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A FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY'S FORMATION BY UNITED STATES PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP IN 2025

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Abstract. *Introduction.* The presidency of Donald Trump's second term is significantly different from his first term. Therefore, the article's objectives were to analyze a foreign policy strategy's formation and the political technologies used by the American president's administration on the international arena in cooperation with other countries in the first year of his presidency. *Methods and materials.* The scientific principle of objectivity and the evolutionist scientific approach were used as methodology in the article. E.M. Primakov – M.A. Khrustalev's method of situational analysis in international relations was used as the main scientific method. The article's author used some materials from American news publications, official White House reports, and American analysts and experts' opinions from other countries. *Analysis.* A comparative analysis revealed changes in the United States' foreign policy approaches and new American political technologies both in the field of international trade and in maintaining its hegemony. *Results.* The study showed that the United States faced new challenges in world politics in 2025 and was not ready to solve them. The United States itself has added the problem of tariffs to the international trading system. The United States has not been able to develop a sufficiently flexible foreign policy strategy or doctrine. The political technologies used by the United States in international relations are still insufficiently effective and efficient. "The art of the deal" in world politics used by Donald Trump is faced, if not with misunderstanding, then in many cases with rejection because it allows the United States to change previously adopted agreements. In addition, the American principle of getting the desired result "through force" does not work in many cases, especially in relations with China, Russia, Iran, and other countries. Formally, "The United States Foreign Policy Strategy 2025," adopted and published in December, outlined the path in the foreign policy of the President Donald Trump administration for the remainder of his second term, which is to maintain the principles of national conservatism bequeathed by the United States founding fathers.

Key words: United States, Israel, Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Donald Trump, trade tariffs, international conflicts.

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ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ СТРАТЕГИИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТОМ США Д. ТРАМПОН В 2025 ГОДУ

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Аннотация. *Введение.* Президентство второго срока Д. Трампа значительно отличается от его первого срока. Поэтому задачей статьи стал анализ формирования внешнеполитической стратегии, используемой администрацией американского президента на международной арене по взаимодействию с другими странами в первый год своего президентства. *Методы и материалы.* В статье в качестве методологии были использованы: научный принцип объективности и эволюционистский научный подход. В качестве основного научного метода применялся метод ситуационного анализа в международных отношениях Е.М. Примакова –

М.А. Хрусталёва. В статье были использованы материалы американских новостных изданий, официальные сообщения Белого Дома. *Анализ.* Сравнительный анализ позволил выявить изменения во внешнеполитических подходах США, новые американские политические технологии как в сфере международной торговли, так и в вопросе поддержания своей гегемонии. *Результаты.* Проведенное исследование показало, что США в 2025 г. столкнулись с новыми вызовами в мировой политике и оказались неготовыми к их разрешению. Сами США добавили себе проблему тарифов в международной торговой системе. США не смогли выработать достаточно гибкую внешнеполитическую стратегию или доктрину. Используемые США политические технологии в международных отношениях пока недостаточно эффективны и результативны. «Искусство заключать сделки» Д. Трампа в мировой политике наталкиваются если не на непонимание, то во многих случаях на непринятие, потому что оно позволяет США менять ранее принятые договоренности. К тому же американский принцип получение нужного для себя результата «через силу» – во многих случаях не работает, особенно в отношениях с Китаем, Россией, Ираном и другими странами. Формально «Внешиполитическая стратегия США, 2025», принятая и опубликованная в декабре месяце, наметила путь во внешней политике администрации президента Д. Трампа на оставшееся время второго срока президентства, заключающейся в поддержании принципов национального консерватизма, завещанных отцами-основателями США.

Ключевые слова: США, Израиль, Иран, Россия, Украина, Д. Трамп, торговые тарифы, международные конфликты.

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Introduction. Foreign policy initiatives of the second term of the presidency of D. Trump began to appear in the public space immediately after his election on November 5, 2024.

