



www.volsu.ru

ТЕОРИЯ И ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ

*The works of famous historians Hugh Graham and Knud Rasmussen, published below, are united by the fact that both of them are devoted to the Russian history of the 16th century, were written in the mid-1980s * and handed over to me by the authors who honored me, their young colleague, to come to Budapest at my invitation. I was originally supposed to publish each of these articles separately in Hungarian. Then I didn't manage to do it, and after that I forgot about them. Though during my further relocation, when arranging the office, these articles always moved with me to a new place, therefore, I remembered about them and kept them in sight. Over time, they were becoming more and more clearly linked in my eyes as valuable historiographical sources that should be preserved for the next generations.*

I express my sincere gratitude to Igor Olegovich Tyumentsev, a faithful follower of R.G. Skrynnikov, for the opportunity to put my intention into practice.

Dyula Svak,

Doctor of Sciences (History) (Budapest, Hungary)

*Публикуемые ниже работы известных историков Хью Грэхэма и Кнуда Расмуссена объединяет то, что все они посвящены русской истории XVI века, были написаны в середине 1980-х годов ** и переданы мне авторами, которые оказали мне, своему молодому коллеге, честь, приехав по моему приглашению в Будапешт. Первоначально предполагалось, что я опубликую каждую из этих статей отдельно на венгерском языке. Тогда это не удалось, а потом я забыл о них. Но не совсем, поскольку во время моих дальнейших переездов, при обустройстве кабинета эти статьи всегда переезжали со мной на новое место, следовательно, я знал о них и держал их в поле зрения. С течением времени они все явственнее связывались в моих глазах воедино как ценные историографические источники, которые нужно сохранить для потомков.*

Выражаю благодарность Игорю Олеговичу Тюменцеву, верному ученику Р.Г. Скрынникова, за то, что теперь это намерение воплощается в жизнь.

Дьюла Свак,

доктор исторических наук (г. Будапешт, Венгрия)

* Dating them is challenging because there are no dates of writing on the manuscripts with the exception of Hugh Graham's work (see more about him: <http://naukarus.com/hyu-grethem-indianskiy-eksperiment-i-sovetskoe-antikovedenie-50-60-h-godov>). Knud Rasmussen (see more about him: http://novist.history.spbu.ru/trudy_kafedry/16_2_2016/2016_16_2_Vozgrin_V_E_-_Knud_Rasmussen_i_Hans_Bagger_datskie_istoriki_Rossii.pdf) probably gave me his article in 1984, when he came to Budapest shortly before his unexpected death in 1985.

** Датировать их не так просто, потому что, за исключением работы Хью Грэхэма (см. подробнее о нем: <http://naukarus.com/hyu-grethem-indianskiy-eksperiment-i-sovetskoe-antikovedenie-50-60-h-godov>), на рукописях нет дат написания. Кнуд Расмуссен (см. подробнее о нем: http://novist.history.spbu.ru/trudy_kafedry/16_2_2016/2016_16_2_Vozgrin_V_E_-_Knud_Rasmussen_i_Hans_Bagger_datskie_istoriki_Rossii.pdf), по всей вероятности, передал мне свою статью в 1984 г., когда приезжал в Будапешт незадолго до своей неожиданной смерти, последовавшей в 1985 году.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2019.2.1>

UDC 94(470)“15”: 342.36

LBC 63.2(2)43-061

Submitted: 15.09.2018

Accepted: 20.09.2018

IVAN THE TERRIBLE: REFORM AND REACTION¹

Hugh F. Graham

was Professor of History at California State College, Bakersfield, USA

Abstract. *Introduction.* Hugh F. Graham (1925–1994) was a famous American historian, Professor at California State College (Bakersfield, USA), specialist in Greek and Latin sources for early Russian history, he also translated a number of R.G. Skrynnikov's works into English. In this article, devoted to the epoch of Ivan IV the Terrible, H. Graham presented his view on the political processes that took place in the highest strata of the Moscow State that constituted the closest circle of Ivan IV the Terrible and that could influence the internal reforms and foreign policy in the state. *Materials.* The study is based on the works of Russian and foreign historians, which allowed the author of the article to show controversial issues and prepare the article using the problem approach (their names and titles of the works are specified in references). In addition, H. Graham drew attention to the data from the following published sources: the works of I. Peresvetov, Protestant pastor in Lithuania Pavel Oderborn, and others. *Analysis.* In this article, the author consistently outlined the events of the reign of Ivan IV: he paid attention to the reforms of the Elected Rada, the oprichnina, and the postoprichnina period. H. Graham noted that along with the active study of the oprichnina period by historians, the issue of functioning was missed, while Zemstvo acted in accordance with the former administrative and institutional norms, continued to function under the traditional aristocratic leadership of the princes I.F. Mstislavskii and I.D. Belskii, whom Ivan IV, in fact, called co-rulers, proclaiming: “We three hold all the power”. H. Graham did not agree with the view of the oprichnina as a struggle with the aristocratic circles. The historian saw the following paradox: almost all the victims were leading figures in the new world, and not advocates of the old order. They were responsible for developing management tools and served in key institutions, participating in the centralization process promotion. They helped the tsar to acquire more authoritarian power he so longed for. *Results.* It is the contention of this paper that the reign of Ivan the Terrible was not atypical, but simply a continuation in its own way of the regular path of development the Muscovite monarchy had long been following. However, a man still able to provoke such wildly disparate assessments of his character and accomplishments will continue to fascinate psychologists, belletrists, historians, and popularizers alike. They will keep returning to him and hope that someone someday will at last manage to capture the elusive essence of the era and of the man himself in such a way as to win general acceptance.

