of cinema. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the PRC was accompanied by the strengthening of cultural ties. For example, large-scale chronicle and documentary films such as *Liberated China* (1950) and *In the New Beijing* (1950), directed by Sergei Gerasimov, and *The Victory of the Chinese People* (1950), directed by Leonid Varlamov, were released in both the USSR and China. These films drew historical and cultural parallels between the two countries and presented the Chinese and Soviet peoples as fraternal. However, the key motif was that China had embarked on the path of socialist development under the auspices of the USSR and that Mao Zedong was portrayed as the leader of the Chinese people and a devoted follower and continuer of Stalin's cause.

As of the time of the novel's release in 1962, China did not yet possess nuclear weapons (although the text refers to a number of successful tests). This theme contributes to the futuristic geopolitical landscape of 1974 – the year in which the novel's events take place – and reflects the authors' assumptions regarding the prospects for the development of Soviet-Chinese relations. However, the historical context of the Cultural Revolution likely predetermined the complete removal of the Chinese theme from the 1966 Russian translation. For example, Lyman's reflections – “With atomic weapons already stacked like cordwood and Peiping boasting of a third hydrogen test, there wasn't much time left” [1, p. 49] (перевод: «В условиях, когда Пекин уже накопил достаточно атомного оружия и хвастает третьим испытанием водородной бомбы, осталось не так много времени» [2, p. 50]) – were omitted from the 1966 edition but reinstated and stored in the 1990 translation.

Second, despite Shevchenko's remark in the introductory article to the 1966 edition regarding the “boring” American stereotypes in depicting the USSR (e.g., treachery and rudeness), all passages portraying Soviet politics as duplicitous were

nonetheless excluded from the Russian translation. In the scene depicting the confrontation between Lyman and Scott, the general reproaches the president for inaction: “And we emphasised until we were blue in the face that it was folly to sign a document which left a clear loophole – namely, that one country or the other could assemble warheads in the one place as fast as it took them apart in another under the eyes of the neutral inspectors. The United States, of course, would never do that. But the Russians would – and they are doing precisely that” [1, pp. 323-324] (перевод: «Мы неоднократно говорили вам и доказывали с пеной у рта, что неразумно подписывать документ, который оставляет явную лазейку, а именно: та или иная сторона сразу же после демонтажирования в одном месте в присутствии нейтральных инспекторов может приступить к их сборке в другом. Соединенные Штаты, конечно, никогда этого не сделают. Но русские сделают – и они именно это уже и делают» [2, pp. 287-288]). The final phrase was omitted from the 1966 edition but reinstated in the 1990 version. This omission reflects one of the key attributes of the symbolic self-identification of the USSR as a peacekeeping nation, one that strictly observes the norms of modern diplomacy and international law and is uniquely qualified to lead the communist world. Scott's claim regarding the USA here suggests that similar strategies were employed to construct the image of the symbolic constitutive Other in both the USA and the USSR [9; 12]. The characteristics of the Soviet Union in the original text came into conflict with the image of the USSR as the constitutive Other for satellite states. The depiction of the Kremlin as “rude and narrow-minded”, which fully aligns with the panslavist understanding of the USSR in the Western cultural tradition [3], was likewise subject to censorship.

The novel, theatre, and radio

Adaptations of the novel for theatre and radio in the 1960s–1970s are associated with the name of Vladimir Tokarev, who collaborated with major authors working with archival materials on military history and foreign policy.

The play *Seven Days in May* was submitted for distribution by the Theatre Department of the Ministry of Culture. Work on the adaptation lasted

for more than two years, and the archives preserved at least three versions of the script. On 14 March 1966, Tokarev received a report containing extensive critical comments. According to the editorial board, it was necessary to strengthen the symbolic portrayal of Scott as a “candidate for fascist dictators” and of Lyman as a figure “in whose real politics and striving to prevent a military catastrophe we recognise the traits of Kennedy” [7, p. 2]. The reviewers emphasised, “The main point of the novel is not the conspiracy... but the clash of two worldviews, two political systems, two Americas” [7, p. 2].

The image of a *doubled country*, widely employed in Soviet propaganda, was contrasted with the unity and integrity of the Soviet state. Further correspondence between the author and the editorial board, followed by a reasoned refusal, exemplifies a clear directive from the state.

Nevertheless, in 1967, Tokarev’s play *Seven Days in May* was broadcast on Leningrad Radio. The author subjected the text to substantial reworking: the character of Casey was given a significant function as narrator. Links were added to the novel’s text, as well as the direct speech of Casey, who, on behalf of the author, offers moral judgements on the characters. The figure of the colonel was also transformed: from a career military man, he evolved into a *raisonneur* well-known in Russian literary classics. Casey disregards a number of rules of trade ethics: he is convinced that Lyman will publicly expose the conspiracy and that the representatives of the “militarists” will be punished. A similar motif is found in the introductory article to the first Russian edition of the novel, in which Shevchenko accuses Lyman of prioritising the prestige of the country and its state integrity over the truth. Casey’s interpretation becomes one-sided: for him, there are no regulations that other characters follow. For the same reason, his family is removed from the adaptation. These changes to the character largely reflect the trends of the Thaw period in Soviet culture [15, p. 11]. Casey’s final exclamation – “What was it, I ask. What was it? What?” – highlights a key aspect of the symbolic hostile Other: in America, the leader of the state never tells the truth, even at the detriment of his own people.

Beginning with the radio play, the adaptations of the novel introduce symbolic elements that

construct a highly specific image of the USA. For example, in the radio play, a recurring leitmotif is employed: following the announcer’s words, “And at this very time, at seven airfields of the country”, a montage phrase follows, consisting of sound effects (the hum of aeroplanes; the roll call of the military – “One-two... Base ‘U’... El Paso...” – and the strains of a military march). This auditory montage serves to create a symbolic image of one of the Americas: a militarised nation, permeated by Cold War paranoia – the America of General Scott.

The first screen versions: *Seven Days in May* (USA) and *The Conspiracy* (USSR)

Seven Days in May, directed by John Frankenheimer, was made without investment from major commercial or military circles in the United States. Contemporary scholars interpret the film as continuing the traditions of criticising authority and paranoia in society established by Frank Capra and situate it within the protest and critical context of the 1960s–1970s [13, pp. 161–164]. Some authors compare the “humiliatingly low” approval rating of 29% received by President Lyman for his pacifist stance with the similarly low ratings received by President Bush for his militarism [14, pp. 19–20]. In the early 1960s, concerns were voiced in American political circles about the potential negative impact of *Seven Days in May* on the international standing of the USA [13, pp. 161–162].

The film was not purchased for Soviet cinema distribution, but it was known to the professional audience, and its influence can be seen, for example, in the television film *Seventeen Moments of Spring* directed by Tatyana Lioznova. The character of Casey aroused increased interest among Soviet authors and reviewers due to his internal contradictions. As a typical representative of the symbolic hostile Other, he renounces the ethos of a military officer in favour of the triumph of civil values. Like the motif of the “two Americas”, this character highlights the flaws of militarism and the military and political power of the USA. Thus, in both the radio play and the film adaptation *The Conspiracy*, Casey was interpreted in a similar fashion by actor Valentin Gaft even before the appearance of a comparable figure – the reflective military officer

Isaev-Stierlitz (Vyacheslav Tikhonov) – in Lioznova's aforementioned work. In the early 1970s, Tokarev again approached the Yermolova Theatre with a proposal titled "On the issue of staging the novel *Seven Days in May* by F. Knebel and Ch. Bailey II" [5, pp. 1-3], in which he proposed to "clarify its ideological orientation and, for this purpose, specify and, in some cases, revise certain elements of the plot" [5, p. 3]. This version envisaged the removal of the motif of confrontation between Lyman and ordinary Americans (which is present in the novel). Instead, the American people are presented as being unanimously supportive of the president, his peace initiatives, and "especially the signing of the nuclear disarmament treaty" [5, p. 3].

Three years prior to the events portrayed in the novel *Seven Days in May*, in 1971, Soviet Central Television broadcast the television play *The Conspiracy*, based on a script by Aleksandr Rokhlin and Anatoly Shaykevich and directed by Svetlana Annapolskaia. In *The Conspiracy*, the symbolic hostile Other is constructed through a set of recognisable symbols associated with the United States in Soviet screen culture of the time. The opening sequence presents an aerial panorama of skyscrapers and the Statue of Liberty, filmed as a miniature sculpture – isolated and lost in the dark – to convey a sense of America's instability. The film makes extensive use of documentary footage, blending it with staged scenes, and the events are accompanied by an off-screen narration. The exposition creates a sense of authenticity through editing of newsreel clips: demonstrations, elections, and presidential imageries, with John F. Kennedy appearing most frequently. The editing rhythm of these chronicle shots and the accompanying commentary reinforce the impression of instability and internal disunity of the country. The staged episodes, shot in monochrome, organically fit into the chronicle texture. The off-screen narrator, adopting a condescending tone, explains that the film supplements the work of the political reporters – as Bailey and Knebel, the authors of *Seven Days in May*, are introduced. The narrator emphasises the belletristic nature of the source material and the timidity of the authors, thereby justifying the need for an "augmented" account of the events portrayed in the novel. According to the logic of the film, the elections in the USA are depicted as

a boisterous spectacle watched by Americans. The Soviet filmmakers expand the narrative, introducing new themes and "previously unknown facts" [6].

Following documentary footage of Washington, the audience sees Valentin Gaft's Casey walking through the Pentagon corridors. The story of conspiracy begins with the colonel's reflections on the ECOMCON base ("Emergency Communications Control") and a phrase that stuck in his memory, accidentally dropped by his friend and colleague Mutt Henderson: "We spend more time training for seizure than for prevention" [11, p. 14] (перевод: «Мы больше учим солдат как штурмовать различные объекты, а не как их защищать»). Shots of the assassination and funeral of the Kennedy brothers are interspersed with the colonel's thoughts on the planned conspiracy. However, it should be noted that Gaft's hero is still used as a *raisonneur*, a representative of the authorial voice, and therefore yields the dramatic centre to the president and the general at the film's climax.

The president's family – in the novel, he is a husband, father, and grandfather – is absent in *The Conspiracy*, but his affection for his dog Trimmer, his childhood-rooted, longstanding friendship with Senator Girard, and his trusted relationship with secretary Esther are emphasised. The president is portrayed as measured, prudent, and calm; in moments of crisis, he slowly smokes a pipe. A side table with spirits near his desk and other domestic details aims to elicit viewer sympathy. The divergence in the interpretation of Lyman and Scott in both the novel and the American film adaptation is profound. Masculinity is a key marker in Cold War representations. In the novel, Scott is characterised by excessive masculinity: his athletic build, massive jaw, and obsession with physical fitness [8, p. 174]. Knebel and Bailey portray him as obsessed with aggression and war, that is, his abnormality, despite seemingly universal recognition. A parallel can also be drawn with the visual tradition of American comic book heroes, whose exaggerated masculinity is a key trait (Superman, Captain America) [16]. The president's second ally, Senator Raymond Clark, reminds Lyman that according to polls of political sociologists, the president's popularity has seriously fallen – to 29%. It is his cooperation

with the Russians that has led to this sharp internal opposition, polarising both society and the political elite – and triggering the conflict of the “two Americas”.

Documentary scenes in *The Conspiracy* – such as Ku Klux Klan members burning a cross in protest against collaboration with the USSR – serve to construct the image of the American ordinary person, who is characterised by cruelty and obscurantism. The president and his policies find no support among the public. The symbolic hostile Other is further developed through documentary footage of American missile launches and nuclear weapons testing, with scenes depicting their devastating consequences.

The president declares that he shares Scott's assessment of communism but argues that the issue lies in the methods used to confront it, not in the sympathies.

The visual style of *The Conspiracy* constantly emphasises its journalistic and documentary character. To depict the secret military base of General Scott, chronicle and documentary footage are employed: robotic-like US soldiers training and marching – the “heirs” of Nazi Germany.

It is curious that the climatic confrontation – the verbal duel between the president and the general – portrays Scott in an unheroic light, far removed from the charismatic figure played by Burt Lancaster in the American film. The sharpness of the dialogue between the opponents is mirrored in the camera angles, which, through visual means, shows how the president at times gains the upper hand in the confrontation and at other times loses ground. The resignation is accepted, the document – Admiral Barnswell's testimony about the conspiracy – is destroyed, and the narrator concludes, “But the country will ever know the real reason for this resignation. This story never was and could not be.”

For the Soviet television audience, this story presented a disturbing image of contemporary American society: an honourable authority figure must act dishonestly; must conceal – and even that cannot protect him. In the final scene, Lyman is shot at a press conference. *The Conspiracy* ends with empty streets and a funeral procession. The final shot is an empty Oval Office. The divergence in the interpretation of Lyman and the people in these screen versions turns out to

be more significant than the portrayal of Casey. The shift of focus from the individual moral dilemma of the military-citizen (Casey) to the tragedy of the head of state and the nation seems characteristic of how the novel was reinterpreted in Soviet mass culture during the 1970s. Tokarev's rejection by the Yermolova Theatre in 1971 directly indicates a characteristic change in the portrayal of the symbolic hostile Other. And the film asserts the notion of collective guilt – that of both government and people.