As for the future foreign policy strategy, D. Trump declared himself as a peacemaker who will stop hostilities in Ukraine “in 24 hours” and “centers on hardheaded dealmaking” [23] and reduce possible systemic risks among opponents and allies who may represent these countries. He even portrayed NATO allies “as free riders enriching themselves under U.S.” [23; 68, p. 225].

It should be noted that all D. Trump's statements were not formed at the level of any specific programs, concepts, and doctrines but constituted his intuitive sense of the need to completely change the policy of Joe Biden's democratic administration [68, p. 227].

Methods and materials. The article uses the scientific principle of objectivity and an evolutionist scientific approach. The method of situational analysis in international relations by E.M. Primakov – M.A. Khrustalev was used as a scientific method.

The situational analysis's use in the study of D. Trump's American foreign policy strategy made it possible to establish its stages and nature formation, peculiarities of using political technologies to pressure partners and rivals, and forecasting individual specific international political situations.

There are materials from American news publications, official reports of the White House, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America-2025, and opinions of American experts and analysts from other countries that were used as materials in the article.

Analysis

D. Trump's foreign policy statements after his election in the period of November 6, 2024 – January 19, 2025

Elected on November 5, 2024, US President D. Trump, before taking office on January 20, 2025, used the possible foreign policy intentions of his administration in the public space (in speeches and on the Truth Social network).

So on December 20, 2024, he threatened to impose duties: on the European Union if the bloc does not purchase large volumes of American oil and gas to compensate for the growing trade deficit with the United States; on Mexico and Canada, 25 percent duties in order to tighten border controls on their part; as well as an additional 10 percent duty on China as punishment for fentanyl exports [34].

On Christmas days in 2024, D. Trump on the Truth Social network pointed out the injustice that has developed in the operation of the Panama Canal, where Panama and China, and not the

United States, became the beneficiaries. At the same time, he criticized Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, saying that he could cut taxes in his country “if they’d be oh so kind enough to become our ‘51st State’” [19].

On January 6, 2025, D. Trump reiterated his decision to introduce universal trade duties, which will extend the tax benefits he introduced in 2017 for a new period [21]. On January 14, 2025, D. Trump announced that he would create the External Revenue Service (ERS) “to collect our Tariffs, Duties, and all Revenue that come from Foreign sources” [26].

In January 2025, D. Trump began to openly talk about the need to transfer Greenland to US control, refusing to exclude military or economic force to achieve this goal. Greenland’s annexation was justified by both the national interests of the United States and the creation of geopolitical stability in the Arctic region [11].

As a result, we can say that D. Trump, before the start of the second presidential term, successfully created for himself a new image of the American nation’s father, which can return the justice and prosperity of the “Gilded Age” by imposing duties, as measures of political and economic pressure, contributing to the return to the homeland of American TNCs, creating a perspective for the territory’s expansion of the United States, and preserving American hegemony by increasing the obligations and expenses of its Western allies to preserve the existing world order.

D. Trump’s intentions in US foreign policy even began to be compared to “like a Swiss army knife: a tool for every occasion” [20].

***Approaches to US foreign policy
for the first 100 days
of D. Trump’s presidency
(January 20 – April 28)***

In America, it is customary to measure the effectiveness and evaluate the results of the newly elected president in the next hundred days, especially during the first year of work in office. Indeed, if we compare these periods of President D. Trump, we can find significant differences in the foreign policy approaches of the presidential administration we are considering.

The nature of the first 100 days of D. Trump’s presidency can be called, on the one

hand, intuitive and almost completely opposing Joe Biden’s foreign policy and, on the other, destroying the international structure of the existing world order [3, p. 443]. It is no coincidence that for the first time during his presidency, D. Trump signed decrees canceling many important international agreements and decisions of the American government related to foreign policy.

Moreover, in the regional direction, the main issues include the deportation of illegal migrants to their countries of origin [2; 10]; the creation of special prisons for migrants abroad [57]; the self-deportation mechanism for migrants from the United States [5]; the introduction of fines for disrupting the announced self-deportation from 998 up to \$1 million per day or confiscation of property [31]; the termination of temporary protected status for migrants from Venezuela [47], then for Haiti and Cuba, and at the end of the 100-day period for Ukrainians. At the same time, President D. Trump exerted tariff pressure on Mexico and Canada [22; 28; 33] and carried out provocative actions in relation to Greenland.