The abstract is prepared by Candidate of Sciences (History), Associate Professor N.V. Rybalko.

Key words: Ivan IV the Terrible, Russian history, 16th century, the oprichnina, Hugh F. Graham.

Citation. Graham H.F. Ivan the Terrible: Reform and Reaction. *Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya 4, Istoriya. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [Science Journal of Volgograd State University. History. Area Studies. International Relations], 2019, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 8-18. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2019.2.1>

УДК 94(470)“15”: 342.36

ББК 63.2(2)43-061

Дата поступления статьи: 15.09.2018

Дата принятия статьи: 20.09.2018

ИВАН ГРОЗНЫЙ: РЕФОРМЫ И РЕАКЦИЯ¹

Хью Ф. Грэхэм

был профессором истории в Калифорнийском государственном колледже, г. Бейкерсфилд, США

Аннотация. *Введение.* Хью Ф. Грэхэм (1925–1994) был известным американским историком, профессором Калифорнийского государственного колледжа (г. Бейкерсфилд, США), специалистом по греческим и латинским источникам ранней русской истории, он также перевел ряд работ Р.Г. Скрынникова на английский язык. В данной статье, посвященной эпохе Ивана IV Грозного, Х. Грэхэм представил свой взгляд на политические процессы, протекавшие в высших слоях Московского государства, составлявших ближайшее окруже-

ние Ивана IV Грозного и способных повлиять на внутренние реформы и внешнюю политику в государстве. *Материалы.* В основе исследования лежат труды российских и зарубежных историков, которые позволили автору статьи показать спорные моменты и подготовить статью с использованием проблемного подхода (их фамилии и названия работ содержатся в библиографии). Кроме того, Х. Грэхэм обратил внимание на данные следующих опубликованных источников: сочинения И. Пересветова, протестантского пастора в Литве Павла Одерборна и др. *Анализ.* В данной статье автор последовательно изложил события правления Ивана IV, уделив внимание реформам Избранной рады, опричнине и последопричинному периоду. Х. Грэхэм отметил, что наряду с активным изучением историками периода опричнины, был упущен вопрос функционирования земщины, которая действовала в соответствии с прежними административными и институциональными нормами, продолжала функционировать под традиционным аристократическим лидерством князей И.Ф. Мстиславского и И.Д. Бельского, которых Иван IV фактически назвал соправителями, провозгласив: «Мы трое держим всю власть». Х. Грэхэм не согласился с взглядом на опричнину как борьбу с аристократическими кругами. Историк видел парадокс в том, что почти все без исключения жертвы были не защитниками старого порядка, а ведущими фигурами в новом: люди, которые отвечали за разработку инструментов управления и служили в ключевых учреждениях, участвуя в продвижении процесса централизации. Именно они помогли царю приобрести больше авторитарной власти, которой он так жаждал. *Результаты.* Х. Грэхэм пришел к выводу о том, что правление Ивана IV, несмотря на все потрясения и драматизм, фактически не изменило основные принципы существования общества. Социальная структура была жесткой и устойчивой. Даже тяжелые удары, нанесенные во время Смуты, не смогли ее разорвать. Когда народ России собрался в 1613 г., чтобы начать восстанавливать свое обездоленное царство, первой и всеобщей заботой было не изучение новых способов организации гражданской политики, а избрание другого царя. Михаил Романов, ставший царем, был избран не за свои способности, а потому, что он был единственным, кто мог продемонстрировать степень связи с несуществующим Домом Рюрика. В этой статье утверждается, что правление Ивана Грозного было не нетипичным, а просто продолжением своего собственного обычного пути развития, которому долгое время следовала московская монархия. Тем не менее человек (Иван IV Грозный), получивший столь разрозненные оценки своего характера и достижений, будет продолжать очаровывать психологов, беллетристов, историков и популяризаторов. Они будут возвращаться к нему и надеяться, что кто-нибудь, когда-нибудь наконец сможет почувствовать неуловимую сущность эпохи и самого человека таким образом, чтобы завоевать всеобщее признание.

Аннотацию подготовила кандидат исторических наук, доцент Н.В. Рыбалко.

Ключевые слова: Иван IV Грозный, история России, XVI век, опричнина, Хью Ф. Грэхэм.

Цитирование. Грэхэм Х. Ф. Иван Грозный: реформы и реакция // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. – 2019. – Т. 24, № 2. – С. 8–18. – (На англ.). – DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2019.2.1>

In his recent, thought-provoking book [35]. Professor Alexander Yanov has posed many questions concerning relationships between movements of reform and reaction in Russia. He himself has decisively located the first example of such a process in the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Like a number of previous historians, he divides the reign into an early, good and a later, bad period. Let us look at some major developments in both parts of Ivan's rule.

Ivan IV's minority lasted from 1533 to 1547. First came an administration headed by his mother, Elena Glinskaia, who was abetted by Prince I.F. Ovchina-Telepnev-Obolenskii. It was not a stagnant interlude. Suppression of a formidable revolt raised by Prince Andrei Ivanovich of Staritsa was a substantial contribution to the process of centralizing government power. Elena's regency

was also notable for a reform that gave Russia a stable uniform currency. Appanage princes were obliged to join with other elements in society and contribute their full share in an extensive program of new fortress construction systematically undertaken along the main southern and western defense lines to check the Tatars and Lithuanians.