***The Last Argument of Kings:* a TV report based on the novel**

The TV film *The Last Argument of Kings* (Posledniy dovod koroley, 1983, directed by Viktor Kisin) was made in a dialogical and journalistic style. Compared to the previous version, the voiceover commentator, who evaluates the characters' actions, is brought to a logical conclusion. The authorial perspective is clearly differentiated. Appearing on screen is Vladimir Dunaev, a prominent international journalist; a well-known TV presenter (*Today in the World* (*Segodnia v Mire*) and *International Panorama* (*Mezhdunarodnaia Panorama*)); and the screenwriter and the originator of the film's concept. He notes that since the novel was written by reporters who were familiar with the American political background, the film will adhere to a corresponding reportage manner that stylistically resembles the Soviet television reports of the 1970s–1980s on the United States from *International Panorama*. Dunaev delivers a reflective monologue at the close of each episode, seeking to place the events of the novel and the film within the context of recent US political history.

The Last Argument of Kings begins as a TV report on Americans' fascination with historical battle reenactments, especially those that commemorate victories, the commentator notes. Dunaev draws a direct parallel between Americans' distrust of President Lyman and the impeachment of Nixon, who, like the fictional president from the novel, signed the first treaty with the USSR on the limitation of nuclear weapons.

The film makes extensive use of various images of the United States, both in terms of

imagery and narrative. Three main categories can be identified:

1. Elements of state symbolism – the US flag, coat of arms, and institutional emblems, as well as archival footage of the Pentagon and the White House;

2. Images of militarism (military aggression) of the USA – documentary footage of US military personnel engaged in foreign conflicts; and

3. Images of peaceful, everyday life in America – fictional scenes of leisure activities (e.g., bowling, horse racing, and hunting), along with documentary footage of daily life in Washington.

The narrative, where the USA is shown as an aggressive militaristic state, is constructed through additional material introduced by the screenwriters – including dialogues, voiceover commentary, and episode content – that goes beyond the original novel. This revisionist narrative and the addition of new plot lines continue the tradition established by the earlier film *The Conspiracy*. For instance, in the novel, Colonel Casey first learns of the secret base when meeting with his fellow Colonel Henderson. The book contains only vague reflections of Casey on military service and camaraderie. However, their meeting in *The Last Argument of Kings* is a frank conversation between two career officers cynically discussing the country and its army.

In their effort to construct a symbolic hostile Other, the authors do not restrict themselves to rewriting dialogue. They add entirely new episodes absent from the source text. For instance, in the novel, Secretary of the Treasury Todd remains in the White House with the president. However, in the film, he carries out Lyman's task and goes to organise a counter-conspiracy. He arranges a meeting of the heads of corporations not affiliated with the military-industrial complex in the well-known Academy Park and proposes that they help block Scott's conspiracy – the proposal is accepted.

Hello, Comrade President!

The screenwriter of *The Conspiracy*, Anatoly Shaykevich, once again returned to the novel by Knebel and Bailey during the late Soviet period and wrote a new screenplay titled *Hello, Comrade President!*. This time, however, the playwright

shifted his focus to the political and social realities of his own time, constructing a fictional narrative around an attempted coup against the president of the USSR. While he meticulously followed the structure of the original political thriller, his version gradually drifted towards the conventions of the action genre. In *Hello, Comrade President!*, the characters are ambiguous. (The manuscript was approved, according to the visa from the State Committee for Cinematography (Goskino), on 11 October 1990).

The main character, Colonel Igor Voronin, races along the Garden Ring on a Honda in the opening scene, and a stream of news pours down on him:

“– The newly elected Chancellor of the United Federal Germany, Franz Clausman, has declared that he does not recognise the post-war borders! The people of Germany, he said, will never accept the separation of East Prussia, Silesia, the Sudetenland, and other historically German territories from the homeland.

– Mass demonstrations across Germany in support of his demands.

– A demarche by Poland!

– The President of Lithuania, Vytautas Damulis, has announced that his republic will soon apply for NATO membership.

– Demonstration of refugees from the Baltic States on Red Square!” [4, p. 2].

At the centre of the plot is Marshal Leonid Artamonov. The protagonist learns of the conspiracy from Yuri – an old friend who now serves as the head of staff of “Quarantine”, a unit with one hundred officers and three thousand soldiers at its disposal. From this point, the narrative unfolds in a manner reminiscent of *Seven Days in May*, though adjusted to reflect the late Soviet realities.

The attempted coup against President Uvarov is scheduled for the Sunday when the Supreme Council will be on holiday, the chairman and the minister of foreign affairs will be away in Italy, the minister of defence will be ill, and the president himself will be in a bunker in Achinsk.

A significant aspect of the characterisation of the president is his personal tragedy – the serious illness of his son – and a symbolic scene set in a church. Dmitry Ivanovich Uvarov and his wife, Irina Petrovna, visit the Archangel Cathedral in formal black. The scene highlights the

composure of the president's wife in dealing with the press. Both the president and the first lady are shown to know how to present themselves before the camera and seem to evoke the author's sympathies.

This script concludes with a press conference of the President, unfolding alongside the staged series of murders. However, the president firmly denies any claims of a conspiracy orchestrated by the generals. The moral of *Hello, Comrade President!* is that all power is criminal. The script was never produced, and a year later, the country in which the events were set ceased to exist.

Results. The shared approach to interpreting the novel, combined with the variety of channels for disseminating its content (theatre, radio, cinema, and television), enables us to identify clear patterns in the construction of the symbolic Other – not only as an enemy figure.

The symbolic image of the USSR as a peacekeeping country, strictly following the ethos of international relations and the cause of peace, underpinned the editorial and censorship amendments made to the first Russian edition of the novel. The Soviet Union positioned itself as the leader of the communist world and, undoubtedly, as the constituting Other. In this regard, any references to China as an equal partner – especially given the deterioration of political relations in the second half of the 1960s – were deemed unacceptable.

At the same time, the image of the state – the leader of the free world – was so significant for the identity of the USSR that even minor derogatory remarks in the novel were excluded, particularly in the 1990 edition. For example, at the aforementioned meeting of Colonels Casey and Henderson, the latter is the first to mention a secret base. However, the 1990 Russian edition retained the censorship of 1966.

Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the great interest of Soviet propaganda in the American novel was the conceptual framework set by its authors, who presented the structural heterogeneity and, at the same time, a certain uncertainty of state processes in the USA. This approach – criticism from within – gained prominence, which is clearly seen in the adaptations of the novel for theatre and radio performances. By the 1960s, Colonel Casey had

been transformed into a *raisonneur*, articulating the authors' critical stance on the unfolding events. Through Casey, the symbolic image of a hostile Other is constructed – a state portrayed as internally divided and therefore incapable of leading the capitalist world.

Although the figure of Colonel Casey Despite was somewhat toned down in the film adaptations *The Conspiracy* and *The Last Argument of Kings*, the key propaganda technique – critiquing the United States through its own cultural products – remained intact. Both Soviet film adaptations made extensive use of documentary newsreels, creating a form of “vertical montage” that aligned the novel's narrative with historical images and the characters' actions and speech. In this respect, it can be argued that the internal contradictions inherent in the construction of the symbolic hostile Other remained a stable element of Soviet discourse until the very end of the Cold War.

The interesting figure of President Lyman understandably attracted considerable attention from Soviet propagandists.

Throughout the media campaign examined in this article, Lyman consistently drew the interest of Soviet propaganda:

- in the 1960s, as a realist politician aware of the historical necessity of diplomatic arms control;
- in the 1970s, as a tragic figure opposing the system;
- and in the 1980s, as a cynical politician who views General Scott pragmatically as a dangerous rival.

A significant aspect in constructing the image of the symbolic hostile Other is the motif of the relationship between the president and the people. While in the 1960s, Soviet theatre adaptations downplayed Lyman's unpopularity, the 1970s saw the state and the people depicted as a unified force (*The Conspiracy*). In the 1980s, however, the American people are once again foregrounded but now portrayed as a weak-willed and inert mass (*The Last Argument of Kings*). This shift suggests a broader re-evaluation of the internal cohesion of elements such as the state, the president, and the people in the construction of the symbolic Other. However, it should be noted that the criticism of the American people and the state system in the 1980s differs significantly from the approach of the 1960s or 1970s. The inability

of the American people to fight inevitably means the end of the pan-Slavic ambitions of the USSR to serve as a global leader. Researchers have noted a pattern in the stereotyping of artistic solutions and the stagnation of propaganda techniques, not only in Soviet screen culture of the 1980s but also in the cinematic output of the broader socialist bloc [10]. It is thus unsurprising

that, on the eve of the collapse of the USSR, the unfilmed adaptation of *Hello, Comrade President!* (1990) relocated the narrative of the novel *Seven Days in May* to Soviet soil. At the same time, the authors unambiguously state the unviability of the state system of their own country: the conflict between civilian and military forces leads to mass unrest and numerous casualties.

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THE POSSIBILITY OF APOCALYPSE: THE NUCLEAR THREAT AS A PHENOMENON OF MASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN PETER WATKINS' THE WAR GAME (1965)

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Abstract. *Introduction.* This article analyses the representation of the nuclear threat in Peter Watkins's *The War Game* (1965) in the context of mass consciousness of the Cold War period. Unlike non-documentary films, where the event of a nuclear explosion is located in the zone of fiction, *The War Game* offers a hybrid form, combining fact and fiction. The film is seen as a response to historical events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, as well as a critique of public indifference and rigidity in the perception of the nuclear threat. *Methods and materials.* The methodological basis of the article is non-fiction film theory. Additionally, the analytics of apocalyptic thinking, collective trauma, and paranoid states developed in social psychology and psychoanalysis are applied. The material of the study is Watkins' film itself, read as a critical artifact that questions regimes of knowledge and visual representation of the nuclear threat. *Analysis.* The analysis follows the structure of the film: conflict escalation, nuclear strike, and post-apocalyptic survival. Each part demonstrates different forms of perception of the nuclear threat, from informational ignorance to the breakdown of social norms. Particular attention is paid to cinematic techniques that create the effect of presence and "television authenticity" that insists on documentation. The film creates a tension between fantasy and fact, demonstrating the combination of these elements in mass representations of the nuclear threat. *Results.* The article demonstrates that *The War Game* functions not only as an anti-war statement but also as a form of critical inquiry into collective representations of the nuclear threat. Watkins uses cinematic hybridity as a metaphor for the hybrid nature of public perception, where scientific data, fact, and fantasy are intertwined. Through the juxtaposition of fiction and documentary, the film is embedded in a cultural critique of the nuclear age and acts as a significant visual document of the Cold War period. *Funding.* The study was funded by RSF, Grant No. 22-18-00305-P, "The images of the enemy in Cold War popular culture: their content, contemporary reception, and usage in Russian and U.S. symbolic politics."

Key words: Cold War, nuclear threat, docudrama, Peter Watkins, nuclear paranoia.

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ВОЗМОЖНОСТЬ АПОКАЛИПСИСА: ЯДЕРНАЯ УГРОЗА КАК ФЕНОМЕН МАССОВОГО СОЗНАНИЯ В ФИЛЬМЕ ПИТЕРА УОТКИНСА «ВОЕННАЯ ИГРА» (1965)

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Аннотация. *Введение.* В статье анализируется репрезентация ядерной угрозы в фильме Питера Уоткинса «Военная игра» (1965) в контексте массовых представлений периода холодной войны. В отличие от игрового кино, где событие ядерного взрыва находится в зоне вымысла, «Военная игра» предлагает гибридную форму, совмещающую факт и вымысел. Фильм рассматривается как отклик на Карибский кризис и войну во Вьетнаме, а также как критика общественного равнодушия и ригидности восприятия ядерной угрозы. *Методы и материалы.* Методологическую основу статьи составляет теория неигрового кино. Дополнительно применяется аналитика апокалиптического мышления, коллективной травмы и параноидальных состояний, развиваемая в социальной психологии и психоанализе. Материалом исследования служит сам фильм Уоткинса, прочитанный как критический артефакт, ставящий под вопрос режимы знания и визуальной репрезентации ядерной угрозы. *Анализ.* Анализ строится в соответствии со структурой фильма: эскалация конфликта, ядерный удар и постапокалиптическое выживание. Каждая часть демонстрирует различные формы восприятия ядерной угрозы – от информационной неосведомленности до распада социальных норм. Особое внимание уделяется кинематографическим приемам, создающим эффект присутствия, и «телевизионной достоверности», настаивающей на документальности. Фильм создает напряжение на стыке фантазии и факта, демонстрируя сочетание этих элементов в массовых представлениях о ядерной угрозе. *Результаты.* Статья демонстрирует, что «Военная игра» функционирует не только как антивоенное высказывание, но и как форма критического исследования коллективных представлений о ядерной угрозе. Уоткинс использует кинематографическую гибридность как метафору гибридного характера общественного восприятия, где сплетаются научные данные, факты и фантазии. Через совмещение вымысла и документальности фильм встраивается в культурную критику ядерной эпохи и выступает как значимый визуальный документ периода холодной войны. *Финансирование.* Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 22-18-00305-П «Образы врага в массовой культуре холодной войны: содержание, современная рецепция и использование в символической политике России и США».