On March 4, 2025, the BlackRock consortium made a deal worth US \$22.8 billion to buy two large ports of the Panama Canal owned by the Hong Kong conglomerate amid intense pressure from US President D. Trump over alleged Chinese interference on a critical trade route [12]. BlackRock acquired a 90% stake in current owner CK Hutchison’s subsidiary, which operates the two ports, bringing both ports under US jurisdiction.

A separate direction in world politics should be considered the intention of President D. Trump to stop hostilities between Hamas and Israel in Gaza [38] and military actions between Ukraine and Russia [3, p. 444; 17], and the threat of not making a “deal” according to President D. Trump should have led to punishment of Russia [54; 59].

The US president actively intervened in the domestic politics of other states. So on February 3, 2025, he announced that he would cut aid to South Africa due to the land reform carried out by the government of President S. Ramaphosa [1].

On March 3, 2025, D. Trump signed a memorandum in which he indicated that the United States does not support the so-called “Global Tax Deal” recommended by the OECD countries, and as for the European Union, he promised to introduce 25% duties on the export of goods [56].

On April 2, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order to levy tariffs on imported goods during an event in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, announcing the introduction of a 10 percent total duty on all imports to the United States, with the exception of Canada and Mexico, as well as targeted duties for dozens of other countries [8]. The basis for this was the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), which gives the president broad powers to regulate various economic operations after the declaration of a national emergency [69].

Having caused shock among Western trading partners and opponents among developing countries, a week later, President D. Trump imposed a 90-day pause on retaliatory duties on foreign trading partners, with the exception of China, to which they were set at 125% [65]. The introduction of the pause by Trump was adopted in the spirit of his commercial ideas about making deals, outlined by him in the book "The Art of Making Deals" [71]. On April 9, 2025, President D. Trump said that "the US is earning '\$2 billion a day' from tariffs" [41].

On April 25, 2025, D. Trump gave an interview to "Time" magazine at the end of the first 100 days of the second term's presidency. In terms of foreign policy, he confirmed that his opinion about Canada joining the United States as the 51st state is not trolling but an objective necessity for Canada itself [46]. In the same place, he said that the promise to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours was a "joke" [46].

Thus, summing up the first 100 days of D. Trump's presidency, it should be noted that the foreign policy course in the regional dimension was tougher than the course on the world stage. Although he continued, on the one hand, to declare American peacekeeping and, on the other hand, to conduct military operations in violation of international law.

So in February 2025, Trump ordered an air attack on ISIS cave complexes in the semi-autonomous Puntland region of Somalia with fighters launched from the Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier located in the Red Sea. An important and visible result of the first 100 days of D. Trump's presidency was the cessation of immigrant lines' movement on the US-Mexican border towards the United States, which decreased by 95–99% [53].

On April 28, 2025, in an interview with "The Atlantic," Donald Trump assessed the first 100 days of his second presidency: "The first time, I had two things to do – run the country and survive; I had all these crooked guys. And the second time, I run the country and the world" [66]. He gave the same high praise in an interview on Meet the Press [52].

***Forming US foreign policy doctrine
during the second 100 days
of D. Trump's Presidency
(April 29 – August 6)***

Immediately, we note that the second 100 days of D. Trump's presidency have become more saturated with foreign policy initiatives. On May 8, 2025, President D. Trump announced a trade agreement with Great Britain, noting that it was "the first of many." It included a 10 percent tariff on imports from the UK, but supplied cars will be taxed at a reduced rate [72].

From May 13 to 16, 2025, President D. Trump undertook a tour of the Middle East's monarchies [6]: Saudi Arabia [27]; Qatar [18], where he noted its mediation role in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict [63]; and the UAE [60], where it was decided to create an AI data center with the participation of American companies [16]. The UAE has pledged to invest a 10-year "investment contribution" in the amount of USD 1.4 trillion in the United States [30].