Cabals of princes and boyars, over which the Shuiski and Bel'skii groups alternately presided, vied with one another for ascendancy after Elena's death in 1538. They were less concerned with promoting the general interest than in obtaining immediate gains for their respective factions. Nevertheless, in 1539 the boyar regime temporarily headed by the Bel'skii group issued the first guba, or district, charters. These documents officially recognized degrees of local autonomy that had long in fact existed in the

country, particularly the northern regions. They permitted local populations to collect taxes and, in areas where the military threat was not adjudged severe, to apprehend and try criminals. This struck a blow at the power of regional lieutenants (*namestniki*), who had heretofore profited greatly by performing such services at the expense of the people under their control².

The boyar regimes provoked increasing opposition from other elements in the population, particularly the class known as the gentry. But it was not easy to curb them. In 1543 Ivan, then aged thirteen, ordered the summary execution of Prince Andrei Shuiskii. It is unlikely he acted on his own initiative. The Shuiskii clan fell from power, but its place was taken by members of the Vorontsov house and then early in 1547 by members of the Glinskii family, Ivan's mother's relatives. These groups behaved more arrogantly and rapaciously than their predecessors had done. In addition, they may well have encouraged the less attractive propensities Ivan was already inclined to display on occasion: he had outraged the citizenry by his cruel and arbitrary actions on a tour he took of the leading towns in his realm. The year 1547, when Ivan was crowned tsar and took a wife, Anastasiia, from the old nontitled Moscow boyar family of Zakhar'in, was crucial in other ways as well. Fires broke out in Moscow that spring. They served as a catalyst. Suddenly the Kremlin was beset by shouting angry mobs demanding members of the Glinskii family be handed over to them, and forcing the tsar to flee. The rising at last dies down after some members of the Glinskii family fell victims to mob justice, but it was clear to at least some leaders that concessions would have to be made. The tsar, in searching for new faces whom obvious involvement in the previous regimes had not discredited, was not motivated by high altruistic principles. He was just plain scared.

The sixteenth century saw the rise of the new class, the gentry. The influence of this group was bound to increase. Centralized authority needed a growing supply of new persons to serve in new administrative organs such as the chanceries, and, more importantly, the demands of war required ever larger numbers of serving-men. The feudal levy, of which this class now constituted the most vital component, had long

been the backbone of the Russian army. The main question had always been how to remunerate them. The solution was to assign them grants of land in exchange for and conditional upon their rendering service. But land alone was of little use to a serving-man on constant call and without hands to till it³. It was not the malignity of any person or persons but the sheer increase in gentry numbers that made serfdom inevitable.

An alternative was suggested. An early publicist of the time was I.S. Peresvetov, who assailed traditional privileged groups as "lazy and rich" and called for the creation of a new army composed of serving-men who owed allegiance to the ruler alone. He, a true autocrat untrammelled by restraints imposed by factions, would know how to reward his men: not with grants of land but with adequate salaries [38]. It is unclear how familiar Ivan was with the petitions through which Peresvetov submitted these ideas, they received partial implementation in the formation of new units of fusiliars (*strel'tsy*) and ultimately, strangely enough, in the oprichnina-corps, although it is doubtful this is what Peresvetov had in mind.

After 1547, the young tsar embarked upon new courses. Familiar noble faces still appeared among his advisors but new blood had been recruited. Reflecting gentry interests, Aleksei Adashev, soon to achieve considerable power, came from a serving family in Kostroma. Ivan Viskovatyi, destined to become Russia's first foreign secretary and ultimately keeper of the royal seal, was similarly of modest background. Archpriest Sil'vestr of the Blagoveshchenskii monastery in the Kremlin, Ivan's spiritual gadfly, was of comparatively humble origin from Novgorod. This group of men was thought to have constituted a distinct political entity, which Prince Andrei Kurbskii later called a "Chosen Council". They were supposed to have functioned as the spearhead of a reform movement that lasted approximately a decade, but it has convincingly been shown [6]⁴ that no such body ever formally existed. Furthermore, there was ample precedent for an informal and shifting body of advisors to stand close to the person of the tsar. Grand Prince Vasiliu III had transacted business "in his bedchamber" with the aid of a few chancery secretaries. The men surrounding his son were more numerous and more heterogeneous.

Sil'vestr may have fostered the hysterical strain that characterized Ivan's religiosity⁵ but the churchman who exercised the strongest influence upon the tsar was the stern Josephite Makarii. He had always been a champion of the church militant in worldly affairs and was a seasoned ecclesiastical administrator, who became metropolitan in 1542. The massive works compiled at his instigation [18, p. 263-382; 7, p. 1-15] inculcated the notion that the Russian ruler should, in partnership with the church, rule as an autocrat and they exalted the power and majesty of the royal office. The young and impressionable Ivan absorbed Makarii's point of view.

Two convocations were overt signs that change was in the air. The first, known as the Assembly of Reconciliation, met in 1549, the second, known as the Stoglav assembly, was in session in 1551. These conventions have sometimes been regarded as potential nuclei that might have developed into some form of representative government. Vernadsky [31, p. 38-39]⁶ has argued effectively that this was highly unlikely to occur. Quite apart from peasants, neither merchants nor townsmen were summoned to them. Clergy below the rank of bishop were appointed by the metropolitan, and government functionaries below the rank of boyar, by the tsar, except for a handful of petty gentry (*deti boiarskie*) elected by a few constituencies in the immediate environs of Moscow. The Stoglav convocation probably brought together no more than 150 participants. The tsar conveyed to both bodies a message that considerations of right and justice demanded the boyars cease their rapine and that concerns voiced by other elements in society must receive attention. This made explicit in moral terms at the highest level what had been implicit in Muscovite life for some time.