Ключевые слова: холодная война, ядерная угроза, докудрама, Питер Уоткинс, ядерная паранойя.

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Введение. Случаи репрезентации ядерной угрозы в кинематографе широко известны: достаточно вспомнить фильмы «На берегу» (реж. С. Крамер, 1959), «Доктор Стрейнджлав, или Как я перестал бояться и полюбил атомную бомбу» (реж. С. Кубрик, 1963) и «Система безопасности» (реж. С. Люмет, 1964). С. Крамер, С. Кубрик и С. Люмет работают с разными жанрами: научная фантастика, черная комедия и политический триллер, но во всех трех случаях событие ядерного взрыва располагается строго на территории вымысла. В неигровом кино проблематика ядерной угрозы разворачивается, во-первых, в рамках работы с хроникой: например, в советской документалистике кадры взрывов в Хиросиме и Нагасаки становятся составляющей антиамериканской холодновоенной риторики. Во-вторых, тема ядерной угрозы воплощается в обучающих и пропагандистских фильмах, нацеленных на информирование зрителя о действиях в случае атомной войны. В частности, из фрагментов именно таких

американских картин смонтировано знаменитое «Атомное кафе» (реж. Дж. Лоудер, К. Рафферти, П. Рафферти, 1983) – компиляционный фильм, деконструирующий параноидальную логику американской пропаганды. Телевизионный фильм «Военная игра», снятый британским режиссером П. Уоткинсом в 1965 г. для телеканала BBC, располагается на границе между игровым и документальным кино: Уоткинс смешивает режимы вымысла и достоверности, концентрируя свое (и зрительское) внимание на восприятии ядерной угрозы как «потенциальной» и на опасности такого восприятия. «Военная игра» предлагает тщательно сконструированную стратегию критики общественного сознания и состояния культуры, отмеченных параноидальным страхом перед атомной войной. Кроме того, «Военная игра» в значительной степени представляет собой реакцию на события Карибского кризиса и войны во Вьетнаме, что позволяет рассматривать фильм в том числе в контексте холодновоенного противостояния СССР и США.

В истории кино Питер Уоткинс известен как режиссер-мистификатор, одним из первых принявшийся совмещать факт и вымысел в кино. Его первый фильм, «Каллоден» (1964), в документальной манере показывал события битвы при Каллодене 1746 г., результатом которой стало поражение мятежников-якобитов силами правительственных британских войск. Исследователи отмечают, что фильм можно рассматривать в контексте осмысления событий во Вьетнаме: «Когда в конце 1960-х “Каллоден” начали показывать по американскому общественному телевидению, многие американские комментаторы прочли его как аллегорическую критику политики США во Вьетнаме и идеи “пацификации” территорий Центрального плато. Уоткинс продолжает отстаивать эту параллель в текстах на своем персональном веб-сайте» [5, с. 230]. «Военная игра» тоже является реакцией режиссера на мировые события: «По его собственным словам, он задумывал фильм как жест против “замалчивания причин обладания ядерным оружием” и для того, чтобы “заставить человека с улицы остановиться и задуматься о себе и своем будущем”» [4, с. 78]; «В течение двух лет [он] думал о фильме, который, по его словам, “разрушил бы текущее молчание” о последствиях применения ядерного оружия» [14, с. 1357]. Исследователи связывают кинематографическое высказывание Уоткинса с его симпатиями в отношении действий CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament – Кампания за ядерное разоружение) и прослеживают истоки замысла фильма в реакции Уоткинса на взрывы в Хиросиме и Нагасаки, а также на кульминацию гонки вооружений в ситуации Карибского кризиса [4, с. 79; 14, с. 1357–1358]. Таким образом, «Военная игра», не являясь примером легитимации идеологических максим времен холодной войны, встраивается в риторику этого периода. Судьба фильма позволяет проследить отношение к ядерной угрозе как феномену массового сознания со стороны властей и медиа; сам фильм обеспечивает критический взгляд на ситуацию ядерной угрозы, увеличивающееся международное напряжение и состояние общественного сознания.

Сюжет фильма прост. В результате эскалации международного напряжения между СССР и США и сочувствующими им блока-

ми стран русские и восточногерманские войска входят в Западный Берлин. Напряжение между коммунистическим и западным блоками растет, и в итоге на территорию Британии обрушиваются бомбы. Камера Уоткинса следит за ядерным ударом в графстве Кент, а затем задерживается на последствиях ядерной войны.

Этот краткий пересказ вполне мог бы относиться к классической версии постапокалиптической фантастики, популярной в игровом кино, но Уоткинс делает свой фильм в форме телерепортажа. Ручная камера и резкий, как будто случайный зум создают эффект присутствия оператора в точке событий, указывая на спонтанность съемок – как и прямые интервью с людьми на улицах. Закадровый комментарий вторит стилистике и логике привычных для 1960-х гг. телевизионных репортажей и конвенционального документального кино. В 1966 г. «Военная игра» получила специальный приз фестиваля в Венеции, а в 1967 г. – «Оскар» за лучший документальный фильм. «Военная игра» фиксирует несколько аспектов ядерной угрозы как элемента коллективных представлений периода холодной войны: страх перед ядерным взрывом, невозможность представить его последствия из-за тотального ужаса, неготовность обывателей столкнуться с этими коллективными аффектами, ригидность массового сознания. Рассмотрим, как фильм работает с каждым из этих аспектов, подробнее.

Методы и материалы. Фильм «Военная игра» обладает гибридной природой, поскольку режиссер объединяет стратегии игрового и документального кино. Исследователи гибридных форм неигрового кино отмечают, что их появление и растущая популярность связаны в том числе с ослаблением связи между фактическим дискурсом и определенным, закрепившимся исторически способом его репрезентации, а также с подрывом привилегированного статуса документального кино как достоверного источника информации [13, с. 3–4]. Даже на этой территории жанровая природа «Военной игры» – смешанная. Этот фильм обладает чертами двух разных жанров: мокьюментари и докуд-рамы. Первое понятие описывает круг фильмов, сюжеты которых оперируют очевидно

вымышленными событиями, а стилистика выдержана в документальной манере; характерной чертой этого жанра является ироническая или сатирическая интонация. Докудрама, напротив, воспроизводит реальные события, задействуя инструментарий игрового кино (актеры, декорации), но тоже в документальной стилистике. Формально фильм Уоткинса должен был бы относиться именно к мокьюментари, ведь ни ядерная война, ни ее последствия не обладают статусом реальности. Вместе с тем «Военная игра» отнюдь не сатирична, и иронии здесь тоже нет. Фильм претендует на документацию событий, которые располагаются на территории действительности, но не эмпирической, а иной – мышления и представлений.

Докудрама маркирована особым «документальным видом» (documentary look), который «конструирует социальное пространство вымысла» и создает «“документ”, который должен быть драматизирован» [3, с. 26]. Такие фильмы опираются на визуальный код неигрового кино; мир в них подлежит наблюдению и конструированию одновременно. «Если классический реалистический фильм в большей или меньшей степени зависит от иллюзии непосредственного видения, от прозрачности формы и стиля, то документальная драма оперирует риторикой опосредованного медиумом стиля, который четко обозначен, но заранее ассоциируется с правдой и нейтральностью» [3, с. 27]. Смешивая два противоположных модуса репрезентации, Уоткинс создает напряжение между двумя формами высказывания о ядерной войне: как потенциальном событии (вымысел) и как уже свершившемся (факт). При этом используемая информация тоже принадлежит двум разным модусам: где-то это факты, уже известные по научным исследованиям и по наблюдениям за последствиями взрывов в Хиросиме и Нагасаки, а где-то – предположения, проективные утверждения, коллективные страхи, воплощенные в документальной стилистике. Вымысел и факт в фильме не противостоят друг другу, как не противостоят друг другу и потенциальное и актуальное. Уоткинса не интересует разрыв или несовпадение между двумя этими режимами знания о ядерной угрозе; скорее, он направляет свое внимание на их сосу-

ществование. Такая стратегия обеспечивает критическую дистанцию по отношению к нескольким дискурсивным режимам существования ядерной угрозы. Уоткинс фиксирует и осмысляет ее на уровне холодновоемной идеологии, в рамках критики государственной политики информирования (и роли СМИ в холодной войне в целом) и как элемент общественных представлений.

Фильм «Военная игра» работает и с психической составляющей представлений о ядерной угрозе – состоянием паранойи и страха. Эти скорее бессознательные и проявляющиеся в культуре коллективные состояния в значительной степени связаны с отсутствием различия между событием как возможным (то есть вымыслом) и событием как уже свершившимся (то есть фактом) – что коррелирует с фильмической структурой, выбранной Уоткинсом. Среди теоретиков кино, социальных психологов, историков существование ядерной угрозы в общественном сознании осмысливается в терминах паранойи, апокалиптического мышления, катастрофических фантазий. Например, Синди Хендершот, обращаясь к репрезентации ядерного оружия в американской кинофантастике, отмечает свойственный этим фильмам аисторизм и мифологизацию. Аисторизм представляется Хендершот реакцией американской культуры на травматический опыт, связанный с переживанием коллективной ответственности за применение ядерного оружия. «Центральным элементом этого аисторизма является перевод проблемы в нечто универсальное, мифологическое – или, что более уместно, травма превращается в паранойю. Мир параноика – это иллюзорный мир, в котором исторические проблемы разыгрываются как мифические битвы между добром и злом» [7, с. 76]. Травматические переживания, впрочем, не обязательно связаны с чувством вины за содеянное. Речь идет о травме вообще – о невозможном, невыносимом переживании непредставимого. Сопоставляя психические реакции людей на природные катаклизмы с реакцией на постоянное присутствие потенциальной ядерной катастрофы, Уильям Майсснер пишет: «Обычные эмоциональные реакции на ошеломляющую катастрофу были налицо: отрицание, апатия, чувство вины и стыда за пережитое. Но у

ядерной катастрофы были свои уникальные характеристики, которые отличали ее от обычных бедствий. Лифтон (1964) описал «синдром катастрофы», который включает в себя элементы стыда и вины, разрушающие доверие к неопределенному и жестокому миру. Психическое закрытие способности к эмоциональному реагированию выполняет защитную функцию – человек может вынести только некоторое количество боли и потерь» [11, с. 98]. То, что игровое кино воплощает в вымышленных мирах, создавая в том числе метафорические или аллегорические образы современности, Уоткинс в «Военной игре» делает предметом прямой документации.

В параноидальном сознании мир конструируется как целостный: паранойя представляет собой «создание тотализующей системы. <...> Систематизация и теоретизирование, характерные для параноика, побудили многих комментаторов ассоциировать паранойю со знанием и системами производства знания *per se*» [8, с. 9]. Создавая фильм на границе игрового и неигрового кинематографа, Уоткинс проблематизирует способы производства знания о ядерном оружии и последствиях его применения наравне с более очевидным и частым сюжетом о природе страха, спровоцированного появлением ядерной бомбы. Этот аффект описывается социальными психологами и психоаналитиками как деперсонифицированный, несистематизированный, схожий с тревогой перед бактерией или вирусом, а также как рудиментарный страх перед неизвестностью [1; 9; 10]. Невозможность ни увидеть, ни помыслить объект этого страха, ни тем более укрыться от него создает поле для конструирования коллективных фантазий. В итоге в массовом сознании ядерная угроза существует как странный мыслительный объект, вбирающий в себя фантазийные конструкции, хроникальные образы, выдержки из научных данных и одновременно представления о закрытости, запретности этой информации. Комбинация этих элементов задает специфику «знания» о ядерной угрозе, которое деконструирует Уоткинс.

Гибридность этого знания, основанного как на фантазиях, так и на реальных данных, связана в том числе с особым типом мышления, которое психоаналитики называют «апо-

калиптическим». Мортимер Остоу сопоставляет апокалиптическое мышление в ядерную эпоху с древними апокалиптическими фантазиями о том, что все живые существа уничтожены, и указывает на то, что ставшая значительно более реальной угроза апокалипсиса «может создать впечатление не только жуткости, но и почти неизбежности» [12, с. 66]. Характерная для паранойи тотализующая схема объяснения мира в таком случае начинает инкорпорировать фундаменталистские идеи как политического, так и религиозного толка: «Отождествляя ядерную войну с Армагеддоном как “последней войной”, те из нас, кто ее боится, получают уверенность в том, что мы выживем и что то, что приведет к уничтожению всех остальных, приведет к нашему спасению, чем бы оно ни определялось. Это будет война, ведущаяся для нашего блага; мы будем победителями» [12, с. 68]. Эти настроения переживаются не столько индивидуально, сколько коллективно; более того, они становятся чем-то вроде социального клея, объединяя индивидов с варьирующимися взглядами в псевдосообщество. Уильям Майсснер отмечает, что параноидальные конструкции могут обеспечивать субъекту что-то вроде рамки, в которой возможно обретение «чувства принадлежности, соучастия, сопричастности, значимой вовлеченности и актуальности» [11, с. 94]. Правда, в таком случае и сообщество само окажется параноидальным; Майсснер использует слово «псевдосообщество», и здесь снова возникает напряжение между фактом и вымыслом, подлинностью и фантазией.