The main expectations of this tour for D. Trump were receiving billions of dollars in investment for the United States; promoting the "New US Policy in the Middle East" [42]; and discussing the possibilities of a more active regional policy of the monarchies at the regional level [27], including in relations between Israel and Iran.

As for trade deals on tariffs, by June 3, 2025, the presidential administration had only one real deal with the UK, so the US trade representative "sent this letter to all of our trading partners just to give them a friendly reminder that the deadline is coming up" (July 9, 2025) [51]. On June 27, 2025, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent admitted that Donald Trump's trade negotiations are likely to continue until September [50], as many countries are in no hurry to conclude trade agreements with the United States [32].

The 51st G-7 summit was called "One Against Six" in the American media and became

important and indicative in relations between the United States and its closest Western allies.

It took place from June 15 to June 17, 2025, in the village of Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada. The summit got its name due to the growing contradictions between Western allies and the United States in world politics. If D. Trump is ready to put an end to the war in Ukraine, then European countries are ready to provide military assistance to Ukraine to the last Ukrainian to defeat Russia.

At the summit, D. Trump suggested that Russia be admitted again to the group. He also said that the war in Ukraine would not have happened if Moscow had remained in the club [75].

An irritant for D. Trump was also Macron's demonstrative arrival at the summit in Canada via Greenland. The United States has blocked a proposed G-7 statement calling on Israel and Iran to de-escalate the conflict, highlighting the distance formed between President D. Trump and the other block's members [74]. The American president left Kananaskis ahead of schedule, the day before the end of the summit [37].

An important foreign policy event was the participation of the United States in the Iranian-Israeli conflict, which began on June 13, 2025, with an unprecedented Israeli military operation against Iran with strikes on nuclear facilities, military bases, and command personnel. This attack, dubbed "the Nation of Lions," was a response to a growing nuclear threat from Tehran, according to Israeli authorities.

On the night of June 22, the United States attacked three Iranian nuclear facilities – in Isfahan, Fordo, and Natanz. As D. Trump himself said, these bombings were supposed to fulfill two goals: to eliminate nuclear facilities in Iran [4; 35] and to stop the deadly exchange of missile strikes for the population of both Israel and Iran [7]. But in opposing D. Trump, it can be argued that the actions of the United States were illegitimate [36; 70] and dangerous [55] and could have consequences for the United States itself [56].

On May 15, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requested 20,000 National Guard troops to assist the Trump administration with immigration enforcement at the US-Mexican border [45] and to expand the repatriation of migrants. The administration also began using the State Department's \$3 billion

"America's First Opportunity Fund" to encourage more countries to take back their citizens who are residing illegally in the US [67].

Thus, summing up the second 100 days of D. Trump's presidency, we can say that the US foreign policy strategy slowly but fully completed its design with bomb attacks on Iranian territory and thus confirmed continuity in foreign policy, despite the change of administrations. Good intentions to end conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine have failed. The unconditional support of the United States for Israel and the increase in spending by NATO countries to 5% of GDP clearly speak of the militaristic nature of D. Trump's American administration.

As for the constant American threat to impose trade duties with all countries, their months-long process of introducing them has clearly shown that the main issue for Trump is the possibility of political pressure and the ostentatious nature of American power in the world, but not economic benefits.

The US foreign policy strategy during D. Trump's third 100 days (August 7 – October 15)

"We will measure our success," Mr. Trump announced in his Inaugural Address, "not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end – and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into" [73]. But by the 300th day of his presidency, the United States had bombed Iran in violation of international law, supplied weapons and intelligence to Ukraine and Israel, and armed European NATO members, effectively forcing them to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP [49].

During the six months of D. Trump's presidency, the number of American troops abroad has not decreased, except "to withdraw several hundred soldiers from some vulnerable positions in Syria" [73], neither American military bases, nor military alliances, nor the number of weapons sold.