An important task then undertaken by Adashev was to revise the existing *Sudebnik*, or law code. The right peasants had to leave their landlords during a two-week period in November (St. George's Day) was left undisturbed, although the right applied only when a peasant had fully discharged all his arrears to his landlord. Local autonomy was given further encouragement. It was made more difficult for nobles to augment their incomes by collecting imposts from the inhabitants in their domain – the practice known as “maintenance”, or *kormlenie*, a notorious and

ancient perquisite. Another statute dealt with another traditional institution, known as “precedence” (*mestnichestvo*), whereby high military and civilian posts were allocated on the basis of a person's pedigree, not talent or capacity. However, the statute did not fully abolish this harmful system, it was declared suspended only when an army was actually engaged in combat in the field⁷.

To expand the land fund required to compensate members of the gentry levy, publicists favouring their cause, like the monk Ermolai-Erazm⁸, agitated for a sweeping land survey. Its purpose would be to equalize holdings and penalize those who failed to render proper service, this concept was honoured more in the breach than the observance. Furthermore, the fundamental need was to acquire additional land for the fund from which serving-men received their allotments. How might it be obtained? There could be no serious question of confiscating patrimonies belonging to nobles and boyars. Only the church with its vast estates was left.

Thus practical considerations rather than the ideological views of the non-possessors brought the issue of church landholding more than once before the Stoglav convention. Some changes did occur. Land deeded to the church after 1533 was declared escheated to the crown and the church was forbidden to acquire new lands without government approval, including estates conveyed to it by members of the nobility. Traditional immunities from taxation the church had long enjoyed were removed [12]. But the huge land fund the church already controlled was unaffected. The tsar and his supporters were not strong enough to prevail against Makarii and the church. Nor had they any real wish to do so. They were not hostile to the church. They sincerely believed in its importance, as can be seen from the fact that much of the Stoglav's deliberation was concerned with how to strengthen the church's ability to discharge its primary spiritual, moral and ethical functions. A note of genuine regret sounded when the Stoglav passed in review the prevailing ignorance and proclivity to vice displayed by the vast mass of the clergy.

Perhaps the changes introduced into the military structure helped Russia to take Kazan' in 1552. Four more years of military operations (including the capture of Astrakhan' in 1556)

established a Russian presence in the Volga heartland and rid Muscovy of a persistently dangerous neighbor. After the campaign was over, the previous changes were taken further. The chancery system continued to expand and became more uniform⁹. The government now had an administrative apparatus in place at the center in which nobles and boyars performed supervisory functions. It was inevitable that further adjustments would be made on the periphery.

Survivals of the *kormlenie* system clashed with the new institutions. Edicts promulgated in 1555-1556 outlawed the practice. After that, it tended to disappear in much of the central region, as it had in the north where few landlords and state peasants were to be found. However, maintenance was not declared abolished everywhere, and powerful people who acquired new lands in the east after the capture of Kazan' and later in the northwest after the outbreak of the Livonian war, actually introduced maintenance into those areas. Old habits die hard. Further discussions about equalizing land grants took place but the sources are unclear as to whether any substantive action was taken.

Historians have stressed how unique these developments were and have spent much time dissecting the personalities presumably responsible for bringing them about. They thereby lose sight of two important points. Centralization of Russian society was bound to increase the influence and power of the gentry, and its leading members would inevitably find their way into the administrative and deliberative bodies. The other point is that the changes never went far enough to challenge the monopoly the aristocracy held over the highest offices in the land. The boyar council in fact actually increased its power and influence during the *oprichnina* era [37]. The organizations through which its members expressed their will remained intact. The institute of precedence remained basically untouched. Surely it is too much to say that "the (reform) government's activity was distinguished by its broad scope and motivated by a desire for the common good and justice" [23, p. 60].

The changes that were made were sufficient to satisfy most of the gentry, thus obviating the danger that their disaffection might threaten the stability of the regime. Ivan never "lost interest in reform", or became disenchanted with the leaders

of a "reforming party." He and his associates had done what they had to do in order to maintain the existing balance of forces in society, no more than was necessary. One is reminded of the promulgation of the October Manifesto, which split the ranks of the opposition and left Tsar Nicholas II free to revert to type. Ivan had other things on his mind: chiefly to initiate the Livonian war in 1558.

To turn to the *oprichnina*: it was not a radical reaction to any "great reforms" that had preceded it. It may, in fact, be compared to a great appanage, the type of polity Tsar Ivan was supposed to be anxious to eliminate. The *oprichnina* represented another phase in the ongoing contest between the Muscovite grand princes and their great servitors. Ivan IV was but continuing a process, discernible as far back as the days of Ivan Kalita, that was well under way during the reigns of his father and grandfather. It assumed a distorted form under Ivan, both because of the tsar's suspicious temperament (as has been frequently observed) and because the goal was now in sight and the stakes were high.