Таким образом, гибридность кинематографической формы «Военной игры» вторит двойственной природе общественных представлений о ядерной угрозе. В такой оптике отказ телеканала BBC включать работу Уоткинса в эфирную сетку можно рассматривать как свидетельство опасений, испытываемых медиа и, шире, властями по отношению к возможному изменению знаний и представлений о ядерной угрозе.

Анализ. Фильм Уоткинса можно условно разделить на три смысловые части, которые последовательно разворачиваются перед зрителем: эскалация международного напряжения и существование ядерной угрозы в ка-

честве потенциальной; актуализация угрозы (сама ядерная война); жизнь после апокалипсиса. В рамках каждой из этих частей Уоткинс документирует разные способы существования представлений о ядерной угрозе, постоянно совмещая логику потенциального и актуального. Первая часть представляет собой экспозицию причин начала ядерной войны. Китай вторгается в Южный Вьетнам, США планирует применить против первого тактическое ядерное оружие. С целью поддержки коммунистических сил русские и восточногерманские власти перекрывают подступы к Берлину и грозятся оккупировать западную часть города в течение 48 часов, если американцы не отменят свое решение. В Британии объявляют чрезвычайное положение, вместо централизованного управления власть передается местным чрезвычайным комитетам. Организована эвакуация граждан в более безопасные части страны. Большую часть деталей, как и положено в телерепортаже, нам сообщает закадровый голос (Уоткинс сам озвучивал фильм), вторя логике конвенционального документального кино, где в отношениях визуального и вербального последнее всегда оказывается более авторитетным, закрепляя смысл первого. Интересно, что, описывая внешнеполитические события, Уоткинс использует названия стран или обобщенные существительные вроде «правительства» или «силы»; понятно, что иначе и быть не могло, учитывая вымышленный характер повествования – но вместе с тем такие формулировки лишний раз указывают на распыление ответственности и десубъективацию действия по применению ядерного оружия. Камера не фокусируется ни на одном из событий надолго: Уоткинс использует быструю монтажную нарезку, и темп монтажа вторит стремительному развитию конфликта. Событийный ряд – только обрамление для основного сюжета этой части. Мнимый репортер с камерой обращается к (мнимым же) прохожим и спрашивает, что им известно о ядерном оружии, углероде-14, об их отношении к потенциальному вступлению Британии в ядерную войну. Граждане демонстрируют предельную инертность: что-то слышали, но толком ничего не знают. Уоткинс снимал по сценарию [4, с. 80], а на роли прохожих выбрал актеров-любителей, участ-

ников местных драматических кружков (фильм снимался в Довере, Грейвсенде и Тонбридже) [4, с. 82–83]. Детальный режиссерский контроль, совмещенный с эффектом спонтанности – метод, который Уоткинс декларировал в своих интервью [4, с. 80]. В итоге в первой части «Военной игры» ядерная угроза фигурирует как нечто, во-первых, неизменно присутствующее, а во-вторых – парадоксальным образом – отсутствующее в качестве объекта реального знания. Контраст между нарастающей вероятностью бомбардировок и своеобразным отказом от реальности, на который указывают ответы респондентов мнимого репортера, провоцирует еще большую тревогу и одновременно создает зону критического высказывания: кажется, что никто не в силах справиться с ядерной угрозой. Правительства стран не могут сдержать наступление войны, а местные комитеты терпят неудачи в организации эвакуации – и все это в том числе потому, что осознание ядерной войны как реального события со своими физическими, химическими, социальными и другими характеристиками отсутствует в массовом сознании.

Исследователи отмечают, что при подготовке сценария Уоткинс опирался на информацию, которую получил на консультациях с учеными, врачами, психологами, стратегами, специалистами по гражданской обороне; кроме того, режиссер основывался на руководствах по гражданской обороне и отчетах о бомбардировках британских, немецких и японских городов во время Второй мировой войны [4, с. 82]. Озвученные в фильме факты призваны не просто заполнить лакуну знания, которую Уоткинс обнаруживает в массовом сознании, но указать на ядерную бомбу как конкретную, измеримую, рационально описываемую реальность. Однако, как мы помним из исследований психоаналитиков и социальных психологов, природа ядерной угрозы такова, что никакое знание не может освободить субъекта от параноидального страха или деконструировать апокалиптическое мышление. Усилия режиссера располагаются, скорее, в этической плоскости: указывая на разрыв между ригидной системой общественных представлений, лишенной важных фактических данных, и реальностью, ими описываемой, Уоткинс фиксирует несво-

димось этих двух пластов знания друг к другу и вместе с тем запускает имплицитное антивоенное высказывание. Например, закадровый голос сообщает: «Если бы была война, то по меньшей мере 20 % территорий, использованных для эвакуации людей, стали бы полностью непригодными для жилья из-за выпадения радиоактивных осадков». Визуальный ряд очевиден: нужная в процентном соотношении часть карты небрежно зачирикана. Как уже было показано выше, тотальный апокалипсис почти непредставим; апокалиптическое мышление предполагает надежду на собственное выживание. Факты же эту надежду очевидно подрывают. Так, ядерная угроза на стадии войны как потенциального события оборачивается феноменом реальным, но немыслимым, и поэтому невозможным для осмысления в терминах осознанной ответственности за возможные последствия.

Вторая часть фильма представляет собой репрезентацию событий ядерной бомбардировки, как если бы они происходили здесь и сейчас. Уоткинс начинает репрезентацию удара с использования негативов и кадров с переэкспозицией: засвеченные изображения демонстрируют, как люди, корчась от боли, закрывают рукой глаза. Комментатор поясняет: бомба взорвалась в шести километрах от места съемки, и на этом расстоянии тепловое излучение обладает достаточной мощностью, чтобы выжечь глазные яблоки, вызвать ожоги третьей степени и воспламенение мебели. Двенадцать секунд спустя места достигает ударная волна: слышен грохот, камера трясется, моментально перемещаясь от дверного проема к потолку с качающейся люстрой, а затем – на крупный план искаженного гримасой ужаса и обожженного лица одного из героев. Все это длится секунд двадцать, не больше. Встык Уоткинс монтирует черный экран со следующим текстом: «Во время недавнего Вселенского Собора в Ватикане английский и американский епископы высказали мнение о необходимости церкви сообщить верующим, что они должны учиться жить, хотя бы и без любви, с ядерной бомбой, при условии, что она “чиста” и “из хорошей семьи”». Следующая монтажная склейка – и мы снова слышим крики боли и ужаса, из дыма взрыва кристаллизуется фигура ребенка, закрывшего лицо ладонями: коммента-

тор поясняет, что мальчик получил серьезные ожоги сетчатки глаза. Вставка титров с упоминанием церковных властей как будто напрямую иллюстрирует тезис о соотносительности апокалиптического мышления с фундаменталистскими призывами. Невозможная как объект рационального мышления и непредставимая в изображении (не случайно Уоткинс нарушает правила кинорепрезентации, пересвечивая пленку), ядерная война здесь размещается на территории публичной риторики, которая оправдывает военные действия, тем самым стремясь «перекрыть» травматическое переживание, и вместе с тем отвечает на характерную для апокалиптического мышления надежду на спасение. Эта логика будет продолжаться и далее – в словах о «праведности» войны в случае ответного удара, в сопоставлении современной ситуации с ритуалами ацтеков, которые приносили в жертву богам по двадцать тысяч человек, веря, что это позволит им сохранить вселенную в надлежащем порядке.

«Военная игра» продолжает «фиксировать» событие ядерного удара в реальном времени (динамичный монтаж и ручная камера, совмещенные с аутентичными звуками взрывов и криками настаивают на логике документации), однако закадровый комментарий переключается сначала на сослагательное наклонение, а затем – на повествование в прошедшем времени. «Это то, что могло бы произойти в Великобритании после ядерного удара по нескольким нашим городам. Так было после бомбежек Гамбурга, Дрездена, Токио и Хиросимы. Такое явление известно как огненный шторм». Уоткинс соединяет три модуса высказывания: о настоящем (манера съемки), о прошлом (отсылка к событиям Второй мировой войны) и о возможном (сослагательное наклонение в начале фразы). Гибридная природа ядерной угрозы как феномена массового сознания здесь становится очевидной: в документальном режиме Уоткинс воплощает на экране коллективные фантазии, основанные в том числе на визуальных артефактах Второй мировой войны и на привычных для зрителя кинематографических стратегиях репрезентации войны. На экране множатся кадры ужасающих последствий: разрушенные дома, извлекаемые из-под обвалов останки, увечья и ожоги, люди, страда-

ющие от неврозов и психических расстройств. Зритель вынужден балансировать между двумя режимами восприятия. С одной стороны, мы слушаем закадровый комментарий, в режиме информирования сообщаящий различные факты. С другой стороны, манера съемки создает эффект присутствия, предлагая зрителю позицию внутри репрезентируемого события. Паранойя, факты и образная система сцеплены до такой степени, что отделить фантазию от действительности больше не представляется возможным, что отражает специфику существования ядерной угрозы в виде гибридного феномена, где переплетены действительность и вымысел, рациональное и иррациональное.

Постепенно звуки взрывов затихают, и фильм начинает повествовать о том, что будет после ядерной войны. Невротические посттравматические реакции не пропадут, и люди не смогут забыть того, чему оказались свидетелями. Правительство решает вопрос с телами погибших: их массово сжигают, не пуская родственников к месту сожжения – так, по словам комментатора, было в Германии во время Второй мировой. В одном из эпизодов герой фильма, глядя прямо в камеру, рассказывает: «После бомбежек Дрездена немцы снимали с погибших обручальные кольца. Они пытались идентифицировать их по надписям внутри колец. Мы тоже так делаем. Мы держим кольца в этом ведре» – и камера переключается на жестяное ведро, на треть заполненное обручальными кольцами. Уоткинс здесь продолжает ту же логику, что и в комментариях с упоминанием бомбежек времен Второй мировой, но на этот раз точкой сопоставления становится не визуальный образ войны, а стратегия репрезентации травмы. Частый сюжет в исследованиях – тезис о том, что она не подлежит прямой демонстрации и часто проявляется через фигуры отсутствия. В «Военной игре» мы, напротив, имеем дело с манифестированным присутствием, интенсифицированным тем фактом, что на экране разворачивается документация событий, которые не произошли, но так, как если бы они уже существовали. В предисловии к сборнику «Травма: пункты» С. Ушакин пишет: «...Ни мастерство в развитии “чувства боязни”, ни совершенствование навыков замещения не могут устранить исходной ситуации –

пережитой утраты. Невозможность восполнить утрату ритуалами выживания, как отмечает Кэти Карут, может означать только то, что “само выживание... становится кризисом”» [2, с. 16]. Такой и оказывается третья часть «Военной игры»: сцены выживания в условиях ядерной зимы манифестируют неизбежное присутствие травмы. Так, кадр с изображением ведра, наполненного обручальными кольцами, маркирует присутствие жуткой смерти и невозможности исполнения традиционных погребальных ритуалов.

В «Военной игре» мир после ядерных бомбардировок – это мир необратимых изменений не только в тканях человеческого тела, но и в тканях социальных, экономических и политических. Люди впадают в апатию и безразличие, не хватает еды и лекарств, начинаются голодные бунты. Ожидаемый результат – активизация репрессивных аппаратов государства и перераспределение ресурсов внутри общества. Закадровый голос поясняет: «Возможно, что в ситуации голодных бунтов сокращающиеся запасы пищи будут сохранены для поощрения тех, кто выполняет грязную работу в интересах всего общества». Следующий шаг – конфликты между бунтующими и полицией, расстрелы несогласных, мародерство. Постъядерный мир – это мир распада социальных связей, моральных норм, сведение человеческого к инстинктивному. Таков ответ Уоткинса на логику апокалиптического мышления: деконструкция фантазии о спасении.

В конечном итоге «Военная игра» Уоткинса оказывается мощным антивоенным высказыванием. На протяжении фильма вводятся мысли о личной ответственности (один из персонажей, священнослужитель, говорит о том, что, передавая правительству право на убийство в ходе войны, гражданин тоже несет ответственность), о критике общества потребления, инертного к внешнеполитическим событиям («Как смогли бы жить американцы после ядерного нападения на Соединенные Штаты, если они привыкли к автомобилям, большим домам, телевидению, морозильникам и так далее?»), а ближе к финалу звучит фраза: «В течение следующих пятнадцати лет еще двенадцать стран, возможно, обзаведутся ядерным оружием. Так что... более чем

возможно, что все, увиденное вами в этом фильме, случится еще до 1980-го года».