Deferred tariffs, which entered into force on July 9 and others on August 1, 2025, became an instrument of coercion and power not so much in the economic sphere as in the political one [25; 15]. So, for India, import duties were established in the amount of 50%, with 25% as secondary duties for the purchase of oil from Russia [62; 46]. In addition, by his decree, President

D. Trump imposed a special tariff of 40% on goods supplied to the United States through other countries [64]. The introduction of duties on imports to the United States, incomplete for all countries, reduced America's trade deficit to \$60.2 billion, or 16.0%, in June 2025 [9].

Moreover, American tariffs have become an instrument of interference in the internal affairs of some Latin American states. So, the United States established 50% duties on Brazil for the trial of former Brazilian President J. Bolsonaro [24; 40] and Colombia for the trial of former President A. Uribe [43; 13]. Brazilian beef exporters alone could face US \$1 billion in lost sales in the second half of 2025 [14].

The same situation for South Africa. S. Ramaphosa tried to maintain a civilized relationship with D. Trump. But the undisguised interference of the American president in the agricultural reform's process in an African country is interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state [61].

In his peacekeeping actions, US President D. Trump uses double standards. If, in relation to Israel, he admits the possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza (stopping the Arabs from receiving humanitarian food aid), then on the part of Russia, conducting its Special War Operation (SWO) in Ukraine, there is the possibility of ultimatum demands to end the conflict [58]. From the beginning, the deadline for D. Trump's ultimatum to end hostilities in Ukraine was set until September 2, which is almost a month, and then reduced to 10 days until August 8, 2025 [76]. As an additional pressure on Russia, D. Trump "directed two US nuclear submarines be positioned in "appropriate regions" [29].

As a result, the following conclusions can be drawn. During the third 100 days of D. Trump's presidency, approaches and mechanisms have finally developed in the conduct of the American foreign policy strategy. Like past strategies, it has continuity, and its main goal is to maintain American hegemony through force, including in the use of military force against weak opponents. A new and significant difference is the use of economic mechanisms in this strategy, such as trade duties, for conducting a foreign policy to comply primarily with national interests among both allies and opponents. The declared American peacemaking has double standards and is

conducted in the collective West's interests. As international experts rightly point out: "The United States now has only one single uncritical ally – Israel" [39, p. 100].

***"US Foreign Policy Strategy 2025,"
as the theoretical basis of the second term
of the presidency of D. Trump
and the outcome of the first year in power***

On December 5, 2025, the White House released a new National Security Strategy [48]. The strategy proposes to actually return to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 – the idea of US dominance in the Western Hemisphere, due to the impossibility of ensuring global hegemony, which was imposed by past administrations on America and which went beyond the national interests.

Analysis of NSS 2025 certainly requires separate consideration, but here we can say that new and important provisions of the strategy were the recognition of the Indo-Pacific region as a key field of future geopolitical battles; identifying China as an economic challenge to the US; the need to prevent direct conflict between the United States and China, including the situation around Taiwan; the Middle East's declining importance in US foreign policy; and the priority of border protection and the fight against mass migration, which is called an existential threat to the United States and Europe.

Results. The study showed that despite the preparation of Project 2025, the formation of a foreign policy strategy by US President D. Trump in the first year of his second presidency was chaotic and idiosyncratic. America faced new challenges in world politics, the most difficult of which were the conflicts between Israel and Hamas, as well as between Russia and Ukraine. The United States itself has added a tariff problem to the international trading system.

An analysis of numerous sources showed that in the United States, in three 100-day periods of 2025, the final foreign policy strategy of the new American administration was developed. The strategy's essence remained the same – the preservation of American hegemony in the world. The new foreign policy mechanisms were geopolitical threats and trade duties, which radically changed the international trading system. The results of these changes are not yet obvious,

but it should be assumed that in the future they will have a negative impact not only on the countries for which duties were imposed but also on the United States itself.

As for international conflicts, the deep causes of conflicts were not affected in their resolution, and their ending is not enshrined in international law. D. Trump's "art of making deals"

in world politics comes across, if not as misunderstanding, then in many cases as non-acceptance, because it allows the United States to change previously adopted agreements. In addition, the American principle of obtaining the desired result "through force" does not work in many cases, especially in relations with China, Russia, Iran, and other countries [44].

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