No ruler will voluntarily compromise the power and authority he possesses. This was particularly true of Ivan, who was deeply imbued with the theory of autocracy¹⁰. It was likewise true of the great nobles, who were similarly unwilling to yield their prerogatives. Events in the year 1553, when Ivan was taken seriously ill, however darkly they are related in chronicle accounts, show that an aristocratic opposition undoubtedly existed. It centered upon the person of the tsar's cousin, Prince Vladimir of Staritskii, who had a viable claim to the throne. The tsar recovered and took reprisals, but his suspicions were not allayed and he continued to feel threatened.

Ivan did not make his move until later. One source of delay was his preoccupation with the Livonian war. Then in 1560 Adashev and Sil'vestr were removed, but the gentry continued to make its presence felt in the burgeoning chancery apparatus. The death of Tsaritsa Anastasiia and the tsar's swift second marriage to the Cherkassian princess Mariia Temriukovna did not halt the aggrandizement of Anastasiia's relatives, the Zakhar'in family. The chronicle had Adashev's father (himself not of noble blood) say to the tsar during the succession crisis of 1553: "Sire, we

shall kiss the cross to you and to your son, Tsarevich Dmitrii, but we shall not serve the Zakhar'in family, Daniil and his brothers. Your son, sire, is still in swaddling-clothes and the Zakhar'in family, Daniil and his brothers, will lord it over us" [24, p. 524]. The feelings and attitudes of the old aristocracy can thus easily be imagined. Nothing had changed a decade later. The nobles continued to resent the Zakhar'in family (though their pedigree was not mean) as interlopers, as it did even more the other new social forces coming forward in society. Ivan grew convinced that disaffection was rife in his realm and treason was in the air. He decided to retaliate.

The dramatic events surrounding the establishment of the oprichnina are well-known: the tsar issued an abdication proclamation, which virtually incited to riot with its sharp attacks on the aristocracy, and withdrew to the redoubt he had prepared in Aleksandrovskaja Sloboda. This inaugurated the most controversial period of his career. The oprichnina and the violence associated with it have long attracted the attention of Russian men of letters (especially Karamzin's sweeping, gloomy ninth book of the History of the Russian State) but, as with so much else in Russian history, serious scholarly analysis began with Solov'ev and Kliuchevskii. The former took the position [30, p. 436-437, 707-708] (subsequently amplified by S.F. Platonov [23]) that the oprichnina, in spite of its brutal methods, was the last essential step a tsar of Russia had to take in order to create a unified state to replace feudal fragmentation. The latter intuitively observed [14, p. 180-181] that the institution was at heart irrational and served no valid purpose, a view Veselovskii subsequently developed [32, p. 133-155]. Various questions have been asked. Was the territorial organization of the oprichnina based on careful calculation by the tsar and designed to extend the unrestricted authority he demanded over surviving appanage principalities? Or did the oprichnina seek to assimilate those areas that were economically more viable, including places where English factories had been set up? Did Ivan identify and take into the oprichnina areas containing clusters of the new people most inclined to support him? Or did Ivan create the oprichnina as a feverish attempt solely to guarantee his own safety? Each concept has attracted advocates ¹¹, the modern ramifications

of the controversy about Ivan IV as it has developed in the Soviet Union have recently been ably described [3, p. 57-74].

One point that has sometimes been overlooked should be borne in mind. So much attention has been lavished upon the oprichnina that the existence of the zemshchina has tended to be ignored, although the territory it comprehended was greater than that transferred to the oprichnina. The zemshchina operated under previous administrative and institutional norms which continued to function under traditional aristocratic leadership. Ivan recognized this. Shortly after forming his oprichnina-appanage he made an allusion to Princes I.F. Mstislavskii and I.D. Bel'skii, who presided over the destinies of the zemshchina. Holding up three fingers, he proclaimed: "We three hold all power" [5, p. 226-227].

A long-held tenet about the purpose and task of the oprichnina is that it was consciously designed to eliminate the last vestiges of aristocratic opposition to Ivan's centralized government. This interpretation has now become highly dubious. During the time the oprichnina existed, from 1565 to 1572, it changed direction more than once and attacked different targets. Nowhere can this be seen to better advantage than in the case of the "Moscow affair" in 1570. At this grisly event Maliuta Skuratov and his minions executed more than 100 individuals. Almost without exception the victims were not defenders of the old order but leading figures in the new: men like Funikov and Viskovatyi, and other secretaries, who had been responsible for developing the instrumentalities that served as key agencies in advancing the process of centralization. It was they who had helped the tsar acquire more of the autocratic power he craved to possess. The ultimate paradox stands revealed when on the tsar's order Boyar Prince Vasiliu Ivanovich Temkin-Rostovskii beheaded Secretary Grigorii Shchapkin [5, p. 259-265] ¹².

In the late 1940s Stalin dominated the Soviet historiographical scene. Intrigued by Ivan, he wished only that the tsar and Maliuta, his patriotic coadjutor, had not been deterred by religious scruples from eliminating all their enemies ¹³. After all, they had the oprichnina, a peerless weapon to wield against recalcitrant, reactionary boyars and churchmen. The oprichnina far outlasted the tsar's lifetime and its effective techniques and positive

qualities were woven into the fabric of the Russian State. Shorn of Stalinist overtones, Al'shits has recently sought to revive this concept [1, p. 45-62], but the weight of the evidence suggests that the oprichnina did not display the characteristics of a coherent political system operating purposefully. Rather it was a vast, sprawling motley force in danger of veering out of control, as evidenced by the results it produced. The Tatars sacked and burned Moscow in 1571, causing enormous damage and huge loss of life, the oprichnina army performed poorly against them the following year at the battle of Molody. It was zemshchina units that saved the day. Ivan was forced to acknowledge he was beaten. He abolished the oprichnina forthwith.