Компания BBC не выпустила фильм в телевизионный эфир, но в 1966 г. он вышел в ограниченный прокат в кинотеатрах и кино клубах [14, с. 1353]; на телеэкранах «Военная игра» появилась двадцать лет спустя, в 1985 году. Причины цензурирования фильма подробно обсуждаются в исследованиях Тони Шоу и Джеймса Чэпмена [4; 14]; авторы опираются на архивные документы, ставшие доступными через несколько десятилетий после запрета. В официальном заявлении телекомпании говорилось, что «Военная игра» «является “слишком ужасающей для телевидения” и поэтому не будет показана» [14, с. 1365]. Сам режиссер связывал решение о запрете фильма с тем, что телекомпания BBC поддалась давлению со стороны правительства [14, с. 75]; представители BBC это отрицали. В 2017 г. была опубликована статья, где с опорой на рассекреченные архивные документы прослеживается взаимодействие разных институциональных и правительственных агентов, результатом которого стал запрет. Автор рассматривает эту ситуацию как пример тонко организованной, не прямой цензуры: «Цензура... может быть более вездесущей и эффективной, когда она интернализирована, то есть когда действуют условия, которые заставляют институциональных субъектов подчиняться по собственной воле, без необходимости потенциально неловких прямых действий со стороны самой правящей власти» [6]. Эта ситуация наглядно отражает природу холодновоемного конфликта – войны, ландшафтом которой оказывается не только эмпирический мир, но и само человеческое сознание. Запрет фильма связан с тем, что в ленте увидели действительность, а не вымысел. Таким образом, «Военная игра» – с проблематикой, отражающей содержание массового сознания 1960-х гг., с гибридной структурой, соответствующей двойственности ядерной угрозы как феномена массового сознания, со специфической судьбой – воплощает в себе логику мышления как зрителей, так и властей, захваченных холодной войной как специфическим состоянием сознания. Документальная составляющая в выбранной Уоткинсом гибридной кинематографической форме относится, таким образом, не толь-

ко к стилистике и использованию конкретных киноприемов, но и к содержанию. Локация фильма – не территория Великобритании, а человеческое сознание. Перемещая событийность из эмпирической действительности в область мыслимого и представимого, Уоткинс направляет камеру на холодную войну как особое состояние сознания, подразумевающее как определенные образы и идеи, так и мораль и систему ценностей. Именно это состояние сознания, надо полагать, и становится основным объектом критики режиссера.

Результаты. Итак, в тексте статьи было показано, что фильм «Военная игра», снятый в 1965 г., не просто создает образ мира непосредственно перед ядерной войной, во время нее и после, но работает с ядерной угрозой как феноменом массового сознания. Представления о ядерной угрозе отмечены своеобразной парадоксальной гибридностью: в них сочетаются реальные факты, научные данные и знания, основанные на последствиях применения ядерного оружия в Хиросиме и Нагасаки, и коллективные фантазии, сформированные в рамках апокалиптического мышления, характерного для мира, переживающего тревогу ядерной угрозы. Аффективная составляющая представлений о ядерной угрозе связывается с параноидальным страхом. Выбирая для фильма гибридную кинематографическую форму, объединяющую привычную для конвенциональной документалистики и телерепортажа опору на фактичность и достоверность с характерной для игрового кино категорией вымысла, Уоткинс решает сразу несколько задач. Во-первых, сама форма вторит специфике ядерной угрозы как феномена массового сознания. Во-вторых, режиссер выстраивает критическую дистанцию по отношению как к действиям средств массовой информации и политике информирования о потенциальной ядерной угрозе, так и к ригидности массового сознания. Указывая на непредставимость ужаса, который повлечет за собой ядерная война, и одновременно демонстрируя именно этот ужас в документальном режиме, Уоткинс обращает внимание на зону потенциального формирования травматического опыта, сопоставляя событие возможной ядерной войны с травматическими событиями Второй мировой. Наконец, благодаря своей

гибридной природе, фильм позволяет осмыслить холодную войну не только как геополитическое событие, но и как особый тип мышления, влекущий за собой определенную систему ценностей и мораль. Таким образом,

«Военная игра» вписывается в культурную критику ядерной угрозы, воплощает логику мышления периода холодной войны и одновременно документирует холодную войну как особое состояние сознания.

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THE THEME OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT IN WESTERN VIDEO GAMES OF THE 1980s AND 1990s

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The presented study explores how the theme of nuclear threat was represented in Western video games during the 1980s and 1990s. The research problem is the lack of a conceptualization of the impact of the narrative component and procedural rhetoric of video games of the relevant period on the perception of the threat of nuclear war and the events of the Cold War. *Materials and methods.* The empirical basis of the study was formed by involving the content of eight video games: Missile Command, Raid over Moscow, Rush'n Attack, Spy vs Spy III: Arctic Antics, Wasteland, Crisis in the Kremlin, Big Red Adventure, and Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game. The methodology of the work combines elements of comparative and structural analysis. *Analysis.* The narrative component of these video games and the specific features of their procedural rhetoric were examined. *Results.* It was established that the image of the nuclear threat in Western video games of the 1980s and 1990s was initially shaped within the framework of stereotypes of perception of American society, rooted in popular culture from both the Cold War and earlier periods. This image did not reflect the point of view of a specific political force. It was distinguished by high variability, which made it possible to orient the audience towards supporting both aggressive and moderate foreign policy. The influence of popular culture, on the one hand, actualized the content and structure of the image; on the other hand, it displaced it into the realm of fantastic escapism. As a result, it was only occasionally perceived as an existential threat to the USA, which determined a wide range of possibilities in terms of influencing the political thinking and behavior of the target audience. *Funding.* The study was funded by RSF, Grant No. 22-18-00305-P, "The images of the enemy in Cold War popular culture: their content, contemporary reception, and usage in Russian and USA symbolic politics", <https://rscf.ru/en/project/22-18-00305/>.

Key words: image of nuclear threat, video games, Cold War, USSR, USA.

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ТЕМА ЯДЕРНОЙ УГРОЗЫ В ЗАПАДНЫХ ВИДЕОИГРАХ 1980–1990-х ГОДОВ

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Аннотация. *Введение.* Представленное исследование посвящено вопросу репрезентации темы ядерной угрозы в западных видеоиграх 1980–1990-х годов. Научная проблема исследования заключается в отсутствии концептуализации воздействия нарративной составляющей и процедурной риторики видеоигр соответствующего периода на восприятие угрозы атомной войны и событий холодной войны. *Методы и материалы.* Эмпирическая основа исследования была сформирована за счет привлечения контента восьми видеоигр – Missile Command, Raid over Moscow, Rush'n Attack, Spy vs Spy III: Arctic Antics, Wasteland, Crisis in the Kremlin, Big Red Adventure и Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game. Методология работы выстроена

путем комбинации элементов сравнительного и структурного анализа. Изучены нарративная составляющая указанных видеоигр и специфика их процедурной риторики. *Результаты.* Установлено, что образ ядерной угрозы в западных видеоиграх 1980–1990-х гг. первоначально вырабатывался в массовой культуре в рамках стереотипов ее восприятия американским обществом как во время холодной войны, так и более ранний период. Данный образ не отражал точку зрения конкретной политической силы. Его отличала высокая изменчивость, что позволяло ориентировать аудиторию на поддержку как агрессивной, так и умеренной внешней политики. Воздействие массовой культуры, с одной стороны, актуализировало содержательное наполнение и структуру образа, с другой – вытесняло в область фантастического эскапизма. Как следствие, он воспринимался в качестве экзистенциальной угрозы для США лишь эпизодически, что детерминировало широкий спектр возможностей с точки зрения воздействия на политическое мышление и поведение целевой аудитории. *Финансирование:* исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда № 22-18-00305-П «Образы врага в массовой культуре Холодной войны: содержание, современная рецепция и использование в символической политике России и США», <https://rscf.ru/project/22-18-00305/>.

Ключевые слова: образ ядерной угрозы, видеоигры, холодная война, СССР, США.

Цитирование. Белов С. И. Тема ядерной угрозы в западных видеоиграх 1980–1990-х годов // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. – 2026. – Т. 31, № 2. – С. 212–221. – (На англ. яз.). – DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2026.2.18>

Introduction. The nuclear threat topic is one of the central elements of the mass culture in the 20th and 21st centuries. Public interest remained even after the real threat of direct conflict between the nuclear powers was minimized. A clear manifestation of this phenomenon is the popularity of cinematography with relevant plot elements, such as the feature film *Oppenheimer* (2023, Christopher Nolan) or the television series *Jericho* (2006, G.N. Bee), *See* (2019, Anders Engström), and *The 100* (2014, D. White). However, unlike the equally widely exploited pandemic or cybernetic phobias, the threat of using nuclear weapons in most cases includes a clear political labeling of the main culprits of the conflict. Due to this, the images constructed in the mass culture can serve as a framework for political perception among fairly broad segments of the population. A typical example in this case can be the role of the US's mass culture in shaping the image of the USSR as an existential threat to the United States in the minds of Americans.

The purpose of this research is to address existing gaps in the study of the topic, specifically by examining the representation of the nuclear threat in American video games from the 1980s and 1990s.

Materials and methods. The empirical basis of the study was formed by using the content of eight video games: *Missile Command* (1980), *Raid over Moscow* (1983), *Rush 'n Attack* (1985), *Spy vs Spy III: Arctic Antics* (1988), *Wasteland*

(1988), *Crisis in the Kremlin* (1991), *Big Red Adventure* (1995), and *Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game* (1997).

The methodology of the work combines elements of comparative, structural, and systems analysis. The first one is used in the comparison of options for representing the topic of nuclear threat in the case of specific games and two macro-periods (the Cold War and the post-Soviet era), while the second one is used to identify key elements of the relevant narratives and options for combining them in specific projects, and the third – within the framework of assessing the impact of the socio-cultural environment on game content and the potential influence of the gaming experience on the specific political perception of the target audience.

The theoretical basis of the research is D.V. Olshansky's concept of political behavior. It suggests that the algorithms of political behavior are formed in the following way: the specific framework of political perception causes a person to have certain feelings, emotions, and affects when receiving socio-political information from the external environment. The influence of these feelings, emotions, and affects leads to adjustments in the individual's political thinking, which, in turn, provokes the subject to exhibit political behavior [18]. It is important to note that this concept assumes the absence of a consistent (permanent) rationality in the political perception of the majority of individuals within society. This

is due to the predominance of the unconscious component of the psyche, particularly in conditions of information scarcity or overload, limited cognitive potential, and high cognitive rigidity.

We consider the impact of the specifics of political perception on political behavior in light of the fundamental principles of cognitive and situational approaches, as well as the social learning theory. This suggests that information signals coming to an individual from the external environment are initially interpreted in accordance with their pre-existing attitudes and beliefs, shaped by stable mental reactions. These interpretations are then adjusted as a result of the influence of the current conditions of the social, natural, and physical environment [3; 11; 16; 21].

A video game has the potential to influence a person's political perception, thinking, and behavior by promoting images that function as signals from the external environment. The concept of the "image" in this context is used from the subjectivist (constructivist) perspective. It suggests that the image is largely artificial and does not reflect objective reality. Being, on the one hand, the result of perception, it, on the other hand, sets its framework through a system of frames and constructs that determine the categorization of observed social reality. At the same time, a political image always possesses a meaningful (internal) component, which is a system of meanings and values designed to provoke a certain behavioral reaction in the recipient [24; 27].

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the representation of the nuclear threat topic (in terms

of its impact on political perception and audience behavior) in video games of the 1980s and 1990s through a system of appropriate images.

Discussion. The existing body of research on the subject is marked by significant gaps. As a rule, researchers focus on the cinema as the most popular segment of popular culture, while the representation of the nuclear threat in other formats is studied in a fragmented manner [10; 14; 22; 26].

A typical example in this case is the video game segment. Most researchers who study it reveal the topic of the nuclear threat either by analyzing modern game franchises (such as *Fallout*, *Call of Duty*, or *Metro*) or in the context of developing broader or related issues [2; 5; 25]. More often than not, the presence of the nuclear threat theme in game narratives is revealed in the background as part of studies examining the portrayal of the USSR [1; 4; 6–9; 12; 13; 15].

This has led, first of all, to significant gaps in the study of how the theme of nuclear threat was represented in early video games produced in the 1980s and 1990s. Meanwhile, it was the works created during this period that had the greatest impact on contemporary perceptions of the topic. The latter was caused, on the one hand, by the intensification of the confrontation between the USSR and the United States in the first half of the 1980s and, on the other hand, by the spread of fears about the restoration of the Soviet regime in Russia or the transfer of part of its nuclear arsenal to terrorist control in the 1990s.



Fig. 1. Poster of the *Missile Command* game

Analysis. In the 1980s, the topic of nuclear threat in video games was first touched upon in the arcade game *Missile Command* (1980). The game's narrative was designed as an imitation of nuclear war (Fig. 1).

In its original version, the game depicted a conflict between the USSR and the USA (later, after several media scandals, the confrontation between these states was replaced by a war between the fictional planets Zardon and Krytol). In accordance with the original concept of the developers, the player solved the task of protecting six Californian cities from nuclear missile attacks. Like all arcade video games, *Missile Command* had no win condition, i.e., it inevitably ended with the destruction of all cities. It is noteworthy that after the end of the game, instead of the typical *Game Over* message, the words *The End* appeared on the screen (Fig. 2) [7, p. 29; 13, p. 43].

It should also be noted that public perception was strongly influenced by references to other works on the topic of nuclear threat (for example, several visuals were borrowed from the movie *Damnation Alley* (1977, Jack Smight)), as well as by the specific historical context, including the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, the election of Ronald Reagan, and the subsequent deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union [12, p. 93].

In American society, *Missile Command* has attained the status of a cult phenomenon, closely associated with the representation of the nuclear threat in popular culture. For example, in the movie *Terminator 2: Judgment Day* (1991, James Cameron), John Connor appears in one of the scenes at the moment of his defeat in *Missile Command*, which is a clear reference to the theme of the inevitable outbreak of nuclear war (Fig. 3).



Fig. 2. End screen of *Missile Command*



Fig. 3. John Connor playing *Missile Command*

In addition, a clone of *Missile Command* is available to gamers on the Pip-Boy interface in the video game *Fallout 4* [6, p. 15; 9, p. 505].

In many aspects, *Missile Command* was the result of cultural and political trends that emerged in the early 1960s. According to E.V. Prosolova, after the first intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads were put on alert by both superpowers in 1959–1960, these weapons began to appear increasingly often in visual propaganda as one of the main symbols of war, and the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis only consolidated this trend. As V.I. Zhuravleva noted, the image of the nuclear apocalypse actually turned into a semantic code representing the conflicts between the USA and the USSR in the early 1960s. The events of the “détente” period contributed to certain erosion of the Americans’ “specter of fear” of the nuclear threat from the USSR, but this theme continued to be clearly manifested in U.S. popular culture (including in narratives promoting the idea of the madness of the perpetrators of the nuclear conflict and the re-examination of geopolitical concepts within critical reflection). Its actualization was facilitated, among other things, by the active exploitation of the image of the bomb during anti-war protests against the Vietnam conflict and green actions highlighting the risks associated with the use of atomic energy. However, it should also not be forgotten that the 1980s marked the heyday of the use of the atomic bomb image in many forms of political agitation in the United States (for example, in posters and caricatures) [19; 20; 28].

The theme of the nuclear threat is also reflected in the action game *Raid over Moscow* (1983). It differs from the previous game primarily in its conditionally positive positioning, which largely corresponds to the traditional American political propaganda from the early Cold War era about the necessity of a “crusade” for freedom against the USSR (Fig. 4) [19; 28]. Whereas the plot of *Missile Command* assumes the inevitable mutual destruction of the parties to the conflict (since they are portrayed as having parity in terms of nuclear missile weaponry), the developers of *Raid over Moscow* suggest the possibility of mitigating these risks. The main character of the game is a spaceplane pilot, capable of quickly striking Soviet missile silos in the Leningrad, Minsk, Saratov, and Kiev regions.

The plot also suggests that the United States has the capacity to land troops in Moscow and neutralize the USSR nuclear weapons control system. It should be emphasized separately that according to the plot of this game, the Soviet Union acts as an aggressor, while the actions of the United States are depicted as a retaliatory strike after receiving reliable information about an impending strike from the USSR. Moreover, the plans for a missile attack on the United States are presented as obviously criminal and unjustified, since their implementation follows the complete nuclear disarmament of the United States. Thus, the developers of the game, most likely, unconsciously, under the influence of prevailing media narratives (considering that this is a purely commercial product), promoted images of nuclear war that were, in many ways, identical to the narratives of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. The latter, it should be recalled, assumed high risks of a strike on the United States as a result of disarmament efforts during the “détente” period, while also suggesting the technical feasibility of completely neutralizing a nuclear strike from the USSR if the SDI program was successfully implemented [17, p. 21].

The creators of the game *Rush'n Attack* (1985, known as *Green Beret* in Europe and Japan) also addressed the theme of the nuclear threat. In the original plot of the game, the main character is a “green beret” who takes part in a mission to rescue American servicemen captured by Soviet troops in Afghanistan (Fig. 5). However, 1987 saw the release of a revised version of the game, in which the player was given the additional task of preventing the launch of missiles armed with nuclear warheads. It is worth noting that, in the game’s instructions, the player is described explicitly as a defender of the “free world.” Thus, the narrative of the game positions the United States and the USSR within the dichotomy of good and evil, with the presence of nuclear weapons in the enemy’s arsenal underscoring its role as an existential threat to the United States. A notable addition to the portrayal of the nuclear threat was the idea that the involvement of great powers in a regional conflict could serve as the prime cause of a nuclear confrontation. Nevertheless, this scenario was presented as conditionally optimistic, since it assumed the possibility of disrupting the launch of Soviet missiles through the use of sabotage and reconnaissance units [23, p. 224].

Thus, whereas in the early 1980s nuclear war was positioned in video games as an existential threat to the United States – one that, in principle, could not be averted in the event of a conflict between the superpowers – later games depicted these risks as relatively insignificant. The narratives of these newer video games incorporated assumptions that an apocalyptic scenario could be avoided, thanks to the scientific, technological, and overall military superiority of the United States. Moreover, these narratives hinted at the perceived necessity of facing similar risks when combating “communist expansion” in other parts, a portrayal likely influenced by both the foreign policy rhetoric of the Reagan administration and cultural constructs – specifically, notions of American exceptionalism and the United States’ quasi-messianic role on the global stage.

During this period, an anti-militarist portrayal of the nuclear threat emerged only in *Spy vs Spy III: Arctic Antics* (1986) and *Wasteland* (1988). In *Spy vs Spy III: Arctic Antics*, the confrontation between two spy saboteurs – symbolically representing the Eastern and Western blocs as equally unscrupulous forces – inevitably resulted in the launch of missiles with nuclear warheads in case of epy success of one of the characters (which caused a disruption of the existing balance of power). In this game (Fig. 6), we observe the developers’ explicit rejection of the traditional portrayal of romanticized “us” and hostile “others” (the “dark doppelgangers” of the West). At the same time, the creators of the game operate within the familiar logic of American political propaganda of the 1980s, which relied on the use of the emotion of fear. They also emphasize the theme of mutual responsibility




Fig. 4. Cover of the *Raid over Moscow* edition



Fig. 5. A frame from *Rush'n Attack*

between the superpowers, which is characteristic of the political discourse of that decade, by using juxtaposition that underscores the dichotomy of the images presented [19; 20; 28].

The plot of *Wasteland*, set in a post-apocalyptic world (and, most likely, was influenced by the movie *Mad Max 2* (1981, George Miller) and similar works in the genre), also presents a generally negative depiction of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR. However, the game is marked by a peculiar romanticization of the post-nuclear world and a lack of portrayal of nuclear weapons as a truly existential threat [4, pp. 61, 62].

In general, within the framework of the “Soviet enemy” image constructed in foreign video games of the 1980s, the theme of the nuclear threat played a key role, since it was the existence of atomic weapons and their delivery systems in the USSR that made it possible to portray the Soviet Union as a genuine existential threat to the United States. This, among other things, facilitated the archotyping and dehumanization of the “Soviet enemy” image, partly by changing its modality through depersonalization [2].

In the games of the 1990s, the theme of the nuclear threat was initially linked to the possibility

of restoring the Soviet system with the concomitant remilitarization of the USSR. However, the very possibility of the revived Soviet Union destroying the United States was not directly declared. For example, in the humorous project *The Big Red Adventure* (1995), the characters encounter the plans of the antagonist (identified as the “mad scientist” Dr. Virago) to literally resurrect Lenin and recreate the USSR as a militarized, expansionist-minded state. However, the representatives of the military elite who sympathize with the antagonist, as well as the conspirators in general, are shown more like comic characters, and the degree of threat within their perception is minimized.

To some extent, one can observe the reanimation of the image of the Soviet nuclear potential as an existential threat to the United States in the game *Crisis in the Kremlin* (1991), whose plot centers on the struggle between various interest groups for power in the USSR. Notably, both the conventional orthodox communists and the “Russian nationalists” led by the autocratic Boris Yeltsin are depicted as potentially hostile forces towards the United States capable of prolonging the Cold War. Thus, for the first time, the image of the nuclear threat to the United States was reconstructed directly from the




Fig. 6. Poster for *Spy vs Spy III: Arctic Antics*

perspective of the Soviet Union as a communist state. However, the scale of this threat was not existential, as the USSR was portrayed as a state experiencing a profound internal crisis.

It should also be noted that the positioning of the nuclear threat as a phantom menace – whether associated with the revival of the USSR or the rise of radical nationalists to power in Russia – was not limited to video games but was a feature of foreign popular culture more broadly (as evidenced by the plots of films such as *Crimson Tide* (1995, Tony Scott), *Air Force One* (1997, Wolfgang Petersen), and *The Peacemaker* (1997, Mimi Leder)).

A project such as *The Fallout: A Post Nuclear Role Playing Game* (1997) played a crucial role in the development of the nuclear threat in video games. In many respects, it echoed the content of *Wasteland* (1988). However, the plot of *Fallout* was the first to depict the confrontation of the United States with a power other than the Soviet Union or Russia as the cause of a nuclear conflict. Similarly, the game reinforced the notion that nuclear weapons no longer posed an existential threat; while their use resulted in mass casualties and significant degradation of material culture, it did not entail the extinction of civilization or humanity as a biological species.

Results. Accordingly, there was a gradual evolution in the portrayal of the nuclear threat in video games during the 1980s and 1990s. Initially, the nuclear threat was strictly associated with the Soviet Union, which was depicted as a state adhering to communist ideology and possessing sufficient scientific and technological potential – factors that contributed to the existential nature of the associated risks.

However, then the threat of a nuclear conflict later became associated not only with the possibility of restoring the Soviet system in Russia but also with the rise of an authoritarian regime in the Russian Federation, founded on radical

nationalist ideologies. Similarly, China began to be considered a potential adversary of the United States in a nuclear war, as seen in the *Fallout* franchise.

At the same time, there was a shift in the perceived status of the nuclear conflict threat between the United States and its adversaries. From the mid-1980s onwards, the scenario of mutual and total destruction of the parties during a nuclear conflict was increasingly replaced by alternative narratives – either the prospect of the United States neutralising the enemy's nuclear missile forces through its scientific, technological, and military superiority or the assumption that a significant part of the population and material culture could survive a nuclear conflict between major powers.

Concurrently, the development of the nuclear threat image was largely shaped by both other formats of mass culture and the official foreign policy discourse of the US authorities. A significant role in the formation of this image was most likely played by sociocultural attitudes inherent in U.S. society, including ideas about American exceptionalism and the messianic role of the United States.

All of this leads to the conclusion that the image of the nuclear threat in Western video games of the 1980s and 1990s was initially shaped largely within the framework of stereotypes prevalent in American society, developed during the Cold War and earlier periods. It didn't reflect the position of a specific political force and was highly variable, potentially swaying audiences to support both aggressive and moderate foreign policies. This created a wide range of possibilities in terms of the potential to influence the political thinking and behavior of the target audience. This situation was most likely a product of the image-related consequences of the crisis in the Soviet system during the 1980s, as well as the degradation of Russia's military and economic potential during the 1990s.

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THE MAKING OF LOU HENRY HOOVER: KEY FACTORS AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The introduction outlines the author's reasoning about the influence of various factors on the personality development of one of the most remarkable American women of her era – Lou Henry Hoover. The purpose of the study is to analyze this process through her upbringing, education, and the development of her key character traits. *Methods and materials.* The methodology of this study relies on both general scientific and specialized methods of historical research – primarily the historical-biographical, retrospective, and historical-systemic approaches, along with elements of the comparative-historical method. The research is grounded in the principles of historicism and historical objectivity. The materials used in this study include archival documents; memoirs; scholarly monographs and articles; biographical essays, as well as resources from the two main research centers dedicated to the 31st U.S. President Herbert Hoover and his family – the Hoover Presidential Library and Museum (West Branch, Iowa) and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace (Stanford University, Palo Alto, California) – in addition to various online resources. *Analysis.* The analysis section presents the main part of the article, covering family upbringing and education as well as the stages of the future First Lady's development – her formation of key character traits and her intellectual growth during childhood and adolescence. Archival materials are cited as examples, including essays by young Lou Henry, which reveal her worldview and distinctive personality traits. The author demonstrates the soundness of Lou Henry's choice of future specialty, along with the characteristics of her mentality and civic outlook. *Results.* The results of the study are presented in the author's conclusions. It is argued that the personal development of Lou Henry Hoover was shaped by a combination of external factors (environment, genetics, education, and culture) and internal factors (motivation, ambition, experience, and intelligence), and unfolded through several key stages connected to her early biography.

Key words: Lou Henry Hoover, First Lady, character development, factors of personal development, wife of the 31st President of the United States.