It has been contended that the Grand Duchy of Moscow experienced a real economic boom in the first half of the sixteenth century. Those who advocate this position rely heavily on a book by D.P. Makovskii [17]¹⁴ that has given rise to much controversy and aroused a good deal of opposition. Russia was undeniably less prosperous in the 1580s than it had been in the 1550s, but the causes of the decline were many and varied. One was the ruinous and devastating Livonian war, which in its final phase the Polish king, Stefan Batory, carried into enemy territory. The number and intensity of the raids conducted by the Crimean Tatars increased. Natural disasters and a severe cholera epidemic took their toll. It was a combination of all these factors that deleteriously affected Russia in the second half of the century. The excesses perpetrated by the oprichina-corps were a contributory, not the primary cause. It might also be noted that the splendid fortifications of Smolensk, which were built from 1595 to 1602, constituted the largest project of its kind that had ever been undertaken in Russia. It is an indicator that the economic depression was not as severe as it has often been portrayed [10, p. 158-159].

Was the political situation much different when Ivan died in 1584 from what it had been when he was crowned tsar in 1547? The answer is that it had changed very little. The feudal levy was still the mainstay of the Russian army. Maintenance still existed in many parts of the country. Precedence still determined one's official position. New men, such as Boris Godunov, had risen to prominence and had quickly learned to

behave like their aristocratic predecessors and use the same institutions, still in place and functioning as they had before, through which to advance themselves. The pious Aleksei Adashev had become enormously wealthy.

The social fabric was tough and resilient. Even the hard blows struck during the Time of Troubles failed to rend it. When the people of Russia assembled in 1613 to begin restoring their prostrate realm, the first and universal concern was not to explore new ways of organizing civil polity but to elect another tsar. Mikhail Romanov, the tsar elected, was chosen not for his capacities but because he was the only one who could demonstrate a degree of relationship with the defunct House of Rurik. No more striking example of the persistence of the dynastic and kinship principle can be imagined. Seen in this broader context, Ivan's reign, for all its drama and excess, had failed to alter the basic structure of the Russian state. It should not be viewed as a time when a far-sighted statesman deliberately decided to break with the past, devise new policies, and contrive new institutions in order to realize his goals, but rather as a time when the government was constantly called upon to come up with a series of ad hoc responses to unforeseen circumstances.

Ivan's reign has been and continues to be subject to extreme swings of interpretive opinion. For example, R.Iu. Vipper declared that among his many sterling qualities Ivan "[was] a brilliant organizer and leader of one of the greatest states of (the) time, "Ivan was distinguished in the Moscow school of diplomacy as a first-class talent, and, finally, that "Ivan Groznyi (was) one of the greatest political and military leaders of Europe in the sixteenth century"¹⁵. Two augmented versions of his book, which had originally appeared in 1922, were published in large editions in Moscow during World War II. The report of a commission that conducted an autopsy on the remains of the tsar and found that he suffered from a debilitating disease moved Professor Keenan [13, p. 49] not long ago to muse that Ivan had little if anything to do in a traditional political system ruled by "an oligarchy of royal in-laws" and an administration run by professional bureaucrats. Historians must therefore disabuse themselves of the superhuman image of the Terrible Tsar they have created and seek other

explanations for what happened during his long reign because of his “pathetic incapacity” Professor Hellie [9, p. XX-XXIV] sees Ivan as an omnipotent monarch – and a raging psychopath.

A word should be said about the sources for Ivan’s epoch. It is true that historians invariably lament the dearth of sources even when sources are abundant, but the complaint is justified in this case. The main chronicles fall silent in the 1560s, not to revive until the accession of Fedor Ivanovich. The few that have survived are unusually cautious or tendentious. This necessitates heavy reliance on accounts left by foreigners sojourning in Muscovy, and their lack of sympathy with and failure to understand conditions there means that they must be used with great critical care. Here is one example of the reaction Ivan was able to elicit from contemporaries.

A Protestant pastor in Lithuania, Paul Oderborn, composed the first biography of Ivan, which was published in Wittenberg early in the first year after the tsar’s death. Of Belinskii’s “fallen angel” he said: “He [Ivan] was tyrannical, brutal, savage, violent, a thief of others’ property, greedy for money, grasping, a devourer of his people, insolent conceited, difficult to access, hard to get to meetings, offensive at meetings, a clumsy speaker, spitefully irritable, easily enraged, horrible, restless, insatiable in lust, a drunkard, prone to excess, thoughtless, monstrous, unjust, inconsiderate, wicked, impious, devoid of intellect, fickle, capricious, too quick off the mark, harsh, too easily influenced, incorrigible, abusive, a causer of wars, unpleasant, disagreeable, without restraint, and unbearable” [11, p. 253]. With friends like these, who needs enemies?

It is the contention of this paper that the reign of Ivan the Terrible was not atypical, but simply a continuation in its own way of the regular path of development the Muscovite monarchy had long been following¹⁶. However, a man still able to provoke such wildly disparate assessments of his character and accomplishments will continue to fascinate psychologists, belletrists, historians, and popularizers alike. They will keep returning to him and hope that someone someday will at last manage to capture the elusive essence of the era and of the man himself in such a way as to win general acceptance.

NOTES

¹ Delivered at conference at University of Michigan, April, 1986.