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ЛУ ГЕНРИ ГУВЕР: КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ ФАКТОРЫ И ЭТАПЫ ЛИЧНОСТНОГО СТАНОВЛЕНИЯ

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Аннотация. Введение статьи включает в себя рассуждения автора о влиянии различных факторов на личностное становление одной из самых выдающихся американок своей эпохи – Лу Генри Гувер. Целью исследования является анализ особенностей процесса личностного формирования будущей первой леди Соединенных Штатов, ее воспитания, образования, ключевых черт характера. *Методы и материалы.* Основу используемой методологии составили как общенаучные, так и специальные методы исторического исследования: в первую очередь историко-биографический метод, ретроспективный, историко-системный, а также элементы сравнительно-исторического метода. Предпринятое автором исследование в целом опирается на принципы историзма и исторической объективности. В качестве материалов используются мемуары, биографические очерки, архивные документы, научные монографии и статьи, включая ресурсы двух главных исследовательских центров, посвященных 31-му президенту США Герберту Гуверу и его семье, – Гуверовской президентской библиотеки и музея (в Вест-Бранч, Айова) и Гуверовского института войны, революции и мира (в кампусе Стэнфордского университета, Пало-Алто, Калифорния), а также различные интернет-страницы. *Анализ.* Раздел содержит основную часть текста статьи, включая особенности семейного воспитания, полученного образования, а также этапы личностного становления будущей первой леди: формирование ключевых черт характера, интеллектуального развития в детстве и подростковом периоде жизни. В качестве примеров приводятся хранящиеся в архивах различные материалы, включая эссе юной Лу Генри, раскрывающие оригинальность ее мировоззрения, уникальные черты личности. Автор показывает обоснованность выбора юной Лу Генри будущей специальности, характеристики ее менталитета и гражданской позиции. *Результаты* научной работы содержатся в авторских выводах по теме исследования. Автор приходит к выводу о том, что личностное становление Лу Генри Гувер происходило под воздействием целого ряда внешних (окружающая среда, генетика, воспитание, культура) и внутренних (мотивация, амбиции, опыт, интеллект) факторов, а также включало в себя несколько ключевых этапов, связанных с особенностями ее ранней биографии.

Ключевые слова: Лу Генри Гувер, первая леди, формирование характера, факторы личностного становления, супруга 31-го президента США.

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Introduction. My study is devoted to the peculiarities of the personal development of Lou Henry Hoover, the First Lady of the United States and one of the outstanding women of her era. When beginning to examine this problem, it is logical to ask what factors influence this process, a question of interest not only to historians but also to any inquisitive person.

It is generally accepted that personality development depends, first of all, on parents (family) and the social environment. Personality formation is a complex process influenced by various factors, including genetics, environment, upbringing, and social context.

Internal factors such as temperament and motivation also play an important role. The most significant factors in personality formation usually include geographical environment, culture, and life experience. According to experts, the formation of personality is based on the process of growing up through interaction with society. In sum, researchers generally distinguish two types of factors in personality development: external

(society, living, and upbringing environment) and internal (personal activity and the presence or absence of a desire for development).

It is difficult not to agree with the theses outlined above, but in this case, I would like to set the priorities more precisely. In my view, such factors as origin and the influence of the geographical and social environment in shaping the personality of the future First Lady are somewhat less significant than those associated with the formation of character. A well-known American proverb says, “Your character is your destiny.” This is probably true that among Lou Henry’s classmates there were likely girls similar to her in origin and upbringing who grew up in the same social and geographical environment, yet they could not compare with her in uniqueness of character and achievement. Beyond her unofficial title of *First Lady*, Lou Henry became renowned as the first American woman to major in geology at university; as a leader of the Girl Scouts of the USA; as an active and successful participant in charitable work; and – most importantly – for

always supporting her husband, the 31st U.S. President Herbert Hoover, together forming one of the most successful and creative “tandems” in American and world history. The Hoover couple was described as a “tandem” by Timothy Walch, former director of the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum (HHPLM). In his preface to a collection of articles devoted to the life, work, and legacy of the 31st U.S. president and his wife, he emphasized that “their marriage became one of the greatest unions in American history” [28].

The main goal of this study is to highlight the features of the personal development of the future First Lady of the United States, beginning with her origin, upbringing, education, and the formation of her main character traits – including those shaped by difficult turns of fate in childhood and adolescence.

Since the life and work of Lou Henry Hoover have long been the focus of my scholarly interest, I have published a number of articles examining specific aspects of this topic [20; 21]. In my recently published “biographical and bibliographical” essay on the First Ladies of the United States, special attention was also devoted to Lou Henry Hoover [22]. Nevertheless, I regard this study as an opportunity to present to all interested readers the most complete and synthesized version of a biographical work devoted to the main stages and features of the character development of such an outstanding and extraordinary figure as the wife of the 31st U.S. president, Herbert Hoover – Lou Henry Hoover.

Methods and materials. The methodology used in my study is based on both general scientific and specialized methods of historical research – primarily the biographical and retrospective methods, along with elements of the comparative-historical method. The study is grounded in the principles of historicism and historical objectivity. The main historical sources used in this work include scholarly monographs and articles, archival documents, and resources from the two principal research centers dedicated to the 31st U.S. President H. Hoover and his family – the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum (West Branch, Iowa) [9] and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace (Stanford University, Palo Alto, California) [11]. Additional materials were drawn from various

online resources, including the First Ladies section of the official White House website [4], the National First Ladies Library [18], and the National Park Service – particularly the First Ladies National Historic Site in Ohio [19]. Of course, it is worth noting the enormous role two people very close to Lou Henry Hoover played in preserving her legacy: her father, Charles Henry, who carefully preserved his eldest daughter’s childhood notes and drawings; and her beloved grandson, whom the family jokingly called “Pete” – Herbert Hoover III [8]. It should be noted that while several dozen monographs and biographical essays have been devoted to the 31st President of the United States, only a few biographical studies have focused on his wife [3; 16; 17; 24]. Having studied all the monographs devoted to the biography of Lou Henry Hoover, I would like to highlight the fundamental, very high-quality, and informative study of Professor Nancy Beck Young [30]. In one of her articles, Professor Young emphasized that it was easy to work on the childhood and youth of the future First Lady:

“Lucky is the biographer who has access to a rich and bountiful collection of primary source manuscript material. I could not ask for a more comprehensive collection of papers than that available for Lou Hoover. Her personal papers chronicle her life from birth to death and provide much insight into the all-important childhood and young adult years when the outlines of her character and personality took shape” [31, p. 20].

Analysis. Lou Henry Hoover (neither her family nor she herself ever used the full name Louise) was born on March 29, 1874, in Waterloo, Iowa. Interestingly, in the same state, just 50 miles to the southeast, in the small Quaker settlement of West Branch, her future husband, the 31st President of the United States, Herbert Hoover (1874–1964), who became famous as a politician, a prominent mining engineer, manager, and humanitarian, would be born six months later. So, Lou Henry was born in the very heart of the Midwest, in a town with the “historical” name of Waterloo. In addition to Iowa’s Waterloo, there are five more towns of the same name in the United States – apparently, settlers from one of them “brought” the name with them when they moved to a new place.

Among the factors in Lou Henry Hoover’s personal development, family upbringing was, in

my view, one of the most important. It is well known that the family is the first and most influential institution of socialization, laying the foundation for a person's character, values, morals, and worldview. The peculiarities of family upbringing can shape such traits as self-discipline, responsibility, and the ability to empathize. In this respect, the family into which Lou Henry was born can be considered almost exemplary. Lou was the firstborn child of bank employee Charles Delano Henry (1845–1928) and his wife, Florence Ida Weed Henry (1848–1927), both originally from Wooster, Ohio.

Returning to the question of family upbringing, I believe it's important to note that Lou's father played the most important role in her personal development. When the family was expecting their first child, Charles dreamed of a son, imagining them hiking, fishing, and hunting together. Even though the baby was a girl, her father's dream undoubtedly came true – Lou happily and willingly participated in all his activities. The atmosphere in the close-knit Henry family, based on mutual respect and shared values, allowed each of its members to grow successfully (primarily spiritually) and develop intellectually.

The next most important factor in Lou Henry's personal development was, of course, the education she received. There is no doubt that receiving a quality education, both at school and higher education, broadens horizons, develops critical thinking, and provides opportunities to cultivate intellectual abilities. Success in studies often reflects motivation for self-development, ambition, a desire for self-realization, and intelligence.

It should be noted that the issues of Lou Henry's genealogy and her development in childhood, as well as the first stages of education in kindergarten and elementary school, were explored in detail by me in one of my previous publications [23].

After several unsuccessful attempts to find a suitable place to live for Florence (primarily due to her health issues, the Henry family moved briefly to Kansas and then for a year and a half to Texas), they finally moved to the West Coast in 1887, to the newly founded Quaker town of Whittier, California. The HHPLM archives contain a description of this town written by thirteen-year-old Lou Henry in a letter to the editor of *St. Nicholas*

Magazine – a popular illustrated monthly for children (circulation 40,000). The letter, published in December 1887, is notable because it describes a settlement founded only about a year earlier. Here is its slightly abbreviated text:

Dear St. Nicholas,

Although I have been subscribing and reading you for about seven years, this is my first attempt to send you a letter, and I hope it will be the first I have mailed from Whittier, as our town is not yet a year old and has only about a thousand inhabitants.

We are all sure that it is situated in one of the most beautiful places imaginable, in the foothills of the Puente Hills, about twenty miles from the Pacific coast... The town is 500 feet above sea level, and overlooks the beautiful valleys of Los Nietos and Santa Ana, with their orange groves, vineyards, etc. The surrounding hills, 1,500 feet high... afford excellent opportunities for picnicking and exploring. We girls love to do this, and there is little left to explore.

Most of the people of Whittier are Quakers (members of the Society of Friends), so the most appropriate name for the settlement was the name of an outstanding Quaker poet (the city was named after the famous abolitionist poet John Whittier, 1807–1882), and most Whittierites are as proud of the name of the city as they are of the city itself.

Quaker College, built on the Pacific coast (its construction cost 100,000 dollars), is also located in Whittier, and the land surveying of the buildings (squares, parks) is almost completed. The college is located on a fairly high hill and will be visible from afar. Our best hotel is "The Greenleaf" – it is said to be one of the best in the southern part of our state... I am in my fourteenth year and my native state is Iowa, but I have also lived in Kansas and Texas. But California is my favorite, for here we can look around and see the ocean, the mountains, the valleys, the eternal snows and the endless summer.

I am afraid that my description of the place will seem a little "dry" to you, but if it is published, I will write you again to tell you about one of our excursions, a picnic, etc. I would like to wish that your readers from the northern states could visit this sun-warmed

land, and I am sure they will enjoy it as much as I do. Goodbye, dear St. Nicholas, with love and best wishes from California, your friend and constant reader, Lou G... [9].

It should be noted that, inspired by the publication of her letter to the editor of a popular magazine, later, in 1896, Lou Henry sent another manuscript to the editor – a short story entitled “The Chiquita Trout,” which, unfortunately, was not published, but its text has been preserved in the HHPLM archives [5].

As we can see, Lou Henry truly loved California, its natural beauty, and especially the mountains – let us remember that she had grown up among the endless prairies of the Midwest. “My father loved the mountains very much, and whenever he had free time, we would go hiking. It was very exciting, since this territory was completely unfamiliar to us,” Lou Henry later recalled [13, p. 79].

There was no noticeable improvement in her mother’s health, but soon, in the early 1890s, Lou Henry’s family “discovered” the city of Monterey, located on the Pacific coast of California. Some aspects of its “foggy” climate helped reduce the cough, and the family eventually “settled” there permanently.

In this town, Lou Henry’s father founded a local bank, and she received a certificate of secondary education. One of the biographical studies noted the special role of Charles in the academic success of his daughter – in particular, it mentions the fact that Lou Henry was about to drop out of high school, but her father firmly insisted on her completing her studies [31, p. 20]. An interesting story is associated with Lou Henry’s high school graduation. In early 2013, while visiting the Hoover Presidential Library and Museum as a finalist in the Fulbright Research Program, the author had the opportunity to witness a significant discovery made by the archivists. Not long before this, one of Lou Henry Hoover’s nieces had passed away, and her heirs decided to transfer some of the First Lady’s personal belongings, previously kept in her home, to the collections of this research center.

Among other materials was the high school diploma Lou Henry received on June 19, 1890. It was housed in its original, very old frame, which was clearly in need of restoration or even replacement. When the certificate was removed

from the frame, archivists discovered that several pages of handwritten text had been stored between it and the back of the frame for more than 120 years. Upon unfolding this unexpected find, they revealed the text of Lou Henry’s graduation speech, delivered to her classmates, teachers, and school administration – speeches that, in the United States, are traditionally given by the top graduates.

I will cite here a fragment – approximately one-third – of this speech, delivered by 16-year-old Lou Henry on her graduation day. It is entitled “Little Jack Horner,” after one of the characters from the “Mother Goose” series of children’s stories familiar to every American:

We are all more or less familiar with one of Mother Goose’s favorite poems –

Little Jack Horner

Sat in a corner, eating a Christmas pie.

He stuck his thumb in and pulled out a plum.

And said, “What a good boy I am!”

...Suppose we were all little Jacks, and the pie from which we were so eagerly picking was our own great world. What a strange sight! – Each little Jack so persistent in his search – and each so eager that his neighbour should not find the plum.

Each of them so important in his little corner, but... so few who become successful enough to be easily noticed in the pie. Usually, we see that it is those who were unnoticed at first, and who have worked their way up, steadily, quietly, and surely.

It is astonishing how many ways we have of getting on with our plums! Some begin very gracefully, simply picking off bits from the edge, frightened at first, but still willing to make the bold attempt and secure their prize. Some are perfectly content with small morsels, and never go below the crust of the pie. Others are overwrought, hunting for prey all their lives, but all to no avail... Other people are continually running past the little plums which they have not deigned to notice, but are still hunting for the big ones, which they never find; – for it is as true in Christmas pie as in the rest of the wide world – if the little things are neglected, the bigger things never come.

There are people who pass right over their plums and do not see them, or, seeing them, do not know what they are, and so

cannot provide them for themselves through their own fault, but they will doubtless bewail the fate that has left them without plums. Some people toil through most of their lives until their plums appear, and then cannot enjoy them. For there comes a time when even plums cannot satisfy – plums from our great world cake, as well as from Christmas cake. But more often than not, the longer it takes to find them, the more satisfying when they are found...

And how many kinds of plums there are! There are sweet plums and sour plums, green plums and ripe plums, small plums and large plums... And how strange that the same plum will affect the tastes of different people. – Here, for example, is a little “musical” plum, which someone has just discovered and then thrown back in disgust, but in a moment some other little Jack will snatch it up and carry it off in triumph. And so we find that everything in this world (and this pie) that is green and sour to one little Jack may be big and sweet to another... And now, when we are about to start looking for our plums, and the crust of the pie is still intact, we lift the edge with no small curiosity and look inside. What is inside looks very attractive, and we think we see plenty of plums, but whether we shall have them or not depends entirely on ourselves.

Let us be very careful in our choice, not to pick the first one we see, but to consider, after we have it, whether we shall be truly satisfied... For we cannot depend on our pie or our plums, and after a while it will be too late to “pick” more, and we shall have only those which we picked in our youth, and perhaps, to our sorrow, we shall regret our choice... And let us not confine ourselves to plums of one kind...

Will we all sit in one corner and hunt for our plums together, as we have searched for the knowledge by which they can be found, and will we share equally what we find, or will one of us, having with great labor and skill secured for himself the greater part, look proudly at the rest and exclaim, “What a good boy I am!”

...Time will tell... [5]

Little additional commentary is required, as the speech reflects exceptional thoughtfulness for someone of sixteen years. It seems to me that any parent would be delighted if their sixteen-year-

old child could express ideas in such an extraordinary and creative manner. I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that Lou Henry’s speech is full of metaphors and wordplay – and that this particular fairy tale was most likely chosen intentionally. In English, the word “plum” has several different meanings. First, it denotes the fruit itself, but it can also mean “a tasty morsel,” “the best thing,” and “the cream,” and in colloquial American usage, “a lucrative position” or “a profitable job” (as in the expression “plum job” – “a cushy job”). When encountering the word ‘plum’ in the text, mentally substituting these alternative meanings allows the passage to take on a slightly different sense – the one that, it seems, Lou Henry intended for her speech.

For readers who may find Lou Henry’s speech too allegorical or complex, it should be remembered that I am discussing the late 19th century, when people spoke – and thought – in a very different manner, and essays – political, literary, or religious – were a common way of expressing one’s feelings and ideas. In the same year, 1890, a few months earlier, Lou wrote another essay in pencil, dated January 31, in which she presented her vision of the concept of the “Independent Girl.” Here is its full text:

The Independent Girl is really quite modern in origin, and is, as a rule, the most bewitching little piece of humanity. Although the word may be taken in many different senses, but the generally accepted one nowadays refers to an ambitious little character who never asks for anything and seldom receives any advice; who will not seek help from anyone, especially if she slightly suspects that the offer was prompted by even a little feeling of charity or sympathy for herself. She prefers to fight her own battle in this life and approaches each encounter with an amazing fighting spirit.

If there are several pairs of admiring or doubting eyes watching her line of conduct, she finds pleasure in the fact that, meeting many obstacles in her path, she overcomes them with a clever engineering solution, or outflanks them with a skill worthy of a great army strategist.

An independent girl is a person whose wrath only the bravest dare to resist, and then, no doubt, with inner fear and trembling.

But sooner or later she is sure to meet a man as independent as herself, and then – a clash occurs, ending in a fight to the death, or they join forces and go forward together, towards the world [6].

As we see, the author of the essay certainly considers herself to be an independent girl and begins to imagine her future life partner – as modern and independent as she is...

Another essay, on the topic of universal suffrage, was written in 1889. Lou Henry was only 15 years old at the time, yet she was already actively engaged in women's civil rights. In this essay, she argued against the classification of women alongside the "feeble-minded, maniacs, and criminals." She also criticized the authors of the bill that infringed on women's rights [31, p. 20].

During her time as a senior at the "Bailey Street School," Lou Henry enjoyed attending various elective classes, topics ranging from geology to literature. Thus, one day at a school masquerade, she appeared in the guise of Joan of Arc – wearing armor hand-carved from tin disks [13, p. 79].

Speaking of the character of the heroine of this study, which had been almost fully formed by the period described, we should particularly note that Lou Henry's distinctive qualities were, above all, her striking self-sufficiency, insight, and independence, including independence from outside opinions. "It is not so important what others think of you," she once noted in a conversation with one of her classmates, "what is much more important is what you yourself feel deep down inside" [29, p. 18]. According to another acquaintance of Lou Henry, she "could seem skeptical and even a little cynical, while remaining a very sweet and charming girl" [26, p. 71].

After graduating from high school in 1891, Lou Henry went to Los Angeles, where she attended State Normal School, but then, in 1892, transferred to a similar school in San Jose, now called San Jose State University.

While studying in Los Angeles, she was active in a club called "The Agassiz Club" [13, p. 79]. This club consisted of young female students who met regularly, about once a week, to contribute to the college museum collection. They collected unusual, unique pets [15].

It was during her student years that Lou Henry became actively interested in politics, clearly

preferring the Republican Party – in her opinion, the most far-sighted and progressive at that time. One of her student works is called "Why I am a Republican." Lou Henry explains her dislike of the Democrats for their decision to secede from the Union during the Civil War. Judging by the course syllabi for 1892–1893 preserved in the archives, Lou Henry studied a wide variety of disciplines in college – from the humanities, such as Professor Melville B. Anderson's course on Representative Poets of the 19th century (G. Byron, W. Hugo, P. Shelley, A. Tennyson, etc.), to socio-economic courses like "Poverty and Pauperism in the United States."

In addition to her main classes, Lou Henry attended the "University Extension Club of San Jose." It was there in the fall of 1892 that she had attended the course on geology taught by Professor John Casper Branner. According to the schedule of classes preserved in the archives, lectures were given on Wednesdays, starting at 7:45 a.m. The course sections included Volcanoes, Volcanic Mountains, and Metamorphism of Rocks, and one of the lectures was titled "The Geological Work of Heat" [7].

It is generally accepted among Lou Henry's biographers that it was Professor Branner and his series of inspired lectures on geology ("The Bones of the Earth"), given in the summer of 1894 in Monterey, which Lou Henry allegedly attended by chance, that prompted her to enroll in the geology department at Stanford University. As we see, contrary to this version of events, the main character of our story did not meet Dr. Branner for the first time, nor by chance in the summer of 1894 – she had studied geology under his guidance one and a half to two years earlier, beginning in the fall of 1892, within the walls of the college in San Jose.

After graduating from San Jose Normal School in May 1893, Lou Henry received a teaching degree like her mother Florence, and after working briefly as an assistant cashier at her father's bank, she then began working in her specialty as an elementary school teacher in Monterey, teaching third-graders [30, p. 10]. But, having begun working in her specialty, the future first lady quickly realized that teaching was not her calling. Increasingly, in conversations with her parents, she tried to justify her new choice. "I love field research," she said, "and I want to know how this world is made –

that's what I'm going to study in geology" [29, p. 18]. Researchers note that at that time, sending daughters to study at a university was still considered somewhat unconventional, but Lou Henry's family was progressive enough that no one interfered with her desire [12, p. 65].

At that time, tuition at Stanford University was free, which made it very attractive to potential students and their parents. Since Stanford University was a charitable project for its founders, Leland and Jane Stanford, in memory of their prematurely deceased son Leland Jr., the tuition fee was first charged to Stanford students only in the 1920–1921 academic year in the amount of \$120 per year [27, p. 13]. Luckily, the distance from Monterey to Palo Alto was just under 90 miles, which wasn't that far by California standards.

Stanford University, whose campus was built on lands owned by Leland Stanford in the picturesque Santa Clara Valley near Palo Alto, 55 kilometers south of San Francisco, and named after Leland Stanford Jr., opened in the fall of 1891. The Geology Department was established in the year of the university's opening, and its first students numbered 11 young men, among whom was the future 31st US President, Herbert Hoover. In total, in the first year of the new university's existence, 555 young people became its students – this generation of the first "Stanfordians" would be proudly called the "pioneer" class ... Its first president was a talented ichthyologist, and most importantly – an outstanding administrator, who had previously successfully headed Indiana University, Dr. David Starr Jordan.

Lou Henry was accepted into the Stanford University Geology Department three years later, in the fall of 1894. She became the first female student in this all-male department [1, p. 21]. In addition to geology courses, she chose to study Latin, chemistry, and a literature-related subject.

A new, and perhaps the most vivid and interesting, period of her life began... Researchers generally report very superficially on the details of Lou Henry's time at Stanford, usually limiting themselves to noting her status as the first female geologist and her meeting with her future husband. Of course, this is clearly insufficient to recreate the full picture of Lou Henry's eventful student years. It should also be noted that during her time

as a student, the future First Lady excelled academically, was actively involved in sports, distinguished herself in extracurricular activities, and left a lasting positive impression – according to the university's first president, Dr. Jordan, Lou Henry was "one of the most talented women ever to study at Stanford" [12, p. 83]. It was here that she met her future husband, Herbert Hoover.

Herbert himself first mentioned his future wife in November 1894: "We have a young girl who has chosen geology as her specialty – a very nice, lovely young lady" [14, p. 8]. "I felt it my duty to aid the young lady in her studies both in the laboratory and in the field. And this call to duty was stimulated by her whimsical mind, her blue eyes, and a broad grinnish smile...", notes Herbert Hoover in his "Memoirs" [10, p. 23]. The meeting with Lou Henry took place in the laboratory of the first dean of the Department of Geology and Mining, Dr. John Casper Branner. Such meetings are usually called fateful. The future 31st president of the United States later called this event "the most important in his life" [25, p. 26]. Lou Henry, in turn, also referred to her acquaintance with Herbert Hoover as "her most important acquisition at Stanford" [26, p. 71]. The acquaintance would soon develop into friendship and then into a strong relationship, despite various circumstances and great distances – Herbert Hoover, after graduating from Stanford University in 1895, left two years later to work on a contract in Australia. Their wedding would take place in early 1899 in Monterey. Ahead of them lay 45 years of happy life together...

Results and conclusion. I would like to emphasize once again that Lou Henry Hoover's personal development was influenced by a number of external (environment, genetics, upbringing, culture) and internal (motivation, ambition, experience, intelligence) factors and also included several key stages related to the peculiarities of her early biography. The first, childhood stage of the future First Lady's development took place in Waterloo, Iowa – it can be conditionally called "Iowa" – and the second, adolescence ("teenager"), was associated with the Henry family's move to Whittier and then Monterey – "California." At the same time, the less significant "transitional" period ("Kansas" and "Texas") also, in my opinion, played a role in the formation of Lou Henry Hoover's character and personal development, expanding

her horizons and knowledge of her own country in all its geographical and cultural diversity. The next most important stage in Lou Henry's life was entering Stanford University and meeting her future husband, Herbert Hoover, with whom she would go through a long and fruitful journey together, including their ascent to the heights of political Olympus.

The combination of the above stages and factors in the personal development of the future First Lady and their interrelation led, in my opinion, to the formation of the unique character traits of Lou Henry Hoover – a personality who was integral, creative, charismatic, and unique in her own way. She was an outstanding American –

a wife, mother, philanthropist, fighter for women's rights, polyglot, and opinion leader. As the First Lady, Lou Henry Hoover was a symbol of the nation, a role model, a “style icon,” a moral compass, and a person who left behind a huge creative and humanitarian legacy. I have tried to analyze the features of the formation of the main traits of her character in childhood and adolescence, since, as the outstanding Russian educator V.A. Sukhomlinsky said, “the years of childhood are, above all, the education of the heart” [2]. It was the “correct education of the heart” of Lou Henry Hoover during her childhood and adolescence that led to such an excellent result.

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