² A.A. Zimin has carefully analyzed these developments [39, p. 222-278].

³ V.I. Koretskii has discussed the evolution of agriculture in Russia during the sixteenth century in general terms, aspects of the pomest’e system, and the road to serfdom. He notes a quickening tempo in rural life at mid-century but cautions, “one cannot speak of the development of capitalism at this time” [16, p. 14]. His views may be contrasted with those of N.E. Nosov [19, p. 44-71].

⁴ The author has made astute use of prosopography.

⁵ I.I. Smirnov has perceptively noted that Sil’vestr’s power and influence may often have been exaggerated [29, p. 231-257].

⁶ S.O. Shmidt has inquired closely into the history of and scholarly literature on these councils. He believes they were larger and more representative than Vernadsky does [27, p. 133-196].

⁷ For a detailed analysis of the work of these councils, especially the revision of the Sudebnik, see [21, p. 5-68].

⁸ For Ermolai-Erazm see [15].

⁹ P.A. Sadikov devotes considerable attention to the prikazy in the second half of his book [26].

¹⁰ In 1564, in the First Epistle to Kurbskii, Ivan writes: “...we were born to rule, so have we grown up and ascended the throne by the bidding of God” [4, p. 14-15], “...I did not take my kingdom by rape, if you then resist (such) power, all the more so do you resist God” [4, p. 18-19], and “...is this “Illustrious Orthodoxy” – to be ruled over and ordered about by my own servants?” [4, p. 24-25].

¹¹ For quite recent examples of divergent trends in Soviet historiography see [36, p. 18-49; 28, p. 62-82].

¹² Schlichting was present at the event.

¹³ This information is conveyed by the actor who portrayed Ivan IV in Sergei Eisenstein’s conceptions of him [2, p. 379-380].

¹⁴ G.A. Novitskii and A.M. Sakharov castigated this work in a review article [22]. The second, augmented edition (Smolensk, 1963), with a foreword by the economist, Academician S.G. Strumilin, was judiciously and critically reviewed by Richard Hellie [8]. N.E. Nosov called certain prosperous hunters, fishermen, and salt-panners of various social origins a protobourgeoisie. But he is careful to distinguish these atypical dwellers in far-north Pomor’e from inhabitants of the rest of the country [20].

¹⁵ Vipper’s enlarged books suited the patriotic mood of wartime Russia. In 1947 the Foreign

Languages Publishing House made available an English translation (Ivan Groznyi) by J. Fineburg, from which the present citations are taken [34, p. 39, 171, 231].

¹⁶ The magisterial final chapter in A.E. Presniakov, *The Formation of the Great Russian State* [25, p. 340-391], provides considerable support for this view. Kazimierz Waliszewski [33, p. 396] wrote: "...all Ivan the Terrible did was to complete or carry on that which had been the Moscow programme for two centuries past". This 1904 work, composed by a man with a reputation for flamboyance, has stood the test of time surprisingly well.

REFERENCES

1. Alshits D.N. *Nachalnyy etap istorii samoderzhavii. Voprosy istorii*, 1985, no. 9, pp. 45-62. (in Russian).
2. Cherkasov N.K. *Zapiski sovetского aktera*. Moscow, Iskusstvo Publ., 1953. 392 p. (in Russian).
3. Crummey R.O. Ivan the Terrible. Baron S.H., Heer N.W., eds. *Windows on the Russian Past: Essays on Soviet Historiography since Stalin*. Columbus, Ohio Publ., 1977, pp. 57-74.
4. Fennell J.L.I. *The Correspondence Between Prince A. M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia, 1564-1579*. Cambridge, University Press, 1963. 275 p.
5. Graham H.F., ed. and transl. *A Brief Account of the Character and Brutal Rule of Vasil'evich, Tyrant of Muscovy* (Albert Schlichting on Ivan Groznyi). *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 1975, vol. IX, no. 2, pp. 204-272.
6. Grobovsky A.N. *The "Chosen Council" of Ivan IV: a Reinterpretation*. Brooklyn (N. Y.), T. Gaus' Sons Publ., 1969. 171 p.
7. Hecker H. Politisches Denken und Geschichtsschreibung im Moskauer Reich unter Ivan IV. *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1982, Bd. 30, H. 1, pp. 1-15.
8. Hellie R. The Foundations of Russian Capitalism. *Slavic Review*, 1967, vol. 26, iss. 1, pp. 148-154.
9. Hellie R. In Search of Ivan the Terrible. Ivan the Terrible. Platonov S.F.; Wiczynski J.L., ed. and transl. *Ivan the Terrible*, Gulf Breeze (Florida), Academician International Press, 1974, pp. IX-XXXIV.
10. Hellie R. *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971. 442 p.
11. *Ioannis Basiliadis magni Moschoviae ducis Vita, a Paulo Oderbornio tribus libris conscripta, ad Henricum Julium, Episcopum Halberstadensem, Brunonisvicarum et Luneburgensium Ducem magnanimum et illustrissimum*. Wittenberg, 1585. 340 p.
12. Kashtanov S.M. K izucheniyu oprichniny Ivana Groznogo [On the Oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible]. *Istoriia SSSR*, 1963, no. 2, pp. 96-117. (in Russian).
13. Keenan E.L., Jr. Vita: Ivan Vasil'evich Terrible Czar: 1530-1584. *Harvard Magazine*, 1978, Jan-Feb., vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 48-49.
14. Kliuchevskiy V.O. *Sochineniya. V 8 t. T. 2* [Works. In 8 vols. vol. 2]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1957. 468 p. (in Russian).
15. Kolesnikova T.A. Obshchestvenno-politicheskie vzgliady Ermolaya-Erazma. *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoy literatury*. Moscow, Leningrad, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1953, vol. 9, pp. 251-265. (in Russian).
16. Koretskiy V.I. *Zakrepushchenie krestian i klassovaya borba v Rossii vo vtoroy polovine XVI v.* Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1970. 368 p. (in Russian).
17. Makovskiy D.P. *Razvitie tovarno-denezhnykh otnosheniy v selskom khozyaystve russkogo gosudarstva v XVI veke*. Smolensk, Izd-vo Smolenskogo pedagogicheskogo instituta, 1960. 239 p. (in Russian).
18. Miller D.B. The Velikie Minei Chetii and the Stepenaia Kniga of Metropolitan Makarii and the Origins of Russian National Consciousness. *Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte*, 1979, no. 26, pp. 263-382.
19. Nosov N.E. O dvukh tendentsiyakh razvitiya feodalnogo zemlevladieniya v severo-vostochnoy Rusi v XV-XVI vv. (k postanovke voprosa). *Problemy krestyanskogo zemlevladieniya i vnutrenney politiki Rossii, dooktyabrskiy period*. Leningrad, Nauka Publ., 1972, pp. 44-71. (in Russian).
20. Nosov N.E. *Stanovlenie soslovno-predstavitelnykh uchrezhdeniy v Rossii*. Leningrad, Nauka Publ., 1969. 605 p. (in Russian).
21. Nosov N.E. Sobor 'primireniya' 1549 goda i voprosy mestnogo upravleniya: (na pereputye k zemskim reformam). *Vnutrennyaya politika tsarizma (serediny XVI - nachalo XX v.)*. Leningrad, Nauka Publ., 1967, pp. 5-68. (in Russian).
22. Novitskiy G.A., Sakharov A.M. Book Review: Makovskii D.P. *Razvitie tovarno-denezhnykh otnosheniy v selskom khozyaystve Russkogo gosudarstva v XVI veke*. Smolensk, Izd-vo Smolenskogo pedagogicheskogo instituta, 1960. 239 p. *Istoriia SSSR*, 1962, no. 2, pp. 178-187. (in Russian).
23. Platonov S.F.; Wiczynski J.L., ed. and transl. *Ivan the Terrible*. Gulf Breeze (Florida), Academician International Press, 1974. 166 p.
24. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey*. Vol. 13. Part 2. Moscow, Vostochnaya literatura Publ., 1965. 533 p. (in Russian).
25. Presniakov A.E.; Moorhouse A.E., transl. *The Formation of the Great Russian State*. Chicago, Quadrangle Books Publ., 1970. 414 p.

26. Sadikov P.A. *Ocherki po istorii oprichniny*. Moscow, Leningrad, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1950. 594 p. (in Russian).
27. Shmidt S.O. *Stanovlenie rossiiskogo samodержavsta*. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1973. 358 p. (in Russian).
28. Skrynnikov R.G.; Hellie J., transl. An Overview of the Reign of Ivan IV: What Was the Oprichnina. *Soviet Studies in History*, 1985, vol. 24, no. 1-2, pp. 62-82.
29. Smirnov I.I. *Ocherki politicheskoy istorii russkogo gosudarstva 30–50-kh godov XVI veka*. Moscow; Leningrad, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1958. 516 p. (in Russian).
30. Solovyev S.M. *Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremen*. Book 3, Parts 5–6. Moscow, Sotsekgiz Publ., 1960. 815 p. (in Russian).
31. Vernadsky G. *The Tsardom of Moscow. 1547–1682. In 2 vols. Vol. 1*. New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1969. 873 p.
32. Veselovskiy S.B. *Issledovaniya po istorii oprichniny*. Moscow, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1963. 538 p. (in Russian).
33. Waliszewski K.; Loyd M. *Ivan the Terrible*. Hamden (Conn.), Archon Books publ., 1966. 431 p.
34. Wipper R.; Fineberg J., transl. *Ivan Grozny*. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947. 254 p.
35. Yanov A.; Dunn S., transl. *The Origins of Autocracy: Ivan the Terrible in Russian History*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1981. 339 p.
36. Zimin A.A. O politicheskikh predposylkakh vznikenoviya russkogo absolutizma. *Absolyutizm v Rossii (XVII–XVIII vv.)*. Moscow, 1964, pp. 18-49. (in Russian).
37. Zimin A.A. Preobrazovaniya tsentralnogo gosudarstvennogo apparata v gody oprichniny. *Istoricheskie nauki*, 1961, no. 4, pp. 117-133. (in Russian).
38. Zimin A.A. *I.S. Peresvetov i ego sovremenniki*. Moscow, Leningrad, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1958. 480 p. (in Russian).
39. Zimin A.A. *Reformy Ivana Groznogo. (Ocherki sotsialno-ekonomicheskoy i politicheskoy istorii XVI v.)*. Moscow, Sotsekgiz Publ., 1960. 511 p. (in Russian).

Information about the Author

Hugh F. Graham (1925–1994), was Professor of History at California State College, Bakersfield, USA.

Информация об авторе

Хью Ф. Грэхэм (1925–1994), был профессором истории в Калифорнийском государственном колледже, г. Бэйкерсфилд, США.